







Re-envisioning Sexuality Education in Aotearoa New Zealand: 
Thinking with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s Aesthetic 




A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Education 
at the 








College of Education, Health and Human Development 







This study situates itself in relation to on-going conversations about the future of 
sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand. It is philosophical and literary in its 
emphasis, even as it concerns itself with policy analysis and critique. 
In response to concerns that school-based sexuality education in New Zealand finds 
itself in somewhat of a stuck place, this thesis looks to the possibilities opened up for 
sexuality education by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s aesthetic education—a 
pedagogical orientation and practice which deploys literary reading in an effort to train 
the imagination to know differently, thereby, bringing about a sustained and uncoercive 
rearrangement of desires. By thinking closely with Spivak’s aesthetic education—and 
by supplementing it with Leo Bersani’s conceptualization of sex as a modality of the 
aesthetic, including the choreographic—this thesis theorizes sexuality education in 
ways that seek to move it beyond the perspectives of physical education, health and 
wellbeing, to which historically it has been tied. In doing so, the thesis re-envisions 
sexuality education as a utopically focussed field—one which by positioning queerness 
as ‘horizon’ nurtures the potential to desire differently, more, and better.   
As it explores Spivakian approaches to literary reading, this study draws upon the work 
of a number of philosophers, mainly from the Continental tradition, as well as queer, 
cultural, educational, literary, and literacy theorists, who prompt and inform reparative 
readings of a number of literary texts—most by queer cis male New Zealand authors. 
When, in the course of this thesis, literary texts are read alongside and athwart policy 
and review documents of the Ministry of Education and the Education Review Office, 
it is in the hopeful/hopeless expectation that ‘something’ queer might result from a 
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In a paper dealing with school-based queer straight alliance as a utopic site of learning, 
Kathleen Quinlivan introduces the beautiful but provocative image of “butterflies 
starting a tornado” (Quinlivan, 2014, pp. 272, 279)—an image brought to her attention 
in a face-to-face interview with ‘Marie,’ one of a number of high school students 
participating in a case study which Kathleen was conducting as “part of a wider 
research project funded by the New Zealand AIDS Foundation and the University of 
Canterbury” (Quinlivan, 2014, p. 275). Throughout this paper, as she entertains the 
possibility of butterflies creating mayhem, Kathleen playfully inhabits and performs 
José Esteban Muñoz’s notion that “we must dream and enact new and better pleasures, 
other ways of being in the world, and ultimately new worlds” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 1). In 
doing so, Kathleen not only affirms the role of the imagination and of the aesthetic in 
the generation of queer utopias as a form of “‘educated’ hope”—a hope which she 
describes as “the dreams of an emergent group dwelling in the region of a critically 
hopeful ‘not yet’” (Quinlivan, 2014, p. 274)—but also attests to the importance of 
allowing this sort of utopic thinking to inform empirically focused sexuality education 
research in general.  
If, in her paper, Kathleen draws attention to how young people participating in school-
based queer straight alliances willingly risk disappointment in order to create “the 
possibility of ways of knowing and being which utilise a notion of queerness as 
primarily about futurity and hope” (Quinlivan, 2014, p. 281), she also, I suggest, 
prompts sexuality educators and researchers to do the same. That is, she urges those of 
us working in the field to leave safe positions behind in order to inhabit the 
uncomfortable in-between spaces of the ‘not-yet’ and the ‘perhaps,’ and, as Lauren 
Berlant puts it, “to occupy these dark times not only with anger, depression, and 
exhaustion, but also with inventiveness, reimagined collectivity, intellectual energy, 
persistent curiosity—and fierce . . . attention” (Berlant, 2019, pp. 4–5).  
As Kathleen shows us, we do well to attend fiercely to the image of butterflies starting 
a tornado. For, it “speaks to the ways in which aesthetic practices can provide sites of 
wonderment for re-visioning the world” (Quinlivan, 2014, p. 279)—and, I add, for re-




It is Kathleen’s vision that has provided much of the inspiration for this thesis—an 
endeavour which, in its own way, attempts to open up “an anticipatory space of hope . . 
. characterized by indeterminacy, both in terms of affect and methodology” (Quinlivan, 
2014, p. 274). Given that my thesis is itself an exercise in queer utopic thinking, my 
wish is that those who read it will be provoked to play with queer theory—especially 
within the mode of the aesthetic and through the reading of literary texts—as they 



















Sexuality Education, the Aesthetic, and the Queer 
The most pernicious presupposition today is that globalization has happily happened in 
every aspect of our lives. Globalization can never happen to the sensory equipment of 
the experiencing being except insofar as it always was implicit in its vanishing outlines. 
Only an aesthetic education can continue to prepare us for this, thinking an uneven and 
only apparently accessible contemporaneity that can no longer be interpreted by such 
nice polarities as modernity/tradition, colonial/postcolonial. Everything else begins 
there, in that space that allows us to survive in the singular and the unverifiable, 
surrounded by the lethal and lugubrious consolations of rational choice. (Spivak, 2012, 
p. 2) 
Queer is a continuing moment, movement, motive—recurrent, eddying, troublant. The 
word ‘queer’ itself means across—it comes from the Indo-European root -twerkw, 
which also yields the German quer (transverse), Latin torquere (to twist), English 
athwart. (Sedgwick, 1993, p. xii) 
Overview 
As its title suggests, this doctoral thesis, Re-envisioning sexuality education in Aotearoa 
New Zealand: Thinking with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s aesthetic education to 
queer the field, concerns itself with sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
including calls to widen its terms of reference in ways that are “playful, experimental, 
hopeful (yet hopeless), and thus decidedly queer” (Allen, 2018b, p. 6).  
In the chapters that follow, I will unfold the central argument of my thesis—namely, 
that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s project of aesthetic education,1 supplemented by Leo 
Bersani’s conceptualization of sex as a modality of the aesthetic, is able to queer and, 
thereby, contribute productively to a re-envisioning of sexuality education in Aotearoa 
New Zealand. If Spivak’s emphasis is on literary reading as a means of uncoercively 
rearranging desires, hence, exercising the imagination to know in different ways, Leo 
Bersani’s conceptualization of sex within the modality of the aesthetic—especially in 
                                                          
1 Spivak’s understanding of aesthetic education is explained, developed and applied mainly in 
the twenty-five essays that constitute the chapters of her An Aesthetic Education in the Era of 
Globalization (2012). However, it is a notion that appears elsewhere in Spivak’s work, most 
recently in her book Readings (2014) which deals with the ethics of reading. 
3 
 
choreographic terms—suggests that it is possible for us to aestheticize our lives as we 
“unlearn . . . our extant modes of being in the world” (Tuhkanen, 2018, p. 20).  
Spivak and Bersani, whether read separately, together, or in conjunction with other 
theorists, have the potential, I believe, to contribute to a re-theorizing of sexuality 
education. Rather than encouraging us to repeat and improve on “what is currently 
intelligible and comfortable (to humans),” they stir us “to escape stagnation of thought 
and practice in sexuality education” (Allen, 2018b, p. 5). By engaging the aesthetic, 
especially through their encounters with literary texts,2 Spivak and Bersani, in their 
different ways, gesture towards a future where “queerness is a structuring and educated 
mode of desiring” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 1). If Spivak and Bersani teach us that a close 
reading of a literary text can “dislodge us from a particular affective conditioning” 
(Snaza, 2019, p. 134)—one that limits our ability to be other than what we are—they do 
so by encouraging us, as we read, to let go of our fear of the unanticipatable, the 
random, and the unknown. Reading in this way prepares us to reach out and to receive 
the other—for, in learning to read otherwise, we may learn to be otherwise. Thus, the 
work of Spivak and of Bersani clearly expands the range of both theoretical and 
pedagogical tools available to researchers and educators wanting, not only to challenge 
present normativities, but also to think utopically and to conceptualize a sexuality 
education capable of nurturing the potential “to desire differently, to desire more, to 
desire better” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 189). 
International and Neoliberal Contexts 
In attempting my own re-envisioning of the field of sexuality education in Aotearoa 
New Zealand, I am mindful that “across the world there are a wide range of different 
approaches to delivering sexuality education” (United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization, 2015, p. 12). Indeed, what The New Zealand Curriculum 
(2007) calls sexuality education is known variously—in other places and/or theoretical 
contexts—by such designations as sex education, sex and relationships education 
(SRE), health and sexuality education, comprehensive sexuality education (CSE), 
                                                          
2 Spivak recognizes that “in the thinking of a borderless world today, we have to use the 
imagination through literary training in the broadest sense, including the filmic, the 
videographic, the hypertextual, learning to read in the broadest sense” (Spivak, 2014, p. 4). In 




family life education, and life skills education. Yet, despite their different emphasises 
and nuances, the programmes that these terms refer to all involve “teaching about sex, 
sexuality, sexual health and respectful or healthy relationships in schools” (Sundaram 
& Sauntson, 2016, p. 3). Thus, while Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage (AOUM) 
programmes may differ significantly from more comprehensive approaches to sexuality 
education—for example, in their attitudes to contraception and the use of condoms in 
the prevention of the spread of HIV—nevertheless, “core elements of these 
programmes bear similarities, and incorporate some or many aspects of CSE” (United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2015, p. 13). 
The fact that sexuality education provision and curricula “are being discussed, debated 
and problematised with an increasing sense of urgency around the world” (Sundaram & 
Sauntson, 2016, p. 2) should come as no surprise given that in many countries there is 
pressure on sexuality education both to deliver “a more holistic ‘whole school’ 
approach” (Thomas & Aggleton, 2016, p. 15) to sexual health and wellbeing, and to 
broaden its focus to take account of sexual rights as well as sexual health. In the half-
century since Western Europe “pioneered the introduction of school-based sexuality 
education” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2015, p. 
19)—this in an effort to improve public health—school-based sexuality education in 
many places has certainly become a more conducive (but also a more contested) space 
for attending to “issues of gender and sexual equality and plurality within education” 
(Sundaram & Sauntson, 2016, p. 2).  
It is also the case, in New Zealand and elsewhere, that school-based sexuality education 
over recent decades has become progressively “steeped in neoliberal ideology and 
confined by neoliberal ‘best practices’” (Bay-Cheng, 2017, p. 344). If, on the one hand, 
neoliberalism, wherever it operates, promotes individual responsibility—thereby, 
producing subjects willingly “seduced by their own perceived powers of freedom” 
(Davies & Bansel, 2007, p. 249)—on the other, it works to ensure that its subjects’ 
sexualities are governed by market forces which manipulate and commodify “the 
human capacity for sensation and affect” (Hennessy, 2000, p. 72). Debates, discussions 
and problematizations concerning the provision and delivery of school-based sexuality 
education within Aotearoa New Zealand—and about the future of the field itself—
cannot, therefore, ignore the “neoliberal sanctification of individual choice and 
valorization of personal responsibility” (Bay-Cheng, 2017, p. 345) which shape many 
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of the pedagogical theories and practices that currently hold sway in sexuality 
education classrooms. Nor has the discursive reframing of sexuality education in 
relation to the promotion of wellbeing—which has been a feature of New Zealand 
schools in recent years—happened in isolation from “enduring international 
conversations” (Sundaram & Sauntson, 2016, p. 3) about young people, schools, and 
sexuality education. While in the past it may have been possible for sexuality educators 
in Aotearoa New Zealand to turn a blind eye to global perspectives on such topical 
issues as gender and sexual violence, consent, sexual diversity and homophobia, same 
sex-marriage, religious and cultural plurality, pornography and sexualisation, or the 
responsibility of teachers in regard to child protection and safeguarding, this is no 
longer the case.  
However, while recognizing the need for research to inform all aspects and areas of 
sexuality education, including “across countries and contexts” (Sundaram & Sauntson, 
2016, p. 3), in this thesis it is not my aim to compare and contrast the situation in New 
Zealand with what is happening in other Anglophone countries—although school-based 
sexuality education programmes here and elsewhere are required to do their bit “to 
produce the new student/subject who is appropriate to (and appropriated by) the 
neoliberal economy” (Davies & Bansel, 2007, p. 247). Furthermore, while I 
acknowledge the powerful influence of neoliberalism on sensual pleasure and human 
desire—a negative impact that is especially evident in its ability to position both 
sexuality and knowledge as forms of consumption—I see little point in comparing and 
contrasting the impact of neoliberalism on sexuality education in New Zealand with its 
effect on sexuality education in other contexts and locations. This study is more a 
philosophical and literary exploration than an exercise in comparative policy critique. 
Rather, my intention is to approach sexuality education from oblique angles—that is, 
indirectly. By attending to the singular and unverifiable elements of sexuality education 
in New Zealand, to the differences that make a difference—those seemingly “random, 
incoherent, and unpredictable” (Jagose, 2015, p. 36) moments or details that resist 
systematization and universalization—I seek to subvert the certainties of ideologies, 
including neoliberalism, which work to “reduce the complexity of those differences and 
foreclose countless other ways to apprehend and negotiate them” (Fawaz, 2019, p. 6).  
Mine, then, is a queer way of operating that attempts to give rise to generous 
interpretations and accounts capable of honouring the multiplicities covered by the 
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umbrella of ‘human sexuality.’ While the readings of sexuality and sexuality education 
that this thesis offers are conducted in the context of unprecedented globalization, 
insofar as they remain faithful to the insights and theorizations advanced and enabled 
by Spivak’s aesthetic education, they eschew “the lethal and lugubrious consolations of 
rational choice” (Spivak, 2012, p. 2) provided by neoliberalism, instead, opting for the 
adventures and surprises opened up by literary reading. 
Reimagining and Rethinking Sexuality Education 
As I reimagine and rethink the field of sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand, I 
do so principally, in the light of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s project of aesthetic 
education with its emphasis on “reading literature closely to exercise the imagination” 
(Spivak, 2012, p. 12), but also through the work of queer theorists, among them Leo 
Bersani, who argues that “sex can also be one of the modalities of the aesthetic” 
(Bersani, 2010, p. 70), especially, when it is framed choreographically as the 
arrangement of “relations between bodies in time and space” (Klien, Valk, & Gormly, 
2008, p. 7).  
I am assisted in this task by a great many philosophers and theorists—Butler, Deleuze 
and Guattari, Derrida, Foucault, Grosz, Kristeva, Levinas, and Sedgwick some of the 
big names among them—who, in refusing “a dogmatic image of thought—the ordinary 
and unexceptional, the given, the normal, the foundational” (St. Pierre, Jackson, & 
Mazzei, 2016, p. 102), have inspired and equipped me to attempt a queering of six 
literary texts, each of which has exerted a strong pull on me, in the case of some, over 
many years. With the exception of Edith Howes’ The Golden Forest (1930) and D. H. 
Lawrence’s Women in Love (1920/1992), which are discussed, respectively, in chapters 
two and five of this thesis, the works that I have chosen to write about are mostly 
novels, and all by New Zealand cis male writers who either identify themselves and/or 
have been described by others as gay or queer—James Courage’s A Way of Love 
(1959), Witi Ihimaera’s The Uncle’s Story (2000), William Taylor’s Pebble in a Pool 
(2003), and Douglas Wright’s ghost dance (2004). This is, in part, because I wish to 
honour authors who either had the courage to write about homosexuality in an era when 
sex between consenting adult males was a criminal offence in Aotearoa New Zealand 
and elsewhere, or who dared to put their name to books that dealt sympathetically with 
same-sex relationships at a time when hostility towards queer people and those who 
advocated for them was still widely tolerated.  
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My over-riding reason, however, for choosing to write about these texts through the 
frame of queer theory is not due to a naïve confusion that the term ‘queer’ can be used 
unproblematically “as a synonym for ‘lesbian and gay’” (Jagose, 2015, p. 28), let alone 
from any desire to claim ‘queer’ as a fixed identity, or to apply it to a discreet body of 
knowledge. Rather, it springs from a conviction that each of these books, if read 
through the lens of Spivak’s aesthetic education and/or in the light of Bersani’s “onto-
aesthetics, which is also an onto-ethics” (Tuhkanen, 2014b, p. 2)—that is, in order to 
“train the imagination to construct knower and known for knowing in different ways 
and understand that this does not define the truth of things” (Spivak, 2016a, p. 367), but 
also with “boundless attention to strange relationalities” (Jagose, 2015, p. 36)—is able, 
in its own way, to complicate and queer understandings of sex and sexuality education. 
This happens, as my readings of these texts show, through “the continual unhinging of 
certainties and the systematic disturbing of the familiar” (Giffney & Hird, 2008, p. 4). 
For, just as it is able to make the strange ordinary by relating the unknown or the less 
known to the known, literary reading also works to make the ordinary strange whenever 
it places language in the service of otherness. 
If, as you will come to see, Spivak’s project of aesthetic education promises an undoing 
of those habits by which human beings mark out territory in the world as their own 
through what she calls “imaginative training for epistemological performance” (Spivak, 
2016a, p. 367), Bersani’s work implies something similar—a retraining “in the 
aestheticization of our lives” through an unlearning of “our extant modes of being in 
the world” (Tuhkanen, 2018, p. 20). However, while Spivak’s aesthetic education holds 
that the imagination may be trained and desires uncoercively rearranged through 
literary reading and other engagements with the aesthetic, Bersani’s call for an 
engagement with what amounts to a process of self-aestheticization springs from a 
conviction that we are “choreographed into being”—each human personality the 
product of “a specific aesthetic of handling” (Bersani, 2018, pp. 54, 55).  
In applying the ideas of Spivak and Bersani to sexuality education—the former, 
emphasizing the role of the imagination in bringing about “epistemological change that 
will rearrange desires” (Spivak, 2012, p. 2), the latter attending to “how we have, over 
time, moved ourselves and how others have moved us, through space” (Bersani, 2018, 
p. 55), thus, formalizing ourselves as works of art—my intention is to open up a field, 
one which is unduly dominated by the perspectives and methodologies of health, 
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physical education, and the social sciences, to new modes of thought, including those 
made possible through literary reading. 
By encouraging ways of thinking that are queer—not only insofar as these “refer to the 
nonnormative, which is a disturbance, veering, or destabilization of stability” 
(Colebrook, 2018, p. 265), but, also, because they are concerned with opening new 
spaces or reclaiming others, rather than defining, normalizing or institutionalizing 
them—I seek to prompt sexuality educators and researchers to cast their eyes towards 
“a horizon of possibility whose precise extent and heterogeneous scope cannot in 
principle be delimited in advance” (Halperin, 1995, p. 62). Such an approach, while 
relying on the facility to unhitch the term queer from “its conventional resonance as a 
container for human sexual nonnormativities,” also allows for a practice of reading 
whereby the queer is positioned “both alongside and athwart” (Luciano & Chen, 2015, 
p. 189) other ideas and practices—including, as is the case here, the theorizations of 
Spivak and Bersani—in the hopeful/hopeless expectation that ‘something’ interestingly 
different might result from a proximity that always inclines towards conceptual cross-
hatching. For, to state, as Sedgwick does, that the queer tends “toward ‘across’ 
formulations” (Sedgwick, 1993, p. xii) is to recognize that the queer is always and 
everywhere already transversing the human in multiple ways—and, in doing so, 
drawing other fields away from themselves. My contention is that Spivak’s aesthetic 
education and Bersani’s conceptualization of sex as a modality of the aesthetic, if given 
the room to work across sexuality education, have the potential to transverse and twist 
the field in ways that are not only “multiply transitive”—especially so if they have 
already themselves been queered—but also generative of an “immensely productive 
incoherence” (Sedgwick, 1993, p. xii), certainly, in regard to gender and sexuality, but 
across all identifications and identities, whenever and wherever attempts are made to 
exceed or invert established binaries. 
In claiming that incoherence—including the bafflement or bewilderment that 
accompanies incomprehension and the breakdown of knowledge—is productive is to 
align myself with Kumashiro’s view that “education is not something that involves 
comfortably repeating what we already learned or affirming what we already know” 
(Kumashiro, 2002, p. 63), but requires that we risk unlearning and all the anxieties that 
go with it. This is especially the case with sexuality education where common sense 
views of the world are necessarily disrupted whenever normativities associated with 
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such taken-for-granted notions as gender and sexuality are examined and challenged. It 
is not surprising, then, that sexuality education classrooms always tend to be sites of 
potential discomfort and crisis for both teachers and students—and that the temptation 
when disruption looms is for those caught in the pedagogical relationship to ‘play it 
safe,’ and retreat from genuine teaching and learning in an effort to avoid “troubling” 
(Kumashiro, 2002, p. 63) what they already know and hold dear. Yet, rather than resist 
the changes that disruption inevitably brings, aren’t sexuality educators better to admit, 
as Kumashiro observes, that “teaching and learning really take place only through 
entering and working through crisis” (Kumashiro, 2002, p. 63)?  
It is in the light of Kumashiro’s provocation—and Allen’s proposal that we “undo 
dominant meanings around sexuality and make it strange” (Allen, 2015, p. 768) by 
deconstructing ‘common sense’ views of it—that I argue the merits of allowing the 
theorizations of Spivak and Bersani to infiltrate and queer sexuality education. For, 
these two theorists can teach sexuality educators to live affirmatively with both crisis 
and the strange by showing us that “desiring to learn involves desiring difference and 
overcoming our resistance to discomfort” (Kumashiro, 2002, p. 63). While, of course, 
there are always limits to the level of disruption that schools and other educational 
institutions will tolerate in the face of queer challenges to “normative modes of 
pedagogy around sexualities” (Allen, 2015, p. 769), my hope is that once equipped with 
ideas and perspectives gleaned from the likes of Spivak and Bersani, sexuality 
educators will be more willing to run the risk of approaching familiar and recurring 
concepts in The New Zealand Curriculum (2007) and documents such as Sexuality 
Education: A guide for principals, boards of trustees, and teachers (2015)3 from odd 
                                                          
3 Throughout the period during which this thesis was researched and written, the 2015 
guidelines were in place, and it is these that I reference throughout. In September 2020, the 
Ministry of Education issued a set of “refreshed guidelines” (Ministry of Education, 2020a, 
2020b, p. 7)—spread over two documents covering years 1–8 and years 9–13—with the stated 
intention of distributing these to schools in Term 4 of the same year. Produced in response to 
the 2018 Education Review Office report into sexuality education in schools, Promoting 
wellbeing through sexuality education, the new guidelines encourage schools to “adopt a 
whole-school approach to strengthening their programmes in relationships and sexuality 
education” (Ministry of Education, 2020a, 2020b, p. 6). As can be gleaned from the key 
learning outcomes for each curriculum level, the revised guidelines ground themselves on the 
notion of wellbeing in the context of a fast-changing world, while attending more closely to Te 
Tiriti o Waitangi and the promotion of human rights than the version they update. Like the 
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angles, that is, slantwise—thus, taking seriously Kumashiro’s argument that “learning 
is about disruption and opening up to further learning, not closure and satisfaction” 
(Kumashiro, 2002, p. 43). By seizing upon, for example, such taken-for-granted notions 
as “positive sexuality’, ‘personal identity’, ‘self-worth’, ‘wellness’ and ‘safety 
management’ (see Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 23), and bringing these in close 
proximity to Spivak’s aesthetic education and Bersani’s conceptualization of sex as a 
mode of the aesthetic, queer cross-hatchings—the sorts of ‘across’ formulations that 
Sedgwick speaks of—may happen, producing, perhaps, a sexuality education that is 
less didactic, more disconcerting, but always working “in the hope of a good world in 
the aporetic mode of ‘to come’” (Spivak, 2012, p. 33).  
Before attending closely in the chapters that follow to the re-envisioning and re-
theorizing of sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand, it is important, at this 
stage, that I acknowledge calls for improvements in the delivery of sexuality education 
in our schools, where, as the Education Review Office—commonly known as ERO— 
admits in its Promoting wellbeing through sexuality education (2018), “overall, 
curriculum coverage remains inconsistent” (Education Review Office, 2018, p. 5). 
Many of the current efforts to get sexuality education to lift its game centre on “gender 
and sexuality diversity” (Education Review Office, 2018, pp. 13, 36, 38, 44)—a key 
area of emphasis in the Government’s push for “high quality sexuality education” 
(Education Review Office, 2018, pp. 3, 41)4. Yet, with the exception of six references 
to the valuable role played by queer-straight alliances, strangely missing from ERO’s 
forty-nine page document—which “paints a picture of where our schools are at today” 
in regard to sexuality education, and “showcases the practices of a group of schools 
effectively meeting the challenges of our current context” (Education Review Office, 
2018, p. 3)—is any mention of the educational possibilities opened up by queer 
                                                          
2015 guidelines, those about to be rolled out fall short of the sort of re-envisioning of sexuality 
education through the aesthetic and the queer that this thesis calls for.  
4 For instance, “greater visibility and celebration of diversity” (Education Review Office, 2018, 
p. 3), “accepting and celebrating diversity” (p. 39), “acceptance and celebration of diversity” (p. 
41), “awareness of diversity” (p. 14), “respecting diversity” (p. 14), “normalise diversity” (p. 
36), “tolerance of diversity” (p. 38), “valued diversity” (p. 15), “value diversity” (p. 45), 
“supported diversity” (p. 39), and “affirm diversity” (pp. 42, 49) are some of the phrases used 
by the Education Review Office (ERO) in their recent document, Promoting wellbeing through 
sexuality education (2018), to emphasize the diversity theme in its many variations.  
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perspectives or approaches. Queer theory’s potential “as an enabling intersectional 
rubric that might potentially correct the majoritarian perspectives” (Jagose, 2015, p. 
29)—which ERO’s focus on diversity in its own way seeks to address—goes 
unrecognized in a document which prefers to keep the queer at arm’s length. This is, 
perhaps, because of a fear that too close a proximity of the queer to such noble goals as 
the “inclusion of sex-, gender- and sexuality-diverse students” (Education Review 
Office, 2018, pp. 10, 12, 15) in sexuality education programmes, as well as through 
school policies, practices and procedures, may confuse those established if unwritten 
boundaries separating the unwanted/unmanageable from the acceptable/desirable.  
If, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick holds, “queer is a continuing moment, movement, 
motive—recurrent, eddying, troublant” (Sedgwick, 1993, p. xii), no wonder it is often 
seen as an unwanted intruder, always ready to put a dampener on the positivity (see 
Education Review Office, 2018, pp. 2, 3, 4, 10, 23, 26, 40, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49) promoted 
by The New Zealand Curriculum (2007) in its approach to health and sexuality 
education. Yet, queer perspectives, including those made possible by the work of 
Spivak and Bersani, because of their willingness to attend to unusual and unexpected 
relationships, have the ability to “offer expansive and dissonant interpretations of 
inclusion” (O’Donnell, 2015, p. 1)—and other concepts that figure large in health and 
sexuality education. This is because they “multiply the ways in which something is 
seen and understood,” while remaining “attuned to the genesis of ideas and concepts” 
(O’Donnell, 2015, p. 1). For example, applying Spivak’s notion of reading as 
teleiopoiesis—“a reaching toward the distant other by the patient power of the 
imagination” (Spivak, 2012, p. 404)—to the concept of inclusion, suggests that an 
inclusive relation will be read as having an outward orientation, in that such a relation 
is directed toward the other as other, rather than concerned with drawing the other to 
the self. Likewise, Bersani’s conceptualization of a “nonunifying centrifugal mobility, 
one in which forms may appear to resist assimilation, even to confront each other 
defensively across their boundaries” (Bersani & Dutoit, 1993, p. 138), if permitted to 
queer and complicate notions of inclusion, may prompt the reinvention of a relationality 
that better refuses the sorts of territorialisation of sexuality that conceptualizations of 
inclusion usually imply. Rather than imagining inclusion as pulling ‘the diverse’ and 
‘the different’ into what may be described as “a narrative center never firmly 
established in the first place” (Bersani & Dutoit, 1993, p. 190), Bersani’s onto-
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aesthetics envisions benefits that may result from our learning to “disorient ourselves in 
the world” (Tuhkanen, 2018, p. 55). 
My aim, then, is not so much to urge sexuality educators to introduce queer-themed 
content into their classrooms, for instance, in the form of YA literature that is 
representative of the LGBTQ+ rainbow, or which tackles heterosexism and 
queerphobia face on—although there is certainly a place for this—but to encourage 
teachers to take what is already very close at hand, not only the curriculum and its 
various texts, but also their own and their students’ experiences, as well as the culture 
of the school and the wider culture, and dare to run across or twist these with the queer. 
If, over the years, queer’s “most frequent deployment has been in the service of 
defiance and reprimand,” my interest lies more in the generative possibilities of “the 
more intimate and complicit gesture of moving athwart” (Wiegman & Wilson, 2015, p. 
11)—that is, transversely, from side to side—in an effort to stimulate and further 
multiply transitive movement, both of bodies and thought.  
In attending to this queer movement, this “lateral mobility” (Bersani, 1990, p. 26), one 
cannot help but engage with what Karen Barad terms “the practice of diffraction”—
those “patterns of differences that make a difference” (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2010, 
p. 49)—a way of working to which Spivakian and Bersanian approaches also attune us. 
This happens, not only as we are positioned to recognize that the relation between the 
queer and the human is “contingent rather than stable,” but also when we are prompted 
to produce a sexuality education where teachers and students are better placed to “read 
up from particular situations” (Luciano & Chen, 2015, p. 189), instead of announcing 
universal truths from on high. Such an attunement—ethical as well as aesthetic—and 
the queer reading that it makes possible in the context of sexuality education, comes 
with the realization that “our attention can and should be mobile” (Bersani, 1990, p. 
204). It also chimes with Spivak’s much repeated advice that we do well to attend to 
“the singular and the unverifiable” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 2, 324, 332, 397, 430). This is a 
task for which Spivak’s aesthetic education—including “the mysterious fun of literary 
reading” (Spivak, 2012, p. 303)—and Bersani’s articulation of self-aestheticization 




In the chapters that follow, I build upon the argument which I have outlined in this 
introduction, namely, that Spivak’s project of aesthetic education, with its emphasis on 
literary reading as a means of training the imagination for epistemological performance, 
and supplemented by Bersani’s conceptualization of sex as a modality of the aesthetic, 
is able to queer and reinvigorate the field of sexuality education. 
The fourteen chapters are grouped into four parts. Insofar as “tending captures the 
double sense of leaning or reaching toward something while cultivating and helping it 
thrive” (Fawaz, 2019, p. 7), each of the four chapter groupings or parts tends toward a 
different aspect of the argument. This structural arrangement, while drawing attention 
to the choreographic nature of much of the thinking in this thesis—thinking which as it 
activates the imagination to move in the direction of the distant and unreachable other 
repositions the choreographic “as a set of dispersive and generative strategies” (Joy, 
2014, p. 27)—also affirms “the incalculable, unforeseeable, protean or . . . veering 
character of desire” (Royle, 2017, p. 85, footnote 36). 
The five chapters in PART ONE tend toward the laying out of an “open mesh of 
possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of 
meaning” (Sedgwick, 1993, p. 8) that comes about through the juxtaposition and 
interweaving of queer theory, Spivak’s aesthetic education, Bersani’s positioning of sex 
as a modality of the aesthetic, and Foucault’s articulation of an aesthetics of existence 
and care of the self. Indeed—at least to some extent—queer theory and the work of 
Spivak and Bersani may be read as “riffing” (Spivak, 2012, p. 185) on the ideas of 
Foucault. On the one hand, these and other theoretical orientations supply “cognitive 
tools for grappling with the very discursive conditions that enable or foreclose our own 
ways of tending toward some things and not others” (Fawaz, 2019. p. 9)—thereby, 
equipping efforts to re-envision sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand. On the 
other, two literary texts—The Golden Forest and Women in Love—allow me to “make 
invisible possibilities and desires visible,” as I (at)tend to scenes of reading with 
“fascination and love” (Sedgwick, 1993, p. 3). 
Chapter one, by attending to calls for the re-envisioning of sexuality education 
in Aotearoa New Zealand, argues that queerness, if positioned as ‘horizon,’ 
opens up sexuality education to ways of thinking that keep hope alive and feed 
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the utopic impulse. In the context of sexuality education, the aesthetic serves the 
utopic whenever the arts, including literature and literary reading, are deployed 
in anticipation of making possible new ways of being, doing and relating. 
Chapter two provides me with the first of six opportunities in the course of this 
dissertation to think ‘through’ a literary text—The Golden Forest by New 
Zealand educator and author, Edith Howes (1872-1954). By working with 
Kathryn Bond Stockton’s notion of the queer child growing sideways (Stockton, 
2009) and emphasizing those occasions in Howes’ novel where wonder is 
provoked through the experience of queer, it becomes possible, I believe, for 
sexuality educators to rethink “their desire for (or fantasies of) coherence” 
(O’Rourke, 2013, p. 193)—an urge which manifests itself in the field of 
sexuality education as a compulsion to plan, and one which too often leads to 
stuckness. 
In chapter three I turn to Michel Foucault’s theorizations of ars erotica and 
scientia sexualis, as well as Anne Carson’s study of eros in classical literary and 
philosophical texts (Carson, 1998), to argue that although the ancient erotic 
lexicon of eros cannot simply be co-opted for today’s sexuality education, the 
erotic still makes its presence felt in today’s sexuality education classrooms, 
especially in those assemblages and figurations that we call queer. With this in 
mind, I propose that literary reading of the type practised by Spivak and Bersani 
is able to queer sexuality education, not only by enabling queer voices to be 
heard, but also by contributing to what Foucault calls an aesthetics of existence 
or care of the self—an undertaking that is at the heart of sexuality education, 
and one which trains readers in the art of listening for and to the queer. 
In chapter four I take up the notion of self-bricolage in order to investigate the 
role that reading queerly might play in the queering of sexuality education, 
especially when the reading subject is conceptualized or imagined as a queer 
self-bricoleur. Although the New Zealand Ministry of Education seeks to 
promote wellbeing through sexuality education, it underestimates the role that 
reading—in particular the reading of fiction—can play in students’ ethical 
formation. In acknowledging that reading is able to change pedagogical 
relations and practices, I argue that it is helpful to employ the concepts of self-
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bricolage and self-bricoleur when attempting to make sense of the ways in 
which truth is performed in relation to the self while using the technology of 
reading to queer sexuality education.  
Chapter five serves as a queer interruption. There, I give an account of myself, 
not only in an attempt to attest at the personal level to the validity of arguments 
that lie at the heart of my thesis, but also to write the relation I have to myself 
and present it to the reader as a form of self-bricolage that witnesses to the 
queer. This piece, which attempts to map the relation between my first-time 
reading of D. H. Lawrence’s Women in Love and the way I live my life as a 
queer man now, stands as testimony to the part played by literary reading in my 
formation as an aesthetico-ethical subject. Thus, I affirm the pedagogical power 
of literary reading in my life and its role in my own sexuality education.  
The four chapters that form PART TWO tend toward sexuality education via two 
concepts/practices that are at the heart of Spivak’s aesthetic education—the persistent 
attempting of collectivities to come through self-abstraction, and the enactment of a 
pedagogy of hospitality that necessitates an interruption of the self. Once again, I 
(at)tend to the reading of literary texts—Courage’s A Way of Love and Ihimaera’s The 
Uncle’s Story—in order to demonstrate that sexuality education may be productively 
approached by way of Spivak’s aesthetic education. 
In chapter six I examine Spivak’s claim that her aesthetic education, in that it 
concerns itself with the literary reading of texts, can become the means by 
which collectivities to come are persistently attempted. I do this in the context 
of a re-envisioning of sexuality education that attends to aesthetic perspectives 
and practices which provide opportunities for wonderment and re-imagining the 
world. By resisting the contingencies of the here and now, and refusing the 
determinations of health and wellbeing, sexuality education remains open to the 
possibilities that literary reading provides.  
In chapter seven, through a reading of James Courage’s pre-gay-liberation 
novel, A Way of Love—a reading that takes into account both queer theory and 
queer pedagogy, as well as Spivak’s own project of aesthetic education—I set 
out to show how an experience of the ways in which collectivities are imagined 
and attempted in a work of fiction can become an opportunity for self-
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abstraction or self-synecdoche, and, hence, a means for attempting (queer) 
collectivities to come. 
Chapter eight focuses on the role of the imagination in Spivak’s aesthetic 
education, including her theorization of the ethical in ways that owe much to 
Levinas and Derrida. If Spivak’s notion of teleiopoiesis enacts a pedagogy of 
hospitality, it also has plenty to offer sexuality education where we are 
challenged to make room for our own and others’ queer and compromised 
selves. In dealing with such notions as alterity, hospitality, interruption and 
suspension, especially as they figure in Spivak’s pedagogy—and in relation to 
literary reading—I prepare the way for a micrological reading of Witi 
Ihimaera’s The Uncle’s Story in the chapter that follows. 
Chapter nine puts under the microscope a key passage from Ihimaera’s novel, 
one which describes an act of sexual penetration involving two men. My 
intention is to lay out and interrogate the desires that are staged by the text, 
especially in the light of Derrida’s question: ‘Is not hospitality an interruption of 
the self?’ Attending to this question raises important concerns for sexuality 
educators about the ways in which hospitality is—and isn’t—performed in the 
context of sexual relations, including in relation to the issue of consent. As well 
as inviting a richer, more complex appreciation of the notion of hauora—often 
described as a Māori philosophy of health and wellbeing—than that which is 
currently on offer in mandated sexuality education programmes in Aotearoa 
New Zealand, the concept of hospitality makes possible the imagining of utopic 
collectivities, such as ‘the gay tribe,’ which, operating in the space between the 
personal and the political, accommodates the singular, the unverifiable, and the 
queer. 
The chapters in PART THREE serve as a pivot, marking as they do a swinging away 
from Spivak’s aesthetic education—although it is never really out of sight—and a 
veering in the direction of Bersani’s theorizations. By positioning sex in relation to the 
aesthetic, as Bersani does, it becomes possible to tend to the possibilities that 
choreographic thinking opens up for sexuality education, especially through the reading 
of a text such as Douglas Wright’s ghost dance, which unravels “the very logics of 
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prohibition, devaluation, and unknowing that so powerfully direct us all to tend in the 
same way” (Fawaz, 2019, p. 8). 
In chapter ten, I argue the benefits of supplementing Spivak’s aesthetic 
education with Leo Bersani’s take on the Foucauldian notion of the 
aestheticization of existence or self-aestheticization—including his positioning 
of sex as a modality of the aesthetic. This is with the intention of enabling the 
imagining of a sexuality education that is not only less tightly bound to the 
epistemological and more concerned with ontological possibilities, but one also 
capable of keeping desire as well as meaning on the move. 
Building on Bersani’s argument that choreography and the choreographic are 
central to any reimagining of new relational modes and of an aesthetico-ethical 
approach to relations between the self and the world, chapter eleven focuses on 
three sex scenes from Wright’s ghost dance. In seeking to demonstrate how a 
literary memoir in its treatment of sex as a modality of the aesthetic is able to 
position its readers as aesthetic rather than as psychoanalytically defined 
subjects in the world, I draw upon Bersani’s idea of choreographing a self, as 
well as Julia Kristeva’s theorizations of chora and choreia, in order to build a 
case for the exploration and activation of choreographic thinking in the context 
of sexuality education. 
As the focus of its chapters widens to include Deleuzo-Guattarian as well as 
psychoanalytical perspectives, PART FOUR (at)tends to literary reading as a pathway 
toward opening up “new possibilities for responding to what is on the move” (Royle, 
2011, p. viii), especially desire. When desire is theorized in multiple ways, sexuality 
education becomes a more productive space, one where “the variability and 
unpredictability of meaning that can attach to erotic and social relations” (Fawaz, 2019, 
p. 10) may be explored in ways that take better account of powerful negative affects— 
including shame—that often circulate in classrooms. A reading of the opening section 
of William Taylor’s Pebble in a Pool suggests how such a reparative response may be 
cultivated. 
With reference to the work of Spivak, Bersani and Wright, and in the context of 
sexuality education, in chapter twelve I consider the ability of literary reading 
to mobilize desire and keep meaning on the move in ways that models of health 
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and wellbeing, which are sometimes unthinkingly imported into classrooms to 
meet students’ needs, often fail to do. In doing so, I seek to present literary 
reading as a pedagogical space where risk and revolt can be experienced and 
mediated, but only to some extent contained. 
In chapter thirteen, while endorsing the enactment of pedagogies of desire, 
especially in the area of sexuality education, I argue the benefits of theorizing 
desire in multiple ways—psychoanalytical and Deleuzo-Guattarian among 
them—in order to keep meaning on the move. If different theorizations of desire 
permit it to do different things and, therefore, to produce different results, then 
attending through its mapping to the ways in which desire underlines movement 
is a worthwhile practice, especially when considering the dynamics of sex and 
the re-envisioning of sexuality education. 
One of the significant challenges that sexuality educators face is how to deal 
adequately in the classroom with those affects which they and their students 
experience or perceive as ‘negative’. In chapter fourteen, I suggest how 
Spivakian, Bersanian, Deleuzo-Guattarian, and queer theorizations around 
desire and its movement—including its relation to literary reading—might 
helpfully inform the treatment of shame, among the most intense of affects or 
negative feelings requiring “depathologization” (Cvetkovich, 2012, p. 5). In 
doing so, I make reference to the opening sentences of William Taylor’s YA 
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Chapter One                                                                                             
Re-envisioning Sexuality Education in Aotearoa New Zealand through 
the Queer and the Aesthetic 
When the path is clear and given, when a certain knowledge opens up the way in 
advance, the decision is already made, it might as well be said there is none to make: 
irresponsibly, and in good conscience, one simply applies or implements a program. 
Perhaps, and this would be the objection, one never escapes the program. In that case, 
one must acknowledge this and stop talking with authority about moral or political 
responsibility. The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain 
experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible; the testing of the aporia 
from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention. 
(Derrida, 1992, p. 41, italics in original) 
Overview 
In this chapter I will explore assertions that sexuality education in New Zealand is “in 
something of a stuck place” (Quinlivan, 2018, p. 116). In doing so, I will consider the 
‘stuckness’ of sexuality education, not as evidence of deficit, but as an indicator of the 
field’s untapped potential. As I see it, sexuality education is a site replete with 
pedagogical possibilities for the queering of the imagination and the building of 
“alternative attachments within” (Berlant, 2019, p. 4). For, while it is certainly possible 
to employ queer to “dismantle a world that has been built to accommodate only some, 
we can also think of queer use as a building project” (Ahmed, 2019, p. 221)—one that 
takes seriously the “desire for both larger semiabstractions such as a better world or 
freedom but also, more immediately, better relations within the social that include 
better sex and more pleasure” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 30). Thus, the use of queer in the 
context of sexuality education is, as I see it, a utopian exercise, not only because like 
other utopian projects it is deeply concerned with “how to reorganize and redirect 
desire in society” (Bradley & Kennedy, 2020, p. 424), but to the extent that it also 
involves the performance of collective futurities which position “queerness as horizon” 
(see Muñoz, 2009, pp. 19–32), while, at the same time, eschewing normalcy in the here 
and now.  
Although there is nothing particularly new in the claim that “utopian educational 
thinking, that is, thinking aimed at better worlds,” is both stimulated and expressed to 
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great effect in the aesthetic mode, it is largely under-acknowledged that much of the 
untapped educational potential of literature and the various arts relates to their ability to 
serve as “rich sources for imagining and understanding the horizons of possibility in 
human action” (Roberts & Freeman-Moir, 2013, pp. xii, 87). Given that “the aesthetic 
provides the affective ballast and concrete means to induce exuberant futures” (Berlant, 
2010), then encounters with the aesthetic through “narrative text, painting, sculpture, 
drama, poetry, architecture, and music” (Roberts & Freeman-Moir, 2013, p. 87) deserve 
to be taken much more seriously by educationalists in their efforts to promote utopian 
thinking within an increasingly negating present. In the context of the queering of 
sexuality education, the aesthetic serves the utopic whenever literature and the arts are 
deployed in the hope of creating conditions that lead to “new ways of being and 
relating, and provide a glimpse of a different and more gorgeous kind of future” 
(Quinlivan, 2014, p. 279).  
If, as Quinlivan suggests, the very idea of a queer utopia is “generative” (Quinlivan, 
2014, p. 272), then it is productive, I believe, not only to survey the history of sexuality 
education in this country with ‘a queer eye,’ but also to read those literary texts that are 
entangled with it in one way or another in the hope of being carried “beyond the given 
and taken for granted” (Roberts & Freeman-Moir, 2013, p. xiii). Such an undertaking—
which in its own way contributes to “a recovery of utopian discourses” (Roberts & 
Freeman-Moir, 2013, p. xii), by challenging us to remain alert to emergent ways of 
being, doing, and relating as we attend to historical and/or literary texts—requires us to 
do more than attend to the dismantling of homo- and hetero- normativities. It is an 
enterprise less concerned with pursuing a model of social perfection or designing and 
implementing utopian programmes, than with fanning the flames of “the utopian 
impulse” (Roberts & Freeman-Moir, 2013, p. x).  
As I begin my task, I cannot help but be mindful of the Ministry of Education’s current 
drive to improve the delivery of sexuality education in New Zealand primary and 
secondary schools, in particular, through more vigilant attention to programme 
planning and implementation. Nevertheless, I wish to make it clear that I have no 
intention of aligning my work to the Ministry’s agenda for sexuality education, nor of 
affirming the finding of a recent Education Review Office report that “the most 
common barrier to effective implementation [is] a lack of specific planning for a 
comprehensive approach to sexuality education” (Education Review Office, 2018, p. 
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7). Rather, my hope is that this thesis will be read as an exercise in critical utopic 
thinking, especially, in the light of calls from researchers, including L. Allen (2011, 
2018b) and Quinlivan (2014, 2018), who argue for a more extensive re-imagining and 
re-conceptualizing of school-based sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand than 
that foreseen or planned for by the Ministry of Education or the Education Review 
Office.  
The Problem with Sexuality Education 
In recent years, sexuality education researchers in Aotearoa New Zealand have made a 
case, not only “for moving formal sex ed. classes beyond their current stuck place” 
(Quinlivan, 2018, p. 115), but also for lifting the field of sexuality education out of the 
doldrums of what has been described as “its interminable preoccupation with whether 
content is appropriate, when to teach it, and who is best to do so” (Allen, 2018b, p. 5). 
While many sexuality educators in schools seem happy enough putting their efforts into 
improving the delivery of sexuality education by faithfully following the Ministry of 
Education’s directives—that is, “by increasing its ‘effectiveness’ in relation to its stated 
objectives”—other more critical voices continue to call for a re-envisioning of sexuality 
education “in ways that reconfigure and exceed its current boundaries” (Allen, L., 
2011, p. 1).  
If demands for a re-imagining of sexuality education may be taken to indicate an 
increasing level of dissatisfaction with the standard of sexuality education programmes 
in schools—programmes which for the most part seem to adhere too closely to 
sexuality education’s historical and enduring aims of regulating moral conduct as well 
as promoting sexual health through the reduction of unintended pregnancies and 
STIs/STDs—they also point to a need to reconceptualise sexuality education in ways 
that shift it beyond its present frame as “one of seven key areas of learning in the health 
and physical education learning area of The New Zealand Curriculum” (Ministry of 
Education, 2015, p. 12). For, while the current push by the Ministry of Education to 
improve the health and wellbeing of young people through the provision of better 
quality sexuality education is clearly well-intended,5 this initiative, in itself, does little 
                                                          
5 The Education Review Office has identified that, in particular, “the needs of Māori or Pacific 
students, international students, students with strong cultural or religious beliefs, students with 
additional learning needs and students who were sex-, gender- or sexuality-diverse” (Education 
Review Office, 2018, p. 5) are not being met by sexuality education programmes in schools. 
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to encourage those responsible for delivering school-based sexuality education 
programmes to think about sexuality outside the health-wellbeing paradigm, or to 
address the important issue of what constitutes young people as sexual subjects. An 
emphasis on health and wellbeing, neither creates an awareness among sexuality 
educators of “the implications of theories underlying practices in the sexuality 
education classroom” (Quinlivan, 2018, pp. 3–4), nor does it encourage them to 
experiment with a range of theories in their own interactions with young people—two 
measures that Quinlivan proposes as a productive counter to an immobilized sexuality 
education. As Allen and Quinlivan argue, the time is now ripe for “conceptualising and 
engaging sexuality education in radically new ways” (Allen, L., 2011, p. 1), including 
exploring “possibilities for conceptualising and practising in the sexuality education 
classroom ‘otherwise’” (Quinlivan, 2018, p. 7).  
Doubtless, there are many ways of advancing the process of putting theories into 
practice in sexuality education classrooms. For instance, while Allen “experiments with 
new materialist ideas in an attempt to decentre the human and bring matter to the fore 
in sexuality education research and practice” (Allen, 2018b, p. 20), Quinlivan advocates 
“a conceptual (un)learning of sorts,” one which asks teachers and researchers not only 
to critique those theories underlying current practices in sexuality education, but also to 
work collaboratively to experiment with a range of contemporary theories in an attempt 
to explore “diverse young people’s lived experience of sexualities, genders and 
relationships” (Quinlivan, 2018, p. 7). Other approaches, sympathetic to earlier research 
by Fine (1988), emphasize “the value of creating more space in the curriculum to talk 
about pleasure and desire in ways that are meaningful and relevant to young people” 
(Allen, Rasmussen, & Quinlivan, 2014, p. 2). 
What these various initiatives share is a dissatisfaction with those types of sexuality 
education—including many school-based sexuality education programmes informed by 
“normative pedagogical practices which privilege rationality, cognition, and neoliberal 
investments in success” (Quinlivan, 2018, p. 21)—that focus overly on assessment, 
measurement and academic achievement in an effort to get things ‘right,’ in order to 
contain, or at least manage, what Jen Gilbert argues is “the wildness of sexuality” 
(Gilbert, 2014, p. xiii). However, while it has been acknowledged that neoliberal 
influences and pressures tend to obscure and devalue the relational, the affective and 
the material aspects of sexuality education, it is important to note that these same 
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influences and pressures also work to suppress what Fredric Jameson terms “the desire 
called utopia” (see Jameson, 2007, especially pp. ix–233). This suppression is aided by 
the marginalization of aesthetic approaches to sex and sexuality, including those that 
seek to create “the possibility of ways of knowing and being which utilise a notion of 
queerness as primarily about futurity and hope” (Quinlivan, 2014, p. 281).  
To the neoliberal mind, William Morris’s question, “how shall we live then?” (Roberts 
& Freeman-Moir, 2013, p. 1)—a question that appears to underpin and drive all utopic 
thinking and any “investigation of the nature of Utopian desire and the substance of its 
hope” (Jameson, 2007, p. 85)—is deemed irrelevant because the answer is already 
obvious. In a neoliberal culture or society people are expected to find meaning and 
satisfaction when, “as self-interested actors,” they put “the production and exchange of 
material goods at the heart of the human experience” (Steger & Roy, 2010, p. 12). The 
urge to engage in aesthetic practices “as necessary modes of stepping out of this place 
and time to something fuller, vaster, more sensual, and brighter” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 189) 
makes little sense to those, who, conditioned by neoliberalism, see the consumerist, 
free-market, globalizing economy as “an indispensable tool for the realization of a 
better world” (Steger & Roy, 2010, p. 11). However, if utopian thinking around sex and 
sexuality, like other manifestations of utopian desire, is characterized by “a consistent 
affirmation of the openness and indeterminacy of the world,” (Bradley & Kennedy, 
2020, p. 427), then one of the most serious and pressing responsibilities facing 
sexuality educators and researchers today is that of keeping alive the possibility of a 
sexuality education yet to come—a task which Google and other digital technologies, 
with their algorithmic computations and controls that predetermine fields of possibility, 
are incapable of performing, despite their allure. 
Therefore, given the great influence that both neoliberalism and technologization have 
exerted in recent decades on education, in this country and elsewhere, it is hardly 
surprising that New Zealand educational policy, for the most part, fails to acknowledge, 
not only “the importance of contemplating futures other than those driven by the 
imperatives of global capitalism” (Roberts & Peters, 2008, p. 7), but also “the loss of 
the sense of the futural” (Bradley & Kennedy, 2020, p. 428) in what is proving to be an 
increasingly toxic digital environment. Thus, guidelines from the Ministry of Education 
(2015, 2020a, 2020b) for the delivery of sexuality education in New Zealand primary 
and secondary schools appear to offer little encouragement or scope for utopic 
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thinking—either of the kind that regards “utopia as more an attitude and a mode of 
being than a clearly detailed plan or doctrine” (Roberts & Freeman-Moir, 2013, p. xii), 
or for the more obviously Muñozian sort of utopic imagining which positions queerness 
as an “educated mode of desiring that allows us to see and feel beyond the quagmire of 
the present” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 1). Ignoring the utopian impulse—which for so long has 
been a vital if often unacknowledged force in Western educational thought, discernible, 
for instance, in the work of Plato, Rousseau, Dewey, and Freire—the Ministry turns 
instead to planning and strategizing in order to advance the progress of a sexuality 
education that is firmly anchored in the here and now. Ours is a sexuality education 
which aims to be “relevant” (Ministry of Education, 2015, pp. 4, 5, 12, 14, 24, 33) and 
“meaningful” (pp. 5, 25, 26, 28)—one which seeks to “engage, empower, and inform” 
(p. 5) today’s young people, rather than waste time scanning the past for insights, or 
generating “a future-focused dream of ways of knowing and becoming differently” 
(Quinlivan, 2014, p. 277) through arts-based activities and aesthetic encounters. 
In attempting to respond to the Ministry’s call for a sexuality education that is marked 
by ‘relevance,’ ‘meaning,’ and ‘engagement’—often at the expense of ‘astonishment, 
‘exuberance,’ and ‘vibrancy’—schools find themselves on the horns of a dilemma. This 
manifests itself in the perceived need to somehow contain “the wildness and 
unpredictability of sexuality” (Quinlivan, 2018, p. 5)—which many believe is provoked 
and stirred whenever sex is given an airing in pedagogical contexts—while at the same 
time opening up opportunities for discourse on matters as pressing and unruly as 
pleasure and desire. Any sexuality education worth its salt, then, will not only 
acknowledge sex “as a source of delight and trouble,” but also as “something that 
hovers at the limits of articulation” (Halley & Parker, 2011, p. 4), for, as Gilbert 
explains, sexuality is “always too much for our conceptual and affective apparatuses” 
(Gilbert, 2014, p. xv). The requirement to (at)tend to and manage those aspects of sex 
and sexuality—however relevant, meaningful or engaging they might be—which are 
unable to be easily explained or comfortably incorporated into established patterns of 
thinking, feeling and behaving, makes the sexuality education classroom a challenging 
and fraught site both for teachers and students. Thus, in requiring that complex and 
potentially ‘hot’ issues, among them sexual and gender identity, sexual orientation, 
heteronormativity, consent and coercion, sexualisation and pornography, and emotional 
and social learning, be addressed in school sexuality education programmes, the 
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Ministry of Education—knowingly or not—is inviting trouble, especially, given that 
“educational breakdowns, conflicts, and controversies” are bound to surface whenever 
“underlying antagonisms between the wildness of sexuality and the purposes of 
schooling” (Gilbert, 2014, p. xiii) are exposed.  
As a study of the history of sexuality education in New Zealand shows, sexuality 
education in our schools has never been free from controversy because what happens in 
sexuality education classrooms always “draws an emotive response entangled with 
religious and political philosophy” (Smyth, 2000, p. 10). Consequently, because 
sexuality education has always been closely linked with schooling’s socializing 
function—that is, to “the ways in which, through education, we become part of existing 
traditions and ways of doing and being” (Biesta, 2013, p. 4)—it has always been tightly 
monitored, especially by those who believe the very purpose of education is 
undermined whenever “its practices, procedures, rules, structures, and relations” 
(Gilbert, 2014, p. x) are threatened by sexuality’s unruliness. Thus, although on the one 
hand, the Ministry appears to behave “as if we knew the meaning of sex” (Halley & 
Parker, 2011, p. 4) by naturalizing it—sexuality education in New Zealand, the 
Ministry tells us, “takes a positive view of sexual development as a natural part of 
growing up” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 4)—on the other, it seeks to control what 
is said and done in sexuality education classes through a regime of planning. Indeed, 
what is valued most by the Ministry—it is listed first in its 2015 guide for those 
involved with sexuality education in schools and is also given emphasis in the refreshed 
2020 version—is “holistic, well-planned sexuality education programmes, taught by 
informed and up-to-date teachers” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 4). Despite what 
else it recommends, the Ministry’s repeated emphasis on more and better planning in 
sexuality education works to affirm understandings of sex that are “all but 
indistinguishable from a repetitive marching-in-place” (Halley & Parker, 2011, p. 5). In 
other words, sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand—premised as it still is on 
the emergence and development, over time and through fairly predictable stages, of 
individuals with relatively stable psycho-sexual identities—appears to do little to 
“satisfy anyone who has a taste for queer” (Halley & Parker, 2011, p. 5). 
By promoting planning so insistently, the Ministry advances what Gert Biesta terms “a 
‘strong’ pedagogy” (Biesta, 2016, p. 91)—one which seeks to guarantee the outcomes 
of its own educational interventions by directing students along clear and given 
27 
 
educational pathways towards destinations that are already predetermined and 
predicted. But, this perceived ‘strength’ comes at the expense of both queer and utopic 
thinking. As a reading of Derrida (1992, p. 41) suggests, a ‘strong’ sexuality education, 
one that is overly concerned with programme design, application and implementation, 
works to foreclose rather than open up possibilities—one can’t ‘escape’ the programme 
the epigraph to this chapter warns—leaving little room for the exercise of responsibility 
on the part of teachers or students. Thus, while it may be the case that “education 
carries an orientation toward freedom within itself” (Biesta, 2016, p. 130), an undue 
emphasis on planning in sexuality education—as in other areas of the curriculum—
announces that the important educational decisions have already been made. It also 
misleads teachers and students into thinking that there is little scope or need for the 
exercise of responsibility—“something we can take upon ourselves” (Biesta, 2013, p. 
22), but can never impose on others or produce in them. In a neoliberal-technological 
educational culture where planning and predetermined outcomes prevail, a 
preoccupation with accountability—being answerable to someone for something—will 
obscure the need for “educators to take responsibility for their actions and activities 
and, more specifically, for what their actions and activities are supposed to bring about” 
(Biesta, 2016, p. 50).  
In this thesis, following Biesta’s line, I argue, not that sexuality education “become 
strong, secure, predictable, and risk-free” (Biesta, 2013, p. 3), but, rather, attempt to 
capitalize on the benefits that flow from “the weakness of education” (Biesta, 2013, p. 
3), including the possibilities that emerge from the often surprising ‘mismatches’ 
between educational ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’—‘mismatches’ which given the wildness of 
sexuality are, perhaps, even more readily apparent in sexuality education classrooms 
than at other pedagogical sites. For, it is in the slippage zone, the gap that opens up 
between stated educational intentions and the unforeseen consequences of intended 
pedagogical activity, that “the very condition that makes education possible”—its 
weakness—prompts “an affirmation of what is wholly other, of what is unforeseeable 
from the present” (Biesta, 2013, pp. 4, 38). Thus, in supporting a ‘weak’ rather than a 
‘strong’ sexuality education, I make a case for refusing the easy enticements of those 
pedagogies, which in chasing certainty, rely on a symmetrical relationship between 
cause and effect. Instead, I argue for a sexuality education that is open to the 
impossible—“not that which is not possible, but that which cannot be foreseen as a 
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possibility” (Biesta, 2009, p. 31). For, as Derrida puts it, it is only by experiencing and 
experimenting with “the possibility of the impossible”—that is, by entertaining the 
utopian impulse which prepares the way for the incoming of the new—that “one may 
invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention” (Derrida, 1992, p. 41). 
A sexuality education open to the advent of the new will not concern itself with “the 
reproduction of what already exits” (Biesta, 2013, p. 140). Happily acknowledging the 
limitations of predetermined learning outcomes, such a sexuality education will work to 
reorient teachers and students “toward futures that are far less foreclosed, far less 
preplanned” (Snaza & Weaver, 2015, p. 7), than what is on offer in many classrooms—
and what many teachers, parents and students are currently comfortable with. By 
permitting, for example, taken-for-granted notions about what it means to be human 
and sexual to be interrupted and disturbed, a ‘weak’ sexuality education will not only 
help us to “give up the idea that human subjectivity can in some way be educationally 
produced” (Biesta, 2016, p. 91), but also to avoid “humanism’s greatest repetition 
compulsion: the desire to plan” (Snaza & Weaver, 2015, p. 3).  
In advocating for a ‘weak’ sexuality education, I am not suggesting that sexuality 
education should altogether abandon its focus on health and wellbeing—or its concern 
with planning—but that notions of health, wellbeing, and planning, as they are 
currently found in sexuality education, be reimagined so as to create the possibility of 
ways of knowing, being and thinking that are capable of producing new and queerer 
subjectivities, including those shaped and formed by the impulse for utopian thinking.  
Sexuality Education, Utopic Thinking, and the Fear of Undecidability  
As I will go on to show in the chapters that follow, Spivak’s contribution to utopic 
educational thinking can be seen in her commitment to open-ended pedagogical 
practices that are always haunted by the ‘undecidability’ of the future—the notion that 
given “the force of the ‘perhaps’” (Spivak, 2012, p. 421) nothing might come from all 
our planning. Reflecting on Spivak’s statement that “the fear of undecidability is the 
planner’s fear” (Spivak, 2003, p. 47), Nathan Snaza observes that “our long-standing 
commitment to subordinating pedagogy to preplanned ends” (Snaza, 2013, p. 50) 
results in anxiety—both when the securities promised by predetermined learning 
outcomes themselves prove to be elusive, and if we find ourselves ‘at sea’ in the face of 
unfamiliar or open-ended pedagogies. As Snaza recognizes, Spivak performs an 
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invaluable service in reminding us that when it comes to pedagogy “there are no 
certainties, that the process is open” (Spivak, 2003, p. 26). For, “real answers come in 
the classroom and are specific to that changeful site” (Spivak, 2003, p. 26)—they can 
never be determined in advance, and it is irresponsible to claim, as neoliberalism does, 
that this is the case. In a statement that has important pedagogical implications, 
Derrida—whom Spivak in many ways echoes—suggests that when “one simply applies 
or implements a program” (Derrida, 1992, p. 41) ethics is conceived not so much as a 
matter of responsibility, but more as the application of various technologies for 
practical purposes and with the purpose of attaining particular results.  
Yet, as I am arguing, the New Zealand Ministry of Education remains wedded to a 
‘strong’ sexuality education that is focussed on lifting its performance by a renewed 
commitment to more and better planning, in particular through an ‘unpacking’ of 
“Health and Physical Education achievement objectives with a sexuality education 
focus” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 15). This attempt at decidability seems to pull 
against the possibility of a sexuality education that “explores the productive 
possibilities of queer ways of being and knowing that don’t fit conventional neoliberal 
notions of success” (Quinlivan, 2018, pp. 38–39), or which cultivates “an optimism for 
opening new possibilities for ways of thinking and being” (Allen, 2018b, p. 29) through 
the queer. If the Ministry’s preoccupation with planning is clearly evident in its drive to 
ensure that teachers “deliver effective, quality sexuality education programmes” 
(Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 3), it is also apparent in its expressed desire to produce 
subjects capable of strategizing their own behaviours, relationships and lives. Indeed, 
the Ministry’s 2015 guide on sexuality education for principals, boards of trustees, and 
teachers not only “aims to help schools to plan and deliver sexuality education” 
(Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 3), but also gives priority to planning in its suggested 
learning intentions for student. The latter is especially evident in the Ministry’s own 
explication of the Health and Physical Education achievement objectives at curriculum 
levels two through to six.6 In short, while sexuality education programmes in New 
                                                          
6 For example, the Ministry’s suggested learning intentions state that students are expected to 
show that they understand and are able to implement the following aspects of planning at the 
various learning levels of the Health and Physical Education curriculum: “planning and 
demonstrating ways to enhance family, classroom, and wider school relationships” (Ministry of 
Education, 2015, p. 15) at level two; “identifying risks and planning safety strategies” (p. 15) at 
levels two and three; “planning strategies for supporting self and others in online 
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Zealand schools are clearly expected to “reduce risk and risky behaviours,” this goal is 
to be achieved by way of a “holistic and comprehensive approach” (Ministry of 
Education, 2015, p. 5) which emphasizes informed sexual decision-making and 
empowerment through planning and strategizing. In addition, students will “reflect on 
friendships and plan strategies for positive and supportive relationships” as well as 
“plan strategies to support inclusion, diversity and respect in friendships” (Ministry of 
Education, 2015, p. 22). Furthermore, in the event that planned strategies “for positive 
and supportive engagement” are unable to be successfully implemented, “strategies for 
seeking help and support will be planned” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 23). The 
Ministry of Education’s new guidelines follow the same trajectory—but with a more 
explicit emphasis on planning for wellbeing. For example, students are expected to 
“make plans to support their own wellbeing and that of others,” as well as “plan actions 
to enhance communication and wellbeing in a range of situations” (Ministry of 
Education, 2020b, pp. 35, 38). 
While the Ministry of Education’s emphasis on well-planned and implemented teaching 
and learning programmes draws attention to one factor which recent research (see 
Byers, Sears, & Foster, 2013; Poobalan et al., 2009) suggests may improve the sexual 
health and wellbeing of young people, it is also indicative of an eagerness on the 
Ministry’s part to direct ‘planners’—whether teachers or students of sexuality 
education—to pursue various pre-determined goals and desired outcomes, especially in 
relation to health and wellbeing. Although the Ministry is cognizant that successful 
sexuality education programmes “are not focused solely on dangers, risks, and 
prevention but explore the meanings associated with sex and sexuality for individuals 
and society” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 25), its strong emphasis on planning 
suggests, nevertheless, an underlying nervousness. This arises, perhaps, from a desire to 
mitigate the irruption of the unexpected and the unwanted in sexuality education 
classrooms—a possibility perceived by the Ministry as posing a threat rather than 
gifting an opportunity to sexuality educators and their students. The Ministry’s focus on 
                                                          
environments” (p. 17) at level four; “identifying a wide range of issues in intimate relationships 
and planning strategies for positive outcomes” (p. 18) at level five; “planning and carrying out 
actions which support diverse gender and sexual identities” (p. 18) at level five; “identifying 
risks and planning for safe engagement in a range of social contexts [for example at parties]” 
(p. 19) at level six; and “planning strategies and demonstrating interpersonal skills for 
responding to needs and challenges” (p. 19) at level six. 
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planning, while doubtless intended to provide clarity as to the purpose and direction of 
sexuality education—for instance, by tying it tightly to health and wellbeing—runs the 
risk of ignoring complexities and foreclosing possibilities by uncritically adopting “a 
series of assumptions of how bodies are supposed to function, as a thesis of what bodies 
are for (and who they are for)” (Ahmed, 2019, p. 205).  
As a consequence of this narrowing, the desire “to play with our organs, to roam over 
each other’s bodies” (Ahmed, 2019, p. 205) is barely tolerated—and certainly not 
welcomed—by a sexuality education which is tasked with the management of sexual 
experimentation and risk through planning and strategizing. Desire and pleasure are 
generally silent casualties in this process—eros and the erotic lexicon are neither 
articulated nor accommodated in mandated health and sexuality education programmes. 
Also neglected in this overly-prescriptive sexuality education—one that is more 
concerned with predetermined outcomes than with performing “a pedagogy of 
openness to the possibility that one might learn as much or more from the loose as from 
the tight” (Berlant, 2019, p. 1)—are “forces of encounter” (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, 
p. 2), including those affective movements, signified by such notions as plenitude and 
wonder, which feed the desire for utopia.  
If, on the one hand, sexuality education’s concern with planning and plans fails to 
contain or account for “a body’s capacity to affect and to be affected” (Seigworth & 
Gregg, 2010, p. 2), on the other, it also tends to have the stultifying consequence of 
both affirming existing norms and generating new ones. This is because sexuality 
education as it is currently focussed cannot avoid mapping pathways to a future that is 
unable to be thought other than in relation to present normativities—not just those of 
gender, sexual orientation, race and identity, but also more recent neoliberal criteria, 
such as accessibility, assessability, affordability and accountability, promoted in the 
name of educational advancement. Given the responsibility of educators to respond to 
what Berlant identifies as “the ethical pressure to figure out repair in the face of 
intensifying world disrepair” (Berlant, 2019, p. 4), a sexuality education that is 
utopically oriented cannot afford to be either timidly conservative or naively optimistic, 
but must distinguish between “abstract and concrete or educated hope” (Chambers-
Letson, Nyong’o, & Pellegrini, 2019, p. ix), as it prepares teachers and students to think 
otherwise in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles. It is only a hope that is 
“grounded and consequential” (Muñoz, 2019, p. 207) that can provide us with “ways to 
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occupy these dark times not only with anger, depression, and exhaustion, but also with 
inventiveness, reimagined collectivity, intellectual energy, persistent curiosity—and 
fierce . . . attention” (Berlant, 2019, pp. 4–5).  
However, as I propose in this thesis, sexuality education’s potential to offer “hope in 
the face of heartbreak” (Muñoz, 2019, p. 207) will be realized not by any amount of 
planning or strategizing, which tends to deliver more of the same, but, through a 
“training of the imagination” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 4, 10, 118, 345)—itself a preparation 
for utopic thinking. This process, as it unfolds both in Spivak’s aesthetic education and 
through Bersani’s positioning of sex within the modality of the aesthetic, involves 
teaching the subject to ‘play’ in order to develop “flexible epistemological 
performance” (Spivak, 2012, p. 353). While for Spivak, as you will see, literary reading 
is a privileged site, a ‘playground’ where cognitive processes are able to be activated, 
exercised and redirected in unique ways that facilitate the suspension and displacement 
of belief—and train the imagination—it is also a place of encounter where cognitive 
and affective processes cannot be easily separated. Furthermore, if to attend to the 
queer is “to build alternative attachments within” (Berlant, 2019, p. 4), then it is also a 
“necessary, impossible, and interminable task” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 373–374), one that is 
exemplified and performed by Spivak’s aesthetic education, especially in its call for the 
“uncoercive rearrangement of desires” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 108, 373, 382, 387)—an on-
going operation that involves both cognitive and affective detachments and 
reattachments. 
In the context of a sexuality education such as ours, exposing what Spivak terms “the 
grounding presence of the sheer selfishness of reproductive heteronormativity” (Spivak, 
2012, p. 98), or what Bersani describes as “the ways in which our bodies are culturally 
mapped, and in particular how their boundaries are drawn” (Bersani, 1996, p. 46), is no 
easy task. This is, as Spivak argues, not only on account of the fact that reproductive 
heteronormativity is “the broadest and oldest global institution” (Spivak, 2012, p. 437), 
but, more specifically, because sexuality education’s entangling of the notions of 
‘health,’ ‘wellbeing’ and ‘sex’ cannot not work to affirm reproduction as a ‘natural’ 
good, presenting as it does “the bodies of each sex . . . as directed toward the other” 
(Ahmed, 2019, p. 205). Reproductive heteronormativity, therefore, not only operates 
“as a form of intended functionality” (Ahmed, 2019, p. 205)—and as a “motor” 
(Spivak, 2012, p. 409) that moves people along well-trodden paths in life—it also gives 
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rise to various forms of “reproductive futurism” which serve to project and preserve 
“the absolute privilege of heteronormativity” (Edelman, 2004, p. 2) from one 
generation of humans to the next.  
Thus, although neoliberalism and consumerism have in recent decades worked in 
tandem to assimilate some expressions of queer sexuality into the mainstream by 
allowing the occupants of certain more ‘benign’ queer spaces to be “seen as ‘normal’ 
by heteronormativity,” this is always on condition that they “play the ‘game’ of the 
dominant culture” (Giffney, 2008, p. 72). Conversely, those queers who ‘can’t fit’ or 
‘won’t fit’—because their particular needs, interests or behaviours don’t align with 
outcomes intended by the majority—are badly served by plans and projects which seek 
to extend the hegemony of the normal by bringing more varieties of queer into a 
common fold. In circumstances where polymorphic desire “confuses identity, 
transgresses borders and confounds telos” (Runions, 2008, p. 102), efforts made by 
well-intentioned sexuality educators and students to reach out and accommodate a 
greater range of variables of sex, gender, race etc.—but always from within a 
framework which tacitly assumes, although it may not explicitly affirm, the dominance 
of reproductive heteronormativity—are bound to be frustrated. When this happens, 
there is merit, I believe, in resisting the urge to seek a remedy for an ineffective or 
malfunctioning sexuality education through a recommitment to planning. While the 
temptation to plan with renewed vigour and a sharper focus is understandable in such 
circumstances, other queerer approaches—ones capable of uncovering “bloom-spaces” 
(Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 9) in what appears to be a desert littered with double 
binds—are, perhaps, more productive.  
For, if, as Spivak argues, “sexual difference and reproductive heteronormativity (RHN) 
are the irreducible” in human cultures, operating as they do “upstream from 
straight/queer/trans,” then these factors—especially given their pivotal role as “the 
chief semiotic instrument[s] of negotiation” (Spivak, 2012, p. 123)—will always tend 
to produce double binds that no amount of planning is able to successfully eliminate or 
sidestep. Thus, for as long as it is conceptualized from within the frame of reproductive 
heteronormativity, homosexual sex—especially anal sex—will be problematic for those 
planning sexuality education programmes. This is so because in exposing “the 
permeability of bodily boundaries,” male with male sex also exposes “the factitious 
nature of sexual differences” (Bersani, 1996, pp. 46, 47). Thus, rather than trying to 
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resolve these binary oppositions through what amounts to assimilation—the absorption 
of queer into normal, gay into straight, and the production of various forms of 
homonormativity—may not our energies be better spent on the impossible but hopeful 
task of cobbling together a good-enough sexuality education, a piece of bricolage, that 
nonetheless works to develop perspectives capable not only of equipping us to 
playfully, if somewhat uncomfortably, inhabit double binds, but also of nurturing 
unlikeness, and of “honouring the ‘anomalous’ and the ‘irregular’ without reducing 
them to something familiar or ‘manageable’” (Bagemihl, 1999, p. 262)? In the context 
of calls for the reinvigoration of sexuality education, literary reading—especially, the 
reading of fiction—has the ability to advance the process of reimagining in that it 
“takes us into the impossible possible of the ‘perhaps’” and “‘not yet,’” positioning us 
as we read beyond the frame of “‘either-or’” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 117, 457) thinking. In 
other words, literary reading provides us with the means of queering sexuality 
education, especially insofar as it taps into and queers “a utopian impulse detectable in 
daily life and its practices” (Jameson, 2007, p. 1).  
In the case of sexuality education, the utopian impulse—which, according to Ernst 
Bloch, can be discovered even “in unsuspected places, where it is concealed or 
repressed” (Jameson, 2007, p. 3)—commonly finds expression in “the vertical, 
forward-motion metaphor of growing up” (Stockton, 2009, p. 11), a notion that 
underpins much educational thought. Indeed, a lot of the effort that the Ministry of 
Education, the Education Review Office, boards of trustees, and teachers put into the 
planning of sexuality education works to ensure that young people and their teachers 
understand human development as progressive—and that they strategize accordingly. 
Talk of “changes in growth patterns” and “stages of growth and development” 
(Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 15) are supported by and, in turn, reinforce the notion 
of ‘growing up’ as something natural and inevitable. However, while this uber-
metaphor encapsulates and represents a taken-for-granted form of utopic thinking—one 
which drives and determines much of the planning that surrounds sexuality education—
it fails to account not only for the transmission of utopian desire along queerer lines and 
by more transgressive metaphors, but also for the idea that “the temporal life of the 
body already resituates the utopian impulse” (Jameson, 2007, p. 6), sending it along 
unpredictable trajectories that resist prescribed futures.  
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To admit, as Lee Edelman does, “that we are inhabited always by states of desire that 
exceed our capacity to name them” (Edelman, 1995, p. 345) is to acknowledge that 
taken-for-granted concepts, such as growing-up, are always and already susceptible to 
queering by the utopic impulse. Therefore, if, as Sara Ahmed argues, queer use is 
creative and attuned to “the variations that are possible when you are not selected and 
rewarded for going the right way” (Ahmed, 2019, p. 219)—that is, when one has been 
disabused of the notion that it is possible to grow-up ‘naturally’ or ‘straight’—then 
those times and situations when things don’t go according to plan, where growing up 
happens too early, too late, or not really at all, take on a new meaning, becoming 
occasions for “finding in the paths assumed to lead to cessation a chance of being in 
another way” (Ahmed, 2019, p. 208). Kathryn Bond Stockton, in proposing that the 
child is “the act of adults looking back” (Stockton, 2009, p. 5), invites us, I believe, to 
reimagine the process of sexual development not as a ‘growing up,’ but as a “growing 
sideways”—a figuring of “a different kind of claim for growth and for its intimate 
relations with queerness”—a reimagining which holds the potential for “lateral contact 
of surprising sorts” (Stockton, 2009, p. 11), not least, by transversing demographics of 
age and gender, as well as ethnic, religious, geographic, and economic backgrounds. I 
am suggesting, in other words, that sexuality education be reoriented and recalibrated to 
generate the queer by attending to “the singular and the unverifiable” (Spivak, 2012, 
pp. 2, 324, 332, 397, 430), especially as it emerges from that “densely populated” 
(Ahmed, 2019, p. 156) space which opens up during the implementation of any plan. In 
other words, possibilities appear in the widening of “the gap between what is supposed 
to happen and what does happen” (Ahmed, 2019, p. 156). It is in this way that the 
slippage zone becomes bloom-space!  
Whereas sexuality education, as it is officially and currently envisaged, anchors its 
raison d’etre in the notion of growing up—and plans accordingly—queerer approaches 
to sexuality education, contrariwise, attend to the gaps that inevitably open up between 
planning and implementation, in particular to those spaces which teachers and students 
tend to dismiss as irrelevant or unproductive because there things are “used in ways 
other than for which they were intended or by those other than for whom they were 
intended” (Ahmed, 2019, p. 199). Queer—thought and deployed in this way—becomes 
a tool not only for reconfiguring personal disappointments, but also for creatively 
addressing a double malaise afflicting the wider field of sexuality education: firstly, a 
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stagnation in research and practice linked to the inability of the tools of critique to 
move sexuality education out of the impasse it currently finds itself in, and, secondly, a 
“chronic negativity” generated by an “orientation that encourages certain kinds of 
interpretation while leaving little room for others” (Anker & Felski, 2017, pp. 11, 15). 
Yet, it is in these seemingly forbidding circumstances—where in the name of various 
forms of critique, genuine as well as pseudo, certain versions of truth are invoked in 
order to attack and destroy what are perceived as “competing conceptions of meaning” 
(Anker & Felski, 2017, p. 14)—that queer is able to productively work to end the sorts 
of stalemates that dog some of sexuality education’s most important and pressing 
issues. This happens, not by utilizing “the x-ray gaze of the paranoid impulse,” but 
through a queer type of utopic thinking which mobilizes queer’s own reparative 
potential—that is, its ability “to assemble and confer plenitude” (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 
149) on selves and communities, even in the most unlikely contexts—all the while 
insisting “on something else, something better, something dawning” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 
189). 
From a Spivakian perspective, the invitation to assemble and confer plenitude—but 
always, as Muñoz says, in the light of “a forward-dawning” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 1) queer 
futurity—calls for a playful but not unserious reading of both texts and the world. Such 
an engagement, one “that produces rather than protects,” implies “a proliferation of 
always different, always postponed meanings” (Spivak, 2016b, pp. xcviii, lxxxviii). 
For, it is in the rich multiplicity of meanings generated by reading that “often we can 
glimpse the worlds proposed and promised by queerness in the realm of the aesthetic” 
(Muñoz, 2009, p. 1). When applied to the re-imagining of the field of sexuality 
education and deployed utopically in/through aesthetic practices, including the reading 
of literary texts, such notions as plenitude, not only counter “instances of immobilized 
reception”—by preparing for the “possibility of receptive exchange” among subjects 
and texts—but also encourage what Bersani describes as an acceptance of “the 
vicissitudes of somatic and psychic receptiveness to the world” (Bersani, 2018, p. vii). 
Sexuality education conceived reparatively, that is, as the assembling and conferring of 
plenitude, thus, becomes a site where multiplicity is encountered and received, a space, 
therefore, where “receptive bodies” (Bersani, 2018, p. viii) are constituted and trained, 
not through the incorporation of others into our own conceptual frameworks, but by a 
practice such as teleiopoiesis (Spivak, 2012, pp. 369, 404, 428, 566, endnote 16, 578, 
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endnote 9, 581, endnote 15)—which by performing the impossible but necessary task 
of “touching the distant other with imaginative effort” (Spivak, 2012, p. 428) 
safeguards the specificity of the other through the ongoing reconfiguration of discourse. 
For, as Bersani observes, “becoming an individual in our post-natal life is to discover 
otherness, that is, our difference from the human and nonhuman objects that are the 
necessarily alien world into which the individual subject is born” (Bersani, 2018, p. x). 
As I argue in the course of this thesis, it is through aesthetic encounters, including 
literary reading, that “the possibility of metaphorically crossing borders into foreign 
territory” (Sorensen, 2010, p. 32) emerges and is entertained. For, in this process, as 
desires are uncoercively rearranged, an aesthetic education that draws sexuality 
education away from itself—making it queer to itself—is enacted. 
Some Concluding Remarks 
Insofar as a commitment to an abundant life—the assembling and conferring of 
plenitude—goes hand in hand with theorizations of queer that stress its “multiply 
transitive” tendencies, it is important to recognize that abundance itself is sustained by 
queer’s own propensity to produce incoherence “across genders, across sexualities, 
across genres, across ‘perversions’” (Sedgwick, 1993, p. xii). Such a disposition, in 
that it encourages and entails the generous if admittedly haphazard activity of scattering 
abroad “the seed of meaning” (Spivak, 2016b, p. lxxxix)—rather than directing, 
containing or restricting its distribution—not only feeds “the desire of a reparative 
impulse,” but also challenges those labouring in the field of sexuality education to 
“develop and disseminate the richest reparative practices” (Sedgwick, 2003, pp. 149, 
150).  
If queer functions performatively “in a present created and sustained by the effortful 
acts—productions and interventions—that embody it” (Barber & Clark, 2002, p. 2), it 
is also productive to imagine queer unfolding as a moment of possibility within its own 
strange temporality. In this way, Muñoz’s conceptualization of “queer futurity, where 
the future is a site of infinite and immutable potentiality” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 127), finds 
itself at (queer) cross-purposes with Edelman’s notion of “reproductive futurism” 
(Edelman, 2004, p. 2). The latter, of course, implies a much bleaker outlook—a 
scenario in which queer is only ever able to refuse and obstruct, never productively 
accommodate or work around, heteronormative time or space—because under the terms 
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of reproductive futurism there is “‘no future’ for queers,” as heteronormativity 
ceaselessly recycles itself “through the figure of the Child” (Giffney, 2008, pp. 60, 56). 
While it has been argued that Edelman’s “polemical engagement” with 
heteronormativity seeks not only to limit “the reach of the human” (Edelman, 2004, pp. 
3, 152), in order to make room for the inhuman, but also to advance a sort of “queer 
apocalypticism” (Giffney, 2008, p. 58) that refuses to invest in the future of 
heteronormativity, my approach—as you will see in the next chapter—is more playful. 
Rather than mount a direct attack, as Edelman does, on the figure of the Child—a 
strategy surely designed not to make new friends among sexuality educators—I 
endeavour to open up “a space for childhood queerness” (Bruhm & Hurley, 2004, p. 
xiv). This I do by thinking with Stockton’s notion of the queer child growing sideways 





Growing Sideways in Golden Forest 
We have seen sex arise. From amoeba to man it winds in exquisite progression of 
unfolding. Beside it, its extension and fulfilment, marches the equally exquisite 
progression of birth, which with variety and marvel carries life for ever onward and 
upward. (Howes, 1932, p. 16) 
Now, my own suspicion is that the universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but 
queerer than we can suppose. (Haldane, 1971, p. 298) 
Overview 
If, in the previous chapter, I argued that sexuality education as it is currently 
conceptualized in Aotearoa New Zealand emphasizes planning and strategizing at the 
expense of both utopic and queer thinking, I also suggested that the utopic impulse, like 
the impulse to queer, may be discerned in the most unlikely corners of educational 
thought—for example, in the often taken-for-granted notion of growing-up, which from 
the beginning has shaped the direction of sexuality education in this country. Now, 
taking up the notions of reparativity and plenitude—and thinking with them utopically 
alongside and athwart Stockton’s conceptualization of the queer child growing 
sideways—I advance my case that there has always been something queer about the 
history of sexuality education in New Zealand. 
It is in the spirit of stirring the utopian impulse, then, that I turn with a queer eye to 
Edith Howes’ The Golden Forest—a book for boys which gives fictional form to the 
author’s utopic hope that a sex education which is “universal, a detail of ordinary 
education, part of human care,” will not only mean “a tremendous advance in social life 
and happiness, supplying as it does an ideal,” but might also bring about “one of those 
sudden forward leaps that sometimes diversify the long, slow drawl of evolution” 
(Howes, 1932, pp. 130, 131). For Howes, the materials for teaching and learning new 
ways of being and relating are “strewn in profusion about the world” (Howes, 1932, p. 
130). In other words, hers is a place-based sexuality education premised on abundance 
and plenitude. Yet, insofar as Howes turns to fiction—mindful of our desire for them 
and the pleasure we derive from them, she fashions stories in an effort “first to give 
form to, and then take possession of, a variety of truths, both literal and figurative” 
(Mahy, 2000, p. 35)—hers is an education very much within the mode of the aesthetic. 
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The Great Experiment 
First published in 1930, and described at the time as “a work for boys who are old 
enough to wonder about the problems of fatherhood” (“Miss Edith Howes: A Book for 
Boys,” 1930, p. 21), The Golden Forest follows in the wake of the success of Howes’ 
earlier book for girls, The Cradle Ship (1916), an internationally acclaimed “landmark 
attempt to provide children with sex education” (Murray, 1996, p. 235). Although 
barely remembered today, The Golden Forest still makes for interesting and productive 
reading, in part, because it invites readers to consider the entanglement of utopic 
thinking and the desire to plan in the context of implementing a sexuality education, 
one which aligns with what Howes proclaims—in an eponymously titled book for 
adults—as “the Great Experiment” (Howes, 1932). Simply put, Howes’ is a sexuality 
education premised on the notion that children, by experiencing the natural world first-
hand, as well as through the study of the natural sciences, may not only come to know 
and understand nature’s myriad workings, but also learn to cooperate with what she 
calls “Nature’s aim,” becoming “responsible thereafter for helping, not hindering, that 
tremendous purpose” (Howes, 1932, pp. 131, 134). As Howes explains: 
. . . gradually and without self-consciousness being made acquainted with facts 
of life and with their purpose, production of the best, children are made ready 
for the facts about their own being, ready to recognize the need for maturity and 
the production of the best in human life. (Howes, 1932, p. 130) 
Howes’ lofty belief that science gives us “confidence to stand upon our own feet, and 
move forward without fear, realizing that all life is one, and that we are one with life” 
(Howes, 1932, p. 3) is reflected in her approach to sex which is similarly positive, 
concerned as it is with producing the best. Just as Howes sees life as evolution—as 
“experiment after experiment, achievement after achievement, in ever mounting series . 
. . . rising in complexity, in beauty, in power”—so, too, does she conceptualize sex as 
winding in “exquisite progression of unfolding . . . . extension and fulfilment . . . 
onward and upward” (Howes, 1932, pp. 4, 16).  
If The Golden Forest exemplifies in fictional form Howes’ optimistic rallying cry of 
“‘Forward with Nature’” (Howes, 1932, p. 131), it is on this basis that I propose that it 
is a helpful text through and against which to ‘think’ Stockton’s notion of the queer 
child as the child who grows sideways. Moreover, it is a text which invites 
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consideration in any re-evaluation of the history of sexuality education in this country 
where, as we have seen, “a positive view of sexual development as a natural part of 
growing up” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 4) is still largely assumed. Given the 
many anomalies and irregularities that are generated through a reading of The Golden 
Forest—both those arising from circumstances specific to the book’s production and 
those that are always already present in any sexuality education—Howes’ novel 
provides an opportunity to experience the queerness of the slippage zone. For instance, 
readers do well to attend to the gaps that open up and often widen between Howes’ 
pedagogical intentions—which are all to do with imparting “the most momentous 
information, the most necessary guidance” (Howes, 1932, p. 129)—and the unforeseen 
consequences of attempting to do so while straddling the genres of what are now called 
children’s and YA fiction. If, as I have suggested, The Golden Forest provides today’s 
readers with an opportunity to imagine the possibilities of a queerer sexuality 
education, one which concerns itself with lateral rather than vertical movement, with 
growing sideways rather than with growing-up, it does so by directing their attention to 
that “perpetual state of wonder and desire,” which seems to the eminent New Zealand 
writer Margaret Mahy, “the truest state with which to confront the universe” (Mahy, 
2000, p. 40). For, while the queering of sexuality education tends to undo planning—
through the crafting of sidelong movements that upset or delay expectations—the 
nurturing of moments of wonder and desire stimulates the utopic impulse in ways that 
make possible the re-visioning of the world. 
In The Golden Forest, as we will soon see, Howes attends to moments of wonder and 
delight in order to advance what she regards as a progressive sexuality education—
albeit one which from our perspective seems to promote a highly idealized image of the 
family “as having an innate structure which is tampered with only at great peril, and 
which continues to assert itself through time and space and in defiance of death” 
(Mahy, 2000, p. 66). Yet, if Howes’ insistence that “present happiness and a golden 
future wait on forethoughtful living” (Howes, 1932, p. 138) doesn’t, at first sight, 
appear to promise the sort of stuff that makes for either a queerer pedagogy or a queerer 
sexuality education, nevertheless, what she sets out to teach about sex, reproduction, 
family relationships and human care in The Golden Forest veers in unexpected 
directions because of the queer manner in which she presents her ideas. Thus, 
inadvertently and despite herself, Howes contributes to that “kind of beautiful and 
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provocative mayhem” (Quinlivan, 2014, p. 281), which is a feature of queer utopic 
thinking. 
Circulating at a time when any opportunities for sex education available to young 
people in New Zealand lay outside the bounds of the formal school curriculum—“the 
syllabus and school texts reflected the middle-class policy of silence on sexual matters” 
(McGeorge, 1977, p. 133)—The Golden Forest draws the attention of today’s readers 
to the undeniable queerness of the history of sexuality education in this country. For, a 
sexuality education not permitted a regular place within the official school curriculum 
until 1989—and, then, for the most part, anxiously surveilled as “one of the most 
contested and controversial curriculum subjects” (Allen, L., 2011, p. 7)—is a sexuality 
education which, by being forced to grow sideways, surely ends up growing queerly.  
If sexuality education’s queerness in relation to ‘normal’ school subjects is apparent in 
its belated inclusion in the curriculum, and that only after HIV/AIDS “precipitated 
significant change in the country’s head-in-the-sand approach to sex education” 
(Smyth, 2000, p. 172), it is also evident in its complex and often fraught relationship 
with literary texts, including The Cradle Ship and The Golden Forest. These were 
written, as Howes readily admits, in the hope of permanent benefit to those children, 
who otherwise would have been deprived of an accurate and balanced understanding of 
sex—“that mysterious and imperative force which carries on the [human] race” 
(Howes, 1932, p. 133). Thus, while there are plenty of other peculiarities that 
distinguish sexuality education in its current form from more regular areas of the school 
curriculum in Aotearoa New Zealand,7 what remains a persistent but mostly 
unacknowledged feature of its history—both before and after it became a recognized 
school subject here—is sexuality education’s tendency to be pulled in a sideways 
direction, that is, off the instructional track, by works of fiction like The Golden Forest.  
Written at a time still shadowed by “intense social obsessions with sexual impropriety, 
prostitution, masturbation, venereal disease and uncontrolled motherhood and 
                                                          
7 These distinguishing peculiarities include: sexuality education’s focus on the body rather than 
the mind, its inclusion under the umbrella of health and physical education rather than as a 
stand-alone subject, the limited number of hours allocated to teaching it at each level each year 
(between twelve and fifteen in most schools), underdeveloped assessment and evaluation 
practices, and the requirement that schools consult with their communities at least once every 
two years about the health and sexuality education programmes that they plan to deliver. 
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childhood” (Belich, 2001, p. 158), The Golden Forest provided boys with the 
opportunity to learn about sex in a way that differed markedly from the usual sort of 
instruction typically given in a private setting “by an authoritative adult, father, 
clergyman, physician or principal” (Watson, 2015, p. 113). If such instruction tended to 
go down one or other of two paths—either taking the “social purity” line, which set out 
to “bring about social change though abstinence outside marriage” (Watson, 2015, p. 
113), or reflecting the “social hygiene”/“sex hygiene” model, which provided “sex 
instruction aimed primarily at avoiding disease” (Watson, 2015, p. 114)—Howes 
moved sex education sideways in the direction of the aesthetic. This she did by using 
fiction to present a detailed pedagogical plan, a “graduated course of instruction in 
fundamental facts” (Howes, 1932, p. 130). As Heather Murray explains, “believing that 
facts were easier to learn when woven into a story or song, Howes . . . learned to 
observe and record phenomena, which she then described in the context of imaginative 
writing” (Murray, 1996, p. 235). By positioning her sexuality education closer in 
relation to science and the aesthetic than to the overtly didactic, Howes found a creative 
and more palatable way of introducing basic information not only about sex and 
reproduction, but also what she termed “human care” (Howes, 1932, pp. 116–141) to 
young people whose “outlook is misted over with perplexity, especially when the body 
is ripening sexually and when new and powerful feelings disturb the mind” (Howes, 
1932, p. 132). At the same time, Howes, by deploying fiction to present her message, 
was able to forestall accusations of promoting self-mortification—as many authoritative 
adult males did—or, of turning a blind eye to situations where self-indulgence prevailed 
due to ignorance.  
If, indeed, Howes wrote The Golden Forest in an attempt to ensure that young males 
were properly equipped for life—she was of the opinion that often “boys especially, 
whose need is urgent, went into the world armed with nothing more than a silly 
snigger” (Howes, 1932, p. 129)—her clear allegiance is to the possibilities opened up 
by a sexuality education that does its level best to be faithful both to science and to the 
imagination. Thus, The Golden Forest supports the view that fiction, insofar as it has 
the aim of “acquainting children with the facts of life, broadening their minds along the 
right channels” (“Miss Howes’s New Book,” 1930, p. 4), must entertain as it instructs. 
But, in bringing science and the imagination together to achieve this goal, Howes has to 
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grapple with the propensity of instruction to pull against entertainment and of 
entertainment to subvert instruction.  
‘Wonder must be part of truth’ 
While Howes’ treatment of sex in The Golden Forest is undoubtedly influenced by the 
various social purity and social/sex hygiene movements active in New Zealand in the 
early decades of the twentieth century, her novel is much more than a thinly disguised 
primer on the role of the male in human reproduction, a fictional work which under the 
guise of entertainment seeks to instruct boys and young men in the facts of life. For, 
although The Golden Forest does indeed warn in a very veiled way of the dangers of 
sexual impurity—the depletion of vitality and the squandering of vital forces, 
presumably, through masturbation and sex outside the marital relationship—Howes’ 
emphasis is educative and socially constructive, rather than punitive or moralistic. If, 
for Margaret Mahy, “wonder must be part of truth—not completely coinciding with it 
of course, a part of truth which our physical systems are anxious to conceal” (Mahy, 
2000, p. 40), then Howes, it seems, shares a similar perspective. For, in presenting her 
principal character, young Jack Rendy, as both endlessly curious and in a more or less 
perpetual state of excitement about the singularities of the world, Howes lays out the 
conditions for her own piece of utopic thinking, one that owes at least as much to the 
imagination as to the natural sciences. 
On the one hand, although The Golden Forest contains many elements typical of 
adventure stories popular with Kiwi boys at the time of its writing, on the other, the 
characters, setting and storyline which Howes has chosen to carry her message serve to 
queer rather than straightforwardly reinforce the idealized image of heteronormative 
family life which she intends to promote. In fact, the ‘natural’ environment of Golden 
Forest, the site of Jack’s scientific and aesthetic education, is certainly more attractive, 
stimulating and stable than “the meaner streets of London” (Howes, 1930, p. 1), from 
where Jack has been transplanted after years of neglect and abuse by an alcoholic 
father. As a review in The Otago Daily Times explains: 
The story is of a little London waif, Jack Rendy, who is discovered by a wealthy 
naturalist, a Mr Morne, and taken to his coastal retreat in New Zealand, in 
which he has a veritable paradise for animals of all kinds—and, incidentally, for 
small boys in search of adventure. Jack’s only kindly recollections are of his 
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mother, long since dead, and a friendly neighbour in his London slum; his father 
he feared, and he translated this fear into a distrust of all fathers, human and 
animal. It is Mr Morne’s task to cure him of his hatred of the male parent, and to 
disclose to him a new conception of life in which parenthood is seen to be a 
noble and interesting thing. (“Miss Howes’s New Book,” 1930) 
So, there is more going on here than adventure. As the story of The Golden Forest 
unfolds, readers and Jack learn that he is being prepared by Mr Morne for a “special 
work” (Howes, 1930, p. 27), the exact nature of which will be revealed in the fullness 
of time. As it turns out, Jack is “the subject of an experiment” (Howes, 1930, p. 241)—
a pedagogical experiment—the purpose of which finally becomes clear near the novel’s 
end when Mr Morne announces: 
I went out searching for a homeless boy, and I found you. I told you I had a use 
for you. . . . If I found you teachable, if the experiment proved a success, I 
would write to your schoolmaster and he would send out one by one other boys 
who would be glad of a home and would be likely to make good. (Howes, 1930, 
p. 241) 
As Mr Morne goes on to explain, his experiment has worked out well, exceeding his 
highest expectations:  
You have more than made good, Jack. From the first you were grateful, and 
your gratitude was shown in hard work, in the wholehearted giving of yourself, 
which is a finer thing than any words. Yours is not one of those small natures 
that take all and give nothing in return. (Howes, 1930, p. 241) 
But what exactly is the nature of Mr Morne’s experiment? And what is the plan that 
Jack has apparently fulfilled so well by the novel’s end?  
At the heart of Mr Morne’s pedagogical endeavour is the fortification, strengthening, 
and cleansing of Jack by knowledge (Howes, 1930, pp. 242, 244). As I have suggested, 
the premise upon which Mr Morne’s educational efforts are based—the notion that an 
accurate and appropriately communicated knowledge about sex protects boys and 
young men from moral corruption—was garnering growing support from moral 
campaigners during a period in New Zealand’s history when male sexuality “was 
believed to be the major driving force behind social impurity” (Watson, 2015, p. 113). 
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In a similar vein, it is not surprising that Mr Morne’s plan—and, indeed, Howes’ own 
ideas—align in some respects with the views of eugenicists who since the early years of 
the century had been calling for “lessons in ‘sex hygiene’” (McGeorge, 1977, p. 135) as 
a means of combating the spread of masturbation, venereal disease, and extra-marital 
pregnancies and births. If the over-all intention of eugenicists was the strengthening of 
family life and the production of “a vigorous race” (McGeorge, 1977, p. 135), this was 
driven by a fear that New Zealanders of British ancestry were imperilling the future 
health and wellbeing of the young nation by reproducing at too slow a rate or through 
inter-marriage with people not of European stock.  
Yet, Mr Morne’s plan, revealed to Jack over the span of four years in the intensely 
homo-social and intergenerational environment of Golden Forest, is a decidedly queer 
one in that it does teach about the traditional heteronormative family and sings its 
praises, but from the perspective of an outsider, one for whom the traditional family 
structure has not brought happiness. If Mr Morne’s plan lends itself to being read 
queerly, it is not only because the Child as he conceptualizes it is “a carefully 
controlled embodiment of noncomplication” (Stockton, 2009, p. 5) within a similarly 
non-complicated family, but because his plan is unable to encapsulate or contain Mr 
Morne’s own affective history or potential. For, while it does indeed seek to instruct 
Jack in the facts of life and disclose to him the responsibilities of fatherhood, the plan, 
as Mr Morne presents it, is driven not by ideology, but springs from the grief and 
remorse of a widower and father whose only son had died at the age of twenty after 
having “wasted himself, his youth, his young manhood” (Howes, 1930, p. 238) in the 
pursuit of what today we term “risky behaviours” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 5). 
Mr Morne—absent father, roaming “the wild places of the earth . . . year after year” 
(Howes, 1930, p. 238) in the pursuit of the natural sciences—blames himself for his son 
Charlie’s death. “I should have been there to train him, to open his eyes to the laws of 
nature and the punishment meted out to those who don’t obey them” (Howes, 1930, p. 
239), he says. But Mr Mourne’s education of Jack is more than an exercise in “the 
teaching of control” (Howes, 1930, p. 239). It is also his attempt to make amends for 
his own neglect of Charlie, an undertaking which he describes as “my great comfort” 
(Howes, 1930, p. 241). In this way, Mr Morne’s plan may be read utopically and 
reparatively as an “ongoing affectual composition of a world” (Seigworth & Gregg, 
2010, p. 3). 
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Although Mr Morne’s plan for Jack is the prototype of a much grander scheme to “save 
[boys] from themselves” (Howes, 1930, p. 240), it is a plan which in its implementation 
exceeds Mr Morne’s pedagogical intentions insofar as it “produces rather than 
protects” (Spivak, 2016b, p. xcviii). This excess—which works “to assemble and 
confer plenitude” while resisting “the paranoid impulse” (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 149) that 
characterized most sex instruction in the early decades of the twentieth century—makes 
its potential felt in the capacity of Jack’s body “to affect and to be affected” (Seigworth 
& Gregg, 2010, p. 2). The plan’s affective consequences, which are beyond Mr 
Morne’s expectations, are most obviously evident in the intensity of Jack’s response to 
all that he encounters at Golden Forest. It is, as if, for Jack, “there is always a chance 
for something else, unexpected, new” (Clough, 2010, p. 224).  
If the term ‘queer,’ as Eve Sedgwick deploys it, refers “to the open mesh of 
possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of 
meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality 
aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically,” then Mr Morne’s plan, which 
is based on the assumption that nature is organized “into a seamless and univocal 
whole” (Sedgwick, 1993, p. 8) fails to contain or explain the excesses and the 
exceptions which Jack encounters at Golden Forest. While Mr Morne certainly 
provides Jack with the encouragement, the opportunities and the training he needs to 
observe the world around him at close quarters, his plan—his wanting things to signify 
monolithically—can never determine Jack’s response to what he encounters. Thus, in 
explaining to Jack what he understands to be “Nature’s plans for parentage,” Mr Morne 
insists that “all life is one and . . . we must work with the plan and not against it if we 
would not be broken and cast aside” (Howes, 1930, pp. 239, 240). Nevertheless, while 
for Mr Morne, exceptions always prove the rule, and singularities must always give 
way to universalities, Jack’s response to the sort of education Mr Morne provides tends 
to upset this very principle, as Jack is drawn to revel in the particularities, the 
multiplicities, and the variety of Golden Forest. In this way, Jack’s is an education in 
the queer. 
Given his considerable abilities as a teacher, Mr Morne soon leads Jack “through 
strange gates into new worlds where things took on a significance they had never held 
before” (Howes, 1930, p. 30). If Mr Morne’s pedagogical intention is nothing less than 
to lay before Jack the “plan of birth and parenthood” (Howes, 1930, p. 241) which runs 
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through all life “from amoeba to man” (Howes, 1930, p. 240)—a plan which equates, in 
part at least, to today’s health and sexuality education—the teaching methods he uses 
work against the sort of monolithic signification that he seeks. For the education Mr 
Morne provides for Jack is an education that is firmly placed-based and experiential, 
arising from the environment of Golden Forest, its abundant flora and fauna. If in the 
mornings there are formal lessons, the acquisition of “a knowledge of the best books” 
(Howes, 1930, p. 30)—Latin, as well as natural history and laboratory work—in the 
afternoons Jack is free to wander Golden Forest, in reality a vast working estate, “more 
like a zoo than a sheep station” (Howes, 1930, p. 17). Jack’s instructions from Mr 
Morne are to take part in the work when he wishes, but above all to observe from the 
men working there how things are done and to find out all he can by “roaming and 
learning [his] way about the place” (Howes, 1930, p. 28). 
While the subject of Mr Morne’s experiment is Jack, its pedagogical emphasis is 
extrospective rather than introspective: “To watch life, to follow it up from its simple 
beginnings, to try to find out even the least of its mysteries!—there is nothing else so 
enthralling, so full of wonder and adventure, so rich in reward” (Howes, 1930, p. 35). 
As Mr Morne explains, “we may best begin to know ourselves by first knowing 
something of the other creatures that inhabit this truly wonderful world, for they are one 
with us” (Howes, 1930, p. 31). As Jack wanders Golden Forest, “happy and interested, 
listening, watching, asking a question now and again, but usually content to be silent” 
(Howes, 1930, p. 65), he learns to wonder. “A wonderful, wonderful world!” (Howes, 
1930, p. 65), he exclaims. Jack’s gaze is “enthralled”; he is “very much astonished”; 
there are “so many engrossing things to do” (Howes, 1930, pp. 31, 32, 49), we are told. 
Jack encounters and acknowledges abundance wherever he goes: “Golden Forest! What 
a place! What a collection of marvels!” (Howes, 1930, p. 27).  
To emphasize this point, Howes presents Jack and her readers with exhaustive, but not 
exhausting, lists and beautifully crafted descriptions of Mr Morne’s floral and faunal 
collections, including detailed accounts of the various plants and creatures therein (see 
Howes, 1930, pp. 29, 82, 145–146). Indeed, by encouraging Jack to look at life, to 
observe things closely, Mr Morne trains Jack’s ‘queer eye’—that is, his ability to give 
“boundless attention to strange relationalities” (Jagose, 2015, p. 36), to attend to what 
Karen Barad calls those “patterns of differences that make a difference” (Dolphijn & 
van der Tuin, 2012, p. 49). It is in this way that Jack learns to allow himself to be 
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captivated and entranced by singularities and peculiarities, those unusual things that 
don’t appear to fit established patterns, which buck trends and pull against Mr Morne’s 
notion of nature’s univocality. As Jack exposes himself to queerness, he learns to be 
comfortable with being somewhat disoriented in the world and begins to see the 
possibilities that open up in such situations. “What queer things there are in the world!” 
(Howes, 1930, p. 85), he announces. 
If Jack’s propensity is to find queerness in the flora and fauna around him, to alight on 
the differences that make a difference and to delight in them, Mr Morne’ seizes upon 
that which he perceives to be queer for another purpose. Put simply, Mr Morne deploys 
queer to defend normativities (physical, moral and social). He does this on the basis 
that the normal is derived from nature and is in tune with it—an argument which he 
uses not only in support of his plan for education in parenthood, but also to defend the 
notion that exceptions in nature establish the rule. In other words, for Mr Morne, any 
whiff of queerness is an opportunity to bolster and praise what is normal. When, for 
example, Jack observes a female Goby fish attempting to eat her own eggs and a male 
fish preventing her from doing so, Mr Morne takes this opportunity to lecture Jack on 
the queerness of “unmotherly mothers” (Howes, 1930, p. 85) and to explain that in 
nature male creatures sometimes take on the protective maternal role. In doing so, 
however, Mr Morne inadvertently exposes and undermines the fragility of his own 
argument. For rules only work when they work—there are always excesses that cannot 
be contained by rules’ parameters. 
If Mr Morne’s plan to educate Jack in the rise of sex from amoeba to man may be 
understood as a personal campaign to bring Jack into line with the taken-for-granted 
notion of ‘growing-up,’ it may also be conceptualized in terms of Mr Morne’s own 
belief in the “benign publicity” (Stockton, 2009, p. 12) of innocence and the closely 
aligned idea that “children are defined and longed for, according to what they do not 
have” (Kincaid, 2004, p. 10). Mr Morne’s commitment, then, is to the notion of a 
progressive transition from childhood ‘innocence’ to an adult state where erotically 
aware men and woman are able to recognize and protect in children that ‘innocence’ 
which they themselves have somehow ‘lost’ in their own growing. Yet, despite the 
comprehensive nature of Mr Morne’s plan—and his announcement that Jack has 
surpassed all expectations—Jack’s response to the plenitude and abundance of Golden 
Forest suggests that his growth is more markedly side-ways than vertical, more 
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typically queer than straight. For Jack’s attention is always being pulled in the direction 
of those things in nature that don’t fit the rules—he is willing to be surprised by them 
and wonders in their presence. His, I suggest, is a diffractive practice in that he reads 
the world “attentively and carefully . . . for differences that matter in their fine details” 
(Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 50). 
While Jack is clearly at home with queer’s plenitude—that is, with queer’s propensity 
to generate an “immensely productive incoherence” (Sedgwick, 1993, p. xii)—he also 
comes to recognize that shifts in perspective and changes in intensity generate their 
own “queer, almost unearthly beauty added by distance and height” (Howes, 1930, p. 
203). This awareness, then, is part and parcel of developing not only a queer eye, by 
attending to those patterns of difference that make a difference, but also of learning to 
frame the world in aesthetic terms: 
It was the deepening of colour that made the difference. The greens were vivid 
emerald; inlet and sea, and even the little river, were the most intense and 
wonderful blue, such blues as Jack had never seen. (Howes, 1930, p. 203) 
Some Concluding Remarks 
In 1927, three years before The Golden Forest was published, the biological scientist J. 
B. S. Haldane voiced his suspicion that “the universe is not only queerer than we 
suppose, but queerer than we can suppose” (Haldane, 1971, p. 298). Thus, it is not 
altogether surprising that Howes in her novel takes the opportunity to remind readers of 
the queerness of the world: “Queer thing, this growing! . . . . Queer thing, life” (Howes, 
1930, p. 183), Jack’s friend Andy tells him. If, on the one hand, it is Jack’s willingness 
to experience and think things “both alongside and athwart” (Luciano & Chen, 2015, p. 
189)—that is, in “‘across’ formulations” (Sedgwick, 1993, p. xii)—which prompts me 
to suggest that Jack’s orientation towards the world is queer, on the other, it is his 
openness to new learning that invites speculation as to how Jack might behave if he 
ever were to be transplanted from Golden Forest into a twenty-first century sexuality 
education classroom in New Zealand. Would he retain his sense of wonder and what 
might he make of the planning? 
As Muñoz suggests, “queer utopias can be glimpsed in the pleasurable ‘astonishments’ 
of the aesthetic” (Quinlivan, 2014, p. 277). It is up to sexuality educators, then, to make 
what they will of The Golden Forest, and of Jack Rendy’s delight as he looks “naturally 
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on the things of nature” (Howes, 1930, p. 241), not only as they work to challenge 
present hetero-normativities, but also, perhaps, as they seek to engage with the aesthetic 
in ways that enable “glimpses of a queer futurity” (Quinlivan, 2014, p. 277). This is 
possible even in a sexuality education that can never completely shake off the 
compulsion to plan. If a sexuality education given over to planning resists reaching out 
from what is “present and actual to something else, something glimpsed in the 
imagination” (Carson, 1998, p. 52), it also always runs the risk of being undone by the 
queer and the utopic, including those pleasurable ‘astonishments’ that Quinlivan speaks 
of and which Jack Rendy experiences at Golden Forest.  
In the chapter that follows, I attend to the ancient erotic lexicon—which provides 
insight into the workings of what today we call queer—not only in order to make the 
most of the proximity of eros and the aesthetic, but also to imagine a sexuality 
education that opens out into an aesthetics of existence, one capable of keeping alive 






Sexuality Education, Eros, and Aesthetics of Existence 
Michel Foucault: “What I meant was that I think what the gay movement needs now is 
much more the art of life than a science or scientific knowledge (or pseudo-scientific 
knowledge) of what sexuality is. Sexuality is part of our behavior. It’s part of our world 
freedom. Sexuality is something we ourselves create—it is our own creation, and much 
more than the discovery of a secret side of our desire. We have to understand that with 
our desires, through our desires, go new forms of relationships, new forms of love, new 
forms of creation. Sex is not a fatality: it’s a possibility for creative life.” (Foucault, 
1996a, p. 382)  
Overview 
In proposing that Spivak’s project of aesthetic education and Bersani’s reframing of sex 
as a mode of the aesthetic are able to undo taken-for-granted meanings about sexuality 
and open up possibilities for making sexuality education strange again, I am mindful 
that what today we term sexuality—and for the most part theorize in relation to health, 
medicine and the various sciences—was once figured in the Western literary and 
philosophical tradition within the modality of the aesthetic, that is, as the erotic.  
By drawing upon Michel Foucault’s notions of ars erotica and scientia sexualis, as well 
as Anne Carson’s exploration of eros in classical literary and philosophical texts, in this 
chapter I argue that the erotic still makes its presence felt in sexuality education 
classrooms, especially, I suggest, through the figurations that we call queer. This is so, 
despite the fact that the lexicon of eros, originating as it did in the workings of ancient 
literary and philosophic imaginations, cannot easily be repurposed for today’s sexuality 
education, For, if queer emerges as we attend to “the art of making sex speak” 
(Doherty, 1996, p. 138), that is, by turning the affects which we connect with sex into 
narratives, it also presses for a hearing whenever we attend to the art of listening to sex 
speak, including through the practice of literary reading. With this in mind, as I explore 
the potential of literary reading—especially of the type practised by the likes of Spivak 
and Bersani—to queer sexuality education, I detail my intention to conduct close 
readings of a number of literary texts in an effort not only to enable queer voices to be 
heard, but to train readers in the art of listening for and to the queer. 
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By emphasizing the propensity of queer, not only to unhinge certainties and disturb the 
familiar through what Eve Sedgwick describes as its cross-wise movement—movement 
that is transgressive as well as transverse—I assert queer’s importance in what Michel 
Foucault calls “an aesthetics of existence” (Foucault, 1984/1992, pp. 12, 89). For queer 
has a part to play in the pursuit of an ascesis—a knowledge of the self that demands the 
adoption of a set of self-practices—in a committed and sustained effort to unbind the 
self from the self. Indeed, because queer “cuts across every locus of agency and 
subjectivity” (Sedgwick, 1993, p. xii), it is well-placed to perform the releasing of the 
self from the self that Foucault calls for. Given that Spivak’s aesthetic education and 
Bersani’s conceptualization of sex as a mode of the aesthetic are in tune with 
Foucault’s notion of the care of the self—all three theorizations imply a process of on-
going subjectification, a continual disassembling and reassembling of the self that 
refuses to privilege the epistemological over the aesthetic or the ethical—I maintain, as 
you will see, that Spivak and Bersani, like Foucault, advance a form of aesthetico-
ethical self-bricolage that is both informed by, and generative of, queer perspectives 
and practices.  
Eros and Sexuality Education 
Before there was sexuality there was eros. Before there was sexuality education there 
were the erotic arts. Long before sex became the property of science, or was thought in 
terms of health and wellbeing, what we now term sexuality was figured within the 
modality of the aesthetic as the erotic—a mode of interacting with the world that 
celebrates “the pleasure of finding ourselves harboured within it” (Bersani, 2010, p. 
153), while accepting, even welcoming, the inescapable risks and dangers attendant 
upon doing so. Thus, although sex and sexuality as categories of thought are largely 
inventions of the nineteenth century—the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), for 
example, gives 1797 as the date of the first recorded occurrence of the term ‘sexuality’ 
in written English—a rich historical archive attests to the fact that “from its earliest 
records, Western culture has been replete with the stories and images of eros, and there 
has been no shortage of teachings and treatises dedicated to the topic” (Bartsch & 
Bartscherer, 2005, p. 1).  
Taking its name from Ἔρως, the often winged Greek god of love, whose mission it was 
“to trouble the hearts of men” (Grimal, 1986, p. 153), either by wounding them with his 
arrows or inflaming them with his torch, the concept of eros as it has developed over 
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time has been consistently linked to physical longing and sexual pleasure, but, more 
recently, also to the queer. If, as we have seen, the queer is always troublant or 
disturbing, it is eros that “makes the familiar ground of our now queered sexual 
knowledge strange again, restoring its rifts, its instabilities, and its flaws” (Huffer, 
2016, pp. 110–111). In other words, it is the erotic, with its origins in unreason and 
divine madness, that still manages to pull the rug out from under any attempts to 
domesticate sex or explain its unintelligibility away by subjecting it to “the rational 
language of sexuality” (Huffer, 2016, p. 110). As Anne Carson argues, Greek lyric, 
tragic and comedic poetry consistently presents eros as “an experience that assaults the 
lover from without and proceeds to take control of his body, his mind and the quality of 
his life” (Carson, 1998, p. 148). It is in the context of this madness—“the best and 
noblest of all the forms that possession by god can take” (Plato, ca. 370 B.C.E./1997a, 
p. 527), Socrates declares—that Greek thinkers, including Plato, debated the educative 
significance of erotic mania in relation to the chaos that the loss of self-mastery 
inevitably brought with it. If—in Plato’s Phaedrus—Socrates concludes that “in fact 
the best things we have come from madness, when it is given as a gift of the god” 
(Plato, ca. 370 B.C.E./1997a, p. 522), this is because madness from a god, including 
erotic disturbance, enables human beings to share in the god’s life and gifts. 
Contrariwise, self-mastery and self-possession are no guarantees of success or quality, 
for, as Socrates observes, “self-controlled verses will be eclipsed by the poetry of men 
who have been driven out of their minds” (Plato, ca. 370 B.C.E./1997a, p. 523). Thus, 
from the beginning, erotic madness—with its attendant violence—is closely intertwined 
with both literary production and representation: 
The poets represent eros as an invasion, an illness, an insanity, a wild animal, a 
natural disaster. His action is to melt, break down, bite into, burn, devour, wear 
away, whirl around, sting, pierce, wound, poison, suffocate, drag off or grind 
the lover to a powder. Eros employs nets, arrows, fire, hammers, hurricanes, 
fevers, boxing gloves or bits and bridles in making his assault. No one can fight 
Eros off. (Carson, 1998, p. 148)  
Yet, as the aforesaid archive also serves to remind us, eros and the erotic arts have 
always been closely linked with the broader question of how might philosophy and 
literature assist us to entertain “passionate or erotic relations with ourselves and with 
others” (Rajchman, 1991, p. 1). Eros, thus positioned, belongs to thinking and the 
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imagination as much as it belongs to sexuality, to desire as well as to pleasure, and to 
the pursuit of truth and an ethical way of living that goes beyond the acquisition of 
knowledge. As Carson puts it: 
There would seem to be some resemblance between the way Eros acts in the 
mind of a lover and the way knowing acts in the mind of a thinker. It has been 
an endeavour of philosophy from the time of Sokrates to understand the nature 
and uses of that resemblance. (Carson, 1998, p. 70) 
If working with the imagination pushes the subject to depart from secure ways of 
thinking and fly in the face of reason in order to accommodate new and potentially 
overwhelming insights, then coming under the sway of eros leads the same subject to 
forsake the stability of familiar ground on the basis of an uncertain promise that a more 
hopeful and pleasurable future—one different from any previously imagined or planned 
for the self—is possible. Such a future, then, “might involve going astray, getting lost, 
or even becoming queer” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 21). To claim that eros is bound up with 
‘becoming queer’ in ways that exceed questions of sexual identity or orientation—
“queer is by definition whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the 
dominant” (Halperin, 1995, p. 62)—is to affirm that unrestrained erotic desire is 
heedless of all norms, always ready to veer away from the straight and narrow path, 
from what is morally and socially acceptable. Because “to think deeply about eros 
requires that one pay heed to many voices and a plurality of expressive modes” 
(Bartsch & Bartscherer, 2005, p. 2), all of which work to pull the feeling and thinking 
subject hither and yon, it follows that eros is inevitably entangled with variety, paradox 
and ambivalence. 
While Plato’s Symposium (ca. 385 B.C.E./1997b) exemplifies the best attempts by 
Greek rationalist philosophers to come to terms with the complex demands of eros, 
specifically the polyvocalities of “erotic love, or better, passionate desire” within male 
sexual and social relationships, it also affirms and explores such relationships “as a 
potentially positive vehicle for education” (Sheffield, 2006, pp. 2, 3). This is the case, 
not only because, when properly ordered, the erastes (the lover) / eromenos (the 
beloved) binary was believed to provide an appropriate conduit for the transmission of 
virtue from one generation of Athenian—male—citizens to the next, but also because 
relationships thus configured furnished those involved with opportunities to reflect on 
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the ways in which desire shapes human choices, leading them through the pursuit of the 
kalon, the ideal physical or moral beauty, into the realm of the aesthetic. In this 
educative process, the imagination, like eros from which it cannot be successfully 
disentangled, clearly plays an important if often unstated role. For it is the imagination 
which enables the lover to stretch his mind to contemplate beautiful things and, thereby, 
ascend through various stages of learning “like rising stairs . . . so that in the end he 
comes to know just what it is to be beautiful” (Plato, ca. 385 B.C.E./1997b, p. 493). 
Thus, in establishing a “connection between an erotic relationship, an appreciation of 
the kalon, and a striving for virtue” (Sheffield, 2006, p. 17), Plato, while making the 
point that our desires, to the extent that they embody both our beliefs and values, are a 
significant component of our ethical lives, directs readers to frame erotic relationships 
in aesthetic as well as ethical terms. In doing so, he gives to eros an aesthetic 
significance that moves it beyond the physical. As David Halperin observes, in the 
context of Platonic eros, “desire ultimately aims not at bodily contact but at self-
transcendence” (Halperin, 2005, p. 52). 
Carson is also keen to tie eros to the aesthetic. In arguing that “the most astounding 
thing about eros” is its operation “by means of an analogous act of imagination” 
(Carson, 1998, p. 61), she claims that eros always behaves paradoxically, incessantly 
reaching across gaps and discontinuities, generating juxtaposing opposites which the 
imagination then attempts to resolve through metaphor. Eros, in other words, acts 
queerly. As she acknowledges eros’ ability to move us in the direction of that which we 
desire—“whether in the future as hope or in the past as memory”—Carson affirms that 
“imagination is the core of desire” (Carson, 1998, pp. 63, 77), operating as it does in the 
mode of the aesthetic, through acts of reading and writing as well as the other arts, to 
extend desire’s reach. If imaginative effort resembles erotic action, it is because all 
kinds of thinkers and artists—like lovers—are drawn beyond “what is known and 
present to something else, something different, something desired” (Carson, 1998, p. 
86), towards something ultimately impossible to grasp or capture. 
The work both of the imagination and of eros is activated by “a desire to bring the 
absent into presence” (Carson, 1998, p. 111). This not only involves collapsing “far and 
near” (Carson, 1998, p. 111), but also bringing together past and present—endeavours 
that have traditionally been regarded as the work of the imagination within the domain 
of the aesthetic. It is disappointing, if not surprising, therefore, that the imagination and 
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eros have been marginalized by the modern science of sexuality and its off-shoot 
sexuality education – both of which to a large extent are driven by bio-medical 
influences. If, in the period between Descartes and Freud, sexuality emerges both as a 
discourse in its own right and a distinct field worthy of scientific study, it is only at the 
end of the nineteenth century with the formulation of the paradigms of 
psychoanalysis—“a melding of hard science and hermeneutics” (Bartsch & 
Bartscherer, 2005, p. 2)—that “eros is eventually swallowed up by bio-logos” (Huffer, 
2009, p. 136), that is, the urge to convert biological instincts into knowledge. With the 
determination that all erotic phenomena have their genesis in nature and biology, the 
notion of eros is easily dismissed as pre-scientific, “not-quite-rational” (Huffer, 2013, p. 
451), and, hence, deemed to be outmoded. At best, eros is relegated to a minor if 
somewhat mysterious role in the “prehistory of the ‘primal’” (Rajchman, 1991, p. 108) 
by the likes of Freud and his followers. In a parallel process, the imagination comes to 
be regarded as a similarly untrustworthy pathway to any sort of truth because it, too, is 
aligned with unreason and the aesthetic rather than with science and the rational.  
The Will to Knowledge, the first book of Michel Foucault’s massively influential three-
volume, but incomplete, project on the history of sexuality, throws a helpful light on 
what appears to be an on-going dynamic of de-eroticization. In delineating “two great 
procedures for producing the truth of sex” (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 57) that have 
operated throughout history, Foucault seeks to explain the apparent eclipse of the erotic 
in Western societies. If in Foucault’s opinion, the West has concerned itself—
increasingly so in recent centuries—with the production of a scientia sexualis, a science 
of sexuality that is premised on “the desire not so much to have sex as to understand it” 
(Taylor, 2017, p. 11), it has done so at the expense of an ars erotica where “truth is 
drawn from pleasure itself” (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 57) rather than from the 
proliferation and categorization of any knowledge pertaining to sexuality. From a 
Foucauldian perspective, the West’s attempt to understand sexuality in relation to 
power through the advancement of a scientia sexualis—a move that casts aside “the 
ancient erotic lexicon” (Huffer, 2016, p. 108) cultivated over many centuries in “China, 
Japan, India, Rome, [and] the Arabo-Moslem societies”—is best interpreted as an effort 
to keep pleasure, “evaluated in terms of its intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its 
reverberations in the body and the soul” (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 57), secret. In other 
words, eros is presented as “a disappearance” (Huffer, 2013, p. 449). For, as Huffer 
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explains, with the emergence of a science of sexuality, “eros becomes the name for that 
which is lost in the moral rationalization of modern sexuality as the site of our 
intelligibility” (Huffer, 2013, p. 449). In this process, the aesthetic lexicon, so closely 
bound to the erotic, also falls from favour in discourses of sex and sexuality. 
In the face of this apparent loss of eros, while there may be a strong temptation to 
retreat to the historical archive in order to retrieve “those bodily practices or forms of 
relation that resemble what we think eros might have once been” (Huffer, 2013, p. 
449), such an approach, Foucault suggests, is based not only on a nostalgia for a culture 
that imposed severe constraints and inequalities on non-citizens—slaves and women 
among them—but also on a misconception that it is possible “to recuperate an original 
form of thought and to conceive the Greek world apart from Christian phenomena” 
(Foucault, 1996d, p. 469). No matter how attractive they seem, attempts to capture an 
erotic past are doomed to failure because in chasing eros we are forced not only to 
confront eros’ otherness, but also “the alterity of a history ruptured by epistemic breaks 
that cannot be bridged” (Huffer, 2013, p. 449). Though, while we are unable to access, 
either directly or entirely, lost forms or expressions of eros, what still remains is the 
possibility of returning to the Greeks in order to bring about “a shaking up of the 
ground on which we think and live” (Foucault, 1996d, p. 470)—this by deploying eros 
as a concept to “think about thinking as a practice of change” (Huffer, 2010, p. 263).  
By conceiving of “an alternative thinking and practice of life within the subjectivated 
living called biopower” (Huffer, 2009, p. 130), traces of the erotic may still be 
discerned everywhere by those with ‘a queer eye’, thus testifying to the ability of the 
erotic to evade those forces that seek to organize and control life as bios. For, despite its 
best efforts to dismiss eros “as the unintelligible form of a fading unreason” (Huffer, 
2013, p. 449), the scientia sexualis, nevertheless, produces and cultivates an eros and an 
ars erotica peculiarly its own. This is apparent in scientia sexualis’ efforts to manage 
people’s sexual lives by way of inducements to self-revelation—for example, through 
its calls for them to confess in a great variety of fora, if no longer their sexual sins, then 
their sexual desires and practices—and in its enquiries “into people’s intimate lives, 
into the secrets of their bodies and souls” (Taylor, 2017, p. 37). If the processes of 
eroticization brought into play by a science of sexuality are most clearly observed in the 
medicalization of sexuality, and in sexuality’s very susceptibility to domination by the 
forces of the new religions of psychoanalysis and psychiatry, they are also apparent, as 
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Foucault suggests, in specifically pedagogical situations where “saying no to all 
wayward or unproductive sexualities” has “traced around bodies and sexes, not 
boundaries to be crossed, but perpetual spirals of power and pleasure” (Foucault, 
1976/1998, p. 45). It is in the context of the attractions, evasions, and incitements 
circulating in pedagogical relationships that the queer carries out the work once 
performed by eros—making sexuality strange again by persisting in movement that is 
both transversal and transgressive.  
Given that educational institutions are “delineated areas of extreme sexual saturation” 
(Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 46)—spaces that generate discourse explicitly informed by an 
authoritative scientia sexualis, or at least discourse bearing some semblance to the 
quasi-scientific—it is inevitable that sexuality education classrooms operate as theatres 
of self-revelation. In other words, they tend to feature and advance, either directly or 
indirectly, such scrutinizing activities as analysis and self-analysis; the taxonomizing 
and labelling of sexualities, both normal and deviant; and the treatment of sexuality, not 
only as central to health and wellbeing, but also as key to explaining human nature, 
character and identity. However, although scientia sexualis’ promotion of “the use of 
clinical language allowed sex to become a pedagogical domain—sex education—while 
remaining in the bounds of professional propriety” (Taylor, 2017, p. 26), the science of 
sexuality has never succeeded in completely eliminating eros from the sexuality 
education classroom. For, as Huffer argues, eros always manages to “re-emerge, in the 
historical present, as an atemporal rupture,” that is, “as the lightning-quick flash of a 
‘mad’ mode of knowing” (Huffer, 2013, p. 449).  
The fact remains that sexuality education classrooms are spaces where intimacies may 
be shared and sexual secrets sometimes exchanged, where “the interplay of powers and 
pleasures” (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 46) is stimulated through a self-revelation of one 
sort or another—or, perhaps, through the refusal to participate in such discourse. For 
example, one subject’s act of confession—whereby a set of sexual possibilities, 
positions or perspectives is claimed for the self as others are resisted—in turn, incites 
“the proliferation of specific pleasures and the multiplication of disparate sexualities” 
(Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 49) among other subjects who themselves are mimetically 
drawn either to self-exposure or to keeping hidden certain aspects of themselves. In 
such a milieu, the fleeting opportunities and risks arising from that ‘madness’ attendant 
upon a mode of knowing stimulated by eros should not be disregarded, but queerly and 
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expectantly put to use by a pedagogy which allows itself to be “conditioned by the 
remuant” (Bojesen, 2016, p. 17), that is, by the provisional. By taking account of that 
which is “changeable, restless and fickle,” a remuant pedagogy recognizes that “risk 
and fate are always visitant” (Bojesen, 2016, p. 17)—especially, I would suggest, in 
those sexuality classrooms where outcome oriented and value-based pedagogies 
dominate to the extent that the uncertainties and vagaries associated with the queer 
movement of eros are either blindly ignored, anxiously suppressed, or unconvincingly 
explained away. 
If, in the light of Foucault’s argument, it is fair to conclude that psychological, 
psychiatric and pedagogical discourses about sex have flourished since the nineteenth 
century because—like the scientia sexualis which produced them—they were 
“profoundly complicit with storytelling, embracing a theory of desire based on an 
insatiable hunger and striving that binds it indissolubly to narrative forms” (Doherty, 
1996, p. 138), then this observation has significance for twenty-first century sexuality 
education classes in New Zealand and elsewhere. For, notwithstanding calls for 
“experiments with new materialist ideas in an attempt to decentre the human and bring 
matter to the fore in sexuality education research and practice” (Allen, 2018b, p. 20), 
there is much to be gained, I believe, from attending both to “the art of making sex 
speak, of transforming its affects into stories” (Doherty, 1996, p. 138), and to the art of 
listening to sex speak, which is developed through literary reading.  
However, my argument is not so much that the reading of fiction is beneficial because 
it submits human desire to “the rigours of hermeneutic interrogation” (Doherty, 1996, 
p. 138), enabling reading subjects, for example, to recognize and understand the 
processes by which sexual discourses constitute their identities. Rather, I emphasize 
that desires may be rearranged, and eros—in the guise of queer—brought into play 
through an engagement with literary texts, particularly fiction. All this becomes 
possible in the context of a broader, more expansive approach to sexuality education, 
one that aligns with the work of what have been called the new humanities—which, as 
Derrida reminds us, are tasked not only with rethinking the future of thinking, but also 
with making ready the way for “an irruption that punctures the horizon” (Derrida, 
2001, p. 53), that is, an interruption of expectations and conventions for which literary 
reading prepares us. In this, I am mindful of Eve Sedgwick’s call for reparative rather 
than paranoid approaches to reading the world and its texts. Like Sedgwick, I do not 
61 
 
claim that every bad thing can be repaired or turned into a pleasure, but that readers of 
the world and of texts benefit from an openness to the possibility of pleasure even 
amidst the most seemingly negative situations. Thus, readings premised on the notion 
that pleasure may be gained from the recognition that desires are always shifting, never 
permanent, do more than honour eros as “bittersweet” (Carson, 1998, p. 3); they 
validate—and are in turn validated by—a sexuality education that remains existentially 
affirmative, especially insofar as its pedagogy “is ultimately and can only ever be the 
teaching of existence and can never offer a way out of existence, even if it can change 
that which is” (Bojesen, 2016, p. 21). 
Aesthetics of Existence, Care of the Self, and Sexuality Education  
In taking on the task of reimagining sexuality education through the aesthetic and the 
queer, I wish to make it clear that I do not want to eliminate ethical or epistemological 
perspectives from the field, but rather seek to reframe these concerns in the light of the 
Foucauldian argument that “we must create ourselves, our lives, as a work of art guided 
by aesthetic values and stylistic criteria that make other kinds of experience possible” 
(Ambrosio, 2008, p. 252). As I do so, I am mindful of W. B. Yeats’ insistence: “Myself 
must I remake” (Yeats, 1938/1992, p. 348). Tellingly, Spivak lifts these words from 
Yeats’ poem, ‘An Acre of Grass,’ for the title of her own study of the life and works of 
the eminent Irishman, thus, emphasizing the elderly poet’s attempts—through his close 
attention to language and aesthetic form—at “the forging of a new personality to meet 
death” (Spivak, 1974, p. 167). While I follow Foucault’s line that an ethical self-
formation—that is, “an exercise of the self on the self, by which one attempts to 
develop and transform oneself, and to attain to a certain mode of being” (Foucault, 
1996c, p. 433)—is neither hardly separable conceptually and in practice from what he 
styles as “an aesthetics of existence” (Foucault, 1984/1992, pp. 12, 89), nor from the 
pursuit of knowledge of the self, I am also conscious that like Yeats, Spivak and 
Bersani in their different ways attest to the invaluable role performed by literature in 
the practice of self-making and re-making.  
In drawing heavily on Foucault in my efforts to rethink sexuality education through the 
aesthetic and the queer, I do so in the light of his project on the history of sexuality, 
which, as Gautam argues, has been “decisive in setting the agenda for a history of 
sexuality not only in the West, but for much of the rest of the world” (Gautam, 2016, p. 
2). More specifically, Foucault’s project attempts to explain the experience of sex and 
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sexuality in Western culture, including their emergence and development as historically 
given objects, as well as their “instances and transformations” (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 
12) in discursive production. If, as we have already seen, volume one, The Will to 
Knowledge, focuses on the ways in which power constitutes sex and sexuality through 
apparatuses of control, especially discourse—confession, admission, statements of 
truth, for example—volumes two and three, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the 
Self, emphasize “the unbinding of the self” (Caillat, 2015, p. 19) through the practice of 
care of the self. In turning my attention to the Foucauldian concept of self-care, it is 
with the intention not only of making links between Foucault’s work on sex and the 
potential contribution of Spivak and Bersani to the reimagining of sexuality education, 
but also of positioning myself as a queer researcher and queer self-bricoleur in relation 
to the work that I undertake in this thesis.  
If, in Foucault’s view, Descartes’ Cogito privileges self-knowledge over care of the 
self, thus, establishing self-evidence as the only valid basis for philosophical inquiry, it 
also leads to the unhappy rejection of aesthetics—as well as erotics and spirituality, 
too— as legitimate pathways to the truth. In his own later work, including the second 
and third volumes of his history of sexuality as well as various interviews, Foucault 
challenges this assumption by arguing that in Antiquity, “caring for oneself, finding 
one’s pleasure in oneself, being the friend of oneself” (Roach, 2012, p. 30) were 
foundational to morality and, therefore, every bit as important as self-knowledge in an 
aesthetics of existence. This is because, in Foucault’s view, aesthetics function as “a 
medium of the self’s relation with itself” (Gautam, 2016, p. 210). 
While Foucault’s resurrection and rethinking of the notion of care of the self as a way 
of life, including its telos of self-mastery, has sometimes been criticized for advancing 
“an egoistic or resigned retreat into individualism” (Roach, 2012, p. 30), such a 
negative assessment of Foucault’s position fails to take account of his argument that 
among the Greeks and Romans care of the self, although always the responsibility of 
the individual, was seen as having incalculable social benefits. For, as Foucault 
explains, “a person who took proper care of himself would, by the same token, be able 
to conduct himself properly in relation to others and for others” (Foucault, 1996c, p. 
437). In a similar vein, Foucault warns that care of the self “cannot in itself tend toward 
so exaggerated a form of self-love as to neglect others or, worse still, to abuse one’s 
power over them” (Foucault, 1996c, p. 438).  
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Given, then, that for Foucault, notions such as an aesthetics of existence and the care of 
the self imply that the way we live—including our behaviour and the nature of our 
relationships with others—will take a particular shape or form which is “the aesthetic 
dimension of ethical practice” (Ambrosio, 2008, p. 256), they also delineate spaces 
where “practices of freedom by which one could define what is sexual pleasure and 
erotic, amorous and passionate relationships with others” (Foucault, 1996c, p. 433) are 
able to be explored. Thus, in the context of an aesthetics of existence or the care of the 
self it becomes possible and necessary that work which addresses matters of sex and 
sexuality be undertaken “by the self upon itself” (Besley, 2005, p. 79). Because it 
strives for freedom—a certain mode of being—rather than for the release of “a hidden 
self or inner nature or essence” (Besley, 2005, p. 79) that is somehow trapped, 
repressed, or alienated, such work must not be confused with liberation. 
In noting common threads running through Foucault’s notion of an aesthetics of 
existence, Spivak’s project of aesthetic education, and Bersani’s reconceptualization of 
sex as a mode of the aesthetic, I suggest that Spivak and Bersani, like Foucault, not 
only think the ethical in relation to the aesthetic, but also align themselves, at least 
tacitly, with the Foucauldian premise that the Delphic Oracle’s injunction to ‘know 
yourself’—gnōthi seauton—demands the adoption of a set of self-practices enabling 
one to ‘take care of oneself’ or be concerned with oneself, epimeleisthai sautou (see 
Foucault, 2000b, p. 226). Underlying the various practices of self-care promoted by 
Foucault—“models proposed for setting up and developing relationships with the self, 
for self-reflection, self-knowledge, self-examination, for the decipherment of the self by 
oneself, for the transformations one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object” 
(Foucault, 1984/1992, p. 29)—is a form of ascesis that is neither coercive nor 
renunciative, but which, nevertheless, always seeks “‘to release oneself from one self’ 
(se déprendre de soi-même)” (Rabinow, 2000, p. xxxviii) by rearranging desires and 
displacing unproductive habits. If, as Rabinow suggests, Foucault’s ascesis is best 
explained as “disassembling the self”—because this term “highlights the material and 
relational aspects of this exercise”—it is important to note, as Rabinow goes on to 
elaborate, that this ascesis implies “a form of continual self-bricolage” (Rabinow, 
2000, pp. xxxviii, xxxix). For, at any point in time and space the self is being formed 
and reformed through an ongoing “making and re-making of subjectivity” (Baker, 
2015, p. 1).  
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This self-bricolage, however, in no way implies a process of self-discovery—there is 
no essential self to be found—rather, it suggests that the subject is involved in its own 
construction, not only by appropriating methods, strategies and resources from the 
concrete possibilities which present themselves in any given situation, but also by 
inventing new tools along the way or improvising with old ones as circumstances 
dictate. As Lévi-Strauss, the French anthropologist and ethnologist who rejigged the 
concept of bricolage in order to account for what he saw as typical patterns of 
mythological thought, explains, “the elements which the ‘bricoleur’ collects and uses 
are ‘pre-constrained’” (Lévi-Strauss, 1962/1966, p. 19). The same holds true for all 
engaged in ascesis, who must be ready to adopt and adapt whatever “practices of the 
self” or “forms of self-activity” are available to them for “the forming of oneself as an 
ethical subject” (Foucault, 1984/1992, p. 28). Given that ethical subjectivity requires 
“an elaboration of the self by the self, a studious transformation, a slow and arduous 
transformation through a constant care for the truth” (Foucault, 1996b, p. 461), it is fair 
to say that this process involves the sort of self-examination and self-struggle that finds 
a parallel in artistic endeavour. By emphasizing that genuine self-care requires that 
attention be given to aesthetic as well as to ascetical practices—in fact, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, ascesis and aesthetics are barely separable—Foucault, in 
advancing the premise that sexuality is as much an aesthetic as it is an ethical concern, 
establishes a foundation upon which I build an argument of my own: namely, that 
sexuality education presents itself as a suitable nexus for “the development of what 
might be called a ‘cultivation of the self’” (Foucault, 1984/1990, p. 43), including 
through literary reading. This, I suggest, is because the field of sexuality education is 
well-positioned to encourage the practice of a type of self-bricolage that is able to take 
advantage of the theoretical tools provided by Spivak and Bersani, as well as of the 
many useful conceptual ‘implements’ sourced from other thinkers and writers, literary 
and philosophical. 
If the creative arts “have historically been a domain of self-enquiry, self-exploration 
and, so called, ‘self-transformation’” (Baker, 2015, p. 2), then Foucault’s insistence in 
his later work (exemplified in the epigraph the heads this chapter) that sexuality is not 
only a discourse that forms us, but “something that we ourselves create—it is our own 
creation, and much more than the discovery of a secret side of our desire” (Foucault, 
1996a, p. 382) should be understood as a deliberate attempt to position sexuality as an 
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aesthetic as well as an ethical practice. In claiming that “with our desires, through our 
desires, go new forms of love, new forms of creation” (Foucault, 1996a, p. 382), 
Foucault not only affords desire a crucial role in the production of the new, but also 
appears to reject his own earlier and somewhat negative articulation that “sexuality is a 
fissure—not one that surrounds us as the basis of our isolation or individuality but one 
that marks the limit within us and designates us as a limit” (Foucault, 2000a, p. 70). In 
directing us away from any part that sexuality might play in delimiting the self, 
Foucault presents us instead with the possibility of creating new forms of social and 
cultural life through the sexual decisions we make.  
Sexual choices, for Foucault, are aesthetic, insofar as they give form to “relationships 
of differentiation, of creation, of innovation” (Foucault, 1996a, p. 385). For gay people, 
Foucault argues, these “new forms of life, relationships, friendships in society, art, 
culture and so on” come about not so much by claiming an identity as by affirming “a 
creative force” (Foucault, 1996a, p. 383) that eschews essentialism. In presenting 
sexuality this way—as an enterprise better appreciated as “the art of life than a science 
or scientific knowledge (or pseudo-scientific knowledge)”—Foucault dares us to 
recognize sexuality as a queer force, for example, by calling for “the desexualisation of 
pleasure” through sadomasochistic practices (S/M), which to the extent that they 
“produce pleasure with very odd things, very strange parts of our bodies, in very 
unusual situations, and so on” (Foucault, 1996a, pp. 382, 384) become tools of queer 
ascesis, queer self-bricolage. In emphasizing that the Foucauldian subject is produced 
through an ongoing ascesis, I do so with the intent of exploring what a queer ascesis 
might look like, not only in regard to cultivating a queer self, but also in the context of 
the queering of sexuality education, especially through its exposure to the ideas of 
Spivak and Bersani. However, before considering the contributions of Spivak and 
Bersani to this line of thinking and the practices associated with it, it is helpful to 
examine the role that “technologies of the self” (Foucault, 2000b, pp. 223–251) play in 
Foucauldian self-care. 
Technologies of the Self and Practices of Self-Care 
When Foucault employs the term ‘technologies of the self,’ he does so in relation to 
those practices which allow “individuals to effect by their own means or with the help 
of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain 
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state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault, 2000b, p. 
225). In other words, technologies of the self serve the telos of self-transformation, 
including the realization of “new forms of relationships, new forms of love, new forms 
of creation” (Foucault, 1996a, p. 382). However, while Foucault regards not just S/M 
but also what he calls “good drugs” (Foucault, 1996a, p. 384) as legitimate technologies 
for use in the cultivation or care of the self—especially when subjects experiment with 
pleasure and its possibilities so as “to create a new cultural life underneath the ground 
of our sexual choices” (Foucault, 1996a, pp. 382–383)—not all technologies of the self 
and their associated practices are as controversial or as potentially dangerous. Thus, in 
suggesting that the notion of technologies of the self is helpful when attempting to 
reimagine sexuality education queerly, I do so without any intention of advocating for 
the inclusion of S/M practices in teaching and learning programmes in New Zealand 
schools, or of opening up discussion about the use of ‘good’ drugs as a safe means of 
creating new pleasures. Instead, I take up Foucault’s notion of technologies of the self 
and the practices of self-formation which they support because, as Besley argues, they 
imply a way of constituting the self that flies in the face of “an instrumental 
understanding of technology” (Besley, 2005, p. 78)—a persuasively dominant model in 
neoliberal education.  
Being both aesthetic and ethical in their reach—aesthetic, in that they attend to the self 
or subject not as an essence or substance, but as “a form . . . not primarily or always 
identical to itself” (Foucault, 1996c, p. 440); and ethical, because they “emphasize 
practices of freedom” (Foucault, 1996c, p. 433)—Foucault’s technologies of the self 
and practices of self-formation stand in sharp contrast to much of what happens in 
education today. Indeed, although The New Zealand Curriculum (2007) and its parallel 
document for Māori-medium schools, Te Marautanga o Aotearoa (Te Tāhuhu o te 
Mātauranga, 2007), both “start with visions of young people who will develop the 
competencies they need for study, work, and lifelong learning and go on to realize their 
potential” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 6), they appear to place the emphasis less on 
subjectification—which concerns itself with “the ways in which students can be(come) 
subjects in their own right and not just remain objects of the desires and directions of 
others” (Biesta, 2017b, p. 28)—than on extending the domains of qualification and 
socialization. This being so, like Besley, I hold that Foucault’s “model of the care of the 
self in relation to practices of freedom” (Besley, 2005, p. 86) provides schools with a 
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sound philosophical basis for the sorts of aesthetico-ethical approaches and 
investigations that may very well prove fruitful in addressing issues of subjectification, 
especially in the context of a sexuality education that is required to promote and 
support “the wellbeing of the students themselves, other people, and society” 
(Education Review Office, 2018, p. 5). But this is only the case if sexuality educators 
are prepared to read documents such as The New Zealand Curriculum and ERO’s 
Promoting wellbeing through sexuality education against the grain—by faithfully 
attending to the work of piecing together bits of old things in new ways, and always 
with the intention of generating divergent rather than convergent meanings in order to 
queer what they find between their covers. 
In proposing that Foucault’s technologies of the self and practices of self-formation are 
able to assist in the reimagining and queering of sexuality education, I recognize that 
these also provide an invaluable reference point for the exploration of Spivak’s 
aesthetic education and of Bersani’s notion of sex as a modality of the aesthetic. For, 
despite their different emphases and nuances, the approaches adopted by all three 
theorists in regard to sex and sexuality are, broadly speaking, “aesthetico-ethical” 
(Baker, 2015, p. 2). If, as O’Leary explains, “for Foucault, the ethical practice which is 
called for by our contemporary situation is aesthetic quite simply by virtue of the fact 
that it involves, as do all artistic practices, the giving of form” (O’Leary, 2002, p. 131), 
this is also true of Spivak and Bersani, who in their pursuit of the aesthetico-ethical are 
careful to attend to form or structure, distinguishing these, as they both do, from related 
concepts such as essence, identity and content. Thus, attention to form provides both 
Spivak and Bersani with a mechanism, not so much for harmonizing the ethical and the 
aesthetic, but for managing any perceived necessity of having to prioritize the one over 
the other. 
Spivak’s aesthetic education, for example, attends to the ways in which a literary work 
advances its argument through “figuration or figuring-forth,” that is, “through its form, 
through images, metaphors, and indeed its general rhetoricity” (Spivak, 2012, p. 38). In 
describing her own project as a persistent and formal effort to train the imagination in 
the classroom, Spivak expresses her conviction that the imagination is prepared for 
epistemological performance not through “information command” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 1, 
62) or retrieval, but by acquiring a facility in the forms and structures of language, 
including the role of literature in constructing the human subject as “an island of 
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languaging” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 492, 493). Just as her aesthetic education speaks of “a 
structure of responsibility”—and addresses “structures of feeling and desires,” rather 
than dealing directly with affects—so it is reliant on readers making “a serious 
linguistic effort to enter the epistemic structures presupposed by a text” (Spivak, 2012, 
pp. 190, 131, 452). For Spivak, the imagination upon which her aesthetic education 
depends is itself a structure, albeit one which remains always “unverifiable” (Spivak, 
2012, p. 104).  
If Spivak’s aesthetic education takes account of the unavoidable double bind 
encountered in the relationship between “an unconditional ethics and an open 
aesthetics,” this is because in claiming “ethics as experience of the impossible—
therefore incalculable” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 18, 349), she recognizes that ethical concerns 
are primarily a matter of relationship rather than of knowledge. Preparation for “the 
mysterious responsibility of ethics” (Spivak, 2012, p. 233) is preparation for living in 
relation with the unknown and unknowable. Hence, Spivak attends carefully to 
instances where there is no apparent or assumed relation, speaking often of 
“relationship without relationship” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 9, 365), “relationship without 
relation” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 11, 380), or “relations without relations” (Spivak, 2012, p. 
470). Encounters with the aesthetic train the imagination to approach the unknown and 
unknowable other—and, in doing so, teach the subject to patiently inhabit the tensions 
of the double bind rather than rush to sacrifice the ethical in the name of the aesthetic, 
or the aesthetic in the name of the ethical. For Spivak, then, the aesthetic gives form to 
the impossible by permitting us to think the double bind. Although challenging, such 
ideas are well worth grappling with, for in opening up sexuality education to the 
possibility that selves can be made and remade through “techniques of self-othering 
toward new collectivities” (Butt, 2015, pp. 1, 4), they also ensure that Foucault’s notion 
of care of the self is framed in such a way that the personal and the individual are 
conceptualized in the light of that which is always other, always beyond, always yet-to-
come. Thinking along these lines serves as preparation for living in relations without 
relations, that is, of living queerly. Thus, Spivak contributes in her own unique way to 
Foucault’s legacy. 
Similarly, Bersani, in speaking of “a new relational mode that might be the result of an 
aesthetic subjectification,” points to the need to develop perspectives and practices that 
would enable a subject to lose himself “in order to find himself again (but now 
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unidentifiable) disseminated among the appearances of the visible world” (Bersani, 
2010, p. 69). In doing so, Bersani is, perhaps, mindful of Foucault’s warning that it is 
not possible simply to translate technologies of the self that are found “in pagan and 
early Christian practice” (Foucault, 2000b, p. 224) into modern life—both thinkers 
recognize that fresh approaches are necessary. Bersani in his own pursuit of new 
relational modes clearly sees the benefit in abandoning the concept of “a psychological 
subject” (Bersani, 2010, p. 70)—which since the time of Freud and through the 
discourse of psychoanalysis has worked to reinforce the belief that sexuality is 
somehow constitutive of what is assumed to be a subject’s deep or core identity. By 
exploring in his own writing “how art can in effect position us as aesthetic rather than 
psychoanalytically defined subjects within the world”—an investigation which leads 
him to the conclusion not only that sex can be conceptualized as a modality of the 
aesthetic, but that the aesthetic subject is “a mode of relational being that exceeds the 
cultural province of art and embodies truths of being” (Bersani, 2010, p. 142)—Bersani 
is able to challenge the received notion that the subject is “a stable individualizing 
entity” (Bersani, 2010, p. 70), while at the same time calling for the sexual subject’s re-
cultivation as an aesthetic subject. As Bersani sees it, the ‘beyond’ of sexuality is 
located in the aesthetic. In order, therefore, to facilitate the repositioning of sex as a 
modality of the aesthetic, Bersani forges his own set of technologies of the self. These 
he theorizes in terms of movement and spatial relations.  
Like Spivak’s concept of teleiopoiesis or her notion of ‘relations without relations,’ 
Bersani’s attempts at delineating a self-aestheticization—one that reconceptualizes sex 
in relation to the aesthetic—imply an outward orientation, rather than a movement that 
is directed inwards; an extension or expansion, not a contraction or withdrawal; a 
depersonalizing of the self, not a self-discovery; a dispersal of the subject, not an 
intensification. If the predominant dynamic of Bersani’s process of self-aestheticization 
is markedly centrifugal, that is, it necessitates in its dispersive, outward projection the 
“relinquishing [of] established foci of attention” (Tuhkanen, 2014b, p. 17), this is 
because centripetal movement—which causes the subject to contract and withdraw into 
itself in an effort to establish or reaffirm a core identity—results in the subject missing 
out on the “pleasurable and diversified extensibility of the body in space” (Bersani & 
Dutoit, 1998, p. 64). Thus, for Bersani, just as “centripetal and centrifugal forces . . . at 
times define, and at times destroy, personhood” (Love, 2014, p. 47), so also do they 
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provide him with a conceptual apparatus that allows for the refiguring of sex as a 
modality of the aesthetic and in choreographic terms. This is because they enable sex to 
be thought of as movement—physical, psychic and social—away from the centre and 
towards the peripheries.  
Just as the ability to manipulate language is a key tool in Spivak’s efforts at “training 
the imagination for epistemological performance” (Spivak, 2012, p. 122), so, too, is it 
indispensable in Bersani’s process of evacuating and relativizing the centre. For, as 
Bersani admits, language is “dangerously centrifugal,” countering as it does centripetal 
movement, which marks “an obsession with the very notion of centres or sources 
themselves” (Bersani, 1970, p. 22). Thus, in a literary work, when language is 
“maximally diversified” (Bersani, 1970, p. 20), room is made for the re-fashioning of 
the self—both the writing ‘self’ and the reading ‘self’—as multiple and mutually 
contesting. This is, in part, because literary reading, by provoking “a certain 
depersonalizing of the personal,” creates opportunities for self-invention through “the 
pleasures of centrifugal play” (Bersani, 1970, pp. 20, 23). Such play is always queer 
because it veers from the centre—and looks back at it slantwise.  
Some Concluding Remarks 
Clearly, Bersani’s ideas about the depersonalizing of the self, the dispersal of the 
subject, and movement from the centre towards the margins have serious implications 
for a sexuality education like ours which clings to an understanding of wellbeing that 
insists on students “positively expressing their identities” (Education Review Office, 
2018, p. 3). If, like Foucault and Spivak, Bersani challenges us to rethink notions such 
as “safety” (Education Review Office, 2018, pp. 10, 13, 14, 27, 33, 39, 41, 44), the 
need to be “secure” (pp. 4, 27, 32), and “belonging” (pp. 13, 23, 27, 36, 37)—which in 
New Zealand schools and in their health and sexuality programmes are inevitably 
closely tied to issues of wellbeing—this is, as we have seen, because in Bersani’s view 
identities are never stable, nor are subjects ever really safe or secure. Any belonging is 
only provisional. This is a lesson that literary reading is able to teach us, especially 
when carried out in the service of the queer. 
This chapter and the next are closely linked. Here I have argued that Spivak and 
Bersani each participate in distinct ways in Foucault’s project of an aesthetics of 
existence and care of the self, including through their attention to “an ongoing assembly 
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and disassembly of subjectivity” (Baker, 2015, p. 2)—this in the context of an 
aesthetico-ethical orientation/practice that has the potential to open up sexuality 
education to the queer. In doing so, my intention has been to prepare the way for the 
chapter that follows, which revisits the notion of self-bricolage in order to investigate 
the role that reading queerly might play in the queering of sexuality education, 
especially when the reading subject is conceptualized or imagined as a queer self-
bricoleur. My wish is that the reading subject, the queer self-bricoleur, will not remain 
impervious to erotic influence—that is, to “the breath of desire” (Carson, 1998, p. 49) 





Queer Self-Bricolage and Reading Queerly in the Queering of 
Sexuality Education 
All knowledge, whether one knows it or not, is a species of bricolage, with its eye on 
the myth of ‘engineering.’ (Spivak, 2016b, p. xxxviii) 
The experience of reading literary texts through the prism of queer theory can also be 
understood as a component in an ethics of the self that can inform (re)constitutions of 
subjectivity as part of an ongoing queer self-making (or self-bricolage). (Baker, 2015, 
p. 8) 
Overview 
In this chapter I explore the triad—or what Anne Carson might call the “three-point 
circuit” (Carson, 1998, p. 16)—of reading queerly, queer self-bricolage, and the 
queering of sexuality education. 
Like writing queerly, reading queerly, insofar as it disturbs taken-for-granted notions of 
stable, unified subjects enduring through time, is an invaluable tool in the sort of work 
of aesthetico-ethical self-bricolage that Foucault, Spivak and Bersani variously 
undertake. If self-bricolage is useful in the reimagining of sexuality education, in part, I 
suggest, because Spivak’s aesthetic education and Bersani’s notion of self-
aestheticization each generates its own distinct process of self-bricolage that is capable 
of producing queer subjectivities, so, too, is the notion of the queer self-bricoleur 
helpful when it comes to opening up possibilities as to how we might see and position 
ourselves in relation to the research that we do, whether as readers of literary and 
theoretical texts, or as a thesis writers.  
In claiming that self-bricolage is a queer activity, I do so because the self-bricoleur’s 
work of patching together some sort of provisional ‘whole’ from a diverse assortment 
of bits and pieces found at hand is an apt figure, not only for describing the way that 
queer people make something of their lives in the absence of a pre-existing blueprint 
for queerness, but, also for explaining the efforts made by those seeking to read and 
write queerly, whether as teachers or students in sexuality education classrooms, or as 
postgraduate researchers. Whatever the context, in order to operate as a queer self-
bricoleur one must develop ‘a queer eye’—that is, the ability to see possibilities for 
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becoming more than what we already are. As Elizabeth Grosz explains, these 
possibilities become visible, not through any effort to shore-up human identity, but by 
attending to “the ways in which difference stretches, transforms, and opens up any 
identity to its provisional vicissitudes, its shimmering self-variations that enable it to 
become other than what it is” (Grosz, 2011, p. 91).  
Later in this chapter, I turn to two ideas which, I believe, are invaluable for conveying 
the productive strangeness of reading and researching queerly, especially in the context 
of the re-envisaging of sexuality education. If the concept of ‘self-taste’—originally 
articulated by Gerard Manley Hopkins as a subversion of Descartes’ Cogito, but later 
also taken up by Derrida—suggests something of the impossibility of sensing oneself as 
anything other than other, then the notion of the playful dissemination of meaning is 
also useful, assuming as it does an open as opposed to a closed hermeneutics. In other 
words, it is the willingness to accept the risk of being queer unto oneself—generously 
spilling and scattering “the seed of meaning” (Spivak, 2016b, p. lxxxix) abroad, rather 
than fruitlessly attempting to direct, contain or restrict its distribution—that underlies 
productive efforts to read or research queerly in the field of sexuality education.  
‘Writing’ and ‘Reading’ the Self in the Context of Sexuality Education 
Bersani and Spivak, insofar as they are concerned with self-formation, or 
subjectification as Biesta puts it—Spivak, for example, by exposing and disrupting 
those processes whereby the reading subject is “consolidated and sedimented” (Spivak, 
2012, p. 39), Bersani, by allowing language to “violate an ineffable, ‘essential’ self” 
(Bersani, 1970, p. 21)—hold to the Foucauldian view that writing and reading are 
among those technologies and practices of self-formation which having their origins in 
Antiquity retain their significance today. Philosophers of education closer to home do 
so, too. Tina Besley, for example, maintains that if schools cultivate “the importance of 
‘writing’ and ‘reading’ the self alongside conversational or dialogical forms of ‘talking’ 
or confessing the self,” then students would be better equipped “to ethically constitute 
themselves” (Besley, 2005, p. 86) as they ‘work’ on themselves. This applies, I would 
add, in the context of sexuality education, which The New Zealand Curriculum views 
“as a lifelong process” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 12)—and surely, therefore, a 
highly appropriate if not a privileged forum for addressing issues of on-going self-
formation or subjectification through the technologies of reading and writing.  
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Yet, while a document such as Promoting wellbeing through sexuality education 
certainly emphasizes the importance of providing, collecting, disseminating and sharing 
“information” (Education Review Office, 2018, pp. 4, 10, 17, 29, 34, 42, 43, 44), it 
gives no strong indication that sexuality education involves self-formation in the 
Foucauldian sense. Sure, a number of requirements relating to student wellbeing are 
clearly stated in the document: for example, that sexuality education “better meet 
students’ needs” (Education Review Office, 2018, p. 8); that it draw on, be informed 
by, or respond to “student voice” (pp. 1, 10, 13, 17, 22, 25, 26, 29); and that it empower 
both “student activism” (pp. 1, 22, 33) and “student leadership” (pp. 1, 11, 17, 22, 33, 
35, 36). But, there is no attempt to theorize the subject or the subject’s self-formation 
outside the framework of promoting wellbeing—nor is the notion of wellbeing itself 
problematized. On the one hand, the Education Review Office acknowledges that in 
recent years “the social and technological context around sexuality and sexuality 
education has shifted quickly and profoundly” (Education Review Office, 2018, p. 18), 
leading to many instances of student bullying through social media, internet websites, 
and other spaces opened up by digital technology, as well as to problems arising from 
students’ exposure to online sexual violence and pornography. On the other hand, ERO, 
in its recommendations to schools, turns a blind eye to the many benefits provided by 
the traditional technologies of reading and writing. Yet, writing and reading, although 
often overlooked in education’s rush to instrumentalize—or demonize—newer, flashier 
technologies, remain invaluable practices of freedom which still have an important role 
to play in students’ moral education and ethical formation. This is especially so when 
adherence to linear progression, predetermined goals, and other forms of coercive 
practice associated with “games of truth” or “truth games” (Foucault, 1996c, pp. 432, 
433) are abandoned in favour of what Foucault presents as the performance of truth in 
relation to the self, including “the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself” 
(Foucault, 1984/1992, p. 9).  
In supporting the view that writing and reading are practices of freedom by which the 
subject is able to uncoercively perform the truth in relation to the self, I do so because 
each in its own way provides the subject with an opportunity “to choose one action or 
direction over another,” that is, “one subjectivity and/or life trajectory over another” 
(Baker, 2015, p. 3). For, each technology—like its paired other—offers the possibility 
of ethical formation, but only when in its deployment “it is informed by reflection” 
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(Foucault, 1996c, p. 435) that is also reflexive. Thus, following Besley’s lead in re-
emphasizing in the context of school counselling the benefits of “forms of 
bibliotherapy, diaries, journal writing, personal narratives, autobiographies and 
biographies, together with the educative impulse of all forms of fiction, poetry and 
drama or role-play—both in film and television—that focus on the self” (Besley, 2005, 
pp. 86–87), I wish to extend the applicability of these forms and practices to the field of 
sexuality education. This I do on the basis of their ability to assist subjects to constitute 
themselves “in an active fashion through practices of the self” (Foucault, 1996c, pp. 
440–441), including creative as well as critical thinking. However, given the scope of 
my thesis—with its stated intention of focusing on literary reading as a means of 
exercising the imagination and uncoercively rearranging desires in the context of 
sexuality education—I attend mainly, but not exclusively, to the reading of fictional 
texts, which The New Zealand Curriculum (2007) neglects in favour of forms of 
reading that reinforce “communicative competence” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 
24) rather than stretch the imagination. Nevertheless, it must be said that because 
reading and writing are two modes of a single process—the one technology implies the 
other and is ultimately inseparable from it—I will at times discuss writing, if only in 
order to make sense of reading as a practice of freedom and self-care. 
In the light, then, of the work undertaken by Spivak and Bersani, which, as we have 
seen, positions self-formation as an aesthetico-ethical practice, it becomes possible and 
necessary to promote reading and writing on account of their ability to form the self 
aesthetically as well as ethically. This is so in the context of sexuality education where 
these two technologies—alongside those of “listening, reflection, and practical 
experimentation” (Ambrosio, 2008, p. 265)—may be utilized to form and reform the 
self as a pedagogical subject. For, when considered in ascetic terms, writing and 
reading provide both sexuality educators and students with powerful tools “for 
transforming their pedagogical relations and practices” (Ambrosio, 2008, p. 265). If, for 
Foucault, writing serves as a tool for ethical self-formation by providing “a way of 
working on the self in a deliberate, focused, and purposeful manner,” it, at the same 
time, also assumes an aesthetic purpose, insofar as it positions the subject “as a work of 
art and the self as an artefact, as an ongoing work-in-progress” (Ambrosio, 2008, pp. 
263, 263–264). Similar possibilities for aesthetico-ethical formation are found in 
reading, which figures the subject neither as the passive recipient of knowledge, nor of 
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values that are transmitted from or through a given text, but as an active participant in 
what has been described as “a performative moment of transtextual connection between 
discursive subjectivities and the embodied subjectivity of the reader” (Baker, 2015, p. 
9). If, through engagement with a literary text, the reader finds himself caught up in a 
new or unfamiliar discourse, he also enters a space of possibility where, through the 
practice of self-bricolage, he is able to work on reconstituting himself.  
While it is naïve to think that we are able to “lose ourselves entirely” through writing 
and reading, it is equally imprudent, I believe, to turn our backs on the opportunities 
that these technologies give us “to alter, or even jettison, some of the cultural 
inscriptions we necessarily acquire as finite and historically constituted subjects” 
(Ambrosio, 2008, p. 265). This is especially so when it comes to the queering of 
subjectivities—that is, the emergence of subjectivities not so much in reaction to 
(hetero)normativity, but from a willingness to risk veering for the sake of veering and 
to delight in the strangeness of lateral mobility. This sort of queer sideways movement 
becomes possible when reparative rather than paranoid approaches to writing and 
reading are adopted. Thus, while writing as an instrument for aesthetico-ethical self-
formation may make use of the insights of queer theory to fabricate new discourses and 
queer existing ones, it will also work reparatively “to constitute new (and radical) queer 
subjectivities” (Baker, 2015, p. 6). Although the queer may emerge “in the 
performative moment of production or writing” (Baker, 2015, p. 7), it will also make its 
presence felt in the act of reception, that is, in the reading process, writing’s ‘other’. 
Here, it is useful to invoke the figure of the bricoleur, as Spivak does, in order, I 
suggest, to explain the emergence of new subjectivities through literary reading. 
As Spivak explains, the bricoleur whom Lévi-Strauss presents to us in La Pensée 
Sauvage (1962)—later translated into English as The Savage Mind (1966)— “is a man 
who undertakes odd jobs and is a Jack of all trades or is a kind of professional do-it-
yourself man” (Spivak, 2016b, xxxvii). But, unlike the engineer, who works from a 
blueprint and with clear aims and objectives, the bricoleur improvises as he goes, 
picking up bits and pieces that are at hand, in the hope of assembling from the things 
that he has found around him, something useful, something quirky, or, perhaps, even 
something strangely beautiful. Having emerged from an unfolding creative process, 
and, therefore possessing neither the advantages nor the limitations associated with 
having a pre-established purpose or form, what is produced by the bricoleur—the 
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bricolage—is always, in the end, somewhat surprising, but also odd, interestingly off-
centre, and, often, slightly wonky. In a sense, the bricolage is never really finished, but 
always an emergent construction.  
In claiming that the practice of literary reading, a key plank in Spivak’s project of 
aesthetic education, is also able to be employed to queer sexuality education—an area 
of the school curriculum in Aotearoa New Zealand that is usually approached with 
great seriousness rather than with any sense of play—I am mindful of Spivak’s 
conceptualization of knowledge itself as bricolage. “All knowledge, whether one 
knows it or not, is a species of bricolage” (Spivak, 2016b, p. xxxviii), she says. As a 
self-described bricoleur, Spivak regards knowledge not as “a systematic tracking down 
of a truth that is hidden but may be found,” but rather, in Derridean terms, as the 
opening up of “the field ‘of play, that is to say, of infinite substitutions in the closure of 
a finite ensemble’” (Spivak, 2016b, p. xxxviii). Insofar as I am committed to 
multiplying “possibilities for conceptualizing and practising in the sexuality education 
classroom ‘otherwise’” (Quinlivan, 2018, p. 7), I am, like Spivak, “more concerned 
with the productivity of theory than with sticking to one approach which may lead to 
one answer, meaning or solution” (Abdalkafor, 2015, p. 186). It is in this context, then, 
that I find the concept of bricolage—more precisely that of self-bricolage—very useful 
when advancing the case for reading queerly in relation to sexuality education.  
As the epigraphs for this chapter indicate, in subscribing to the view that literary 
reading advances knowledge, including in regard to sex and sexuality, I do so not only 
in the light of Spivak’s argument that meaning-making is the work of the bricoleur 
rather than the engineer, but also because, as Brian Opie suggests, the reading of fiction 
“permits release from the strictures of instrumental reason, realism and objectivity, 
opening a freedom to enquire which is limited only by the resources of form, genre and 
language available to a writer” (Peters, 2019, p. 1287). In other words, the practice of 
reading is generative of queer subjectivities when it frees readers from ties that bind 
them to the familiar and the habitual, allowing them, instead, “to imagine other 
trajectories, other possibilities” (Baker, 2015, p. 12) for selves that are no longer 
thought of as stable or normal. Insofar as reading facilitates “a decoupling of identity 
from notions of the natural” (Baker, 2015, p. 7), it also opens readers up to the 
indeterminacy of interpretation, a precondition both for the queering of sexuality 
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education and for the shaping of a more playful approach to meaning-making in 
general. 
Queer Self-Bricolage and Queer Research 
As I have indicated, one of my reasons for attending to the concept of self-bricolage in 
relation to Foucault’s work—a notion first suggested by Rabinow (2000), but also 
explored by Dallas Baker (2011, 2015) in the context of queer becoming, queer self-
making, and queer performativity through the practices of writing and reading, 
including in relation to Practice-Led Research (PLR)—is to argue that self-bricolage is 
a useful conceptual tool in the reimagining of sexuality education. Another is that both 
Spivak’s aesthetic education and Bersani’s notion of the aestheticization of the self 
imply a process of continual self-bricolage which generates the queer in ways that 
resonate with Foucault’s take on ascesis or self-disassembling. However, it is a more 
personal motivation, one closely linked with how I position myself as a researcher who 
through the process of research also seeks to ‘remake’ myself, that leads me to adopt 
the term queer self-bricoleur in relation to the research that I do. In this light, the 
somewhat personal piece which follows this chapter can be seen as an attempt to give 
an account of myself as a researcher—one who, while engaged in the processes of 
reading (both literary and theoretical texts) and writing (this thesis), works in a queer 
and on-going way as a self-bricoleur. 
What is queer about the work of bricoleur-researchers is not just the products they 
patch together—in my case this thesis—but the decisions and selections they make 
during the process. For the work of queer bricolage, which necessarily encompasses 
queer self-bricolage, requires that bricoleurs develop ‘a queer eye’—if not ‘for the 
straight guy,’ then for the complex possibilities that lie before them in “the proliferation 
of difference” (Luciano & Chen, 2015, p. 187) that is waiting to be found in the already 
existing, the seemingly ordinary and the apparently normal. Only having first seen 
queer possibilities can bricoleurs attempt to assemble the diverse parts at hand into 
some sort of ‘whole’. In the case of a theoretical researcher like me, this not only calls 
for a willingness to work “between and within competing and overlapping perspectives 
and paradigms” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018, p. 12), but also requires the courage to risk 
veering off well-trodden paths. At best, this sort of work can be a hit and miss affair, 
offering, as Spivak likes to put it, “no guarantees” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 16, 54, 484, 500, 
502, 507). Given that any structure assembled by the bricoleur-researcher is only ever 
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provisional, the success or value of queer bricolage in the context of the research 
process lies not in its permanence nor in its polish, but in its ability to stimulate a 
curiosity—maybe, a sense of wonder—that provokes others to new thought, further 
creativity, encouraging them, perhaps, to become queer bricoleur-researchers 
themselves. In the case of the queer self-bricoleur who also happens to be researching 
sex and sexuality education, a necessary engagement with the “hopeful and 
interminable” (Spivak, 2012, p. 72) process of remaking the self will be accompanied, 
if not always by feelings of sheer pleasure, then, at the very least, by a willingness to 
see strangeness in everything, including in the commitment to embrace sex as “a 
possibility for creative life” (Foucault, 1996a, p. 382). 
In presenting myself as a queer bricoleur-researcher, I do so conscious that the 
theoretical bricoleur, as well as reading broadly, must become familiar with “the many 
interpretive paradigms (e.g., feminism, Marxism, cultural studies, constructivism, queer 
theory) that can be brought to any particular problem” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018, p. 12). 
Of course, I am more at home with some of these interpretive tools than with others, 
and certainly feel more confident applying them to the reading of literary texts than 
deploying them in other contexts. Nevertheless, what excites me most about the 
bricolage is the opportunities it provides to “bring together multiple knowledges to 
form new epistemological and ontological interactions” (Kincheloe, 2004b, p. 37), 
including the possibility of queering them. If a familiarity with the notion of 
intertextuality—which affirms that “all narratives obtain meaning not merely by 
relationship to material reality but from their connection to other narratives” 
(Kincheloe, 2004b, p. 27)—is useful in reaching an understanding as to how a piece of 
verbal bricolage such as this thesis hangs together, it also goes a long way to explain 
my inclusion of the many hundreds of different quotes from a very wide range of 
sources, both primary and secondary, that are found throughout its pages. My delight in 
locating these quotes—some by famous figures, others by relatively unknown 
commentators—selecting and thinking about them, and weaving them into an argument 
of my own, has sustained me in the sometimes arduous process of thesis writing.  
Having said this, of all the theoretical implements that are available to a bricoleur-
researcher like me—one who readily picks up ideas and perspectives from literary and 
philosophical discourse, processing them mainly through textual analysis, rhetorical 
analysis, semiotics and hermeneutics, as well as submitting them to approaches 
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consonant with various areas of philosophy, including Continental philosophy and the 
philosophy of education—two of the trickier tools to learn to play with are ‘queerness’ 
and ‘queer theory.’ This is because “the[ir] slipperiness and mercurial dynamism . . . 
breaches the boundaries of definition even in the moment of defining it—a being, a 
doing, a method” (Alexander, 2018, p. 277). In other words, heavy-handed or 
misjudged attempts at deploying queer and queer theory will fail if they do no more 
than perpetuate homonormativity, or serve as placeholders for “a potentially infinite 
coalition of political subjects” that is “not reducible to a lesbian/gay demographic” 
(Jagose, 2015, p. 29). It is better that queer and queer theory be understood as 
“invocational, gesturing toward the possibility of [their] own future emergence” 
(Jagose, 2015, p. 30). 
Bryant Keith Alexander, in claiming that for the researcher the value of queerness and 
queer theory lies in their ability to attend to “the reality of alterity that penetrates the 
suppressed and supplanted presence of difference that always and already exists in 
daily operations,” points in the direction of “queer worldmaking” (Alexander, 2018, p. 
278), the process of opening up spaces and perspectives from which the world can be 
viewed anew. Yet, if queerness and queer theory are indispensable tools for the queer 
worldmaker, the same holds true for the queer bricoleur who opens up previously 
unimagined spaces and perspectives by producing what he can—no matter how odd—
through improvisation with whatever is available to him. Given that both types of queer 
‘maker’ work open-endedly, relying, as they do, on processes that involve them to a 
great extent in creative thinking and practice, their use of queerness and queer theory 
eschews prescription, favouring experimental deployments of the various tools at hand. 
While acknowledging that the notions of queer worldmaking and queer bricolage have 
much to contribute to the rethinking of sexuality education—and that both can be put to 
work in sexuality education programmes and classrooms—I am mindful that in this 
context there is always a tendency for thought to coagulate because too many teachers 
and students cling to the notion that “the nature of beings and existents” (Alexander, 
2018, p. 279) is largely fixed. Therefore, if, in my advocacy of Spivak’s aesthetic 
education and Bersani’s self-aestheticization, I emphasize the importance of literary 
reading in the process of queer self-bricolage—that is, in the facilitation of the 
emergence of new subjectivities—I do so not because I believe that reading has no part 
to play in queer worldmaking, but because reading queerly, insofar as it is “a 
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subjectivity-centred creative practice [that] disrupts the notion of subjectivity as stable, 
lasting and unified” (Baker, 2015, p. 12), is an effective preparation for queering the 
world. Like the practice of writing queerly, which involves “a deliberate inscription and 
dissemination of non-normative discursive subjectivities” (Baker, 2015, p. 5), reading 
queerly not only cultivates “a queered aesthetics of existence” (Baker, 2015, pp. 6, 7, 
12, 13), but also, in the long run—that is, text by text—contributes to the queering of 
the world as selves are made strange to selves through literary reading. 
Like the bricoleur, who “makes do with things that were meant perhaps for other ends” 
(Spivak, 2016b, xxxvii)—and like Spivak herself, who in her own deconstructive 
readings of literary texts makes “strategic use of different theoretical tools” 
(Abdalkafor, 2015, p. 186) gathered from a wide range of sources beyond literary 
theory and pedagogy, including feminism, anthropology, Marxism, psychoanalysis, 
postcolonial studies, and cultural studies—I attempt, in this PhD thesis, to put together 
my own piece of bricolage. By taking up a number of Spivak’s own theorizations and 
practices, most especially those associated with her notion of aesthetic education, as 
well as supplementing these with Bersani’s notion of the aestheticization of existence, 
especially sex—and, by exposing these to queer perspectives—I seek to rearrange and 
apply them to sexuality education, a field for which they were not originally intended.  
To this end, and because the things at hand which are potentially useful to the bricoleur 
include an indiscriminate assortment of theories and practices—in my case conceptual 
tools acquired through academic study and many years working as a teacher, resource 
writer and education advisor—my approach to research more often than not also takes 
advantage of the notion of concept-as-method, which prods me “to take the risk of 
thinking differently; of throwing off the shackles of preexisting, methodologies [sic]  
that constrain us; and of not knowing what ‘to do’ next” (Lenz Taguchi & St. Pierre, 
2017, p. 647). Hence, in using the various tools available to me, I see little point in 
insisting on a sharp demarcation between theories and practices—for “there is no 
dividing line between the empirical and the philosophical” (Kincheloe, 2004a, p. 10) in 
the work that I do—but prefer to enter what is a field of infinite play by emphasizing 
the creative, the original and the pleasurable, rather than the fixed and the stable. 
Acknowledging, as a bricoleur-researcher, that “there is no tool that does not belong” 
(Spivak, 2016b, xxxviii), I pick up queer theory and happily use it across Spivak’s 
theorizations of aesthetic education in the reading of literary texts. In doing so, I am 
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encouraged by Kincheloe’s observation that “bricolage can also imply the fictive and 
imaginative elements of the presentation of all formal research” (Kincheloe, 2004a, p. 
1), including the sorts of figuration or figuring-forth that occur not only in literary 
reading but also in thesis writing when these are thought of in aesthetic terms. 
Reading and Researching Queerly—Self-Tasting and Playfully Disseminating 
Having argued that literary reading, as well as the research process itself, can be 
productively thought in terms of queer bricolage—and mindful that such work involves 
the on-going assembling, disassembling and reassembling of subjectivities by the 
reading or researching bricoleurs themselves, more specifically as forms of queer self-
bricolage—I now turn to the curious notion of ‘self-taste’ and the role played by the 
playful dissemination of meaning in all this. 
While it is the case that “queerness works by contiguity and displacement, knocking 
signifiers loose, ungrounding bodies, making them strange” (Dinshaw, 1995, p. 76), 
this is especially so in matters of sex where the wildness of our desires and inclinations 
constantly threatens the integrity of the self, reminding us that we are not in 
equilibrium, never in possession of ourselves, but always stretching and being stretched 
to become something different, something else, something other. Given “the 
incalculable, unforeseeable, protean or . . . veering character of desire” (Royle, 2017, p. 
85, footnote 36), it is not surprising, then, that in its perpetual mobility “desire itself 
remains potentially antinormative, incompletely assimilable to the ego, and hence 
inimical to the model of the person, fundamentally impersonal” (Dean, 2000, p. 238). 
If, as Derrida reminds us, “to be is to be queer” (Derrida, 2005, p. 703), then this, 
perhaps, is so because our own attempts at self-awareness are a matter, not so much of 
thinking, as Descartes famously argued, but of ‘tasting’—when ‘tasting’ is understood 
as the ability “to sense oneself in the sense in which one lets oneself be affected also by 
a feeling or a sensation” (Derrida, 2005, p. 690), the willingness to allow oneself be 
affected in a way that is only imaginable through selftaste, the auto-affection of touch. 
As Gerard Manley Hopkins, subverting the Cartesian Cogito, puts it: “I taste myself, 
therefore I am, and when I taste myself I find myself utterly different from everything 
else whatsoever” (Miller, 1963, p. 271).  
This experience of selftaste, which itself is inextricably entangled with the uncanniness 
of being strangely alone with oneself, of being other to oneself at any point in time or 
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space, of being unheimlich, prompts the recognition that “my own selftaste is a queer 
thing in a disjointed queer and now” (Dunne, 2013, p. 57). It seems to me that such an 
awareness—of “belonging without belonging” (Dunne, 2013, p. 56)—provides the 
basis not only for a queer ontology, but also for a queer aesthetics in which desire, 
emerging as it does “in a multiple form, whose components are only divisible a 
posteriori, according to how we manipulate it” (Hocquenghem, 1972/1993, p. 50), 
performs much of the queering. This experience of being queer unto oneself, but also of 
finding others to be queer, is undoubtedly associated with the unruliness of sex. It is 
also one of the paradoxical consequences of literary reading that the text invites its 
reader to taste what is “impossible, but desired” (Royle, 2017, p. 87), that is, to enter a 
fictional world which though unshareable—living as it does in the imagination of the 
author—nonetheless, offers itself to the reader in all its teasing unknowability: 
“Would that you might taste me. Would that you might taste my selftaste.” 
(Royle, 2017, p. 87) 
In apparent defiance of “the abyss of insularity between one selftaste and another 
selftaste (or ‘othertaste’),” the act of reading tempts the reader with the promise of 
accessing the selftaste of another, that is, “an other’s taste of itself” (Brower, 2019, p. 
60). As I have suggested, to the extent that language operates according to a 
metaphysics of absence, where signs represent concepts and things that are not actually 
present, “reading consists of a strange paradox in which readers imagine themselves to 
be entering the mental world of the author precisely in the author’s absence” (Coleman, 
2009, p. 78). However, if the queerness of the reading event—it is an experience which 
at one and the same time is both intimate and alienated—is accepted and welcomed, 
readers soon develop the confidence and skills to construct their own mental images of 
the world from the words on the pages in front of them. Over time, as trust deepens and 
commitment to the reading process grows, readers begin to enjoy the uncertainties that 
arise from the necessary “play of presence and absence” (Spivak, 2016b, p. lxxviii) 
which reading entails. If on the one hand, literary reading demands a certain kenosis or 
self-emptying, the willingness to remain open to “the experience of being led out of 
oneself” through imaginative engagement with a text, on the other, it also involves the 
“projection of an ‘I’ between our eye and the page” (Coleman, 2009, pp. 71, 92). This 
‘I’ is not the ego, but the reading self which emerges from undecidability, from the play 
of presence and absence that structures the act of reading. 
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To affirm, then, that literary reading is characterized by a certain undecidability is to 
assert that the reader-text relationship “entails the experience of a suspended relation” 
(Royle, 2003, p. 15). This deferral—the experience of the impossible—necessarily 
steers the reader away from making definitive, once-and-for-all claims about a text’s 
meaning. Thus, an attentive and committed reader, while remaining ever-faithful to the 
protocol of the text, is always open to the possibility that the meaning of a text—this 
includes its characterizations, motifs, representations, situations, and themes—will 
always be other than what it is. If literature “asks the reader to participate constantly in 
the construction of texts, and to discover in the texts themselves the rules for reading 
and understanding” (Rice & Schofer, 1983, p. xiv), it also requires him to work 
interminably to deconstruct texts and the structures implied therein, which as Spivak 
explains, calls for “a reading that produces rather than protects” (Spivak, 2016b, p. 
xcviii)—an insight, which, as we have seen, Sedgwick expresses in terms of the 
reparative and the paranoid. Deconstructive approaches to reading, “by inaugurating the 
open-ended indefiniteness of textuality,” not only “offer a way out of the closure of 
knowledge” (Spivak, 2016b, p. ci), but also create an intoxicating brew of pleasure and 
fear—this as readers free-fall into the abyss of textuality, which proffers, “not an exact 
and controlled polysemy, but a proliferation of always different, always postponed 
meanings” (Spivak, 2016b, p. lxxxviii). This process prepares and positions readers to 
meet the unknown and unknowable other. The productive reading of a text, therefore, 
calls for “the playfully disseminating rather than proprietorially hermeneutic gesture of 
interpretation” (Spivak, 2016b, p. lxxxix). Such an approach, while certainly 
provocative, signals that productive readings are the result of generously spilling and 
scattering “the seed of meaning” (Spivak, 2016b, p. lxxxix) abroad, rather than the 
consequence of penetrating a text in order to pin down or restrict its meaning.  
If deconstructive reading is dismissed by many as a negative and hope-less activity, this 
is not only because it overturns important and long-established protocols of reading, 
especially in the fields of literature and philosophy, but because the notion of 
deconstruction is itself identified with a desire to destabilize or even destroy structures 
in the ‘real’ world. Yet, Derrida, in stating that “destabilization is required for 
‘progress’ as well,” makes the point that “the ‘de-’ of deconstruction signifies not the 
demolition of what is constructing itself, but rather what remains to be thought beyond 
the constructivist or destructionist scheme” (Derrida, 1988, p. 147). In other words, 
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deconstruction, as the likes of Derrida and Spivak see it, is hope-filled, in that it 
occasions an opening up to the impossible, to what has not yet been thought or 
imagined, including to a future that refuses to be the inevitable consequence of a 
working out of ideas or an implementation of programmes that belong to the present, if 
not to the past. If such a future is unknowable—and taken-for-granted notions including 
the natural, the spontaneous and the commonsensical cry out for deconstruction—then 
the task of reading becomes the exposure of “the enigmatic relationship of the living to 
its other and of an inside to an outside” (Derrida, 2016, p. 76). Such an exposure 
involves the rendering of the familiar unfamiliar, this with the intention of it “being 
thought and activated otherwise” (Royle, 2009, p. 118).  
Some Concluding Remarks 
As Spivak has suggested, we readers read both protectively and productively—in fact, 
depending on the circumstances that determine a particular scene of reading, as we 
work our way through a text we will find ourselves shuttling between these two modes 
of relating to otherness. If protective or resistant reading works to safeguard the 
familiar, including those established structures which support the claim that literature 
somehow reveals the ‘truth,’ productive reading requires a much greater level of 
“somatic and psychic receptiveness to the world” (Bersani, 2018, p. vii). Thus, the 
latter mode of reading takes seriously the “‘will to ignorance’” (Spivak, 2016b, xcviii), 
a perspective that calls for a certain distrust of oneself—of one’s own abilities and 
mastery of language—on the reader’s part. Such an attitude, although at first 
uncomfortable to live with, gradually equips the reader to play easefully with the 
unknowable as she deconstructs the schemas which are at work in texts, “not in order to 
reject and discard them, but to reinscribe them otherwise” (Spivak, 2016b, xcviii). 
A reader, of course, faces many challenges and risks when grappling with the unknown 
and the unknowable—with the forever undecidable and the deferred. Not least of these 
is the constant need to stay alert to any tendency to assume the presence of hidden 
truths and meanings lurking among and behind the words of a text, truths and meanings 
waiting to be revealed by a skilled and devoted reader. However, as Judith Butler sees 
it, the greater danger lies not so much in playing with the unknowable, but in our 
refusal as readers to read receptively: 
86 
 
. . . it is the resistance to reading that is the greatest risk, for it leaves us 
clutching forms of knowledge and language that are the sign of our 
unknowingness. Better to tarry attentively with the unknowable—that is the 
wager here” (Butler, 2016, p. xxiv)  
It is on the basis of the possibilities that arise, firstly, from this willingness to tarry 
attentively with the unknowable, but, secondly and just as importantly, from “a textual 
energy that sets itself against congealment” (Spivak, 2016b, p. xciv) and which 
challenges “immobilized reception” (Bersani, 2018, p. vii), then, that I argue in this 
thesis that literary texts, fiction especially, are untapped and underutilized resources 
when it comes to sexuality education. This is the case not because of any role that 
literary texts might have in a narrowly focussed dissemination of biological or technical 
information, nor for their promotion of moral, medical or health propaganda, but, 
rather, for their ability to “provoke perceptual shifts and subsequent corporeal 
response” (Dinshaw, 1995, p. 76) in their readers. In particular, I emphasize the 
potential of literary reading both to facilitate an exploration of sexuality’s queerness 
and to generate a queerness of its own. That is: 
. . . fluidity, über-inclusivity, indeterminacy, indefinability, unknowability, the 
preposterous, impossibility, unthinkability, unintelligibility, meaninglessness 
and that which is unrepresentable  . . . (Giffney & Hird, 2008, p. 4) 
In the next chapter—which ‘arrives’ as a queer interruption—I attend to a particular 
scene of literary reading, which more than forty years ago queered my own sexuality 
education in many of the ways that this present chapter has described and explored. As 
I recall and patch together this earlier reading, I am aware that I am also involved in an 





A Queer Interruption—Giving an Account of Myself 
There are no guarantees for the good reader, never any ways of knowing that one is 
even becoming a good reader. There are only ever new beginnings, as if we were 
Sisyphus-like learning to read all over again each day. (Dunne, 2013, p. xxiv) 
Rereading a book or poem, like revisiting an imagined landscape, similarly depends on 
the to-and-fro movement of retreat and conservation, forgetting and memory: the 
movement that we call reflection. In this sense, the book (or poem, or landscape) 
functions as a link—as what Wilfred Bion (in ‘Attacks on Linking’) calls the linking 
junction of thought. (Jacobus, 1999, p. 82) 
To Begin With 
If, as Spivak says, “we cannot not want to tie up all the loose threads in any world” 
(Spivak, 2012, p. 453)—including the world of the self—it is understandable, therefore, 
that I wish to give an account of myself, which, as Judith Butler puts it, amounts to “a 
kind of showing of oneself, a showing for the purpose of testing whether the account 
seems right, whether it is understandable by the other, who ‘receives’ the account 
through one set of norms or another” (Butler, 2005, p. 131). In other words, while this 
interruption may be read as my attempt to demonstrate the validity of arguments that lie 
at the heart of this thesis—arguments which were introduced and developed in the 
preceding chapters—it is also the writing of a relation I have to myself, a form of self-
bricolage that witnesses to the queer. Furthermore, it is the writing of a relation that 
emerges as an address to an other—that is, to you, the reader—a relation which 
modulates itself in its writing according to the extent of this writer’s ability to imagine 
the strangeness of the manner of its reception. 
Insofar as it requires a self-delimiting, a self-defining, a self-deciding, and a willingness 
to act upon the self, this piece of somewhat personal writing seeks more than ‘self-
awareness’. Rather, the self-monitoring, the self-testing, the self-improving and the 
self-transforming that reflexive work such as this calls for—no matter how adequately 
or inadequately achieved—serve a moral purpose, the pursuit of “a certain mode of 
being” (Foucault, 1984/1992, p. 28), which, as Foucault argues, is inseparable from the 
cultivation of forms of ascetical self-activity. If, as you will see, this piece tries to 
account for my efforts to map the relation between my first reading of D. H. 
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Lawrence’s Women in Love and the way I live my life as a queer man now—which, of 
course, encompasses matters of sex and sexuality—it also presents itself as an exercise 
in “self-formation as an ‘ethical subject’” (Foucault, 1984/1992, p. 28). It stands, 
moreover, as a testimony to the part played by literary reading in my formation as an 
aesthetico-ethical subject, for, as I have argued, literary reading trains aesthetic as well 
as ethical responses. In seeking, then, to account for my belief that an engagement with 
a literary text has the capacity to shape aesthetico-ethical subjectivities, I affirm the 
pedagogical power of literary reading in my life, trumpeting its importance here, 
especially in relation to my own sexuality education.  
The account of myself that I present here involves an attempt to access something of 
my first reading of Women in Love—an endeavour that is premised on the possibility of 
a reader being able to return to a literary text again and again so as to reengage and 
relearn with it through a process of reflection. The words of Éamonn Dunne and Mary 
Jacobus that head this chapter give some indication of what a reader adventurous 
enough to want to participate in this rather queer but rewarding process should expect. 
Giving an Account of Oneself 
I’ve been known to say that I learnt more about sex from D. H. Lawrence than from any 
other writer. In making this claim, I do so not on the basis of my reading of his 
infamous Lady Chatterley’s Lover (1928/2013)—which in its unexpurgated form had in 
1960 been the subject in the United Kingdom of a high-profile and eventually 
unsuccessful obscenity trial against Penguin Books; this because of its explicit 
descriptions of sexual activity and its use of four-letter words—but on the strength of 
my first encounter with Women in Love, a novel which unsettled my body, stirred my 
imagination and got me thinking, not only about sex and sexuality, but also desire, in 
ways that no other book had done before and few have done since.  
With my first reading of Women in Love was planted the seed of a conviction that “the 
capacity to be alone in the presence of an object” (Jacobus, 1999, p. 5), such as a book, 
especially a work of fiction, is an invitation to open oneself up to the possibility of 
being surprised, disconcerted, and even astounded. This is not only on account of the 
fact that reading “implies a change of state or orientation, and even gender” (Jacobus, 
1999, p. 7), but because the act of reading is unavoidably marked by a hospitality 
towards the unexpected other—however that other comes, whatever form that other 
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takes. If my first reading of Women in Love—a reading that emerged out of a certain set 
of unrepeatable circumstances which constellated at a particular time and place in my 
life—was a weird experience, this was in part because of the strange possibilities, 
insights, understandings, feelings, and affects that ‘arrived’ as a result of exposing 
myself to an incoherence born of the realization that the other is never reducible to the 
status of the same. It was also due, I believe, to the peculiar nature of reading, which, as 
Dunne describes it, is “perpetually peripatetic, perverse, perambulatory, and never even 
present to itself” (Dunne, 2013, p. xxiv). In other words, reading offers no easy 
comforts, no guarantees of success, no reassurances to the reader that he is getting 
better at it. But, paradoxically, the less ‘at home’ a reader feels with a text, the less 
likely he is to take it for granted. It is at the point of frustration that a reader must 
decide either to cast the book to one side or take the time and do the hard work that will 
enable him to appreciate its strange surprises. This experience, the consequence of what 
Eileen A. Joy calls “weird reading” (Joy, 2013, pp. 28–34), I later came to frame in 
terms of the ‘queer’—a protean notion which I have returned to again and again, and 
from different angles, in the course of this thesis. 
In choosing to interrupt my dissertation with a reflection on my first reading of Women 
in Love—a novel which over the years I have read many times and, indeed, in 1979, 
studied in-depth while completing a paper on the modern novel for an MA in English 
Literature at the University of Canterbury—I do so with the intention of conveying 
something of my first encounter with this powerful text. If, on the one hand, it is no 
easy task to recall what I felt and thought when I first read Lawrence’s novel more than 
forty years ago, on the other, it is even more difficult to sort and side-line memories of 
subsequent readings of the book, including those where I consciously employed various 
tools of literary analysis, or was aided by the writings of literary critics and theorists in 
my efforts to understand and appreciate such a rich text. Thus, in offering this reflection 
on the part that my first reading of Women in Love played in the queering of my 
education—including my queering as an aesthetico-ethical subject by Lawrence’s ideas 
about desire, sex and sexuality—I do so not because of any need for “the cold comfort 
of hermeneutical finality” (Dunne, 2013, p. xxiii), but, rather, in an attempt to keep the 
memory of my original reading alive and kicking.  
Shadowed by a double bind—the imperative to forget in order to remember—I am 
tempted, at first, to try to eliminate from my mind all memories of subsequent readings 
90 
 
of Women in Love in an effort to keep to the fore my original response to Lawrence’s 
novel. But, on further consideration, I realize it is not possible to retreat entirely from 
later textual explorations. Nor is it desirable, I believe, to do so. For, insights gleaned 
from subsequent readings, including those generated during my formal study of the 
novel, paradoxically, give rise to the desire and equip me with the skills to productively 
put to use what remains in my memory of that first reading of Women in Love. If, as 
William Bion says, a book enables a linking function of thought, Women in Love—
including my ongoing and often intense efforts to grapple with the text, “working 
through, sifting out, peering into and being guided by [the] words on the page” (Dunne, 
2013, p. xxiii)—has over many years served as an important touchstone in my thinking 
about sex and sexuality, attesting as it does to my abiding faith in the ability of 
literature and literary reading to contribute in a unique and compelling way, not only to 
an understanding of sex, but also to the pedagogy of sexuality education.  
Thus, given the well-nigh impossibility of conserving my first reading of Women in 
Love, isn’t it better, I tell myself, to welcome the advice that “the more one reads the 
more one notices the possibilities of other readings, competing readings, readings that 
undo the salutary certainty of predestination” (Dunne, 2013, p. xxiv)? With this thought 
in mind, and the benefit of hindsight, I put to work my later readings of Women in 
Love, not to dismiss the first one, nor to somehow preserve it in aspic, but to revisit and 
reconstruct it. In so doing, I create a sort of simulacrum of the original reading—but 
one which resists efforts to cover up the traces of intrusions made by later readings—in 
an attempt to account for my conviction that literary reading can be a valuable form of 
sexuality education. Such work is best approached in the anticipation that for the good 
reader “there are no guarantees,” but “only ever new beginnings” (Dunne, 2013, p. 
xxiv). When a committed reader opens a text like Women in Love in this spirit, she 
may, like me, learn to read anew. 
If as Jacobus observes, reflection relies on both retreat and conservation, forgetting and 
memory, then my concern here is not “to recover past times and lost objects” (Jacobus, 
1999, p. 83)—a first reading of Women in Love and an old life, now (almost) beyond 
this reader’s grasp—but to carry out a reparative and inventive operation, the scope of 
which surpasses any attempt to highjack reading in order to preserve memories of a 
former life upon which a present identity is founded. Rather, in emphasizing the 
reparative, I am mindful that through the act of literary reading “the reaching action of 
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desire is attempted again and again in different ways” (Carson, 1998, p. 28)—and that it 
is in this very action of reaching that desire performs its reparative work, preparing the 
way for the incoming of the new. For, “good reading teaches one to unlearn one’s 
habits of reading, to see again, anew, even in the texts we feel we know” (Dunne, 2013, 
pp. xxiv–xxv). In this way, through the rearrangement of desire—which involves the 
exercise and extension of desire’s reach—reading becomes less paranoid and, hence, 
more open to surprise as “the reparative reader ‘helps himself again and again’” 
(Sedgwick, 2003, p. 150). This orientation towards self-help is seen in the reparatively 
positioned reader’s willingness “to organize the fragments and part-objects she 
encounters or creates” (Sedgwick, 1997, p. 24), primarily, in order to work on the self, 
and to conduct what Foucault calls “a practice of the self” (Foucault, 1996c, p. 432). 
For reading, “whether considered as a process, a representation, or an ideology” 
(Jacobus, 1999, p. 9), assumes a range of concepts that form the basis for much of our 
thinking around notions of the subject and subjectivity. If ideas about presence and 
absence, inner and outer, self and other, cognitive and affective figure significantly in 
discourse relating to both reading and subjectivity, so, too, does desire. Indeed, as the 
reader works her way through the lines of a text, especially a work of fiction, “desire 
deconstructs the Cartesian opposition between mind and body, radically destabilizing 
the difference that holds them apart” (Belsey, 1994, p. 34). Through this process, desire 
opens the way for subjectivity’s reshaping.  
Because desire, however it is theorized, belongs neither to body nor to mind, but 
exceeds both structures, it is able to speak powerfully of sex and sexuality, positioned 
as these are “uneasily poised between the biological, the social and the psychic” 
(Weeks, 2011, p. 198). If, as Weeks observes, “desire is a term that lies at the heart of 
sexuality” (Weeks, 2011, p. 39), it is also, I suggest, a notion, which, because it brings 
along with it instability and unpredictability, comes into productive play not only when 
conceptualizing and thinking about the subject and subjectivity, but in the theorization 
of reading as well. 
Women in Love and the Queering of My Education 
I read Women in Love for the first time back in 1975. It was near the end of the summer 
holidays before the start of my first year of BA studies at the University of Canterbury. 
I was eighteen years old and somewhat hesitantly coming to terms with my own 
sexuality. While I was still reluctant to identify openly as gay, despite the fact that by 
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then the term was beginning to be embraced in a more positive way by many who had 
previously thought of themselves as belonging to the category ‘homosexual’, I certainly 
wasn’t prepared to go so far as to label myself queer at a time when the ‘q’ word 
retained strong connotations of sexual deviancy—and was almost always used 
pejoratively.  
If, during the nineteen-seventies, ‘progressive’ publications such as The Little Red 
Schoolbook (Hansen & Jensen, 1972) and Down Under the Plum Trees (Tuohy & 
Murphy, 1976) provided me and many other New Zealand adolescents and young 
adults with much needed access to information about a whole range of sexual 
relationships and activities deemed perverse by many in the community—information 
that was seldom readily available from parents and other authorities—it was Women in 
Love which gave me new insight into the complexities of desire and encouraged me to 
begin to think more optimistically and adventurously about sex and sexuality, including 
the many dimensions and varieties of sexual experience. Given that “the queer empties 
out the natural, the essential, empties out the conventional foundations of representation 
and identity” (Dinshaw, 1995, p. 89), it is fair to say that my first reading of Women in 
Love—an event, as I recall, that unfolded over a number of nights in the privacy of my 
bedroom—was a very heady and disorienting experience. Not only did this bookish 
encounter expose me to the sense of what it is to feel oneself queer, it also contributed 
significantly to the queering of my education, marking, as it did, an important step in 
my training (my educare)8 in the art of accommodating and cultivating the peculiar and 
the strange—something not taught in any school or university at that time—but also 
heralding a drawing out or leading on (my educere), that is, my coming out as a young 
gay man. 
It is true to say that Women in Love provided a strong liberating counter to the 
narratives about sex which circulated around my Catholic home and single-sex 
secondary school, where solicitous parents and priest-teachers armed with the 
Catechism presented sex as a beautiful and enduring mystery—the meaning of which, if 
I was patient, would be unfolded over time within the institution of Christian marriage. 
                                                          
8 Two Latin root words (educare and educere) are identifiable in regard to the etymology of the 
term ‘education’. If educare (meaning ‘to teach or to drill’) implies a step by step approach to 
the handing on and acquiring of knowledge, educere (meaning ‘to lead or to draw out’) 
suggests a realization of one’s potential, a coming into one’s own. 
93 
 
But, it wasn’t Lawrence’s didactic advocacy for a sexual ethics that aligned closely 
with Nietzsche’s very uncatholic notion of living dangerously beyond good and evil 
that won me over. Rather—although I could not find words for it at the time—the 
attraction of Lawrence’s novel for me lay in its ability to open up textual spaces where 
“a new, anti-conventional relationship between desire and non-legitimized forms of 
sexuality” (Tilghman, 2008, p. 90) could be imagined and articulated. In particular, 
Women in Love allowed me not only to think about my own sexuality more freely, but 
also to interrogate more closely the notions about sex which I had inherited from those 
around me. In a sense, my first reading of Women in Love—a text where verbal 
ejaculations relating to desire and sex greatly outnumber physical orgasms—marked 
my decisive insertion into a process involving “the transposition of desire into sexual 
discourse and of sexual discourse into more sexual discourse” (Craft, 1994, p. 45). In 
fact, I can’t imagine myself writing as I am now—thereby, stitching together words 
about desire, sex, sexuality education, the ethical, the aesthetic, and literary reading into 
a “patchwork of intervention and contingency” (Spivak, 2012, p. 39), this to be 
incorporated into “the web, the weave, the garment (text) woven from the threads of the 
‘already written’ and the ‘already read’” (Allen, G., 2011, pp. 5–6)—without first 
having had this seminal reading experience. 
It was mainly through the interactions and interlocutions of the central characters in 
Women in Love—the quartet of Ursula and Gudrun Brangwen, Rupert Birkin and 
Gerald Crich, along with the “nerve-worn” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 9) Hermione 
Roddice—that I somehow grasped that Lawrence was laying out a case, a process, if 
not a programme, for self-formation. What impressed me was not only the seriousness 
with which Lawrence treats desire, sex and sexuality, but his willingness to make these 
hitherto taboo subjects topics of novelistic discourse. At a stage in my life when I was 
acutely aware that I was strangely other to myself, my reading of Lawrence’s novel 
enabled me to be less afraid of my own otherness—after all Women in Love is replete 
with otherness. This reading also prompted me to cultivate a capacity to see life in more 
fluid terms, to open myself up to a future that wasn’t thought of as foreclosed, one that 
was imagined as processual rather than tied to a particular destination. As I was to read 
many years later, when life is thought of as a journey or a process, identities become 
“spaces to be navigated, revisited, revised and elided on a moment-to-moment basis” 
(Giffney, 2009, p. 7), not territories to own or occupy. Travellers on life’s journey, I 
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came to believe, do well not to appropriate or possess others, but, rather, to 
acknowledge and accept their unreachable otherness.  
Back in 1975, the time was not yet ripe for me to articulate and entertain concepts such 
as ‘queer-becoming’ or ‘queering queer’—let alone experiment with queer theory, a 
term which wasn’t widely used until the nineteen-nineties. However, as a result of my 
first reading of Women in Love, I was certainly encouraged to question and think 
beyond notions of stable identity or fixed relations produced by categorization 
according to gender, sexual orientation, race, class or religion. Thus, when Birkin, for 
the most part Lawrence’s mouthpiece in Women in Love, expresses his desire for “a 
strange conjunction” with Ursula, “not meeting and mingling . . .  but an equilibrium, a 
pure balance of two single beings;—as the stars balance each other” (Lawrence, 
1920/1992, p. 142), I was receptive to his signalling of a new way of relating, a form of 
relational intimacy characterized by stillness and impersonality, rather than the 
assertion of identity. As is suggested by his use of this star-balance metaphor, Birkin—
as I would later discover from my reading of Jacques Derrida, Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, and Leo Bersani—is operating here in the relational-mode-of-the-yet-to-come, 
attempting to engage not only Ursula’s imagination, but also the imaginations of 
readers like me who are prepared to go wherever the text takes them, thus, willingly 
risking the uncoercive rearrangement of their desires. Such is the invaluable work that 
fiction performs in “training the imagination for epistemological performance” (Spivak, 
2012, pp. 122, 134, 197, 465). This work, of course, does not easily happen if “reading 
is predestined, directed, goal-oriented, and prejudicial” (Dunne, 2013, p. xxiii). 
It hardly mattered to me that within the fictional world of Women in Love occasions of 
contentment and clarity—freedom from desire—seemed to come to Birkin and Ursula 
rarely and fleetingly. What was important was that Lawrence was generous enough to 
give his characters opportunities to taste such (im)possibilities. Of even greater 
significance, was the fact that Women in Love seemed to lay before me, its actual if not 
always its implied reader, the same (im)possibility of living in equilibrium—that is, 
free from the insistence of desires pushing me in one direction or pulling me in 
another—which the novel offers its characters. Yet, Lawrence’s expectation that 
readers would follow Birkin’s lead and reimagine sex as a type of connectedness that 
seeks balance rather than amalgamation or union—“fusion, fusion, this horrible fusion 
of two beings” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 303), Birkin proclaims—is generally 
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uncharacteristic of a novel which more often than not presents desire and sexuality in 
vitalistic terms, that is, as constantly on the move, propelled by an immaterial and 
unmeasurable force. Thus, we read of “mysterious life-flow” (p. 307), “life-motion” (p. 
307), or of “a rich new circuit, a new current of passional electric energy” (p. 308).  
Although for Lawrence, balance, equilibrium and stillness are defining features of an 
idealized “strange conjunction” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 142) between the sexes, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that by his own recognition these conditions are not to any 
degree achieved in the actualities of this world, belonging as they do to the yet-to-
come. For, as Lawrence makes clear, men and women are still in the process of 
becoming—“the singling away into purity and clear being, of things that were mixed” 
(Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 195), he calls it. In the meantime, until this refining is 
complete, “sex is that which remains in us of the mixed, the unresolved” (Lawrence, 
1920/1992, p. 195). According to the sexual logic at work in Women in Love, sex is 
significant not because it leads to self-transcendence—in fact, Birkin wants sex “to 
revert to the level of the other appetites, to be regarded as a functional process, not as a 
fulfilment” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 193)—but only insofar as it is capable of 
dissolving and disintegrating those structures that inhibit or block energy flows, 
including the movement of desire. As Birkin puts it, desire leads to freedom when its 
path is unhindered by “the merging, the clutching, the mingling of love” (Lawrence, 
1920/1992, p. 194). 
If Women in Love promotes the release of the passional as a necessary counter, not only 
to what Lawrence regards as the deadening impact of mechanical repetition in all areas 
of life—including what he believes is the wearisome and mindless nature of much 
heterosexual activity—but also, more broadly, to “a moribund universe dominated by 
dissolution, by devolution and disintegration” (Howe, 1977, p. 52), then this, perhaps, 
is to be expected of a novel written under the shadow of the destructions wrought by 
the Great War. Yet, despite its depiction of a world obviously breaking down and 
moving ever-closer to complete chaos, for me, a first-time reader, it is the attention and 
respect that Women in Love affords desire and its polytropic movement—in particular, 
desire’s entanglement with the dynamics of both normative and non-normative 
expressions of sexuality—that I found intriguing. For Lawrence’s treatment of desire 
struck a chord with what my own youthful (in)experience told me, namely that desire 
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does easily wander from established and sanctioned tracks and that sex is a very queer 
thing indeed.  
If he appears to affirm in his characters those manifestations of desire that advance 
variety and generate otherness, Lawrence also clearly rejects any efforts to repress, 
channel or coerce it—including strategies that promote the verbalization of unconscious 
desire—which he believes are designed to serve predetermined goals and satisfactions. 
Thus, not only does Lawrence have his exemplary characters—I’m thinking, especially, 
of Birkin and Ursula here—entertain such esoteric notions as “paradisal unknowing” 
(Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 244) and “the Dionysic ecstatic way” (p. 245), he also allows 
them to explore anal eroticism and homoeroticism as pathways to “equilibrium” and the 
“pure balance of two single beings” (p. 142). In this way, Lawrence’s characters enact 
very different modes of desire from those expounded in pioneering sexological texts by 
the likes of Krafft-Ebing, Hirschfeld, Havelock Ellis and Freud, who were preoccupied 
with categorizing and classifying aspects of sexuality through the application of 
methods and approaches borrowed from medicine and science. Because Lawrence 
always sides with the instinctive and the intuitive—he calls these blood-consciousness 
or knowledge found “in the blood” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 37)—it came as no 
surprise to me that in a novel where “Blutbrüderschaft” or blood brotherhood is posited 
as a way of dealing with “the problem of love and eternal conjunction between two 
men” (p. 200) that desire is frequently linked with blood and its shedding, so much so 
that sexuality is often entangled with violence, including murder. 
While I would later encounter and come to appreciate other perspectives on Lawrence’s 
treatment of desire and sex in Women in Love—for example, Anna Powell’s 
observation that Lawrence seeks to mobilize the erotic in order to “combat the 
imposition of a cold and affect-less ‘reason’ on the sexual sphere” (Powell, 2011, p. 
52), or Carolyn Tilghman’s assertion that in challenging the early twentieth century 
“valorization of sentimentality, compulsory heterosexuality, and middle-class 
respectability” (Tilghman, 2008, p. 90), Lawrence is calling for the libidinization of the 
social—what I remember most powerfully about my own first reading of his novel is 
the intensity with which my desire, clearly erotic, but also more than sexual, carried me 
ever “forward, onward, through the text” (Brooks, 1992, p. 37). Although, as I have 
indicated, this first reading of Women in Love was in one sense a solitary affair—I not 
only read on my own, but also largely kept my thoughts and feelings about the book to 
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myself—I also had some awareness that “however isolate the scene of reading, no one 
ever reads alone” (Craft, 1994, p. 143). If, back in 1975, I was happy that my reading of 
Women in Love brought me into the welcome company of Lawrence’s characters and 
ideas—features of the novel that I was miraculously able to assemble from the words 
on the pages in front of me—what came to me much later was the realization that 
“reading inserts every reader into a serial proliferation (of, to mention a crucial few, 
signs, sounds, silences, mediations, practices, commodities, other readers and writers)” 
(Craft, 1994, p. 143), and the conviction that no one reader, no matter how dedicated or 
careful, can ever really probe such multiplicity. These insights were to bring me a queer 
sort of comfort. 
If I also sensed from my first reading of Women in Love that Lawrence’s novel not only 
tells of desire through the story it unfolds, but also arouses and makes use of desire “as 
dynamic of signification” (Brooks, 1992, p. 37), this was because I recognized that my 
own desire as reader is an essential component in the process of interpretation or 
meaning-making, especially when it comes to the reading of fiction. Thus, I became 
consciously aware, perhaps, for the first time, that desire is “central to our experience of 
reading narrative” (Brooks, 1992, p. 37)—and, therefore, indispensable to the “never-
ending weaving” (Spivak, 2012, p. 241) and unpicking of meaning that happens 
whenever we engage with a fictional text, and choose to play in that gap between 
presence and absence which the text opens up. Yet, at the same time, what I found both 
compelling and surprising about Women in Love was its ability to release in my body 
powerful sensations and affects that my mind was quick to link to a gamut of 
emotions—anticipation, surprise, excitement, exhilaration, love, apprehension, fear, 
anger, hate, confusion, among them. Strangely, while I had no trouble identifying and 
thinking about the emotions that the novel gave rise to, I could neither easily name nor 
adequately describe to myself the sensations and affects that somehow seemed to 
connect me with pressing immediacy to the fictional world of Women in Love, where 
desire and sex, along with all manner of other forces, fluxes and flows, appeared to 
operate at the heart of things. I was later to discover that my struggle to think clearly 
about the relationship between affects, emotions, beliefs and ideas could be explained 
by the notion that affects and sensations are ultimately unassimilable, operating beyond 
existing social codes and, therefore, unable to be “semantically or semiotically ordered” 
(Massumi, 1995, p. 85). 
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I maintain that the reason why Women in Love gripped me so powerfully at this first 
reading wasn’t because the novel was prompting me to recognize and recall affects and 
sensations that I had experienced before. Rather, it seemed to me that the very scene of 
reading was a site of generation for these phenomena, which coming into existence, 
flowed between the book and my body, wherein they circulated. When I attempt to 
recall these sensations and affects, which I now understand as “visceral forces beneath, 
alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing” (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 
1)—and, therefore, largely “disconnected from circuits of meaning” (Marsden, 2019, p. 
185) that narrative relies on—I associate them with a sense of ‘in-between-ness,’ that 
is, with that gap between presence and absence which reading so queerly, but fruitfully, 
exploits. As Seigworth and Gregg argue, “there is no pure or somehow originary state 
for affect” (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 1). Yet, the scene of literary reading, insofar 
as it manages to open up a space from which “vital forces insisting beyond emotion” 
(Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 1) push us to move, think, and extend ourselves—or hold 
us back from doing so—is as privileged a site as any from which to launch an 
investigation into “how affects as pre-subjective, visceral forces come to be captured 
and confined in particular bodies in the first place” (Marsden, 2019, p. 185). As I have 
indicated, because literary works are able to “communicate affects that circulate 
independently of the consensual and conventional semiotic codes” (Marsden, 2019, p. 
185), it will come as no surprise that affects are ‘recognized’ and make their presence 
‘felt’ at the scene of reading, not through any ability to determine meaning, but by such 
qualities as intensification and diminution, acceleration and the deceleration—that is, 
through changes in/to/upon bodies as they move through time and space. 
While it was obvious to me as a first-time reader of Women in Love that the pervasive 
and seemingly unstoppable forces and affects that appeared to emerge from its pages 
were unable to be adequately defined or consistently contained and controlled by the 
novel’s characters, it was only later that I would discern that what Lawrence was 
attempting to achieve—and what was happening to me as I read the novel—could be 
explained in Deleuzian terms as “the liberation of sensations and affects from their 
imprisonment in bodies that are over-determined by molar identity-formation” (Ansell 
Pearson, 1999, p. 196). At the time, however, I was content to be blown away by what I 
recognized as Lawrence’s hyperbole—his exaggeration and over-intensification of 
feelings, thoughts and perceptions, to the extent that these features seemed to become 
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unmoored from particular characters and assume a weird life of their own—as, for 
example, is the case when Gudrun reaches out to pass her sketch-book to Gerald: 
And as if in a spell, Gudrun was aware of his body, stretching and surging like 
the marsh-fire, stretching towards her, his hand coming straight forward like a 
stem. Her voluptuous, acute apprehension of him made the blood faint in her 
veins, her mind went dim and unconscious. (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 114) 
If I was struck by the care with which Lawrence places his characters within a realistic 
and highly determined social order—the characters in Women in Love are drawn from 
all levels of British society and operate across a broad canvas of settings indicative of 
the first decade of the twentieth century—I was also disconcerted, at first, by 
Lawrence’s treatment of these same characters not so much as individual subjects with 
their own distinct and coherent psychological identities and desires, but rather as 
provisional assemblages, constellations first formed then pulled apart by the massing, 
un-massing and re-massing of energies within and around them. Thus, while 
Lawrence’s depiction of the novel’s key locations—the Midlands mining town of 
Beldover, the colliery owner’s home, an aristocratic country house, bohemian London, 
and the Tyrolean Alps—remain faithful to the familiar protocols of nineteenth century 
fictional realism, he often up-ended my readerly expectations by persistently 
undermining the conventional notion that fictional characters are to be understood as 
autonomous and self-directed entities. Lawrence, I realized in hindsight, despite his 
stated desire for balance and equilibrium, positions his readers in such a way that they 
view the novel’s characters as sites or fields upon and through which all manner of 
forces move and play. Hence, he shows no hesitation, not only in blurring the usual 
boundary separating a character’s conscious and unconscious experiences, but also in 
attending to the movement or flow of vital forces between one character and another. 
For example, a minor character, Pussum, is able “to infuse herself” into Gerald’s bones 
“as if she were passing into him in a black, electric flow. Her being suffused into his 
veins like a magnetic darkness, and concentrated at the base of his spine like a fearful 
source of power” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, pp. 66–67). Because minds as well as bodies 
are subject to flux, characters readily “lapse out” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 38), “lapse 
into unknowingness” (p. 38), or “swoon” (p. 325). Gudrun, for example, experiences “a 
keen paroxysm, a transport” (p. 8) at her first glimpse of Gerald, while Gerald’s 
“ultimate consciousness” is torn, “letting through the forever unconscious, unthinkable 
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red ether of the beyond, the obscene beyond” (p. 236), at the sight of a gash made on 
Gudrun’s arm by a vicious rabbit.  
Kinetic Forces/Choreographed Bodies 
In his endeavours “to treat character as a complex of changing impulses,” including his 
attentiveness “to moment-by-moment alterations in relationships that define the self,” 
Lawrence clearly rejects the coherence and stability of personality, thus aligning 
himself with modernist attempts to theorize character “through a vitalist prism” (Moses, 
2014, p. 2). Yet, I sensed even at that first reading of the novel that Lawrence in 
choosing to present his characters in kinetic terms—that is, by emphasizing “movement 
rather than stasis . . . process always underway rather than position taken” (Seigworth 
& Gregg, 2010, p. 4)—was straining to do more than focus his readers’ attention on the 
ways in which characters are subject to the movement of forces both within and beyond 
themselves. I certainly found my own attention curiously drawn towards those episodes 
in the text where Lawrence’s characters negotiate and manoeuvre their way in and 
through the spaces they occupy. 
It is at such moments that Lawrence seemed to purposively invite me to consider his 
characters both as self-choreographers and as choreographed by others—this by 
prompting me to take account of the ways in which bodies “move toward, away, into, 
around each other” (Royle, 2016, p. 272), regardless of whether the movement is 
conceived primarily in material, psychic or social terms. Thus, while on the one hand, I 
recognized that characters in Women in Love are conduits for forces that at times bear 
little relation to what I understand as human, on the other, I also perceived, if only 
vaguely, that some of them, at least some of the time, are permitted by Lawrence to 
engage with the world choreographically. As they move through the novel, characters 
consciously seek to organize the ways in which bodies relate to one another in space 
and time—that is, they concern themselves with “the act of framing relations between 
bodies; ‘a way of seeing the world’” (Klien, Valk, & Gormly, 2008, p. 7). It is not too 
much of a stretch to claim that I sensed, although I couldn’t clearly express it then, that 
Lawrence’s exemplary characters, Birkin and Ursula, were striving for what I would 
later learn from Leo Bersani is “an aesthetic and, more specifically, a choreographic 
construction” (Bersani, 2015, p. 6) of life. This aesthetic-choreographic construction 
takes account of the desire for equilibrium or balance in its various modes, including 
the sexual, and incorporates those efforts to achieve that sought-after “strange 
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conjunction” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 142) wherein “‘relatedness’ and ‘otherness’ are 
complementary rather than in opposition” (Kondo, 2001, p. 71).  
Given Lawrence’s efforts to present the characters in Women in Love in relation to 
processes underway rather than positions taken, it made sense, I thought, not only to 
think of his characters in terms of their orientation towards the forces, flows and fluxes 
that they find themselves caught up in, but also according to whether their movements 
and the desires that prompt them are directed or choreographed predominantly towards 
creation or destruction, life or death. Lawrence aligns certain characters, most clearly 
Birkin, who looks forward to a “new cycle of creation after—but not for us” 
(Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 167), but also Ursula, with the forces of life. Others, 
including Hermione, Gerald and Gudrun, because they submit to mechanical ways of 
feeling, thinking and acting which involve them in the disintegration of “the vital 
organic body of life” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 446), are unable to escape the thrall of 
death, despite their protestations otherwise. In this context, then, sex is significant, not 
in itself, but insofar as it is deemed by Lawrence to be the expression of a character’s 
will either to live or to die—a desire also located in the physical or psychological 
attempt by one character to struggle with and overpower another.  
Lawrence never fails to draw his readers’ attention to the kinetic elements at work in 
the various settings and scenes of Women in Love—for example, the Crich’s mining 
operation at Beldover where even the talk “vibrated in the air like discordant 
machinery” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 111);  Gudrun “pulsing and fluttering 
rhythmically with her feet, making slow, regular gestures with her hands and arms” 
(Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 160) as she dances with the cattle at Willey Water; or “the 
dark blood and mess pumping over the face of the agonised being” (Lawrence, 
1920/1992, p. 328 ) as Thomas Crich, Gerald’s father, succumbs to death at Shortlands. 
However, at that first reading of Women in Love, two incidents accentuated for me the 
strikingly different consequences that can result from Lawrence’s positioning of his 
characters—or, if you prefer, their positioning of themselves—in relation to the forces 
of life or of death that move in, through and around them. The first of these is 
Hermione Roddice’s near-deadly assault of Rupert Birkin, her erstwhile lover; the 
second, the naked wrestling match between Birkin and Gerald Crich. 
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If Hermione’s attack on Birkin with a lapis lazuli paper-weight is presented by 
Lawrence as the inevitable outcome of forces that work to overpower her—“terrible 
shocks ran over her body, like shocks of electricity, as if many volts of electricity 
suddenly struck her down”—her own overwhelming need to eliminate any obstacle, 
human or otherwise, that stands in the path of one for whom the inhuman force of will 
is all that ultimately counts suggests that aggression and thrust rather than negotiation 
and manoeuvre are the primary determinants of Hermione’s actions in a world where “a 
thousand lives, a thousand deaths mattered nothing now” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 99). 
Thus, as I read it, Hermione’s violent behaviour—“her consummation of voluptuous 
ecstasy” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 99)—is symptomatic of an inability to choreograph 
and craft movement synergistically, that is, in productive relation to those whom she 
meets as she moves through the various spaces of encounter provided by the novel. 
Hermione’s realization that Birkin’s presence is a “wall” that “she must break down” 
(Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 98) implies, as Bersani says, that in her “any possibility of 
receptive exchange is erased by the passion for absolute control” (Bersani, 2018, p. vii). 
If successful choreography requires “somatic and psychic receptiveness to the world,” 
then, Hermione’s “unstoppable destructive movement” towards Birkin must be counted 
as an instance, in extremis, of “willed nonreceptivity” (Bersani, 2018, pp. vii, ix, viii)—
a refusal to ‘dance’ that exceeds, and cannot be explained in terms of, the usual 
entanglement of tensions and relaxations that occurs between bodies which are, at one 
and the same time, both receptive and resistant. 
While Hermione, by demanding that those whom she encounters become consenting 
agents of her will, exemplifies nonreceptiveness, the nude wrestling match between 
Rupert and Gerald, which dominates the whole of the ‘Gladiatorial’ chapter of Women 
in Love, provides Lawrence’s male characters with the opportunity to explore what 
Bersani calls “receptive bodies” (Bersani, 2018, p. viii)—this by opening up 
choreographic possibilities made available through an aesthetic framing of sex. To me 
as an eighteen-year-old—already a dedicated bibliophile, but still a closeted lover of 
men—Lawrence’s description of two naked men wrestling “swiftly, rapturously, intent 
and mindless,” before constellating at a certain point in the process as “a tense white 
knot of flesh gripped in silence between the walls of old brown books” (Lawrence, 
1920/1992, p. 264), was at that first reading both strongly homoerotic in its appeal and 
clearly choreographic in its emphasis. In this chapter, where action quickly succeeds 
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action, my attention, all those years ago, was focussed on the multiplicity of moves by 
which one wrestler seems “to interfuse his body through the body of the other” 
(Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 264).  
As the movements of one wrestling man are converted and counteracted by those of the 
other, the unfolding of the process appeared to me to be determined not by brute 
strength, but by “physical intelligence” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 264). For, while there 
is “struggle together,” there is also the discussion of methods, the practising of grips, 
and a growing familiarity with “each other’s rhythm” that allow Birkin and Gerald to 
attain “a kind of mutual physical understanding” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, pp. 263, 264), 
which culminates in the two men lying on the library floor with the one warmly 
clasping the hand of the other. If this wrestling match triggered in me an especially 
memorable frisson—in part, I think, because the action happens in a library—I believe 
that the power of its erotic charge is somehow intensified “through the play between 
receptivity and resistance” (Bersani, 2018, p. xi) which characterizes the somatic and 
psychic negotiations that structure this highly choreographed scene. 
When I first read ‘Gladiatorial’, although I was undoubtedly struck by the ability of the 
words on the page to stimulate affects and emotions that seemed to move in sync with 
the sentences and paragraphs that passed before my eyes, it was the give and take of the 
wrestling bodies, and the “possibility of receptive exchange” (Bersani, 2018, p. vii) 
which they suggested, that attuned me to the episode’s aesthetic qualities, directing me 
to pay closer attention, in particular, to the form that movement takes, rather than linger 
over the congealments that result from stasis. By signalling, in this way, “not a 
monumentalizing of the self, . . . but a renewable retreat from the seriousness of stable 
identities and settled being” (Bersani & Dutoit, 2004, p. 9), Lawrence’s choreographic 
treatment of movement complicated and queered the very sexual fantasies that it had 
aroused in me in the first place, prompting me to consider and reconsider whether in 
fact it is ever possible to draw a hard and fast line between sex and the aesthetic.  
Lawrence’s skilful unrolling of the wrestling session between Birkin and Gerald, while 
demonstrating that erotic aggression is able to be productively channelled through 
formal attentiveness—that is, if the possibilities opened up when movement is 
approached choreographically are recognized and exploited—also emphasized for me 
that “aesthetics is not a break, per se, from the problems posed by bodies-in-relation” 
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(Snediker, 2014, p. 170), but rather an opportunity to rethink how such problems are 
framed. By directing me to imagine sex in aesthetic terms, that is, to think 
choreographically, Lawrence brought home to me at that first reading of Women in 
Love the advantages of configuring sex and the aesthetic, whether literally or 
figuratively, in relation to one another. 
On the Way to an Aesthetic Education 
During the course of my first encounter with Women in Love, if, as I have tried to 
suggest, the words on the pages of my tattered Penguin paperback copy of the novel 
became both a focus and a conduit for longing—a vehicle which enabled me through 
the act of reading to risk what I later learned from Derrida was the impossibility and 
unutterability of selftaste and othertaste—my engagement with Lawrence’s text was 
also preparing me to think more explicitly about the lifelong process of making, 
unmaking and remaking ‘myself’.  
Although many factors—personal, familial, educational, religious and cultural—
contributed to this, my first reading of Women in Love certainly enabled me to 
experience time more queerly. While it is tempting to claim that this reading of Women 
in Love marked an important step in a process of queering, such a statement does not do 
justice to those “queer temporalities, visible in the forms of interruption” (Freeman, 
2010, p. xxii), which persistently challenge the dominance of chronos, that is, time 
conceived as seamless linear progression, time marching forward as if in unison. If a 
commitment to becoming queer implies that “time can produce new social relations and 
even new forms of justice that counter the chrononormative and chronobiopolitical” 
(Freeman, 2010, p. 10), then a text like Women in Love provided me, its reader, with 
plenty of opportunities to resist the pull of chronos. For, is it not so that the practice of 
literary reading, in its training of the imagination to engage in teleiopoiesis—“a 
reaching toward the distant other by the patient power of the imagination” (Spivak, 
2012, p. 404)—suggests many possibilities for “living in relation to indeterminately 
past, present, and future others” (Freeman, 2010, p. xxii)? As it directed me to attend to 
the ways in which the queer interrupts what Walter Benjamin calls “homogeneous 
empty time” (Freeman, 2010, p. xxii), Lawrence’s novel also worked to disturb 
chrononormativities which determined that there was a ‘right’ time for education, for 
entering the workforce, for buying a house, for marrying and having children—
chrononormativities that were not a good fit for a young gay person like myself! More 
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importantly, my reading of Women in Love seemed to bring me “closer to the time of 
kairos, the moment of opportunity” (McCallum & Tuhkanen, 2011, pp. 8–9), opening 
my eyes to the unusual, the strange and the weird, encouraging me to think and act 
more confidently outside and beyond taken-for-granted and normalizing categories. 
If it is the case that in the years since my first reading of Women in Love I have come to 
think and act more queerly, this is linked to various dispositions and practices which I 
have acquired or developed, often as a result of ongoing ‘educative’ encounters with 
the aesthetic. Not only has my queering through the aesthetic prompted me to learn to 
appreciate the singular and the unverifiable—while developing my facility to entertain 
multiple readings of books, myself, and the world—it has also taught me to avoid 
essentializing, unifying, and universalizing. By advancing my ability to negotiate rather 
than attempt to resolve polarizing binaries, and to seek out ideas and concepts that open 
up thought instead of closing it down, queer ways of being, knowing and doing have 
enabled me to attend to what something does or produces in preference to focussing 
unduly on whether it is right or wrong, true or false. 
Clearly, my exposure to Women in Love led me to a greater awareness of the role 
played by desire and the imagination in my attempts to open up and reach out “to the 
difference of the other” (Coleman, 2009, p. 15), especially through reading. But, what I 
took much longer to appreciate was the extent to which intellectual history evidences 
“an astonishing array of vastly different, strongly embattled, and oftentimes mutually 
exclusive assessments” (Schlutz, 2009, p. 3), not only pertaining to the imagination, but 
also to desire. With the help of queer theory, instead of seeing this as a problem, I 
learned to enjoy problematization—the defamiliarization of common sense. However, it 
was only in more recent years, after being introduced to the work of Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak during a paper on critical approaches to global citizenship 
education taught by Dr Vanessa Andreotti, that I was able to acknowledge that my 
engagement with Women in Love had moved me a significant distance along the path of 
what Spivak calls an aesthetic education, a process which, she argues, changes how we 
acquire and structure knowledge. If, in Derridean terms, I was drawn through my initial 
and subsequent readings of Women in Love to imagine the (im)possibility of “an auto-
affection of touching” and “the kind of intimate tactile sensitivity that is enigmatically 
called taste” (Derrida, 2005, p. 690), was I not, as Spivak, proposes, also “productively 
undoing” my own understanding of sex and sexuality by entering and engaging with 
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Lawrence’s text, “without accusation, without excuse, with a view to use” (Spivak, 
2012, p. 1)? 
While my reading of Women in Love yielded to me something of my own selftaste, it 
also positioned me to accede to the sense of another selftaste—the othertaste of the 
novel’s characters in whom it has been said “irreconcilable human affects must meet, 
mingle, and interpenetrate” (Craft, 1994, p. 141). For, although Lawrence’s fictional 
men and women were altogether-close to me, they remained, at the same time, 
strangely unknown and unknowable, much like my own queer sexuality. If, at that first 
reading, Women in Love miraculously gifted me with a strong taste of sex and for sex—
both selftaste and othertaste—it was always the taste of sex mixed with blood, dirt, 
mud, fire, water, ice or death; sex more often bound up with violent homicidal and 
suicidal impulses that compelled and repelled, that invited both identification and 
repudiation. Only rarely did the sex there taste unequivocally of life, of unreserved 
affirmation. Yet, the intense storm of affectivity unleashed by this first encounter with 
Women in Love encouraged me to re-imagine sexuality in more open-ended and 
creative terms, that is, as a somewhat chaotic experience, both exciting and scary—as 
opposed to the more predictable linear progression with pre-determined purposes or 
goals that many sexuality education programmes, especially those that put a strong 
emphasis on the telos of sex, tend to favour. If I am now at a point where I can 
confidently claim that literary reading is of immeasurable value in the context of re-
envisioning sex and sexuality education, it is because my reading of Women in Love 
convinces me that fiction prompts us “to cross a horizon into another life” (Lawrence, 
1924/1971, p. 142). As I have suggested, it also works to form and reform 
subjectivities—and to queer them. 
Caught up in the intensity, exhilaration and immediacy of the moment, and recognizing 
that my first readerly engagement with Women in Love had played a key part in shaking 
up my desires, I hoped and, eventually, did dare to live differently, out of the closet. 
However, it was only later, when I was immersed first in the study and then in the 
teaching of English literature that I was able to give serious and sustained attention to 
how Lawrence, through the skilful and purposeful manipulation of language, managed 
to engineer this significant shift within me. For, at the time of my first reading of 
Women in Love, while I certainly sensed the power of Lawrence’s writing, thoughts of 
rhetorical poetics and the intricacies and subtleties of figuration—metaphor, metonymy, 
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synecdoche, hyperbole, irony, litotes, for example—were far from my mind and largely 
escaped my consideration. Nevertheless, the work of rhetorical poetics—the equation 
of “the rhetorical, figural potentiality of language with literature itself” (de Man, 1979, 
p. 10)—to which Women in Love and other great works of literature exposed me, 
provided me with what Derrida helpfully calls “the figure of some contact with 
oneself” (Derrida, 2005, p. 690). This figure, a structure of thought without which it is 
impossible to imagine being affected by a sensation, feeling or emotion, allows for the 
type of aesthetic education envisaged by Spivak, one which rearranges desires, and 
keeps meaning on the move. For, it is only when readers allow themselves to be 
captured and occupied by the figurative, which happens after they willingly enter the 
ground or space of figuration opened up by a text and choose to play there, that the 
imagination is trained to construct knower and known differently. 
While it is clear that Lawrence skilfully utilizes the force of language in a handful of 
the greatest twentieth century novels written in English, what is not so obvious—
although we are told by Ursula in Women in Love “that words do not convey meaning, 
that they are but a gesture we make, a dumb show like any other” (Lawrence, 
1920/1992, p. 180)—is that Lawrence treats language less as a conduit of knowledge, 
than as a necessary tool for self-transformation. Indeed, for Lawrence, the ability of 
language to contribute to the making, unmaking and remaking of the self—the writing 
self and the reading self—springs from language’s libidinal force and its ability to 
produce dynamic effects, including its projection of “a mobile, transitional self, 
continually subject to fluctuation and change, forever readapting itself to fresh psychic 
impulsions from within and without” (Doherty, 2001, pp. 30–31). Given that the forces 
and flows of life can only be partially and inadequately conveyed by language, which, 
paradoxically, both reveals and conceals the nature of their movement, Lawrence’s 
willingness to take up the challenge of using words to express the impossibility of what 
one of his biographers calls “the felt life of physical experience” (Worthen, 1991, p. 
181)—desire, sex and sexuality included—is to be celebrated, suggesting as it does his 
commitment to ‘unfixing’ the self, keeping it open, flexible, and to my mind, queer. 
If “to recognize in paranoia a distinctively rigid relation to temporality, at once 
anticipatory and retroactive, averse above all to surprise, is also to glimpse the 
lineaments of other possibilities,” then an opportunity to read Women in Love is an 
invitation, I believe, to read reparatively, that is, to remain open to what is other in the 
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text, thus, avoiding “a paranoid optic” (Sedgwick, 1997, pp. 24, 25). My experience of 
reading Women in Love for the first time, though particular and unique to me, 
nontheless “highlights the importance of literature as a pedagogical tool that ‘teaches’ 
us about the world and our place in it” (Dimitriadis & Kamberelis, 2006, p. 189). This 
being the case, works of literature when read in pedagogical settings, including in the 
context of sexuality education, deserve to be read in ways that accentuate and maximize 
their reparative potential. This, as I have suggested, implies a willingness on the 
reader’s part to be open to the queer. 
As you will see as this thesis unfolds, it is literature’s pedagogical potential—released 
when literary reading is approached deconstructively and queerly—that animates not 
only Spivak’s project of aesthetic education, but also the work of Bersani and other 
queer theorists who argue that sex and sexuality be conceptualized in aesthetic terms. 
Literature’s pedagogical significance, thus, is closely linked with its ability to 
reparatively position readers not only to imagine futures that may be very different 
from the present, but also to entertain the notion that the past “could have happened 
differently from the way it actually did” (Sedgwick, 1997, p. 25). Key to developing a 
reparative orientation towards literary reading, and, hence, the capacity to read 
reparatively, is a willingness to embrace “the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality,” 
which offers “a way out of the closure of knowledge” (Spivak, 2016b, p. ci). Given that 
reparativity is premised on both difference and deferral—in contrast to paranoia’s 
insistence on sameness and closure—it is closely bound up with desire, which, as 
Spivak’s aesthetic education reminds us, is itself “a deconstructive and 
grammatological structure that forever differs from (we only desire what is not 
ourselves) and defers (desire is never fulfilled) the text of ourselves” (Spivak, 2016b, p. 
ci). If I talk about desire a lot in the pages that follow, this is because, to my mind, 
desire is a great force for queering the aesthetico-ethical subject. And what better 
pedagogical site is there to experience queering than the scene of reading! 
Some Concluding Remarks 
When I first read Women in Love I didn’t quite know what to make of the novel’s 
ending. I desired, or thought I desired, a clear-cut conclusion, one that somehow 
resolved the remaining tensions in the otherwise exemplary Birkin-Ursula relationship. 
But, what Lawrence gave me on the subject of love, I felt, left me hanging, if quietly 
so. Today, I take a different view of this scene, enjoying, as I now do, the ‘up-in-the-
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airness’ of a situation brought about by the instability and unpredictability of desire. As 
Lawrence’s dialoguing duo of Birkin and Ursula finally run out of steam, halt their flow 
of words—thus, leaving unresolved their consideration of the (im)possibility of 
Birkin’s desire for an “eternal union with a man” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 475)—a 
space of opportunity is opened up for the reparatively positioned reader to work in a 
space where desire shows itself forever differing, forever deferring.  
When Birkin refuses to capitulate to Ursula’s insistent demand that his own desire for 
sexual union with a man is “obstinacy, a theory, a perversity,” he not only keeps alive, 
at least within his own head, the possibility of a relationship with a male, but also 
enables the reader to imagine a queer space where the possibility of “another kind of 
love” (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 475), a love that resists what Birkin sees as the 
mindless habits of heterosexual intercourse, can be voiced and explored: 
“You can’t have two kinds of love. Why should you!”  
“It seems as if I can’t,” he said. “Yet I wanted it.” 
“You can’t have it, because it’s wrong, impossible,” she said. 
“I don’t believe that,” he answered. (Lawrence, 1920/1992, p. 475) 
Through his “I don’t believe that”—a differing and a deferring—Birkin keeps the door 
open to possibility and surprise, even if just a little, both for himself and for the reader.  
If I conclude this queer interruption, and Part One of this thesis, with the reminder that 
the narrowest of gaps leaves enough space for queer to playfully do its work, then this 
is also to gesture in the direction of the chapters that follow in Part Two. These 
chapters, which remain firmly focussed on Spivak’s aesthetic education, attest to the 
ability of Spivak’s thought not only to open up spaces where it is possible to attempt 
(queer) collectivities to come, but also to position pedagogy, literary reading and 
sexuality education in relation to a hospitality that welcomes interruptions by the queer. 




















Sexuality Education—(Queerly) Attempting Collectivities to Come 
For me, the “philosophico-literary”—the aesthetic in aesthetic education—is the means 
for persistently attempting collectivities to come. (Spivak, 2012, p. 464) 
When we seem to have won or lost in terms of certainties, we must, as literature 
teachers in the classroom, remember such warnings—let literature teach us that there 
are no certainties, that the process is open, and that it may be altogether salutary that it 
is so. (Spivak, 2003, p. 26) 
Overview 
If, as Muñoz insists, “we must dream and enact new and better pleasures, other ways of 
being in the world, and ultimately new worlds” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 1), then a re-
envisioned sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand—a sexuality education that is 
prepared to indulge in queer utopic thinking will risk disappointment in order to create 
the possibility of ways of being, knowing and doing that deploy queerness primarily in 
relation to futurity and hope. Such an endeavour is sustained not just by individual 
commitment, but, as Quinlivan reminds us, through “the dreams of an emergent group 
dwelling in the region of a critically hopeful ‘not yet’” (Quinlivan, 2014, p. 274). In 
other words, it is by (queerly) attempting collectivities to come that the contingencies 
of the here and now are side-lined in favour of “aesthetic practices which can provide 
sites of wonderment for re-visioning the world” (Quinlivan, 2014, p. 274). Thus, queer 
is positioned both as horizon and as “exuberance” (Jagose, 1996, p. 101). 
In this chapter, then, I seek to throw light on Spivak’s claim that aesthetic education, in 
that it concerns itself with the reading of literary texts—not only in the humanities 
classroom, but also, I propose, as a way of reimagining and rethinking sexuality 
education—becomes the means by which collectivities to come are attempted. This is 
in the context of a sexuality education which, as it refuses the confines of health and 
wellbeing, remains open to the possibilities that literary reading provides.  
Much is to be gained in the sexuality education classroom, I believe, from attending to 
queer encounters in the fictional realm. If, as Tarc claims, Spivak’s own praxis is 
premised on the possibility that “students might begin to respond ethically to ‘Others’ 
violently affected in a world deeply divided by the self/other dichotomy,” then it is 
fruitful “to imagine education as the means by which other possibilities for becoming 
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human exist” (Tarc, 2005, pp 843, 834). Literature and literary reading, as Spivak 
reminds us in the second of the epigraphs at the head of this chapter, play an important 
part in such an education by directing us away from certainties and opening up other 
(im)possible ways of being human—and sexual. While this work is not without its 
risks—and is always undertaken without any guarantee of success—Spivak’s efforts 
suggest that “in the collective struggle for shared meanings, in the classroom, one 
begins to practise a love of Others sustained through response, through committed 
engagement and through return” (Tarc, 2005, p. 846). The practice of this hard-won 
love, including in the context of sexuality education, is especially important if teachers 
and students are to negotiate the dichotomies and double binds produced by sexual 
difference and the tyranny of reproductive heteronormativity (RHN). 
While Spivak’s comments about queer, queerness and queeredness are scattered 
throughout her work, and tend to be made in passing rather than systematically argued, 
a more serious consideration of the applicability of queer theory to Spivak’s project of 
aesthetic education and its pedagogical emphasis—and, in turn, of her aesthetic 
education to sexuality education—is, nevertheless, warranted. This present chapter, 
then, is mainly theoretical in its emphasis, providing discussion and analysis of queer 
theory and reflection on queer pedagogy as they come into play with Spivak’s project 
of aesthetic education. Drawing on the work of Deborah Britzman, who, like Spivak, is 
deeply engaged with what it means to learn and to unlearn—that is, with the queering 
of pedagogy—I attempt to illuminate Spivak’s approach to teaching and learning. 
Spivak’s Classroom—A Site of Potential Collectivity 
A number of commentators have written of the importance for Spivak of the 
humanities—which she regards as an indispensable site for “persistently attempting 
collectivities to come” (Spivak, 2012, p. 464). Swift, for example, while suggesting that 
the humanities classroom has in recent years become increasingly significant for her as 
“site of a potential collectivity” (Swift, 2011, p. 93)—a space where the narratives and 
knowledge claims associated with globalization can be examined and resisted—argues 
that the type of aesthetic education which Spivak practices and promotes, both among 
teacher trainees from subaltern communities in West Bengal and students in elite 
American Universities, collapses the distinction between teaching and learning. Spivak 
herself is explicit in her claims that humanities education is “a collective project where 
people work in small, decentralized ways rather than something that is extended from 
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this end of the world [Columbia University, New York, where she currently holds the 
position of University Professor] to the rest of it” (Spivak & Shaikh, 2007, p. 174). 
In a similar vein, Snaza, commenting on Spivak’s pedagogical practice, observes that 
“she produces an account of classroom temporality that does not operate according to 
linear, humanist presuppositions” (Snaza, 2015, p. 49). He argues that for Spivak the 
classroom is always open to future possibilities in that it is a site of hope and change 
where selves are made, unmade and remade in ways that run counter to the neoliberal 
educational agenda with its emphasis on standardization, ‘best practice,’ and 
controllable outcomes. For Spivak, if the classroom is a political space, it is not because 
overtly political projects are initiated and developed there, but on account of “the kinds 
of attention and attunement we practice together in classrooms” (Snaza, 2015, p. 50). In 
other words, the sorts of classroom practices—including literary reading—that bring 
about the rearrangement of desires are themselves powerful forms of politicization, 
especially insofar as they work against the construction of stable, predictable human 
subjects, linear notions of time, and de-contextualized and disembodied approaches to 
learning. If the rearrangement of desires that takes place in classrooms—sexuality 
education classrooms included—is in itself a form of politicization, then, the 
importance of this process lies not so much in any concrete outcomes that it may 
produce, than in its potential to open up “an anticipatory space of hope . . . 
characterized by indeterminacy, both in terms of affect and methodology” (Quinlivan, 
2014, p. 274). For, it is from this often uncomfortable in-between space that 
collectivities may emerge. Thus, while pedagogical encounters give rise to hope, they 
are also marked by apprehension and anxiety—this because there is never a guarantee 
that any collectivity, no matter how much it is longed-for, will ever be realized in a 
form that matches our desires.  
From a Spivakian point of view, then, good classroom teaching is not primarily 
concerned with communicating predetermined knowledge, but “about becoming-with 
students . . . through the production of emergent collectivities around questions without 
answers or solutions” (Snaza, 2015, p. 60). Such a perspective not only provides those 
seeking a rethinking of sexuality education with the theoretical means to undertake this 
important task, but also encourages them to resist the sorts of foreclosures and 
stalemates that are produced by an overreliance on planning. Literary reading, 
especially, of fiction, has an important role to play in the reconceptualization of 
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sexuality education along these lines in that it teaches us “to alter one’s openness to a 
world and to embrace the difficulty of ceding subjective, personal agency” (Snaza, 
2015, pp. 54–55)—pre-requisites for any reconfiguration of sexuality education that 
seeks to invoke “a relationship between the human and the natural worlds that is ‘in 
excess’ of capitalist globalization” (Majumder, 2017, p. 20). Acknowledging such a 
relationship both requires and enables a rethinking of sexuality and sexuality education 
in ways that challenge us to “imagine ourselves as planetary subjects rather than global 
agents, planetary creatures rather than global entities” (Spivak, 2003, p. 73). While the 
process of rethinking and reimagining sexuality education in such terms has its own 
attendant anxieties, it also brings with it many opportunities, prompting us to affirm the 
value of that which we cannot control as well as kindling in us the hope that is needed 
for change to happen. Spivak performs a valuable service by showing that “what we 
need . . . is less a new mode of education than different ways of attending to the 
encounters to which we are already exposed” (Snaza, 2015, p. 60). In this, she gestures 
in the direction of a queerer sexuality education, one with a planetary horizon. 
Queer Theory in Spivak’s Aesthetic Education 
Of the many double binds that Spivak concerns herself with in An Aesthetic Education 
in the Era of Globalization—self and other, body and mind, caste and class, race and 
class, metropolitan minority and postcolonial majority, mother tongue and global 
idiom, ‘truth’ and ‘rhetoric,’ the uselessness of human life and the push to be useful, 
among them—it is those arising out of sexual difference and reproductive 
heteronormativity which she claims are the most powerful, pervasive and enduring. 
This is because RHN, as “the broadest and oldest global institution,” provides us with 
“a complicated semiotic system of organizing sexual/gendered differential” (Spivak, 
2012, pp. 437, 124) that establishes its own seeming irreducibility. By positioning itself 
“upstream from straight/queer/trans,” RHN brings us into a double bind “through the 
variety of our sexualities” (Spivak, 2012, p. 124). 
Spivak’s project of aesthetic education, in seeking to expose sexism in its many forms 
and on multiple fronts, directs us to perform “a post-normative queeredness” (Spivak, 
2012, p. 3), one which, perhaps, still bears the trace of an “originary queerness” 
(Spivak, 2012, p. 190) that contains—and is contained by—RHN. In that Spivak’s 
aesthetic education has as its purpose “the training of the imagination in 
epistemological performance through a rearrangement of desires” (Spivak, 2012, p. 
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125), it appears to have much in common with queer thought, which if it is “to have any 
specificity at all . . . must be characterized by becoming, the constant breaking of 
habits” (McCallum & Tuhkanen, 2011, p. 10). Berlant’s description of desire as “a state 
of attachment to something or someone, and the cloud of possibility that is generated by 
the gap between an object’s specificity and the needs and promises projected onto it” 
(Berlant, 2012, p. 6) speaks both to Spivak’s aesthetic education and to queer theory in 
that both concern themselves with opening up possibilities in spaces that are generally 
taken to be normative and hegemonic. However, while “queer theory is a critical 
inquiry into the alignments of sex, gender and desire that are in the service of normative 
forms of heterosexuality, the heteronormative, that saturates the social and cultural 
order” (Graham, 2014, p. 6), it is also “a site of struggle” where “an ensemble of 
knowledges, many of them contesting knowledges” (Hennessy, 2000, p. 53) come 
together in discourse. Yet, as Annamarie Jagose explains, although queer is “the point 
of convergence for a potentially infinite number of non-normative subject positions” 
(Jagose, 1996, p. 101), it differs from those political movements which cling to fixed 
and exclusive notions of identity.  
In that queer unconditionally renounces all claims to sovereignty, “chafes against all 
regimes of normalization” (O’Rourke, 2006, p. 30), and opens itself to futurity so as to 
remain hospitable to the impossible, it not only resonates strongly with many of 
Derrida’s ideas—which are suffused throughout many of queer theory’s key texts—but 
also sits easy with Spivak’s deployment of the notion of “position without identity” 
(Spivak, 2012, pp. xv, 31, 32, 33, 431, 432, 435, 439, 465, 501, 583, endnote 36), a 
concept somewhat akin to that of ‘structure without content’. Indicative of Spivak’s 
propensity for this type of logic-testing theorizing is her assertion that gender, “thought 
of as an instrument of abstraction . . . is in fact a position without identity” (Spivak, 
2012, p. 31). This idea, Spivak readily acknowledges, comes directly from queer 
theorist David Halperin who theorizes queer as “an identity without an essence” 
(Halperin, 1995, p. 62). 
Indeed, Spivak’s aesthetic education, as a means of persistently attempting 
collectivities to come, supports queer understandings and approaches to education, and, 
in turn, is supported by them. Spivak herself has spoken of “the idea of the use of queer 
theory as an instrument making an argument, rather than a contained sector of critical 
work” (Fondazione Unicampus San Pellegrino, 2013)—an understanding that she also 
116 
 
applies to psychoanalysis, which she approaches neither as a descriptive taxonomy, a 
clinical practice, nor as a key to understanding gendering and sexual difference, but 
rather as a theory to think with, through, and against. Thus, in the same way that 
Deborah Britzman uses psychoanalysis to ask whether contemporary pedagogy can 
come up with ethical responses capable of refusing “the normalizing terms of origin 
and fundamentalism” (Britzman, 2012, p. 292), so Spivak employs psychoanalysis and 
queer theory to perform a pedagogy capable of bringing sexuality and the aesthetic into 
productive proximity. For, like Britzman, Spivak finds it “useful to read queer theory 
not as a set of contents to be applied, but as offering a set of methodological rules and 
dynamics useful for reading, thinking, and engaging with the psychical and social of 
everyday life” (Britzman, 2000b, p. 54, endnote 6). This approach is helpful, including 
in the context of the re-envisioning of sexuality education, not only when “considering 
the play of ambivalence in constituting experience,” but also while investigating “the 
fault lines of ideas” (Britzman, 2000b, p. 54, endnote 6) that dominate discourse 
pertaining to sex and sexuality.  
Like other deconstructive ways of attending, Spivak’s work has an obvious 
applicability to sexuality education, which—because of sexuality’s wildness and its 
tendency to provoke opportunities for recognitions and misrecognitions—is not short of 
moments “where meaning breaks down, defies its object, and unconsciously reverses its 
intentions (Britzman, 2000b, p. 54, endnote 6). Literary reading, as performed by 
Spivak’s aesthetic education, gainfully makes use of the sorts of recognitions and 
misrecognitions that sexuality stirs up. By opening up a space where it is possible for 
the subject to be taken beyond the self and its confines, it allows the subject to 
experience something of the mutability of personality, identity, selfhood—and 
sexuality. As Britzman observes, Spivak—whether in her approach to reading, 
thinking, or engaging—“is not asking that ‘identity’ be restored to a nice ontology, a 
site of uniqueness or comfort, a font of self-esteem, or a celebration of individuality” 
(Britzman, 2012, p. 292). Rather, as Spivak herself make clear, she is wanting readers 
to attend closely to “cases of exorbitant normality” (Spivak, 2012, p. 162), whether in 
the area of gender and sexuality, or elsewhere. This is in order to queer them. 
Pedagogy—Spivakian and Queer  
While Spivak is widely celebrated as “a literary theorist, a postcolonial critic, a 
translator, feminist, Marxist, and deconstructionist extraordinaire” (Ray, 2016, p. 
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1528), in her work she has always drawn attention to her role as teacher, whether in the 
elite universities of the USA or in the rural schools of Bangladesh and China. As “a 
teacher who remains ethically responsible to pedagogy” (Ray, 2016, p. 1529), Spivak 
has concerned herself—with increasing urgency in recent years—with changing 
readers’ minds and desires while pursuing an ethical relation with the other. To a large 
extent, her energy has been spent on persuading teachers and students to exercise their 
imaginations through literary reading. For Spivak, “because it enables self-othering, the 
literary is, as always, the place where self-transformation may occur” (Sanders, 2006, p. 
22). However, while she has never styled herself as a philosopher of education—Spivak 
is too much of an individualist, and, perhaps, too eccentric, to claim allegiance to any 
particular school or system of educational thought—she, nonetheless, as Henry A. 
Giroux acknowledges, has contributed significantly to the redefining of “the meaning 
of critical pedagogy” (Giroux, 1992, p. 2), especially, I suggest, in the field of critical 
literacy. While she is certainly interested in education in the wider sense, Spivak’s own 
efforts have, for the most part, have been focussed on the practice of reading—hence, 
her project of aesthetic education. 
Sangeeta Ray, commenting on Spivak’s preoccupation with “teaching as a form of 
learning,” argues that pedagogy is the motivating force behind much of Spivak’s 
work—“the art of teaching; the implications of teaching; the negotiations between 
subjects during teaching” (Ray, 2009, p. 29). Key to Spivak’s pedagogy is the structure 
we term the imagination. Indeed, the pedagogical goal of Spivak’s aesthetic education 
—the uncoercive rearrangement of desires for epistemological performance—involves 
what, in Deleuzian terms, can be described as the deterritorialization and the 
reterritorialization of the imagination. For Spivak, the rearrangement of desires “is not 
imposed by the teacher but takes place in a manner analogous to the reading of texts” 
(Simmons, 2014, p. 141), a process which she figures as a “a kind of no holds barred 
self-suspending leap into the other’s sea” (Spivak, Lyons, & Franklin, 2004, pp. 207–
208). As Spivak herself reports, “the idea of teacher has been one that allows me to do 
that jumping into the other’s space” (Spivak et al., 2004, p. 216)—especially, at the 
scene of reading. Concerned as she is with seeking out aporia and opening up debate, 
rather than with finding lasting solutions to specific problems, Spivak’s teaching, 
nevertheless, remains “hopeful and interminable” as it “presupposes and looks forward 
to a future anterior of achieved solidarity and thus nurses ‘the present’” (Spivak, 2012, 
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p. 72). Such teaching, especially when it activates the literary imagination, is utopically 
focussed, allowing us to “figure the impossible” (Spivak, 2012, p. 116) without 
neglecting the often painful realities in front of us. It is the sort of teaching that has the 
potential to contribute to a re-envisioning of sexuality education. For, by setting as 
horizon a (queer) future that isn’t a repetition of today’s ‘same,’ it gestures “towards the 
possibilities for creating a more open, connected, and loving world” (Quinlivan, 2014, 
p. 277). 
In that Spivak’s pedagogical approach involves “unlearning learning in order to ask: 
What is it to learn?” (Spivak, 2012, p. 162), her own work and queer pedagogy share 
similar perspectives and approaches—and pose similar questions. For, like Spivak’s 
aesthetic education, queer pedagogy concerns itself with the deconstruction of 
knowledge, and the role of the teacher in this task. As de Castell and Bryson remind us, 
rather than addressing the generation of knowledge and its transmission, queer 
educators must show “an interest in the destruction of knowledge, rather than in its 
creation” (de Castell & Bryson, 1998, p. 235).  
However, ‘destruction,’ as it is employed in the context of the queering of education, 
including sexuality education, is not to be understood as a nihilistic operation, but 
rather as an affirmative practice that proceeds out of love, and with the intention, made 
explicit by Spivak, of “giving rise to new ways of reading, writing, teaching in the 
strongest sense” (Spivak, 2012, p. 72). As Shlasko notes, in addition to speaking “to 
education stakeholders’ treatment of queers (n.) and queerness, of identity and 
normalcy,” queer pedagogy performs a valuable service by “interrogating mainstream 
pedagogies” (Shlasko, 2005, p.125) so as to first expose and then overturn their hidden 
premises. While queer pedagogy, especially in the context of sexuality education, is 
mistakenly seen by many as primarily corrective in its focus—providing “inclusion 
strategies” (Shlasko, 2005, p.127) for marginalized queer students, for example—its 
scope is much wider, including the exploration of the role that desire and pleasure play 
in relation to learning, and the interrogation of education’s complicity in the 
suppression of knowledge.  
If the aim of queer pedagogy is to “constantly multiply the possibilities of knowledge” 
(Shlasko, 2005, p.128)—by challenging the normative—then its emphasis will not be 
on answers but on questions, including what makes something thinkable or unthinkable. 
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As Britzman puts it, “queer theory offers education techniques to make sense of and 
remark upon what it dismisses or cannot bear to know” (Britzman, 1998a, p. 214). 
Spivak’s aesthetic education attempts something similar. In that her project pays due 
attention to the incalculable in education and values the imagination as “our inbuilt 
instrument of othering, of thinking things that are not in the here and now, of wanting 
to become others” (Spivak, 2012, p. 406), Spivak’s pedagogical intention is not just to 
challenge and subvert that which is taken for granted, but, rather, to create the 
conditions necessary for utopic thinking. As she says, “‘norm’ . . . is not an 
endorsement, but a description that frames my struggle against sexisms” (Spivak, 2012, 
p. 124). However—as Spivak affirms in her statement that opens this chapter and 
resonates throughout it—in this struggle, which deploys the aesthetic as “the means for 
persistently attempting collectivities to come” (Spivak, 2012, p. 464), queerness always 
belongs as much to the ‘not-yet’ as to the present. 
Britzman, in proposing a queer pedagogy that “worries about and unsettles normalcy’s 
immanent exclusions” (Britzman, 2012, p. 293), argues that in addition to being 
transgressive in regard to matters of affection and desire, such a pedagogy will question 
the production of essentialist subject positions by considering the constitution of selves 
that are performed by subjects in queer relation. Directed in an ethical response towards 
the other, Spivak’s pedagogical approach, insofar as it seeks to activate encounters that 
uncoercively rearrange desires, works in a similar way to Britzman’s, destabilizing and 
decentring “reproductive heteronormativity (RHN) as the broadest global institution” 
(Spivak, 2012, p. 438).  
If, for Britzman, pedagogies that claim to be queer must move beyond the strategies of 
providing information and seeking attitude change in an effort to include and take 
account of LGBTQ+ and other marginalized voices in the curriculum, the same holds 
for Spivak. Though promoting tolerance, such strategies, in that they rely on the binary 
of sameness/otherness, “may in actuality produce the grounds of normalization” 
(Britzman, 2012, p. 298) which they set out to challenge. Thus, Spivak sees the 
teaching of tolerance as “today’s soft option” (Spivak, 2012, p. 393)—easy in theory 
but difficult in practice. A more urgent pedagogical need is the admittance of “the 
unthinkability of normalcy” (Britzman, 2012, p. 298) and the consideration of how it is 
continually reconstituted in our discourse. Spivak, in speaking of the need to unmoor 
normality, refuses to be persuaded by arguments that more and better ‘information’ can 
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do this job. Rather than relying on twin myths—firstly, that “information neutralizes 
ignorance” and, secondly, that it is “a mirror of the real”—Spivak aligns with Britzman 
who proposes that queer pedagogy rethink “the everyday normative . . . as producing 
the grounds of estrangement and new forms of ignorance” (Britzman, 2012, p. 299).  
Like Britzman, Spivak is sceptical of the status afforded ‘information’ in neoliberal 
pedagogies, including the claim that the provision of accurate information relating to a 
particular issue will lead to attitudinal change. In this light, the emphasis that sexuality 
education programmes in New Zealand schools give to ‘information’ and the faith that 
they place in its efficacy—whether expressed in the requirement that “detailed 
information on student needs, learning and progress” (Education Review Office, 2018, 
p. 10) be collected and reported on, or in efforts to minimize harm on occasions such as 
school balls “by providing students with information about how they can keep 
themselves safe before, during, and after the event” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 
27)—need to be questioned.   
Indeed, throughout the more than 600 pages of her An Aesthetic Education in the Era of 
Globalization, Spivak wrestles with what an aesthetic education can do in a world 
where “information command has ruined knowing and reading” (Spivak, 2012, p. 1). 
For Spivak, providing information without attending to the historical circumstances of 
its production is a useless exercise. While it may be a worthy aim, for example, to 
deploy sexuality education to establish a more inclusive world for girls, women and 
queer people, a lot more than “information retrieval” (Spivak, 2012, p. 128) is needed. 
In Spivak’s view, a much more difficult but very important thing to come to grips with 
is the notion of “perspectival normativity,” the requirement that we “perspectivize the 
idea of normality” (Spivak, 2012, p. 178). No amount of dissemination of information 
on its own will assist with the deconstruction of perspectivization. However, paying 
attention “to the difference between information control and learning to read, 
information or anything” (Spivak, 2012, p. 517, endnote 57) will. In Spivak’s view, 
good teaching, focussed as it is on reading in what have traditionally been called the 
humanities, plays an invaluable role in opening the mind to other epistemes. It will be 
more concerned with the ‘how’ than with the ‘what,’ with the form of teaching rather 
than its content: 
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The substance of teaching informs or is informed by [the] form. I am not talking 
about ‘what’ because that is the problem: people think that just giving a lot of 
‘what’ actually does work as teaching. The trouble to teach is no longer 
undertaken. (Spivak & Shaikh, 2007, p. 175) 
In Spivak’s view, it is not that the ‘what’ is lacking in importance in teaching—the 
problem is that “we cannot stop with the ‘what’ . . . we have to think about how the 
teaching is being done” (Spivak & Shaikh, 2007, p. 175). This is necessary if the 
sexuality education classroom is to be embraced not only as a site where desires are 
rearranged for epistemological performance, but also recognized as a space where 
“sexuality moves through educational objects and pedagogical relations in 
unpredictable ways” (Gilbert, 2014, p. xiv), stirring as it goes a wide range of affective 
responses. Snaza, in observing that Spivak “foregrounds the paradoxical temporality of 
teaching” (Snaza, 2015, p. 53), draws attention to her claim that one of the most 
important aspects of classroom encounters is their ability to attune us to “non-linear 
temporality” (Snaza, 2015, p. 60), thereby, altering our embodied attention, rearranging 
our desires, and, in the long run, our politics. Spivak’s insight that the pedagogical 
encounter is attentive to “the mattering of time, the ways in which time comes to 
matter” (Snaza, 2015, p. 49) resonates with queer’s emphasis on time as kairos—the 
moment of opportunity—rather than time as chronos or sequential ordering. In positing 
the notion of queerness, not as a state of being or as an identity, but as a way of 
becoming, queer theory provides the basis for a queer pedagogy that enthusiastically 
engages “in questions of becoming as the processes of unforeseeable change” 
(McCallum & Tuhkanen, 2011, p. 8). By conceptualizing time as kairos, it becomes 
possible not only to imagine collectivities to come, but also to attempt them—including 
through the practice of literary reading, which has the ability to make the demands of 
chronological time matter less than the opportunities that emerge from the page in front 
of the reader’s eyes. 
Queer Reading Practices 
Shlasko recognizes that “as an aesthetic, queer looks for and enjoys potentially 
subversive content in cultural texts of any media” (Shlasko, 2005, p. 124). Yet, in 
attending to queer pedagogy’s insistence on queer reading, it is necessary to make an 
important distinction between the inclusion in the curriculum of texts about or from the 
point of view of queer subjects, and “reading queerly” (Shlasko, 2005, pp. 129, 130). 
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Reading queerly, to which Shlasko gives priority, involves “seeking out the queer or 
potentially queer meanings in a text” (Shlasko, 2005, p. 129.), whether or not the text is 
explicitly queer, either in its subject matter or in the perspectives that it presents. 
Whatever the text, a queer reading will attempt to draw out those multiple meanings 
and implications that refuse normalcy. A queer reading will point out internal 
contradictions in the normal—wherever and whenever it is found. Insofar as queer 
ways of reading are more concerned with what readers do with a text, than with the text 
in itself, they promote “the sense of reading as a self-reflective practice” (Shlasko, 
2005, p. 130). Thus, queer ways of reading affirm that “texts change readers, and 
readers change texts” (Shlasko, 2005, p. 129). Meaning is always on the move. 
If queer theory acknowledges “the intrusion of exorbitant normalcy and the ways such 
normalcy ignores the everydayness of queer identifications, pleasures, practices, and 
bodies” (Britzman, 2012, p. 294), then queer reading practices operating within queer 
pedagogy eschew the comfort of sameness and the sort of self-affirmation that comes at 
the expense of excluding that which is other. Queer ways of reading, to the extent that 
they make space for the undecidable and the unknowable—that which cannot be 
disciplined or controlled—promote “the proliferation of one’s own identificatory 
possibilities” (Britzman, 2012, p. 297), rather than a return to the confines of a familiar 
and comfortable ‘self.’ Thus, they become “an imaginary site for multiplying 
alternative forms of identifications and pleasures” (Britzman, 2012, p. 297)—a site, 
also, where difference is claimed as the very condition that makes community possible.  
Spivak’s aesthetic education travels a similar trajectory in that the potential for change 
that is activated by literary reading is released as self-synecdoche or self-abstraction, a 
process which enables readers to respond to calls to attempt collectivities to come 
through a teleiopoiesis—that is, by trying to reach and touch the distant other through 
imaginative effort. While difference—the surplus of subjectivity—must always be put 
aside to claim collectivity, difference, nevertheless, makes its presence felt in the 
realization that imagined collectivities, even queer ones, are never attainable in the here 
and now. There is always the need to position queerness as horizon.  
By promoting reading as “the habit of mind that can be open to experience ethics as the 
impossible figure of a founding gap, of the quite-other” (Spivak, 2012, p. 111), Spivak 
undertakes her own version of queer reading. Simmons’ claim that Spivak’s 
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teleiopoiesis—insofar as it leads to a recognition that “the gap between the ego and the 
Other will never be bridged” (Simmons, 2014, p. 142)—brings with it both a loss of 
certainty and a certain humility, also applies to queer reading practices. For, both 
Spivakian and queer approaches invite readers to attempt to learn by switching off or 
silencing their own voice. By incessantly nudging readers to think in ways that admit 
the possibility that neither self nor other ‘owns’ a stable identity—and that neither is 
‘normal’—both imply an imagination that works “with the Other through the Other’s 
eyes as much as possible” (Simmons, 2014, p. 142). 
Some Concluding Remarks 
Spivak and Britzman raise important questions about how difference should be read 
and engaged, not only in relation to Spivak’s aesthetic education or the process of 
reading queerly that Britzman theorizes, but also in the context of a re-envisioned 
sexuality education that seeks to develop the potential to desire differently, more, and 
better. By taking seriously the proposition that “something queer can happen to anyone 
when one attempts to fix and unfix identity” (Britzman, 2012, p. 301), sexuality 
educators and researchers are better prepared to explore ways in which pedagogy might 
engage with alterity. These include thinking through the notion that in the other one 
reads difference and self-difference not identity. Insofar as reading acknowledges 
“difference within identity” and avoids equating interpretation with “a confirmation or 
negation of identity” (Britzman, 2012, p. 303), it becomes a means of disrupting the 
inside/outside binary and other hierarchies that still persist in sexuality education, 
underpinned and protected as they are by often unexamined conceptualizations of 
sexual identity, gender identity, and personal identity embedded in the curriculum (see 
Ministry of Education, 2015).  
While reading is “always about risking the self, about confronting one’s own theory of 
reading, and about engaging one’s own alterity and desire” (Britzman, 2012, p. 304), it 
also throws a light on the ways in which education, including sexuality education, 
sometimes limits how life is imagined and lived, both individually and collectively. If 
queer ways of reading encourage the urge to learn “about one’s own otherness, one’s 
own unconscious desires and wishes, one’s own negations” (Britzman, 2012, p. 305), 
then Spivak’s aesthetic education, by attending to the practice of teleiopoiesis, 
harnesses a pedagogy capable of imagining a sociality that exceeds the dominant and 
the hegemonic—one which by opening up the reader to utopic possibilities becomes a 
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means for (queerly) attempting the sorts of collectivities to come that are a feature of a 
sexuality education hospitable to its own re-envisioning. 
If the theorization of Spivakian pedagogical practices and ways of reading presented in 
this chapter has contributed to an understanding of Spivak’s persistent attempts at 
(queer) collectivities to come, then the chapter that follows will put these theorizations 
to work at a scene of reading where they encounter the singularities and specificities of 
a literary text. In an effort to explore ways in which collectivities to come can be 
imagined and attempted in fiction, it will attend to James Courage’s A Way of Love as it 






A Queer Reading of A Way of Love 
I put aside the surplus of my subjectivity and synecdochize myself, count myself as the 
part by which I am metonymically connected to the particular predicament, so that I 
can claim collectively, engage in action validated by that very collective. (Spivak, 
2012, pp. 436–437) 
. . . I nevertheless suffered a certain homesickness for the company of those who lived, 
as I did or had done, in more or less full self-acceptance of their own natures as 
members of what I may call without exaggeration our immense league—members who 
were scattered and for the most part strangers to one another, but who shared a 
common erotic compulsion, a common form of social difficulty, often a common 
glossary, and who rejoiced in the anonymity of cities. (Courage, 1959, p. 145) 
Overview 
In this chapter, through a reading of James Courage’s pre-gay-liberation novel, A Way 
of Love (1959)—one that takes into account both queer theory and queer pedagogy, as 
well as Spivak’s own project of aesthetic education—I set out to show how an 
experience of the ways in which collectivities are imagined and attempted in a work of 
fiction can become an opportunity “to release the possibility of self-abstraction, self-
synecdoche” (Spivak, 2012, p. 440), and, thus, become a means for attempting (queer) 
collectivities to come. In my exploration of A Way of Love, I pay particular attention to 
those queer moments and spaces which “extend a welcome to the impossible” and give 
witness to the potential of queer “to reshape material realities in unanticipatable ways” 
(O’Rourke, 2006, pp. 22, 29). For, it is at these moments and in these spaces that it 
becomes possible to imagine transformative collectivities and solidarities to come, and 
that the way is opened up for their emergence or arrival—unforced and unannounced. 
Thus, the ethical reflex is trained.  
Although produced and published in Great Britain, A Way of Love has the distinction of 
being “the first overt story of same-sex love written by a New Zealander” (Burke, 2008, 
p. 101). Because it deals with the issue of male with male sex in a sympathetic and 
sensitive way, Courage’s novel achieved considerable notoriety at the time of its 
publication and was effectively banned under the censorship laws that operated in New 
Zealand prior to the establishment in 1964 of the Indecent Publications Tribunal. If 
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during my exploration of A Way of Love I attend to ways in which the novel’s 
characters, especially its narrator, attempt (queer) collectivities to come through a 
process of self-synecdoche, in doing so, I will veer towards those singularities which, 
by proliferating identificatory possibilities, gesture in the direction of the queering of 
sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand—a matter that is addressed in the 
chapters that follow.  
However, before laying out my reading of A Way of Love, I wish to make it clear that I 
use the term ‘queer,’ not primarily as a synonym for gay, lesbian, transgender, 
transsexual, or intersexed, but more often to designate a subject position, a politic or a 
certain aesthetic flavour. In line with Halperin’s historicist approach to the construction 
of sexuality, the label ‘gay’ rarely appears in my discussion of A Way of Love. It would 
be both misleading and universalizing to apply the term to a period in history, the 
nineteen-fifties, when it was not commonly used by men who engaged in sexual 
activity with other men to describe themselves. On the other hand, as I will explain, at 
the time the novel was written and set, the term ‘homosexual’ was being more readily 
adopted, both by men—especially from the middle classes—who were sexually 
oriented towards other men, and by society generally. This term is used where 
appropriate. 
As I approach A Way of Love, I am mindful that “literary criticism is itself 
performative, insofar as it is a discursive practice that creates, reiterates and conceals 
certain norms and normal ways of reading” (Rigby, 2009, p. 474). I seek to read 
Courage’s novel ethically in that I take responsibility for my response to the text and 
for the consequences of my act of reading (see Miller, 1987, p. 43). As I read (queerly), 
I also adopt a historicist approach to the construction of desire and sexuality, one that 
recognizes their irreducible specificity—in Spivakian terms, their singularity and 
unverifiability—in relation to a time and place distant from my own. In the case of A 
Way of Love, I attend to the performance of male homosexual desire in England in the 
decades after World War II.  
Some Background 
In order to prepare the way for my reading of Courage’s novel, I first provide sufficient 
historical background to support an informed understanding of the book’s treatment of 
male homosexuality.  
127 
 
Set in nineteen-fifties London, where Courage had for the most part lived since leaving 
New Zealand in 1932, A Way of Love is profitably read against the background of the 
work of the Wolfenden Committee which in 1954 was tasked by the British Parliament 
to investigate the perceived ‘threat’ of homosexuality. Its establishment came in the 
wake of a number of high-profile and widely-publicized court cases throughout the 
British Isles, but mostly in London, involving the arrest, conviction and imprisonment 
of adult men for engaging in consensual sex with other adult men.  
German in origin, the term ‘homosexuality’ entered the English language relatively late 
in the nineteenth century when practitioners of the new ‘science’ of psychiatry 
employed it to denote “a distinctive classification of sexual behavior, sexual desire, and 
sexual subjectivity” (Halperin, 2012, p. 43). As it was originally applied and 
understood, the concept ‘homosexual’ pathologized same-sex sexual desire—which 
was considered to be but one manifestation of the more pervasive problem of gender 
inversion. Indeed, it was an inborn reversal of gender traits that was believed to prompt 
males to act or dress as females and females to act or dress as males.  
However, into the twentieth century, as psychiatry grew in influence, the term 
homosexual gained greater currency among the wider population, and homosexuality 
itself came to be seen as a condition to be dealt with by clinicians, rather than a sin to 
be forgiven by priests, or a crime to be punished by the courts. In the years after World 
War II, as homosexuality assumed greater significance “as a contemporary urban 
problem” that affected most metropolitan centres, but especially London, “the ontology 
of queer male behavior” (Hornsey, 2010, p. 26) and its moral status were hotly debated, 
mainly among the educated classes. By the nineteen-fifties calls had grown louder for 
homosexuals to be treated not as criminals, but as unfortunates suffering from a 
psychiatric disorder that had its origins in social factors. An increasingly common 
belief was that homosexuals were the victims of “environmental disturbances, which 
had arrested their ability to enter proper sexual relationships” (Hornsey, 2010, p. 27). 
High on the list of social disruptions that ‘caused’ homosexuality were “the 
psychological failings of the impoverished ‘broken’ home” (Hornsey, 2010, p. 26) with 
its hostile or absent father and its over-protective, possessive mother.  
While the characters in A Way of Love make passing conversational references to Freud 
and to key features of Freudian psychology—including “an unresolved Oedipus 
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complex” (Courage, 1959, p. 40)—the novel omits any overt mention of the Wolfenden 
Committee or its 1957 Report recommending the decriminalization of homosexual 
behaviour between consenting adults in private. Courage, however, was well aware of 
the Wolfenden Committee’s work—and of the British Government’s lack of action in 
response to its Report—as a letter written in 1958 to fellow New Zealand author Frank 
Sargeson reveals: “I’m very afraid that we’ll all have to remain felons—or dishonest 
boyos—in our lifetime” (Sargeson & Shieff, 2012, p. 268).  
Yet, what A Way of Love does do is provide a narrative that evidences the quiet but 
subversive queering by Courage’s fictional felons and boyos of “the deities of family, 
home and marriage,” which “were all the more venerated” (Ackroyd, 2017, pp. 216–
217) in the years following the end of the Second World War—a period hailed by many 
as marking a return to normalcy after the deprivations of the Great Depression and the 
ravages of war. Courage’s novel, “rather than contributing to a collective or 
essentialised conception of nonnormative identity,” invites readers to view identities 
queerly—“as they are in everyday life: complex, subjective and multiple” (Burke, 
2008, p. 96).  
Admittedly, Courage’s focus is somewhat narrow. Instead of attempting to deal with 
the “diverse agglomeration of different identities, lifestyles, and ways of engaging with 
the city” (Hornsey, 2010, p. 3) that was a feature of London’s sizeable population of 
queer males, Courage concerns himself for the most part with those queer men—by and 
large from the middle-classes or with aspirations in that direction—who valued and 
sought “public discretion, domestic propriety, and companionate monogamy” 
(Hornsey, 2010, p. 8). By focussing “not just on what made them different but also on 
those values they shared with men and women of their class” (Houlbrook, 2005, pp. 
203–204), Courage not only emphasizes the respectability of the queer men who 
populate A Way of Love but, in doing so, seeks to distinguish them in the reader’s mind 
from other queer men—cottagers and queans, for example—who were perceived by the 
general public to be disorderly or criminal, and judged, therefore, as threats to the 
common good. By positioning his middle class homosexual men firmly within the 
bounds of conventional morality, Courage builds a case for the decriminalization of 
homosexual activity that is consistent with the recommendation of the Wolfenden 
Report, which advocated for what has been called “a legitimate private ‘homosexual’ 
space” (Houlbrook, 2005, p. 262).  
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As he creates a fictional world where respectable queer men perform their sexuality 
within the confines of private homes—and where the likelihood of arrest, though 
present, is not as great as it would be in public or semi-public spaces—Courage works 
carefully to protect readers from having to consider and legitimize any form of 
commercial sexual activity between men. Nor does he expose them to the cruising of 
bars, parks and public lavatories by males on the lookout for sex with other males. Any 
references in the novel to sexual activity that is either initiated or transacted in public or 
semi-public spaces casts such behaviour in a negative light: 
And picking up a body for the night from some queer bar or other is altogether 
too precarious—to say nothing of a taste of ashes in the mouth. (Courage, 1959, 
p. 39) 
By emphasizing the respectability of homosexuality, especially its alignment with 
middle class morality and domesticity, Courage, like the Wolfenden Committee, was, 
unwittingly or otherwise, “marking out boundaries and firming up binaries—
establishing which emerging construction of a homosexual type should be released 
from the law’s grasp” (Lewis, 2016, p. 205). In other words, he is concerned with 
producing what today is called the politics of homonormativity—“a politics that does 
not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and 
sustains them” (Duggan, 2002, p. 179). Nevertheless, within the tight frame in which A 
Way of Love operates—and, maybe, because of it—there is much that is queer and of 
interest in Courage’s novel. 
The Synecdochic Performance of Queer Collectivity 
In order to understand how that which is queer in A Way of Love is able to find 
expression and make itself felt or count in the absence of institutional validation, it is 
helpful to acknowledge, as Spivak does, that “the repetition of singularity that gives 
multiplicity is the repetition of difference” (Spivak, 2012, p. 436). However, in order to 
achieve agency, that which is queer—the singular, the non-normative, the unfixed—
ends up ‘sacrificing’ itself to presume and perform collectivity through a process of 
self-synecdoche spelt out by Spivak in the quote that heads this chapter. 
In relation to the sort of synecdochic performance of collectivity that Spivak describes, 
it is important to note that “the term queer does not designate identity, but alliance” 
(Butler, 2015, p. 70). Queer alliances come about “through a self-synecdoche that can 
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be withdrawn when necessary rather than confused with identity” (Spivak, 2012, p. 
439). This is because the synecdoche and the metonym—the figure to which 
synecdoche is most closely related—are inherently unstable, subject to change, and 
open to renegotiation as subjects move through time and space. Considered in the light 
of Muñoz and Quinlivan’s insistence that it is most productive to approach the notion 
of queer collectivity utopically—as ‘horizon,’ not something belonging to a specific 
time and place—Spivak’s aesthetic education is best thought as a path towards 
collectivities to come, rather than as a mechanism for endorsing particular collectivities 
in the here and now. In other words, while sometimes useful as a term of affiliation, the 
designation ‘queer’ never adequately or completely describes that to which/whom it is 
applied, whether synecdochized as a collective or not. The attempts at self-
synecdochizing which we see in A Way of Love are, therefore, better understood as the 
result of a commitment to queer as utopic—however provisional or restricted in scope 
that commitment is—rather than to any notion of essential or universal queerness.  
Told in the first person from the point of view of Bruce Quantock, a successful forty-
nine-year-old architect, A Way of Love is the story of “a man who must obviously have 
had his opportunities with women—and who has preferred to make his choice 
elsewhere” (Courage, 1959, p. 44). The plot of the novel is built around Bruce’s 
involvement with Philip Dill, a younger man, sexually inexperienced, unsure of 
himself, and new to London, whom the narrator first meets by chance when cheek 
literally collides with jaw at a Festival Hall concert. As Bruce describes it, “the contact 
. . . was an astonishment to us both—a kind of detonation between strangers” (Courage, 
1959, p. 11).  
In telling the story of what happens “when two men find their love in one another”—of 
his and Philip’s two-year affair; “how it began and how it ended” (Courage, 1959, pp. 
159, 9)—Bruce not only comes to terms with the complexities that shaped their 
relationship, but also throws a light on the ways in which their respective (and very 
different) approaches to desire, sex and queer worked either to open the way for 
collectivities to come or foreclosed on such possibilities. By exploring the extent to 
which Bruce, Philip, and to a lesser degree the other characters who populate A Way of 
Love, choose either to “self-synecdochize to form collectivity”—or resist such a pull—
it becomes possible to reflect on the extent to which the collectivities that are 
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performed “take difference itself as [their] synecdochic element” (Spivak, 2012, p. 
437). 
The default position of the many male characters in A Way of Love who are sexually 
attracted to other men is aloneness—physical, mental, and emotional. This manifests 
itself, either positively or negatively, as solitude or loneliness: “We are all separate 
beings” (Courage, 1959, p. 14), Bruce tells himself. It is their experience of 
separateness and aloneness, rather than any ideological or political motivation, which 
moves men who are sexually drawn to other men to embrace the queer, self-
synecdochize, and claim connection to an abstract whole. Bruce, for example, despite 
“health of body” and “the material blessings of a comfortable house and a reasonable 
income” (Courage, 1959, p. 36), is deeply unhappy. Writing of the pain of finding 
himself in his empty home, “alone again with the lamp, my paper and the point of my 
pen,” Bruce dreads the frustration of going “alone to my bed” (Courage, 1959, pp. 26, 
58). He ventures on solitary walks in Devon and Brighton as an antidote to what he 
prefers to think of as “a passing loneliness” (Courage, 1959, p. 35), albeit a loneliness 
that is increasingly difficult to ignore. In acknowledging that his way of life is “too apt 
to be conditioned by a certain deviation” from the norm—which he judges “as neither a 
crime nor an unjustified indulgence”—Bruce is prompted to admit to himself that “in 
my soul I was alone and I sought not to be alone” (Courage, 1959, p. 36). Yet, while 
refusing the double trap of self-justification and self-pity, Bruce is able to convince 
himself: “Let it be sufficient that I am as I am . . .” (Courage, 1959, p. 14). 
In dismissing the authority both of criminology and psychiatry in respect to his 
sexuality—“there shall be no excursions into psychology here” (Courage, 1959, p. 14), 
Bruce tells us—he not only claims a certain queerness by resisting the hold of these 
heteronormative structures, but also an existential loneliness that is aligned to a 
depathologized type of melancholia. This melancholia, as Muñoz argues, is an integral 
feature of ordinary life for those, including queers, who belong to “communities under 
siege” (Muñoz, 1999, p. 74). However, in that it can be deployed “to map the 
ambivalences of identification and the conditions of (im)possibility that shape . . . 
minority identities” (Muñoz, 1999, p. 74), melancholia serves a positive purpose as a 
mechanism that assists in the restructuring of identity. To varying degrees, many of the 
queer characters in A Way of Love experience melancholia, especially as a consequence 
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of adopting disidentification as a “strategy of resistance or survival” (Muñoz, 1999, p. 
5) against the hegemony of heteronormativity.  
Disidentification enables a subject to simultaneously refuse both assimilation and 
rebellion in regard to the dominant ideology. As Muñoz puts it, “to disidentify is to read 
oneself and one’s own life narrative in a moment, object, or subject that is not culturally 
coded to ‘connect’ with the disidentifying subject” (Muñoz, 1999, p. 12). For example, 
‘Mr White,’ one of the small number of homosexual men who agreed to be interviewed 
by the Wolfenden Committee [on Thursday 28 July, 1955], in explaining that the world 
of his queer companions “covers a very wide field” who are “all completely at ease in 
one another’s company” (Lewis, 2016, p. 219), emphasizes the homosexual male’s 
ability to cross class and social boundaries with ease. The thought of this worries 
society, not because individual heterosexuals are endangered, but because the structure 
of reproductive heteronormativity, which is tightly entangled with the hegemony of 
class, is threatened. As ‘Mr White’ explains: 
. . . homosexuals almost entirely do not move in circles or classes; they move in 
an accepted pattern through society. They do not pay very much attention to 
social status or where they come from or where they are going to; and I think 
that is one of the reasons why society is rather alarmed about them, that they do 
not adhere to the ordinary social prejudices and distinctions. It is quite possible 
that a peer may be attached to a farm labourer or an able seaman to a university 
professor, and I have known an eminent novelist who lived in a great state of 
devotion with a London policeman  . . . (Lewis, 2016, p. 218) 
By living openly as a homosexual, ‘Mr White’ clearly announces his refusal to 
assimilate into heterosexual society. At the same time, he is in no position to denounce 
the dominant heteronormative ideology of an inhospitable and class-ridden British 
society for what it is. In order, therefore, to argue the injustice of legislation that entraps 
and criminalizes men committing homosexual acts in Great Britain, ‘Mr White’ must 
do so on the basis of what he admits is “a deformation of character” (Lewis, 2016, p. 
219)—that is, the ‘arrested’ nature of his own emotional and social development. To 
the extent that he pathologizes himself in order to decriminalize homosexuality, ‘Mr 
White’ performs a disidentification—“a survival strategy that works within and outside 
the dominant public sphere simultaneously” (Muñoz, 1999, p. 5). In performing this 
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disidentification before the Wolfenden Committee, ‘Mr White’ is effectively 
“reworking . . . those energies that do not elide the ‘harmful’ or contradictory 
components of identity” (Muñoz, 1999, p. 12). The characters in A Way of Love enact 
similar survival strategies—not before a parliamentary committee—but on a more 
intimate scale, in a domestic setting, and in the presence of men who love men. 
If Muñoz’s notion of disidentification highlights “the survival strategies the minority 
subject practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere” (Muñoz, 
1999, p. 4)—one which either punishes or silences those subjects who don’t fit the 
fantasy of what a normal citizen is supposed to be—Spivak’s strategy of self-
synecdoche involves “the putting aside of difference” (Spivak, 2012, p. 436) in order to 
perform collectivity. Both practices contribute to the process of queer world-making— 
disidentification allows subjects to endure public hostility by “recycling and rethinking 
encoded meaning” (Muñoz, 1999, p. 31) through the performance of queer, often in 
private but porous spaces, while self-synecdoche enables a subject to become 
metonymically connected to a particular situation through identification with a group, a 
‘whole.’ Thus, disidentification and self-synecdoche each play their part in opening the 
way for collectivities to come. We see both processes at work in A Way of Love.  
It is Bruce’s recognition that it is physical desire which draws him to bond with other 
men—although, often, not without an accompanying melancholia—that enables him to 
feel himself “no longer alone” (Courage, 1959, p. 52) in the world. It is this same 
awareness that also allows him to stave off self-atrophy. As Bruce affirms at the novel’s 
end, sexual desire has its own validity whether or not it leads to love: “I cherish 
physical desire for its own sake, for its power to alleviate the solitudes of my kind and 
as it may expand into love” (Courage, 1959, p. 255). But to what extent does A Way of 
Love show that it is necessary, as Spivak says, “to put aside difference and self-
synecdochize to form collectivity” (Spivak, 2012, p. 437) in order for physical desire to 
flourish and for love among men to grow strong? And, more broadly, what is the 
relationship between self-synecdoche and disidentification in Courage’s novel? 
As readers follow Bruce from place to place around London, he introduces them to 
various queer individuals, collectivities and subcultures, leading them through these 
encounters to an understanding of “a more emotional and felt form of metropolitan 
sensibility” (Hornsey, 2010, p. 29). Bruce insistently and unashamedly asserts a bond 
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with those whom he meets, those whom he describes as “men of my kind”—a bond 
experienced in “no ordinary thirst but . . . a persistent longing, a yearning of the whole 
flesh” (Courage, 1959, p. 13).9 Like Bruce, these men claim “more or less full self-
acceptance of their own natures,” self-synecdochizing to form collectivity, figuring 
themselves as part of what Bruce terms “without exaggeration our immense league” 
(Courage, 1959, p. 145)—a synecdochic metaphor which is contextualized and 
explained in Courage’s epigraph to this chapter. 
By asserting membership of “the company of those who lived, as I did, or had done,” 
Bruce not only claims the right to seek out those who are akin to himself, “those whose 
natures offer the same or similar tastes, aversions, artistic or physical preferences” 
(Courage, 1959, pp. 145, 14), but also affirms the possibility of a collectivity to come 
based on erotic desire among men—and in so doing performs it. Samuel R. Delany, 
describing his first visit to the St. Mark’s Baths in New York in the early nineteen-
sixties, offers a perspective similar to that of Courage’s narrator: 
. . . what this experience said was that there was a population—not of individual 
homosexuals, some of whom now and then encountered, or that those 
encounters could be human and fulfilling in their way—not of hundreds, not of 
thousands, but rather of millions of gay men, and that history had, actively and 
already, created for us whole galleries of institutions, good and bad, to 
accommodate our sex. (Delany, 2004, p. 293) 
Courage and Delany both emphasize the positive role that sexual desire plays in 
performing and creating queer collectivities, which, “by surpassing the solitary pervert 
model and accessing group identity” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 64), challenge heteronormativity 
and its institutions. What makes such affirmations, such performatives queer is the 
realization, as Muñoz puts it, that “queerness is essentially about the rejection of a here 
                                                          
9 Throughout A Way of Love, men like Bruce, who erotically desire other men, are referred to 
collectively but variously as: “friends of my own persuasion” (Courage, 1959, p. 36); or “of 
your persuasion” (p. 44); “a strange race, a people apart” (p. 44); “of a certain kind” (p. 48); 
“the kind . . . I happen to be” (p. 79); “your kind” (p. 95); “friends of an understood kind” (p. 
107); “members of my kind” (p. 141); “the wider companionship of my kind” (p. 145); “the 
company of my kind” (pp. 153, 246); “friends of my own kind” (p. 173); “our persuasion” (p. 
180); and as “others of my kind, my circle” (p. 238). 
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and now and an insistence on potentiality or concrete possibility for another world” 
(Muñoz, 2009, p. 1).  
The queerness that is claimed by Bruce and his companions is not a solid identity or “a 
stable foundation, it is rather a performance, a shifting signifier” (Morris, 2003, p. 197). 
It amounts to what Spivak refers to as a “position without identity” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 
xv, 31, 32, 33, 431, 432, 435, 439, 465, 501, 583, endnote 36), being the homosexual 
pole of the heterosexual/homosexual binary within the construction of 
heteronormativity. Yet, the performance of queerness also releases what in Spivakian 
terms is “the possibility of self-abstraction, self-synecdoche” (Spivak, 2012, p. 440)—a 
possibility premised in this context on the repetition of difference rather than sameness. 
For example, by stating unapologetically that he is “no stranger in the land of Sodom” 
(Courage, 1959, p. 53), Bruce is not only refusing the Biblical injunction against 
homosexuality and the Christian code of sexual ethics based upon it, but is also staking 
a claim to a reterritorialized space in the ‘to come’—a queer space—for himself and 
other sexual strangers. Though Bruce’s attempt at queer world-making though the re-
figuration and subversion of Sodom may be considered a minor gesture, it nevertheless 
provides “glimpses of an actually existing queer future in the present” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 
61)—one that permits inhabitancy, if not possession, of spaces hitherto regarded as off-
limits. 
Muñoz’s insight that “queerness exists for us as an ideality that can be distilled from the 
past and used to imagine a future” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 1) helps readers to recognize and 
appreciate the many queer potentialities that suffuse the world of A Way of Love—a 
world not only where sexual intimacies between men are implied rather than explicitly 
described, but one, also, where sex takes place “in spaces that [are] underscored as 
emphatically private and circumspect” (Burke, 2008, p. 101). While the demands of 
Bruce’s professional and public life give a solidity to his existence—“an anchor 
holding me to the sea-bed of the overt and the practical”—his on-going allegiance is 
less to the conventions of his own time than to what he describes as “a companionship 
that had served me well enough in the past” (Courage, 1959, pp. 24, 145). In other 
words, Bruce embraces the sort of non-heteronormative assembly which, in Muñoz’s 
view, offers “a vast lifeworld of queer relationality, an encrypted sociality, and a 
utopian potentiality” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 6). Thus, Bruce’s allegiance to the sexual 
companionship which he experiences among men makes possible the sorts of 
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collectivities to come that Spivak says take difference, here sexual deviancy, as their 
synecdochic element. 
Private Spaces of Queer Performativity 
It is the private, indoor spaces of people’s homes—rather than London’s clubs, 
bathhouses or public lavatories—that in A Way of Love provide relatively safe meeting 
places for Bruce and queer men like him, drawn for the most part from the middle 
classes. Such spaces provide an opportunity for men—from a range of occupations, 
including the military and the police, and covering the age spectrum—to come together 
in shifting combinations, varying in size and makeup, in order to socialize and, perhaps, 
initiate sexual intimacies. As Henning Bech argues, “the city is not merely a stage on 
which a pre-existing, preconstructed sexuality is displayed and acted out; it is also a 
space where sexuality is generated” (Bech, 1987/1997, p. 118). Thus, regardless of 
whether queer men gather on “the first floor of a converted town house of Italianate 
dignity” (Courage, 1959, p. 15), in “the upper rooms of a ramshackle house near King’s 
Cross” (pp. 27–28), or in a “mews flat in Marylebone” (p. 36), it is in these private but 
porous spaces that “the essential need for an understanding of queerness as collectivity” 
(Muñoz, 2009, p. 11) is enacted and reinforced. There the notion of ‘queer’ is 
performatively deconstructed—“redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage” as a 
means of shaming, accusing, pathologizing and insulting men who desire sex with other 
men—and repurposed by these same men to create a site of resistance where “an 
enabling social and political resignification” (Butler, 2011, pp. 173, 176) becomes 
possible. In these spaces the idea of ‘homosexual’—entangled as it so often is with 
queer—is similarly deconstructed and reterritorialized as it is unmoored from its origins 
in psychiatry and pathology, and used affirmatively to construct what many are happy 
to label a homosexual identity. Bech explains the process in this way:  
Being together with other homosexuals allows one to mirror oneself in them and 
find self-affirmation. It allows one to share and interpret one’s experiences. It 
allows one to learn in more detail what it means to be homosexual: how to act, 
what to think, thus lending substance to one’s proclaimed identity, as well as 
assimilating certain techniques that may help bridge the gap between this 
identity and one’s actual experiences and conduct. (Bech, 1987/1997, p. 116) 
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The private spaces of A Way of Love, thus, serve a pedagogical purpose, for it is within 
them that the queer men who gather there, prompted initially and for the most part by 
sexual desire, learn how to be queer. If, as Vygotsky claims, “learning results from 
people participating in contexts where semiotically-mediated social interaction is 
facilitated,” and that it involves “participation in shared practice and is mediated by the 
sociocultural” (Brown, 2005, p. 2), then the spaces where men who desire men gather 
become pedagogical sites characterized by the sharing of queer ways of thinking, 
knowing and doing, through various interactions, discursive practices, pedagogical 
scaffolds etc. that are typical of sites of learning. By inhabiting these sites, Bruce and 
his kind experience a sexuality education appropriate to their kind—one that is place-
based and, by necessity, experiential, where “a learner constructs knowledge, skill, and 
value from direct experiences” (Knapp, 2008, p. 13). 
Private homes become the setting for dinners, teas, themed parties, and other occasions, 
both formal and informal, where queer “badinage” (Courage, 1959, p. 37) finds its 
expression not only in conversazione but also in song and musical performance, 
tableaux vivants, floor shows, cabaret and ballet. For example, a Winter Carnival is 
established by the draping of walls “with some kind of coarse white net” upon which 
sequins are sprinkled “to simulate the snowflakes”; a host and his guests—all males—
ready themselves “for a cabaret turn” where they might take the part of “one of the 
principal actors” (Courage, 1959, p. 51); the staging of a “mock rehearsal,” a pas de 
deux from Swan Lake featuring “a prima ballerina of strapping virility,” devolves—not 
unexpectedly—into “a travesty of balletic disasters, interrupted by furious squeaks, 
wheezes and rheumatic groans from the two performers” (p. 54); and the same Swan 
later metamorphosizes into “a transparently dressed girl with a parasol, a cartwheel hat, 
and grotesquely large feet in white shoes” who sings in “aspiring falsetto” (p. 57): 
 Nobody knows, they only guess, 
 Why I stroll through the Park in a chiffon dress . . . (Courage, 1959, p. 57) 
As Butler observes, such acts of gender miming and parody support the argument that 
gender itself is an impersonation—“the construal of gender-as-drag” (Butler, 2011, p. 
175). In that many acts of queer performativity fit the category of drag, including those 
that take place in Courage’s novel, they are subversive—but not always 
unproblematically so—and only insofar as they mirror and expose “the mundane 
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impersonations by which heterosexually ideal genders are performed and naturalized” 
(Butler, 2011, p. 176). The extent to which the various drag acts and impersonations are 
successful in achieving this is, of course, open to debate. 
While these queer gatherings and performances happen in private and behind closed 
doors rather than in public spaces, they, nevertheless, witness to the fact that men who 
sexually desire men “have learned to find each other; to map a commonly accessible 
world; to construct the architecture of queer space in a homophobic environment” 
(Berlant & Warner, 1998, p. 551) and, thus, attest to the possibility of queer world-
making. The pervasive nature of queer and its discombobulating affects are not lost on 
Courage’s characters. As Randal, a visitor to the city, says: 
‘Everybody’s queer,’ the American suddenly drawled. ‘That’s the truth—
everybody in London’s queer. It gets me kinda confused.’ (Courage, 1959, p. 
216) 
While queer theorists Berlant and Warner (1998) focus primarily on queer world-
making and “the radical aspirations of queer culture building” as they pertain to public 
spaces, it is important to acknowledge that queer world-making happens in any space—
including the fictional spaces of A Way of Love—where “the heterosexual couple is no 
longer the referent or the privileged example of sexual culture” (Berlant & Warner, 
1998, p. 548). The private spaces of A Way of Love, the spaces within which the novel’s 
queer world emerges and is nurtured, have their own “entrances, exits, unsystematized 
lines of acquaintance, projected horizons, typifying examples, alternate routes, 
blockages, incommensurate geographies (Berlant & Warner, 1998, p. 558). Much of 
what happens behind the closed doors of A Way of Love can, therefore, be understood 
as anticipating and preparing the way for queer collectivities to come—the post-gay-
liberation types of queerness evident in ACT UP, Gay Pride parades, and other public 
manifestations of queer seen in more recent decades, all of which continue to bear the 
traces of their queer past.  
If queerness is “a temporal arrangement in which the past is a field of possibility in 
which subjects can act in the present in the service of a new futurity” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 
16), then the décor, furnishings, and ornamentation of the private spaces of A Way of 
Love, and the conversation and behaviour that take place in them, assume a utopic 
significance, not just because they reference and give witness to a queer past—mythical 
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or historical—where men took men as lovers, but on account of the contribution they 
make to the formation of queer collectivities to come. This happens through their 
validation of a queer present, no matter how fragmentary or fleeting, and the hope they 
hold out for a queer future. As Burke observes, “the novel gestures toward a plethora of 
. . . queer personages ranging from modern individuals, such as Tchaikovsky, Proust, 
and Gide, to Hellenistic figures—for example Eros, Ganymede and Sappho” (Burke, 
2008, p. 107). Certainly, a queer sociality is encrypted in the objects found in the 
houses and rooms that Bruce and his kind inhabit. A “complete set of Gide” (Courage, 
1959, p. 43), positioned prominently in Bruce’s bookshelves, codedly announces his 
sexual orientation to those in the know, while the potted hyacinth on his mantelpiece—
a plant named after the divine Hyacinthus, “so beautiful that Apollo fell in love with 
him” (Grimal, 1986, p. 218)—prompts a comparison between Bruce and Philip’s 
partnership and that of the two male gods and lovers. Bruce finds the hyacinth’s strong 
scent “disturbing” (Courage, 1959, pp. 35, 41), perhaps an intimation that his 
relationship with Philip will come to grief—just as Hyacinthus’ liaison with Apollo 
ended with his own bloody, if accidental, death. 
It is worth emphasizing again that A Way of Love makes no reference either to public 
events of the day or to political matters that might impact on the lives of homosexual 
men. Nor does it “articulate notions of ‘queerness’ within frameworks that reflect 
emergent queer politicisation and the ethnic model of gay identity” (Burke, 2008, pp. 
97–98)—as Witi Ihimaera’s Nights in the Gardens of Spain (1995) and The Uncle’s 
Story (2000) do in later decades. For example, while a rereading of Plato’s Symposium 
by Bruce’s old university friend and lover, Victor, provides an opportunity to consider 
“that marvellous encomium Socrates utters about our kind of love” (Courage, 1959, p. 
87), it results not in a serious theorization of the nature of male same-sex love, but in 
the rather queer conclusion—gently subversive as it is—that despite “all that merging 
of physical and spiritual beauty between the lover and the beloved . . . they must have 
had terrific romps with their boyfriends without caring tuppence about any spiritual 
relationship afterwards” (Courage, 1959, p. 88). A recognition of shared queer 
aspirations with the Greeks—and the intuition that a queer thread, or at least the trace 
of one, runs through history—is implicit in Victor’s observation that “still, like us they 
did hanker for something different” (Courage, 1959, p. 88). Such a comment—despite 
or perhaps because of its seeming superficiality—betrays a queer aesthetic which not 
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only “lets us feel that this world is not enough, that indeed something is missing,” but 
also “contains blueprints and schemata of a forward-dawning futurity” (Muñoz, 2009, 
p. 1). 
The strongest and most overt protest against heteronormativity and the status quo in A 
Way of Love is in fact directed at the British literary establishment and, by implication, 
the censorship laws which exclude or limit the presentation of homosexuality in a 
sympathetic light for fear of public scandal. This comes in the form of a lively dinner 
table conversation where the matter of the invisibility of queer characters in English 
fiction—where “murder’s considered a proper subject while love between two men 
definitely isn’t” (Courage, 1959, p. 110)—surfaces. While a strong desire is expressed 
“to read a novel about queers that treats us as human beings like other people” 
(Courage, 1959, p. 110), this may be understood as expressing not only the frustration 
and anger of the book’s queer characters, but the author’s own well-grounded fear that 
A Way of Love faced rejection by potential publishers on the grounds of its ‘indecency,’ 
or after publication risked being withdrawn from sale for the same reason. 
Refusing the Queer, Refusing Self-Synecdoche 
As we have seen, Bruce, in claiming membership of the “immense league” of men like 
himself who share “a common erotic compulsion” (Courage, 1959, p. 145), readily and 
freely self-synecdochizes to form collectivity. But in the absence of any public 
validation of homosexuality, “difference itself” becomes the “synecdochic element” 
(Spivak, 2012, p. 437) that establishes the group which Bruce claims as his own. Philip, 
however, for much of the span of his relationship with Bruce, is “not willing to commit 
himself to membership of a league he saw fit to disdain, while sharing not the least of 
their compulsions” (Courage, 1959, p. 145). His refusal to self-synecdochize on the 
basis of his sexual desires results in Philip’s loss of agency—for, as Spivak reminds us, 
“agency presumes collectivity” (Spivak, 2012, p. 436). 
The intensity of Bruce’s attraction to Philip, which is generated at their initial, 
accidental encounter, is attributed by Bruce to “the hungers of a nature I happen to 
delight in sharing with other animals” (Courage, 1959, p. 254). Indeed, he honours the 
male body, “that envelope of man . . . for its pleasures and its carnal beauty” (p. 10). 
Bruce, in describing Philip, emphasizes his partner’s inherent animality—most often 
expressed in terms of feline imagery. For example, readers are told by Bruce of “the 
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animal fact of his [Philip’s] body” (p. 205) and of “a sort of animal impasse” (p. 239) 
that he and Philip experience in a moment of tension between them. Recalling their first 
meeting, Bruce describes Philip’s “youthful face as resentful, as lost and as ignorant of 
its charm, as that of some tiger-cub surprised behind the bars of a cage” (Courage, 
1959, p. 12). He repeatedly refers to Philip’s “young face” (p. 41) and “the golden glare 
of the eyes directed at mine” (p. 11) as “tigerish” (pp. 11, 41, 95, 127, 188). Most 
tellingly, when Philip leaves his own accommodation to live in Bruce’s house, Bruce 
figures Philip’s move as an emancipation of “this beloved creature, this young tiger I 
was releasing from his lair or his cage.” (p. 120). But released where and for what 
purpose? 
Bruce certainly recognizes the resonances between his own aloneness—past and 
present—and that of Philip. On seeing Philip’s dismal furnished room in Earls Court 
for the first time, Bruce is reminded of his own painful loneliness as a young man new 
to London: “I felt a shrinking in my soul, a sympathy for this lad beside me who might 
be as I had been” (Courage, 1959, p. 78). Yet, Bruce’s “releasing” of Philip from the 
confines of his “furnished room in digs” (Courage, 1959, pp. 120, 77) seems to offer 
more than the possibility of an end to loneliness. In Spivakian terms, it is an invitation 
to Philip to self-synecdochize on the basis of an instinctive animality and a sexual 
desire for other males, both hitherto largely unexplored and unexpressed by the young 
man. Throughout A Way of Love, Courage carefully and subtly establishes a 
metaphorical connection between the repression of erotic desire by men who are 
sexually attracted to men and the confinement of animals in cages. At key points in the 
novel, “the cough and roar of the lions or the harsh yell of the cranes” (Courage, 1959, 
p. 24), which are enclosed at the neighbouring zoo, can be heard by Bruce from his 
bedroom window. In stating that such sounds “bring the jungle to my bedroom 
windows” (Courage, 1959, p. 24), Bruce is opening the way for a range of possible 
interpretations, all of which must account for animal and human desires that have been 
neutered or debased. By the end of the novel the animal cries emanating from the zoo 
are of such intensity as to convey extreme levels of frustration and menace, signifying, 
perhaps, Philip’s inability to follow his desires and Bruce’s anger that Philip cannot do 
so. 
In all this, Bruce clearly recognizes that his particular relationship with Philip, though 
monogamous, “had its deepest roots in a common gratification of the senses” (Courage, 
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1959, p. 254), that is, in a desire that necessarily extends beyond the boundaries of any 
private life with Philip to include friends and strangers who also claimed membership 
of that vast league of men who desired other men. In contrast, Philip, believing Bruce 
to be the one man who’d make him happy for ever, insists from the beginning that their 
affair be “strictly something between ourselves, a matter à deux” (Courage, 1959, p. 
107), that is, a private relationship that operates within a carefully circumscribed 
domestic space. Expressing the view that Bruce is only interested in physical attraction, 
Philip is emphatic that he wants nothing to do with Bruce’s “friends of an understood 
kind” whom he believes “scornful, rapacious, terrifying” (Courage, 1959, p. 107). As 
Bruce sees it, Philip is afraid that “he would instantly find himself branded as ‘one of 
them, because of us’” (Courage, 1959, p. 107).  
Paradoxically, the partnership that at first seemed to offer Philip and Bruce the 
possibility of escape from aloneness and loneliness becomes closed-in on itself, one of 
self-imposed isolation. This relationship—disconnected as it is from others—is 
repeatedly figured as a “private island” separated from the greater landmass: “You 
might be on an island, Mr Quantock, just the two of you” (Courage, 1959, pp. 173, 
140), observes Rose, their housekeeper. On the rare occasions when the pair attempt to 
socialize with others, the effort is described as “an excursion into foreign country, a trip 
away from our island” or as an “expedition away from our ‘island’” (Courage, 1959, 
pp. 165, 212). In refusing to associate with friends of Bruce’s kind, Philip is effectively 
refusing the queer, thus, blocking “a portal into worlds” which Muñoz describes as 
“fuller, more sensual, brighter, vaster” (O’Rourke, 2014, p. 34). By avoiding queer 
spaces Philip is also refusing the life-giving opportunities which they provide.  
Finding himself “unreasonably anxious not to lose the wider companionship of [his] 
kind,” Bruce experiences the separation from the company of men like himself as 
“restriction . . . frustration  . . . homesickness” (Courage, 1959, p. 145). While it is fair 
to say that Philip eventually allows Bruce to introduce him to a few of his queer friends, 
it is only when Philip is faced with the likely breakdown of their relationship that he 
belatedly and futilely makes a determination to try to integrate with Bruce’s 
community: 
. . . he [Philip] had felt that he must try to assimilate himself into the little world 
I shared with others of my kind, my circle. If he tried hard enough, he had told 
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himself, he could do it; he could turn himself into ‘one of those’. He would try 
all means; the assimilation might only be a matter of experiment. (Courage, 
1959, p. 238) 
Sara Ahmed’s insight that “(hetero) norms are investments, which are ‘taken on’ and 
‘taken in’ by subjects” (Ahmed, 2014, pp. 146–147), is a useful point from which to 
begin an exploration of Philip’s understanding of and attitudes towards queer 
collectivities. If, as Ahmed argues, “heteronormativity functions as a form of public 
comfort by allowing bodies to extend into spaces that have already taken their shape,” 
then it is possible to understand why Philip—a man who is surely erotically attracted to 
another man—is, at the same time, so strongly drawn to heteronormativity as “a form 
of comforting” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 148). Although Philip tries hard to find comfort in 
heteronormative scripts, his wish to assimilate, to be absorbed into the heteronormative, 
nevertheless, reveals a desire to aspire to an impossible ideal, one that his relationship 
with Bruce suggests he is failing to live up to. Philip’s desire for the comfort of 
heterosexuality is articulated most clearly in his stated intention to try to marry, 
although he has no particular woman in mind: “I want to marry, one day, Bruce. I want 
to try—and you can’t stop me” (Courage, 1959, p. 240). 
Philip is comfortable with the ideal of heteronormativity, even though he is often 
personally ill at ease within heterosexual spaces. Obversely, he is contented when alone 
with Bruce, but awkward in the company of Bruce’s queer friends. As Ahmed 
observes, “whilst being queer may feel uncomfortable within heterosexual space, it 
does not then follow that queers always feel comfortable in queer spaces” (Ahmed, 
2014, p. 151). 
Queering the Heteronormative? 
Bruce, on the other hand, despite his professional success and apparent social poise, 
expresses “a discomfort with the scripts of heteronormative existence” (Ahmed, 2014, 
p. 151). For example, his contact with his family—that is, with his sister, Louise, her 
husband, Percy, and their two children, Jules and Virginia—is irregular and fleeting. As 
he says, theirs is “another world altogether” (Courage, 1959, p. 27). Louise, for her 
part, is unable to imagine, let alone comprehend, the ‘otherness’ of Bruce’s life. She 
regards the absence of a significant female in her brother’s life as a serious lack: 
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‘How can a man live in a house by himself? There’s something missing—
hairpins on the carpet, a magazine left half open, a sprinkle of face-powder on 
the edge of the wash-basin upstairs.’ And she looks at me searchingly, silently. 
(Courage, 1959, p. 29) 
On the rare occasions when Bruce is persuaded by Louise to visit her family at their 
farm in Suffolk, he hurries back as soon as he can to his “different world of London” 
(Courage, 1959, p. 31)—and to the company of his queer friends. As Bruce’s situation 
shows, it is “the bonds between queers, that ‘stop’ queer bodies from feeling 
comfortable in spaces that extend the form of the heterosexual couple” (Ahmed, 2014, 
p. 155). Ahmed, in proposing that “the effects of ‘not fitting’” are “a form of queer 
discomfort,” suggests that the unease that is experienced in heteronormative 
environments—the traditional family unit, for example—is generative insofar as it is 
“about inhabiting norms differently” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 155). In other words, ‘not 
fitting’ becomes productive when it queers the heteronormative. Ahmed’s point that 
queer is not so much concerned with transcending the normal, but with opening up 
pathways in life “that do not ‘follow’ those norms through” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 155) is 
poignantly illustrated in the queering of the relationship between Bruce and his 
adolescent nephew, Jules. Of all the relationships in A Way of Love, that which 
develops between uncle and nephew is in many ways the queerest—queerer, perhaps, 
than Bruce’s self-synecdochic relationship with the immense league of men of his own 
kind, and, clearly, queerer than his relationship with Philip, which in its domestic 
arrangements follows heteronormative lines. It is a relationship that presents itself as 
becoming-pedagogical, and, yet, one also strangely lacking in desire.  
During a Christmas visit to Louise and her family in Suffolk, Bruce finds twelve-year-
old Jules gazing at him “with candour and a love utterly devoid of desire” (Courage, 
1959, p. 32). After briefly meeting Jules’ eye, Bruce’s averts his face. For Bruce—a 
man who above all values physical desire for “its power to alleviate the solitudes of my 
kind and as it may expand into love” (Courage, 1959, p. 255)—the sudden realization 
that love can seemingly arrive without desire is deeply discomforting, propelling his 
decision to return early to his empty house in London where he experiences an acute 
attack of loneliness. This Bruce seeks to alleviate, as is his habit, in the company of his 
own kind. Yet, Bruce is inextricably drawn to Jules, who, as Louise reports, loves 
145 
 
spending time with his uncle. During a long-promised visit with Jules to the zoo, Bruce 
reflects: 
Two more years, three perhaps, and this child would be aware of himself as a 
man, the emotions of a lifetime ahead announcing themselves in a clear or 
tentative word uttered to another. What did I wish for him, this adult-to-be? 
Abundant happiness, abundant love certainly. (Courage, 1959, p. 170) 
Thus, Bruce imagines an interpellation-to-come—the hailing of his nephew into 
adulthood by various affective forces, some strongly insistent, others less so. Like a 
good fairy godmother, Bruce calls down blessings of love and happiness upon Jules, 
but refuses to take any steps that might one way or another influence his nephew either 
to assimilate into the heteronormative or to resist it. In no way does he wish to advance 
Jules’ “necessary and delicate unfolding” (Courage, 1959, p. 170), which must be 
shaped by other forces and encounters.  
For Bruce, there is no thought of exposing his nephew to “possibilities of living” 
(Ahmed, 2014, p. 155) that flout established norms. Yet, in asserting what amounts to a 
suspension of involvement in matters relating to Jules’ development, Bruce does not 
recuse himself entirely from a pedagogical role in Jules’ life. Bruce’s stance in regard 
to Jules is a stepping back, a postponement, rather than an abandonment of 
responsibility. A queerness is felt in the space between the said and the unsaid, in the 
agreement reached between uncle and nephew not to exchange a kiss on parting: 
‘Listen, Jules—you mustn’t mind if I don’t kiss you goodbye in front of your 
mother.’ 
He continued to look out of the taxi window at the buses, undisturbed. ‘I don’t 
like people kissing me,’ he said. 
‘That settles it then. When shall we meet again?’ 
‘When I’m older, I suppose. Or some time. I’ll come to see you when I’m in 
London.’ 
‘If ever you need any help I can give you . . .’ (Courage, 1959, pp. 170–171) 
The queerness suggested here is “posited not as an identity or a substantive mode of 
being but as a way of becoming” (McCallum & Tuhkanen, 2011, p. 8). As such, it is 
not discernible within linear time or chronos, but makes itself felt in a temporality that 
is understood as kairos or opportunity. While their parting conversation indicates a 
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‘wait and see’ attitude, a suspension, on the part of both Bruce and Jules—and conceals 
a caution that the time is not yet right for the pair to forge a closer bond—the 
foundation for a path to a mutually beneficial relationship has, nevertheless, been laid. 
Later, at Louise’s instigation, and following the breakdown of his relationship with 
Philip, the time is right for Bruce to respond affirmatively to the invitation to take a 
more active and overtly pedagogical role in Jules’ life: 
. . . let me be allowed to make my declaration: so far as I am able I shall give to 
Jules the guidance of a dispassionate philanthropy none the less valid because 
neutral in desire. (Courage, 1959, p. 255)  
In drawing the reader’s attention to his resolve to guide Jules and promote his 
welfare— but without desire—Bruce seems to suggest that it is both necessary and 
possible to exclude desire from what amounts to a pedagogical relationship. Hence, he 
is eager to stress that any future relationship with Jules would be “something frankly 
different in kind” (Courage, 1959, p. 255) from that with Philip. However, while 
Bruce’s assertion that his interest in Jules is free of erotic interest may be construed as 
self-protective— especially given the wide-spread, but groundless fear that homosexual 
men set out to corrupt youth and children—it can also be perceived as a move on 
Courage’s part to shore up the respectability and moral probity, not only of his narrator, 
but also of the body of homosexuals whom Bruce exemplifies.  
But, does Bruce’s claim that it is possible to be dispassionate or neutral in any 
relationship with his nephew hold up? Or, is there a fault line running through it that 
serves as evidence of a queer encounter of ideas—“where meaning breaks down, defies 
its object, and unconsciously reverses its intentions” (Britzman, 2000b, p. 54, endnote 
6)? If, as Britzman states, “sexuality is the first condition for human curiosity and hence 
the first condition or force of learning,” and that “without sexuality, the human would 
not desire to learn” (Britzman, 2000b, p. 38), then, it would seem that Bruce is 
mistaken in his belief that the erotic can be corralled off from the pedagogical—or that 
it is beneficial to do so. For without eros, our ability to live “a vital intellectual and 
social life,” and “our capacity to attach passionately to knowledge, other people, and 
life projects” (Britzman, 2000b, p. 36) are greatly diminished.  
Bruce’s declaration that as far as he is able he will dedicate himself dispassionately to 
Jules’ wellbeing, heralds, then, a fraught venture—one which by positioning eros “as a 
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threat in need of containment” (Britzman, 2000b, p. 34), rather than as a potentially 
life-giving force, limits the relationship’s possibilities. Bruce’s partnership with Philip 
having ended, where will his desire—which Bruce affirmed so positively and 
consistently throughout the novel—find its expression? At the end of his narrative, 
Bruce’s silence as to where he stands in regard to any on-going self-synecdochization 
into that immense league of men who share “a common erotic compulsion” (Courage, 
1959, p. 145)—which may or may not also be Courage’s silence—is telling.  
Let’s turn to Spivak for enlightenment. As Simmons observes, “Spivak is sceptical of 
all collectivities that form a synecdoche” (Simmons, 2014, p. 142), for while 
synecdoches are necessary for agency, their formation also demands the putting aside 
of the surplus of subjectivity. In other words, in the formation of a collectivity, not all 
parts of a subject can be included in the ‘whole.’ Inevitably, much is lost. Hence, for 
Spivak, the value of self-synecdoche lies not in any concrete achievements that might 
be produced—a collectivity achieved tends to reproduce its own limitations and 
injustices—but in its ability to imagine and open up utopic possibilities through the 
figuration of collectivities to come.  
To further his relationship with Jules it appears that Bruce believes he needs to put 
aside self-synecdoche and disassociate himself from that collectivity which he calls 
“our immense league” (Courage, 1959, p. 145). However, in doing so, Bruce not only 
refuses to admit a queering of his relationship with Jules, but also forecloses on 
possibilities opened up by any rearrangement of desires that permits the imagining of 
the proximity of eros and the pedagogical. By acceding to his sister’s warning that at 
the age of fifty he “must look time in the face,” Bruce chooses to view the future as 
“enemy” (Courage, 1959, p. 255). Thus, instead of positioning queerness as 
‘horizon’—and, thereby, conceptualizing queer futurity as “infinite and immutable 
potentiality” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 127)—Bruce, as he concludes his story, appears to 
abandon efforts at attempting (queer) collectivities to come. There is, as he stoically 
acknowledges, “a lack, a vacancy” (Courage, 1959, p. 255) in his life. 
Some Concluding Remarks 
As I have attempted to show, James Courage’s A Way of Love may be read queerly, but 
also in ways that are consistent with Spivak’s project of aesthetic education, which sees 
the philosophical-literary as “the means for persistently attempting collectivities to 
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come” (Spivak, 2012, p. 464). In this chapter, I have drawn attention to ways in which 
Courage’s characters—depending on their willingness or reluctance to attempt 
collectivities to come—either embrace self-synecdochization or refuse it. In the next, I 
will focus on Spivak’s espousal of a pedagogy of hospitality which attends to the risky 
and uncertain work of welcoming and responding ethically to the other. Given that 
“hospitality implies letting the other in to oneself, to one’s own space” (Still, 2013, p. 
13)—thereby threatening the domain and the integrity of the self—the practice of 
literary reading, which by its very nature demands an openness to the text, becomes an 





Spivak’s Aesthetic Education—Pedagogy and Hospitality 
The text puts us in a position, if we are reading carefully and following signals, to 
know what to look for when we are reading. It makes us ready to read in a certain way. 
Yet it is also necessary to remember that the expression or staging of a desire does not 
mean that the desire is fulfilled in the text. . . . To be able to lay out the desire so that 
the reader can participate in the desire is the first step. . . . The text shows a desire but 
not a fulfilment. A declarative becomes a question. The reader learns to read. The 
reader sees what the text is preparing her/him for, and then begins reading . . . . The 
next step is not to freeze the readings—readers who are going to become teachers! 
(Spivak, 2014, pp. 56–57) 
Overview 
Though complex and demanding, the work of Emmanuel Levinas—“one of the most 
profoundly original Western philosophers in the twentieth century”—provides a rich 
and rewarding archive for scholars wanting to position teaching and learning, not only 
in relation to “the new and the strange” (Zhao, 2016, pp. 323, 324), but, more 
especially, in response to that which arrives as radically other. 
In this chapter I argue that a Levinasian ethics of alterity10—the ethical encounter of the 
other—drives Spivak’s pedagogy, causing her to postpone the epistemological in order 
to indefinitely prevent the construction of the other “as object of knowledge,” and 
leading her to persistently prioritize that which is singular and unverifiable over “a 
nonspecific, pluralized otherness” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 316, 342). This approach, which 
has the ability to disturb and dismantle habitual ways of knowing and thinking, also has 
much to offer sexuality education, where, as in other fields, an emphasis on mastery of 
information has had a detrimental impact on knowing and reading. As we will see, 
                                                          
10 Spivak, in invoking Levinas as “the generic name” that covers those, including Derrida—
and, I think, Biesta—who hold the view that “the eruption of the ethical interrupts and 
postpones the epistemological” (Spivak, 2012, p. 316), does so in order to advance her own 
argument: namely, that efforts to construct the other “as object of knowledge” (Spivak, 2012, p. 
316) may be persistently interrupted and undone by way of her aesthetic education. Spivak’s 
interest in Levinas—at least in relation to her own project—is, therefore, quite specific, 
ignoring as she does other aspects of his thought that are relevant to education. In concerning 
herself with “the figuration of the ethical as the impossible” (Spivak, 2012, p. 104), Spivak, like 
Levinas, locates ethics as more a matter of relation than of knowledge. 
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insofar as Spivak’s pedagogy opens “hospitality into teleopoiesis” (Spivak, 2012, p. 
302), activating the imagination to think “a borderless world of unconditional 
hospitality” (Spivak, 2014, p. 3), it also performs what has been described as “a new 
understanding of hospitality” (Westmoreland, 2008, p. 1)—one provoked by Derrida’s 
question in response to the death of Levinas: “Is not hospitality an interruption of the 
self?” (Derrida, 1999a, p. 51). Such a question deserves to be posed in the context of a 
sexuality education that asks to be re-envisioned, one which is willing to attempt its 
own rethinking by daring to imagine the interruption of the self as a (queer) utopic 
enterprise. 
As Spivak’s aesthetic education suggests, “the mind’s immune system” (Spivak, 2012, 
p. 383)—which all too often keeps us “imagining the object of hospitality only as the 
begging stranger at the door” (Spivak, 2000, p. 26)—is broken down by the sort of 
training that is performed by literary reading, especially when it is hospitable to alterity, 
interruption and suspension. This insight, which drives Spivak’s pedagogical 
endeavours, has, I suggest, much to offer a sexuality education that seeks to become 
more than what it is. 
The Patient Power of the Imagination 
If the imagination plays a key role in Spivak’s aesthetic education and figures 
significantly in her theorization of the ethical, it also, I suggest, has important work to 
do in the re-envisioning of a more hospitable sexuality education—a rethinking that 
acknowledges the otherness of sexuality and takes seriously the place of the aesthetic in 
the theorization of an ethically responsive and queerer field. This is because the 
imagination enables aesthetic encounters—including literary reading—to prepare “that 
space that allows us to survive in the singular and the unverifiable” (Spivak, 2012, p. 
2), not by promoting a drive for knowledge but, rather, by revealing “the absence of a 
match between who we imagine the other to be and the wholly other that cannot be 
approximated” (Sharpe, 2014, p. 516). 
Spivak’s project of aesthetic education, in that it involves “reaching toward the distant 
other by the patient power of the imagination” or “touching the distant other with 
imaginative effort” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 404, 428)—and strives for a response from that 
distant other—articulates and seeks to enact “an ethics of alterity” (Ray, 2009, p. 80). 
Yet, the distant or wholly other is not necessarily far-off in spatial or temporal terms, 
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for, as Spivak explains, “the most proximate is the most distant, as you will see if you 
try to grab it exactly, in words, or, better yet, to make someone else grab it” (Spivak, 
2012, p. 406). This is particularly so in relation to our sexuality, an aspect of ourselves 
that we position as question, but which in its “foreignness—often understood as 
sexuality itself—refuses to be known” (Gilbert, 2014, p. xix). Long-time scholar Jeffrey 
Weeks describes researching and writing about sexuality as “a bit like jumping 
blindfold into a deep, dark pool of murky water” (Weeks, 2011, p. xi). Spivak, as we 
have seen, tellingly figures reading in similar terms—as a leap into the other’s sea. 
As it shapes an ethics of alterity, the imagination also cultivates an attitude of 
hospitality that is invaluable when swimming in the often murky waters of sexuality 
education. If Spivak, like Derrida, asks that we embrace hospitality as an interruption of 
the self, this is because welcoming the other, responding ethically to the other, demands 
it. Yet, hospitality is always a risky and uncertain business, especially in the context of 
a re-envisioned sexuality education, one which in attempting to imagine a queerer 
world not only demands better conditions for queer students, teachers and whānau, but 
also insists that “we must make room as well for our unintelligible selves” (Gilbert, 
2014, p. xxiv). Thus, when a sexuality education that acknowledges excess and 
embraces complexity is accused of inviting damage to “the integrity of the self, or the 
domain of the self” (Still, 2013, p. 13), then we need to be aware that this charge may 
conceal an unwillingness to admit that the ‘selves’ which participate in the pedagogical 
relations that make up sexuality education are, as Gilbert argues, already 
compromised—“riddled by contradictions; injured, in part, by sexuality” (Gilbert, 
2014, p. xxv).  
In a sense, an ethic of hospitality operating inside as well as outside sexuality education 
challenges educators to “construct structures that are ‘auto-immune’—bodies that break 
down their own immunities against the coming of the other” (Caputo & Cook, 2016, p. 
ix). It also “assumes a decentred subjectivity” (Ruitenberg, 2016, p. 9) that is at odds 
with modernist understandings of the human subject, including those which support 
ethical frameworks centred on autonomy, virtue and wellbeing—structures that largely 
determine current approaches to sexuality education, but which for the most part 
neglect perspectives that seek “to account for things in non-anthropocentric mode,” or 
which bring about what Jackson and Mazzei term “a posthumanist becoming” (Allen, 




The aim of Spivak’s project of aesthetic education, as we have seen, is to bring about 
“an epistemological change that will rearrange desires” (Spivak, 2012, p. 2). As if in 
tune with Biesta’s call to “engage with the question of whether what we desire is 
desirable, not only for our own lives, but also for the lives we try to live with others on 
a planet that has limited capacity for fulfilling all the desires projected onto it” (Biesta, 
2017b, p. 4), Spivak seeks to dismantle habitual ways of thinking and knowing, 
thereby, “resisting a humanist episteme that presupposes the other to be identical with 
the self” (Sharpe, 2014, pp. 515–516).  
Spivak, like Biesta, holds that genuine education necessitates “an interruption of our 
desires” (Biesta, 2017b, p.16). Her careful use of the adjective ‘uncoercive’ to describe 
the rearrangement of desires which necessarily occurs as a consequence of an authentic 
education—her own project of aesthetic education, for example—signals not that 
classrooms are free of psychological “shoving and pushing” (Spivak, 2014, p. 81), but 
that an interruptive education must always take account of “a ceaseless future anterior, 
something that will have happened without our knowledge, particularly without our 
control, the subject coming into being” (Spivak, 2012, p. 243). The lesson from this is 
that no matter how well we plan as teachers we cannot determine the future. The best 
we can do is take account of its undecidability! Biesta makes a similar point to Spivak. 
By describing teaching as dissensus, he links teaching to the incommensurable—“a 
future way of existing of the student” (Biesta, 2017b, p. 6) that is foreseen neither by 
the student nor by the educator. 
The emphasis that both Spivak and Biesta afford the interruptive in education reveals 
an indebtedness to Levinas. Biesta, for example, in arguing that “the fundamental 
educational gesture is that of interrupting and questioning development” (Biesta, 
2017b, p. 17), follows Levinas’ line, which holds that the experience of our subject-
ness always comes as an interruption of immanence. Similarly, Spivak acknowledges 
that her aesthetic education builds on the work of Levinas in that it is premised on the 
proposition “that the eruption of the ethical interrupts and postpones the 
epistemological” (Spivak, 2012, p. 316). If, as has been claimed, “Levinas’s theories of 
subjectivity and teaching lead us to reconsider the very nature of education, what and 
who education is for” (Strhan, 2012, p. 2), then Spivak and Biesta, through their staging 
of teaching as an interruptive practice, one that attends to the impossibility of education 
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in the Derridean sense, challenge what has become “the prevailing, contemporary 
educational imaginary”—that education is a student-centred and -driven enterprise 
“where it is ultimately for learners to construct their own understandings and build their 
own skills” (Biesta, 2017b, p. 45). Under this regime, the main job of an educator, 
including the sexuality education teacher, is to set up the means for learning to happen, 
often by facilitating “participatory processes” with “learners interacting with each 
other” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 26). Underpinning this pedagogical approach is 
the belief, often unstated and unquestioned, that the universe is “immanent to my 
understanding”, and that it is, therefore, possible through my efforts to comprehend 
information and facts “to bring the world ‘out there’ back to me” (Biesta, 2017b, pp. 
46–47).  
Sexuality education as it is officially mandated in Aotearoa New Zealand is not free 
from this emphasis, with the Ministry of Education helping schools to plan and deliver 
to students sexuality education programmes “that connect with their lives, are relevant, 
interactive, and student-centred” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 5)—as well as up-to-
date. While there are pluses in having a student-centred sexuality education—including 
the involvement of students “in setting content and in contributing to pedagogical 
decisions” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 5)—there are negatives as well, especially 
if a preoccupation with student-centred learning diminishes those approaches to 
teaching that “open up other possibilities for students to exist in and with the world” 
(Biesta, 2017b, p. 5). Of particular concern to Spivak are those types of education 
which intentionally or unintentionally work to limit “the radical interruption of ethical 
hope” (Spivak, 2012, p. 227) by cultivating forms of narcissism that confuse self-
recognition with self-knowledge. 
Imaginative Activism and the Other 
Although “ethical values” are one of the “personal and interpersonal skills and related 
attitudes” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 12) that students are expected to develop in 
the course of their sexuality education, a reading of the Ministry of Education’s 
Sexuality Education: A guide for principals, boards of trustees, and teachers (2015)11 
                                                          
11 While ethics and ethical concepts/standpoints are, perhaps, contextualized more effectively in 
the 2020 guide (see Ministry of Education, 2020b, pp. 8, 30, 31, 37, 39) than in the 2015 
version, they still remain largely untheorized. The Ministry’s confident assertion that “students 
are ethical decision makers and guardians of the world of the future” (p. 26) would benefit from 
154 
 
suggests that ethics are seriously under-theorized by those who determine the direction 
of sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand. This is this case despite the 
requirement that students at senior levels compare and contrast ethical standpoints in 
regard to such matters as sex, gender and intimacy, as well as analyse ethical issues that 
influence gender, relationships, sexuality and sexual health (see Ministry of Education, 
2015, pp. 19, 21). The Ministry’s stipulation that school programmes “acknowledge the 
sexual diversity of New Zealand communities” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 11) is 
all well and good, as is its attention to equity, respect and human rights. However, good 
intentions do little to compensate for the absence of the sorts of theoretical tools that 
would assist teachers and students to grapple ethically with issues of difference—let 
alone in ways that allow queer utopias to be glimpsed through the aesthetic. 
In a similar vein, it is telling that the Education Review Office attempts to advance its 
agenda of promoting and supporting student wellbeing through sexuality education 
without reference to ethics, an important aspect of education which has traditionally 
been couched in terms of such notions as good, duty, right, obligation, choice and 
virtue. At a time when, as the Education Review Office acknowledges, “there is an 
increasing awareness of issues around sexual harassment, the fundamental importance 
of positive consent, and much greater visibility and celebration of diversity” (Education 
Review Office, 2018, p. 3), it is unfortunate that ideas of wellbeing are not being 
exposed to what Louisa Allen terms a “multi-dimensional” (Allen, 2018b, p. 5) 
ethics—ethics which theorize their own ongoing productive entanglement with 
ontology and epistemology. 
It seems that a number of sexuality education researchers working in the New Zealand 
context—including those seeking to queer sexuality education research or to cultivate 
an openness to the politics of pleasure (see Allen et al., 2014; Quinlivan, 2018)—are 
open to ethics being theorized in ways that allow it to do more than provide students 
with opportunities to “develop attitudes of respect and of care and concern for 
themselves and other people” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 14), or to acquire the 
ability to frame sexuality issues in terms of responsibilities and rights. Louisa Allen, for 
example, working from a feminist new materialist perspective, explicitly positions 
                                                          
an exposure to the sorts of queer criss-crossings that become possible whenever theory is 
permitted to serve an “imaginative activism” (Spivak, 2014, p. 80)—including that advanced by 
Spivak’s aesthetic education through its attendance to literary reading. 
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“ethics and justice” (Allen, 2018b, p. 19) at the heart of sexuality education research 
and teaching. By attending to the materiality of the body and relinquishing “a concern 
for mastering the field through acquisition of knowledge” (Allen, 2018b, pp. 5, 13), she 
attempts a sexuality education which in acknowledging the inseparability of ethics, 
ontology and epistemology resists the pull of neoliberalism and other ‘stuck’ ways of 
thinking and doing.  
Spivak’s aesthetic education, like Allen’s feminist new materialist approach to 
sexuality education, refuses methods of education “in which desired outcomes are 
known in advance and steps to achieve them pre-determined” (Allen, 2018b, p. 133). In 
their work, both rely on ‘inventive’ pedagogies which attempt to inaugurate an 
‘event’—that is, the incoming of the unexpected, the uninvited, the singular, the 
unverifiable, and the unprogrammable. However, while Allen pursues a pedagogy that 
“does not pre-exist the material encounter” (Allen, 2018b, p. 133), Spivak favours—but 
does not restrict herself to—a pedagogy derived from the Levinasian notion that the 
ethical “comes to us from the interhuman relationship” (Levinas, 2017, p. 91).12 
Following Levinas’ line that “the only absolute value is the human possibility of giving 
the other priority over oneself” (Levinas, 2017, p. 96)—sometimes as the only 
alternative to dehumanization and violence—Spivak maintains that the best preparation 
for an ethical encounter with the unknown other is through an aesthetic education. This, 
she argues, involves “an obstinate attempt at a formal training of the imagination in the 
classroom” (Spivak, 2012, p. 118).  
While Spivak steadfastly resists providing a schematic programme detailing how she 
would do this, the fragmentary accounts of her own classroom practices that emerge 
from her interviews, essays and lectures suggest that her pedagogical direction is not 
only shaped by a Levinasian ethics, but is also very much concerned with the process of 
what Biesta terms subjectification—the means by which students become “subjects in 
                                                          
12 Spivak, in her essay ‘Imperative to Re-imagine the Planet’ (Spivak, 2012, pp. 335–350), 
attends to the notion of planetarity in order to argue that the human possibility of giving the 
other priority over oneself must extend to the prioritization of the nonhuman other. By insisting 
that we rethink ourselves “as intended or interpellated by planetary alterity,” Spivak invites us 
to position ourselves in “a dialogic of accountability” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 347, 350). This 





their own right and not just remain objects of the desires and directions of others” 
(Biesta, 2017b, p. 28). Thus, Spivak’s pedagogy, like Biesta’s, is “intimately bound up 
with the ways in which we engage with and respond to what and who is other, with 
what and who speaks to us, addresses us, calls us, and thus calls us forth” (Biesta, 
2017b, p. 3).  
In arguing that Spivak’s pedagogy is insistently mindful of alterity, it is necessary to 
state that in her teaching and classroom encounters Spivak makes no claims to know the 
other. Rather, as Sharpe notes, Spivak “cautions against letting our intellectual 
enterprise be guided by a will to knowledge that equates the ethical with a desire to 
know” (Sharpe, 2014, p. 516). Refusing always to construct the other as an object of 
knowledge, Spivak advocates instead for what she calls “imaginative activism” 
(Spivak, 2014, p. 80) in an effort to change epistemological performance. She seeks to 
do this by demanding what seems impossible—“that the other must be imagined as 
both self and other” (Sharpe, 2014, p. 516). By deliberately prompting her students to 
‘think’ this aporetic structure—a structure expressed by way of a catachresis or strained 
metaphor—Spivak shifts their attention to the mismatch “between who we imagine the 
other to be and the wholly other that cannot be approximated” (Sharpe, 2014, p. 516). 
Our response to this double bind, Spivak emphasizes, must be negotiation rather than 
resolution.  
Thus, although Spivak acknowledges that as teacher her “brief always is to enter the 
other’s space”—and that “the idea of teacher has been one that allows [her] to do that 
jumping into the other’s space” (Spivak et al., 2004, pp. 205, 216)—she insists that this 
interruption comes about not by way of knowledge, let alone information, but through 
the imagination. As she says, “my idea of entering the other’s space calls for the 
imagination at its most active” (Spivak et al., 2004, p. 207). For Spivak, the 
imagination plays a vital role in developing “the impulse towards the ethical” that “has 
to be activated away from the underived selfishness which operates in all creaturely 
life” (Spivak, 2014, p. 3). The imagination works most directly and effectively in the 
context of what, in the widest sense, is a literary education that “trains the imagination 
to step out of self-interest” (Spivak, 2014, p. 4) in order to think a world—and a 
sexuality—without borders. By “engaging with the imagination in the simplest way,” 
we as readers learn to “suspend our own interests into the language that is happening in 
the text, the text of another traced voice, the voice of the presumed producer of the 
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text” (Spivak, 2014, p. 4). Insofar as reading demands a leap of the imagination, it also 
requires faith and humility. For, it is no easy thing “to meet the world without 
preconceived notions of what we will find there” (McCarthy, 2015, p. 30)—even if the 
world that we meet emerges from the words of a literary text. 
As Lyons and Franklin observe, in Spivak’s view “teaching and the classroom are 
sacred, or close to sacred” (Spivak et al., 2004, p. 218). This is not on account of any 
ritual or ceremony that teaching might entail or enact, but because it involves an 
encounter with the wholly other that defies and exceeds all strategy, manoeuvring, 
negotiation and reason. In that teaching, for Spivak, is “a situation where the otherness 
of the other, the mysteriousness of the other” is always taken to be unavoidable and 
irreducible, she sees herself as being “more at the mercy of the teaching situation than 
someone who is planning moves” (Spivak et al., 2004, p. 218). 
Given that deconstructing the other as an object of knowledge is an important aspect of 
Spivak’s pedagogy, it is not surprising that her approach is both to “teach and unteach 
at the same time in the classroom” (Spivak et al., 2004, p. 220). As Spivak describes it, 
“I make a statement and immediately counter with possible objections to the statement” 
(Spivak et al., 2004, p. 220). The imagination plays an important part in this 
‘unteaching’ in that it is its task “to place a question mark upon the declarative”—
especially those statements that confidently assert themselves as fact—and to refocus 
attention “upon the detail that often escapes the attention of people who work to solve 
what seem to be more immediate problems” (Spivak, 2014, p. 5). In choosing to 
describe her work in terms of “the micrology of practice” (Spivak, 2014, p. 5), Spivak 
points to the need to pay attention and afford value to the little things, the seemingly 
insignificant aspects of gender, sexuality and class, for example, that are often 
dismissed as being unimportant or peripheral, except to the likes of women, servants, 
and queers. As Spivak sees it, “a literary education can direct one to noticing these 
otherwise ignored details” (Spivak, 2014, p. 7).  
Spivak, by yoking the notions of teaching and unteaching, and insisting on “unlearning 
learning in order to ask: What is it to learn?” (Spivak, 2012, p. 162), aligns herself with 
the pedagogics of unlearning, an educational orientation that “signifies both growth and 
the undoing or reversing of that growth” (Cochran-Smith, 2003, p. 25). In this way, 
Spivak challenges us to “think about the way that learning happens as a disruptive, 
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unsettling, or better, an interruptive force” (Dunne, 2016, p. 17). Insofar as she both 
teaches and unteaches, she fulfils Dunne’s criteria of a worthy teacher: 
Good teachers are teachers who suspend knowledge, who open up the abyss. 
They’re the ones that know that counselling Enlightenment values of self-
reliance and autonomy initiate an inescapable double bind. ‘Listen to me but 
don’t listen to me.’ ‘Listen to me: Think for yourself!’ (Dunne, 2016, p. 20) 
While uncertainty is usually perceived as a privation or lack, the pedagogics (of 
unlearning), which Spivak advocates, ascribe value to the concept and practice of 
suspension. This is so because suspension “enables uncertainty to appear as something 
other than a negative form of knowing” (McCarthy, 2015, p. 23)—and so prepares the 
way for the arrival of the unexpected. Thus, it also marks “the possibility of always 
becoming otherwise” (McCarthy, 2015, p. 26).  
In the context of a sexuality education such as ours, which historically has been more 
concerned with “exhortations to practice safer sex”—because “bodies are deemed in 
need of risk-management” (Allen, 2014, p. 89)—than with creating possibilities for 
becoming otherwise, many will be threatened by the prospect of a reimagined sexuality 
education. For, if the scope of sexuality education is to widen and its horizons shift, 
then long- and firmly-held notions about the need to control corporeality must be 
unlearnt. In their different ways, Allen and Spivak attend to this unlearning, and, thus, 
make it possible to think a sexuality education without borders—corporeal or 
imaginary. If Allen’s efforts to “demonstrate student bodies as sexual beyond mindful 
‘will’” (Allen, 2014, p. 92) attest to a way of unlearning that locates agency in the 
body’s materiality, then Spivak’s aesthetic education sidesteps the ‘will’ by developing 
receptivity/hospitality through teleiopoiesis, thereby training the imagination to move 
beyond self-interest while prompting us to re-think agency as “permission to be 
figurative” (Spivak, 2012, p. 437). This permission comes with entering the text. 
Entering the Text 
Given that information is never enough—in sexuality education as elsewhere—and the 
use of literature as “evidentiary authentication” (Spivak, 2014, p. 165) a 
misappropriation, Spivak maintains that the best shot at changing habits of mind is a 
literary education, whereby “one inserts oneself inside the text of the other, not as 
her/himself,” but in an attempt to “ventriloquize” (Spivak, 2014, p. 31) or take on the 
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voice of the other. This insertion or ventriloquization is made possible through literary 
reading, which, as Derrida explains, involves “a suspended relation to meaning and 
reference” (Derrida & Attridge, 1992, p. 48). Thus, in addition to facilitating what 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge famously referred to as the “willing suspension of disbelief” 
(Coleridge, 1817/2000, p. 314), literary reading allows us to experiment with “different 
positionalities (including a position of naiveté) in order to understand something of 
positioning itself” (McCarthy, 2015, p. 27). For this to happen, it is necessary that 
Spivak’s formula for reading—“not to excuse the text, nor to accuse the text, but to use 
the text by entering into its ‘protocol’” (Bruns, 2011, p. 124)—be observed. Spivak’s 
insistence that the reader enter the protocol of the text springs from her belief that “the 
text puts us in a position, if we are reading carefully and following signals, to know 
what to look for when we are reading” (Spivak, 2014, p. 56). It is the text itself that 
prepares and guides us to read in a certain way.  
While texts do many things, from the perspective of Spivak’s project of aesthetic 
education and its potential to contribute to a re-envisioning of sexuality education, their 
most important function is, perhaps, “the expression or staging of . . . desire” (Spivak, 
2014, p. 56)—a process which Spivak addresses in the epigraph to this chapter. In this 
regard, texts are most effective when they are able to position desire in such a way that 
readers can participate in it. Such participation is possible because of “the transactional 
nature of reading” (Spivak, 2012, p. 323)—that is, the “reciprocal, mutually defining 
relationship” (Rosenblatt, 1986, p. 122) which develops between the reader and the 
literary text. As the relationship between reader and text proceeds in “a to-and-fro 
spiral” (Rosenblatt, 1995, p. 26), each is continually affected by the contribution of the 
other. Through literary reading and the teaching of literary reading—processes by 
which a text becomes “a transactional space”—the reader-student is prepared “for the 
ethical reflex” (Spivak, 2014, p. 50). Spivak’s understanding of the text as transactional 
space clearly echoes Donald Winnicott’s articulation of the concept of transitional 
space as “an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life 
both contribute” (Bruns, 2011, p. 26). While any text is transactional—to the extent that 
it has the potential to teach the reader how to read it and the world—literary texts are 
especially so, not only because they focus the reader’s attention on the use of form and 
technique as well as on content, but because in communicating a sense of ‘voice’ they 
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also evoke the sensory, thereby creating the possibility of arousing a strong affective 
response in the reader.  
In that it occupies “the third space between an individual’s inner world and the external 
world, as both self and not-self simultaneously” (Bruns, 2011, p. 30), a literary text 
becomes a transitional object, but one that has a transactional function. Guided by the 
words on the page, which come from the external world, the reader constructs images, 
sounds, and events that live in the inner world of the imagination. In giving herself over 
to the text, that is, by suspending her desire to read the text in a habitual, pre-
programmed way, the reader allows the text to take her in a certain unforeseen 
direction. In this way, reading “invites one to be uncomfortably at home with one’s 
unthinkable thoughts of self in the words of others” (Mishra Tarc, 2015, p. 92). As we 
read—and respond positively to the invitation proffered by the text—“we experience a 
transferable quality of our mind, as our dreams, desires, memories, and experiences 
intermingle in thoughts of others” (Mishra Tarc, 2015, p. 79). Given that boundaries 
between self and other, inner and outer, become fluid in the transitional/transactional 
space, the activity of literary reading that occurs there is “capable of deeply influencing 
readers’ experiences of difference and patterns of relating to otherness” (Bruns, 2015, 
p. 34). As Mishra Tarc sees it, Spivak’s project of aesthetic education and its training of 
the imagination provides educators with the opportunity to “reorient literacy as the 
process by which we might become differently human” (Mishra Tarc, 2015, p. 52)—
and, I suggest, differently sexual. In support of Spivak, who warns teachers and future 
teachers engaging with texts “not to freeze the readings” (Spivak, 2014, p. 57), Mishra 
Tarc argues that we need to read literature in ways that keep meaning on the move as 
we “learn how to use literacy to think and story anew our lives and the lives of others” 
(Mishra Tarc, 2015, p. 55).  
Spivak’s commitment to the teaching of literary reading—including her insistence that 
for the reader and the teacher this process involves “sustained training into suspending 
oneself in the interest of the other person or persons” (Spivak, 2014, p. 6)—calls for a 
certain trust, an attitude of openness and receptivity on the part of both. In this regard, it 
is helpful, once again, to contrast the orientation implied by Spivak’s aesthetic 
education with “the constructivist ‘hegemony’ in education,” which presumes that all 
knowing is “the result of the activity of an intentionally constructing mind” (Biesta, 
2017b, p. 33). Given her call for imaginative activism to supplement knowledge, 
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Spivak, like Biesta, clearly recognizes the limitations and dangers of constructivist 
pedagogies which all too often not only refuse to allow the ethical “to interrupt or 
suspend the epistemological” (McCarthy, 2015, p. 27), but are also wary of teacherly 
interruption and the notion of “putting something in the student’s trajectory” (Biesta, 
2017a, p. 88). Spivak’s rejection of constructivist approaches to the teaching of literary 
texts is motivated to a large extent by her unease with those theories of reading which 
affirm that “the learner is presumed to be mastermind and manipulator of language,” or 
privilege the self as “the sole producer of one’s capacity to think, speak, and write” 
(Mishra Tarc, 2015, p. 48). In this, Spivak sides with Derrida, who, in taking the view 
that it is language that constructs us and contains us, speaks of language as 
monolingualism: “an absolute habit,” which I am unable to challenge, “except by 
testifying to its omnipresence in me” (Derrida, 1998, p. 1). 
Following Derrida’s argument that language constitutes us—in that “it dictates even the 
ipseity of all things” (Derrida, 1998, p. 1) to us—Spivak proposes that “if we can grasp 
that all human children access language that is ‘outside,’ as mother tongue” (Spivak, 
2014, p. 86), then we might also be able to grasp the notion that we become human in 
response to an outside call which precedes us. In articulating this position, Spivak 
strengthens the case for her own aesthetic education which attends to the development 
of the ethical response “created epistemologically as a collectivity of minds” (Spivak, 
2014, p. 96). This, she admits, is a challenging task, one requiring persistent effort, 
because in an educational environment determined largely by neoliberalism, 
collectivity is constantly undermined by individualism and competition. Despite this 
uncertainty, Spivak remains committed to the opportunities that literary reading 
provides for attempting collectivities to come in the classroom, where—she both hopes 
and doubts—“there is ‘the good teacher,’ ‘the good student,’ on the way to collectivity” 
(Spivak, 2012, p. 4). 
For Spivak, then, the focus of the literature classroom is not “an active and reflexive 
use of the mechanics of the language,” but the shaping of “the mind of the student so 
that it can resemble the mind of the so-called implied reader of the literary text, even 
when that is a historically distanced cultural fiction” (Spivak, 2012, p. 36). Thus, 
Spivak’s teaching of literary texts is premised on the notion that as we read a text and 
encounter its singular use of language we open ourselves up to being constructed—as 
well as deconstructed—by it. Deconstruction, then, is not a destructive process. As 
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Spivak points out, “what people forget is that there is a C-O-N in the middle of that 
word” (Spivak, 2014, p. 135). 
Mishra Tarc, in claiming that “we have not yet come to think of reading as a process by 
which the self and the world can be made, ruined, repaired, and remade in the span of a 
few hours or days” (Mishra Tarc, 2015, p. 92), hints at the possibilities that Spivak’s 
approach to reading offers. Because, in Spivak’s view, “literature buys your assent in 
an almost clandestine way and therefore . . . is an excellent instrument for a slow 
transformation of the mind” (Spivak, 2012, p. 38), it follows that any attempt “to act 
out the text as the text of the other” is best done gradually, carefully, and humbly, but 
“without the desire to reclaim” (Spivak, 2014, pp. 31, 39) what is other for the self. In 
this, Spivak’s approach resembles that of Biesta who maintains that in educational work 
the emphasis needs to be on “slowing down rather than speeding up, so that it becomes 
possible to pay attention, first of all, to one’s desires” (Biesta, 2017a, p. 89). As Spivak 
acknowledges, it is only when deceleration happens that it becomes possible for us 
“[to] not think about our experience as the context for everything” (Spivak, 2014, p. 
84). This urge to reference everything to ourselves, she says, is “the desire which we 
need to rearrange first as we are getting educated” (Spivak, 2014, p. 84). Unless we do 
so, Spivak argues, we stay trapped within our own justified self-interest—a dangerous 
position in which to be because it leads to self-righteousness and, ultimately, violence 
against the other. 
In the context of a re-envisioned sexuality education, one that is both queerer and more 
utopic, literacy as Spivak practices it becomes a tool for both deconstructing and 
storying anew our sexual lives and those of others—this in ways that “resist, reclaim, 
invent, oppose, defy, make trouble for, open up, enrich, facilitate, disturb, produce, 
undermine, expose, make visible, critique, reveal, move beyond, transgress, subvert, 
unsettle, challenge, celebrate, interrogate, counter, provoke and rebel” (Giffney & Hird, 
2008, p. 5). If deconstruction helps us to avoid positioning ourselves at the centre of 
everything—or of seeing our ‘truth’ as everyone else’s—storying ourselves anew keeps 
alive the flame of the utopic impulse both within us and in our sexuality education. Not 
only do the opportunities for re-storying that literacy provides create an environment 
conducive to queer self-bricolage and a platform from which to position queerness as 
horizon for the human, they also open up possibilities for conceptualizing sexuality 
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education as a space for “queering the non/human” (see Giffney & Hird, 2008), 
including through literary reading. 
Hospitality and the Text 
Derrida in observing, on the one hand, that for Levinas hospitality involves an 
unconditional and absolute “tending toward the other, attentive intention, intentional 
attention, yes to the other,” while noting, on the other, that it depends on the existence 
of barriers that allow it to be “regulated in a particular political or juridical practice” 
(Derrida, 1999a, pp. 22, 48), draws attention to the aporetic thinking which, he 
believes, reveals itself in Levinas’s conceptualization of hospitality. While ethics 
require that we always remain receptive to the possibility of unconditional hospitality—
that is, our orientation must be one of complete openness to the wholly other, to the 
unanticipatable and unwelcomable guest—at the same time, we are uncomfortably 
aware that we are subject to political, social, economic and cultural forces that shape 
and determine the particular laws that control the thresholds of our multiple and 
plurivocal communities. While this is glaringly obvious in relation to matters such as 
migration, citizenship, and asylum, it is also apparent when the question of ‘queering 
the state’ (see Duggan, 1994, pp. 1–14) is raised. If the conception of an unconditional, 
absolute hospitality that always welcomes the stranger (including the sexual stranger) 
and recognizes the singularity of every visitor is clearly consistent with the Levinasian 
principle that “the Other is transcendent to politics, law, rights, and typologies” 
(Simmons, 2014, p. 89)—and, thus, is always able to interrogate these categories—then 
conditional versions of hospitality will always be susceptible to deconstruction and 
prone to being unsettled by “the structure of transcendence” (Simmons, 2014, p. 86). At 
the same time, the practicalities determining the provision of hospitality in “its 
immanent manifestation or everyday meaning” (Simmons, 2014, p. 86) will always pull 
against transcendent notions of hospitality and seek to bind it with conditions.  
Spivak, recognizing that Levinas reaches an impasse in his efforts to bridge the gap 
between ethics, “understood as a responsible, non-totalizing relation with the Other,” 
and politics, which is necessarily concerned with “the plurality of beings that make up 
the community” (Critchley, 2014, p. 220), does not attempt to resolve the aporia of 
hospitality. Seeking instead to preserve from Levinas “the discontinuity between the 
ethical and the epistemological” (Spivak, 2012, p. 317), she deals with the aporetic 
nature of hospitality by deploying her aesthetic education to train readers “to exercise 
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the imagination to play the double bind” (Spivak, 2012, p. 12). In playing the double 
bind, Spivak attempts not to manage or undo it, but, rather, to use or ab-use it 
productively. To this end, she asks readers to “think hospitality or recognition” in ways 
that no longer “begin and indeed end with the migrant” (Spivak, 2012, p. 302), but 
which widen its scope to include pedagogical practices, among them the reading and 
teaching of literary texts. 
If Derrida’s question posed as a farewell to Levinas invites us to consider hospitality as 
an interruption of the self, then the receptivity that is demanded of the reader as she 
encounters a literary text may be understood as hospitality extended to everything that 
comes in the form of an interruption to the self by way of the text. Such receptivity—or 
hospitality—in that “it involves and requires a willingness to risk self-dispossession . . . 
is not so much about becoming open as it is about becoming unclosed to something or 
someone” (Kompridis, 2013, p. 20). If receptivity is understood as a type of 
spontaneous but reflective responsiveness, then it becomes possible to imagine 
hospitality not only as answerability, but as necessary for change, including the sort of 
rearrangement of desires which Spivak’s aesthetic education seeks.  
While receptivity or hospitality involves an answerability to the text, that is, an 
“openness to that which is unfamiliar or unsettling, a spontaneous readiness to follow a 
line of flight or descent” (Kompridis, 2013, p. 20), Spivak’s aesthetic education implies 
the reciprocity of hospitality in the process of readerly formation—where the reader is 
both “host and guest with respect to a text” (Still, 2013, p. 51). In the 
transitional/transactional space that is reading, the reader allows herself to be welcomed 
by the text, while at the same time welcoming it “without prejudice, into [her] heart” 
(Still, 2013, p. 51). This welcoming, as Spivak explains, is not concerned with excusing 
or accusing the text, but with developing a critical intimacy that is faithful to the text’s 
protocol. Reading in this way takes on an intertextual quality that does more than 
prompt the recognition that written or spoken texts feed into or influence other written 
or spoken texts—and, in turn, are fed or influenced by them. Insofar as readers accept 
or refuse elements from the texts that they read, that is, they are hospitable or not 
towards them, they become intertextual by allowing their reading to shape their 
narration of themselves and others. Tellingly, Spivak figures this ongoing process of 
intertextuality in choreographic terms, as one text “weaving itself with another, the 
dance” (Spivak, 2012, p. 319). However, if reading sometimes seems less of a dance 
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and more of a struggle—above all a struggle to be hospitable to the other, especially 
when the other’s call for recognition comes in an unfamiliar guise—this is to be 
expected because when it come to the practice of reading “there are no guarantees” 
(Spivak, 2012, pp. 500, 507). 
Spivak, in her own reading and teaching of reading, is ever sensitive to the nuances and 
shifts in meaning that appear when students become aware of the differences between 
the textual-figural and the ‘real’—and risk playing in the gap between the two. As we 
have seen, in rejecting the claim that we can “somehow learn to resolve double binds 
by playing them” (Spivak, 2012, pp. ix, 1), Spivak makes a case for her aesthetic 
education, and “the training of the imagination that can teach the subject to play” 
(Spivak, 2012, p. 10), thereby, uncoercively rearranging desires. At the same time, she 
also advances a pedagogy of hospitality that opens up “that space that allows us to 
survive in the singular and the unverifiable, surrounded by the lethal and lugubrious 
consolations of rational choice” (Spivak, 2012, p. 2). For in this hospitable and 
transactional space—made possible by literary reading and premised on the notion of 
intertextuality—that which is singular and unverifiable is permitted to interrupt and 
disrupt the rational. 
Levinas, Spivak, and Literary Engagement 
As I have argued, Spivak’s project of aesthetic education, including its pedagogical 
direction, has been influenced to a significant extent—both directly and via Derrida’s 
critique—by Levinas’ alteritarian ethics, which affirm that “radical difference signifies 
a relation of obligation, a sense of responsibility that exceeds my grasp and my 
comprehension” (Drabinski, 2013, p. xii). If the call of the other presses me to respond 
to the other, it also shapes my subjectivity. Given, however, that in Levinas’s view any 
attempt to engage with literary texts in the pursuit of the ethical is both problematic and 
risky, Spivak’s claim that a training in literary reading “makes the muscles of the 
ethical reflex stronger” (Spivak, 2014, p. 57) is in need of further scrutiny. 
Claudia Eppert, for example, notes that “Levinas’ own disparagement of literature, art, 
and criticism shadows new considerations of the educational possibilities for these 
fields of engagement” (Eppert, 2008, p. 67), including, therefore, for Spivak’s 
deployment of the imagination in her project of aesthetic education. Indeed, like Plato, 
who banished poetry from his Republic because he believed that it prevented those who 
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wrote it from attaining the truth, Levinas holds that literature and other art forms are 
deceptive to the extent that they claim to know and/or represent the other. There is also 
a danger, one to which Spivak herself is alert, that literature and the arts will produce “a 
hyper-narcissistic orientation toward the self” that results in “unthinkable consequences 
for scapegoated and dehumanized ‘Others’ of the world” (Mishra Tarc, 2015, p. 121). 
Notwithstanding these reservations, Levinas’ work does provide “a justification of a 
variety of approaches to literature,” including “a new and different way of attending to 
the ethical in the textual, and of the responsibility inherent in reading” (Eaglestone, 
1997, p. 7). In particular, Levinas permits a poetic or literary imagination that 
“responds to the surprises and demands of the other,” and “never presumes to fashion 
an image adequate to the other’s irrecuperable transcendence” (Kearney, 1995, p. 111). 
Thus, while his condemnation of the poetic imagination, especially when used to 
“incarcerate the self in a blind alley of self-reflecting mirrors,” must serve as a warning 
against any illusory and assimilationist claims—for example, that the imagination’s 
task is to work to reduce alterity to “its own remembered or anticipated fantasies” 
(Kearney, 1995, p. 110)—Levinas’ own theorizing, nevertheless, opens the door for the 
sort of work that Spivak undertakes. 
Given that Spivak in her approach to literary reading is mindful of Levinas’s injunction 
that “criticism must be sensitive to the way in which language reveals the other and our 
responsibilities to the other” (Eaglestone, 1997, pp. 7–8), then her own aesthetic 
education may be seen as exemplifying one way of attending to the ethical through 
literary reading. Spivak is not unaware of the risks in what she does. While insisting 
that all teachers—but, especially those concerned with literary reading—are “activists 
of the imagination” (Spivak, 2014, p. 54), she also understands that the imagination 
falls easy prey to solipsism. Hence, she remains committed to an aesthetic education 
that works “to train the imagination, so that it can become something other than 
Narcissus waiting to see his own powerful image in the eyes of the other” (Spivak, 
2014, p. 54). Spivak’s attention to the ethical can be seen in her deployment of 
teleiopoiesis as a way of countering solipsism. Schwab, in arguing that “literature 
provides, at its best, a heteronomous experience that achieves a movement to the other 




While there is “a remarkable congruence between Spivak and Levinas in trying to 
imagine the other ethical subject who cannot be comprehended” (Ray, 2009, p. 91), an 
important distinction between Levinas’ approach to alterity and Spivak’s—one that 
impacts significantly on the latter’s pedagogical orientation—can be discerned in the 
way each approaches the articulation of “the absoluteness of the other, the sense in 
which the other approaches from outside and beyond my will” (Drabinski, 1997, p. 
159). On the one hand, Levinas, in explaining that the wholly other (l’Autre) “shows a 
face and opens the dimension of height, that is to say, it infinitely overflows the bounds 
of knowledge” (Levinas, 1996, p. 12), emphasizes the human subject’s experience of a 
power that both exceeds the self and is never able to be contained by it. Spivak, on the 
other, eschews notions of elevation and implications of transcendence by persistently 
positioning the other as coming from ‘below.’ In doing so, she underlines not only what 
she sees as Levinas’ failure to challenge dominant ideologies of gender and sex, but 
also the need to interrogate what she believes is his argument that “the erotic accedes 
neither to the ethical nor to signification” (Spivak, 2009, p. 186). 
In acknowledging that the desire for authentic ethical engagement is both enabled and 
disabled by our admission that there is much that can’t be communicated or made clear 
in our relationship with the other, Spivak is not claiming that ethics are impossible, but, 
rather, that “the ethical situation can only be figured in the ethical experience of the 
impossible” (Spivak, 2012, p. 98). In other words, radically alterity—or the wholly 
other—“must be thought through imaging” (Spivak, 2012, p. 97), not by logical 
argument. If Spivak’s intention as a teacher of reading is to train her students to be 
receptive to the other coming from ‘below,’13 her pedagogical approach has an 
applicability beyond the context of its initial articulation—the education of students in 
the elite universities of the United States. While her hope may be that “these children of 
the superpower” disabuse themselves of the notion that “they are the reason why 
history happened and they can help the whole world” (Spivak, 2012, p. 297), her 
                                                          
13 The urgency of Spivak’s call to students and readers to attend to what is happening ‘below’ 
them—that is, use their imaginations to reach out to the distant other ‘below’—can be seen in 
her frequent use of such imperatives and encouragements as: “imagine those from below, who 
would be citizens” (Spivak, 2012, p. xiv); learn to “use the European Enlightenment from 
below” (pp. 3, 345); “‘ab-use’/‘use from below’” (p. 11); “try to learn to learn from below” (p. 
97); “learn to learn from below how to teach the subaltern” (p. 217); and “learn to learn from 
below, from the subaltern, rather than only study him (her)” (p. 439). 
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aesthetic education—especially in its theorization and activation of teleiopoiesis—has 
much to offer sexuality education, which, as Gilbert argues, is in need of “theories of 
sexuality that can enfranchise teachers and students alike” (Gilbert, 2014, p. 102). 
Some Concluding Remarks 
Of course, reaching out and touching the distant other with imaginative effort requires 
the reader to accept that she will make mistakes—mis-takes—with whatever text she is 
reading. As Spivak tells us: “I assume that the passing of a text into my grasp is a mis-
take, of course” (Spivak, 2012, p. 28). Yet, we must take such mis-takes to be 
productive, including in the context of a sexuality education attempting to be hospitable 
to its own re-envisioning—one that does not get bogged down by “conflicts about 
queerness,” but sees them “as opening up spaces for teaching and learning” (Gilbert, 
2014, p. 102). In this context, the passing of a text into a reader’s grasp by way of a 
mis-take is an act of hospitality, not only insofar as the reader is receptive to 
unlearning, but also to the extent to which she welcomes whatever arrives unannounced 
as guest with the text. A sexuality education mindful of this dynamic will be more 
attentive to learning incomes than to learning outcomes, to the presence and arrival of 
the queer than to the production and maintenance of normativities. 
If Spivak’s aesthetic education prompts us to think hospitality in ways that extend to 
literary texts and the pedagogy of literary reading, it also pushes sexuality educators 
and researchers to ask the unavoidable question: What does it mean to think hospitality 
in the context of sexuality education? As you will see, the chapter that follows—by 
building on the theoretical work of this chapter and employing Spivakian notions of 
hospitality in its reading of Witi Ihimaera’s The Uncle’s Story—sets out to address this 







A Micrological Reading of Penetration in The Uncle’s Story 
It is the negotiability of senders and receivers that allows teleiopoiesis, touching the 
distant other with imaginative effort. The question of negotiability, like all necessary 
impossibilities, must be forever begged, assumed as possible before proof. (Spivak, 
2012, p. 428) 
Overview 
So as to throw light on the ways in which Spivak’s pedagogy concerns itself with 
alterity, hospitality, interruption, and suspension, it is my intention in this chapter to 
conduct what Spivak would call a micrological reading of an act of sexual penetration 
that takes place in Witi Ihimaera’s The Uncle’s Story (2000)—and of the double bind 
which results from it. This particular double bind, which arrives as an imperative to 
choose between the demands of culture and those of sexuality, cannot be resolved. 
However, like other double binds that arise in relation to sex, sexuality and sexuality 
education, it may be able to be negotiated, as the epigraph to this chapter suggests, if a 
hospitality that is open to teleiopoiesis—“touching the distant other with imaginative 
effort” (Spivak, 2012, p. 428)—is assumed and activated. 
My reading, metaphorically speaking, puts under the microscope a key passage from 
Ihimaera’s novel, one which describes an act of sexual penetration between two men. I 
do this in order “to be able to lay out the desire[s]” (Spivak, 2014, p. 56) that are staged 
by the text, to participate in them as a reader, and to interrogate them, especially, in the 
context of the question posed by Derrida: “Is not hospitality an interruption of the 
self?” (Derrida, 1999a, p. 51). By choosing to deal with a text where, as a consequence 
of what is understood to be a transgressive sexual act between males, extreme demands 
are placed on hospitality—which in the context of The Uncle’s Story is conceptualized 
in relation to the traditional Māori understanding and practice of manaakitanga—I am 
pushed to come to terms, in one way or another, with three ethical imperatives: “the 
demand to address a guest one cannot ask to know; the demand to protect the home one 
must surrender to the guest; and the demand to reciprocate outside a paradigm of 
reciprocity” (Ruitenberg, 2016, p. 22).  
If these ethical demands raise important questions for sexuality educators about the 
ways in which hospitality—“by definition a structure that regulates relations between 
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inside and outside” (Still, 2013, p. 11)—is (and isn’t) performed in the context of 
sexual relations, they also point to the possibility of theorizing sexual ethics within a 
much wider framework than that established by the Ministry of Education, which 
emphasizes the acquisition of attitudes such as respect, care and concern, and the 
development of “personal rights and responsibilities, including consent” (Ministry of 
Education, 2015, p. 12). At the same time, attending seriously to hospitality in sexuality 
education invites a richer, more complex appreciation of the notion of hauora—
including its inextricable relationship with the foundational concepts of 
whanaungatanga, manaakitanga, and kotahitanga14—than that which is currently on 
offer in mandated programmes. Hospitality also makes room in sexuality education for 
the imagining of utopic collectivities, such as “gay tribe” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 131), 
which, operating in the space between the personal and the political, accommodates the 
singular and the queer. 
I recognize that by introducing an indigenous fictional voice into the conversation, as I 
do in this chapter, I am bringing a new dimension to my argument—one which carries 
its own demands and requires careful handling. This is so because, as Linda Tuhiwai 
Smith explains, any study of Indigenous literature or philosophy from a non-Indigenous 
perspective brings with it “a cultural orientation, a set of values, a different 
conceptualization of such things as time, space and subjectivity, different and 
competing theories of knowledge, highly specialized forms of language, and structures 
of power” (Smith, 1999, p. 42). These work together to simplify and standardize 
complex events, ideas, relationships and stories.  
Ideally, then, I would want to engage in a more comprehensive and nuanced discussion 
of the tensions, gaps and possibilities that become visible when Māori ways of 
understanding and being in the world are placed alongside and athwart other ideas that 
circulate in my thesis. However, I acknowledge that given the constraints of time and 
space I am unable to do this to any great extent. Nevertheless, it is important to state 
that insofar as I explore Indigenous concepts, I do so with the intention, not only of 
explicating key themes in Ihimaera’s novel, but also of problematizing the ways in 
which the Ministry of Education and the Education Review Office promote aspects of 
                                                          
14 Whanaungatanga is concerned with building relationships; manaakitanga encompasses an 
ethic of caring; while kotahitanga describes an ethic of bonding (see MacFarlane, 2004). 
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mātauranga Māori—a non-traditional term for Māori ‘knowledge’ that “arose 
contiguous with the arrival of the biblical world view in Māori communities of the 19th 
century” (Royal, 2012, p. 32)—in the context of sexuality education.  
Given that Māori, queer, and Spivakian notions often come into proximity and, indeed, 
rub against each other in this chapter, readers may wish to draw their own conclusions 
about the degree to which these are mutually hospitable and/or prompt us “to imagine 
future potentials” (Driskill, Finley, Gilley, & Morgensen, 2011, p. 22)—not just for 
queer and Indigenous theories and practices, but also for the field of sexuality education 
in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
The Uncle’s Story—An Introduction 
In The Uncle’s Story, which has as its basis the Tāwhaki cycle of myths, Witi Ihimaera 
makes use of the literary device of “a story within a story” to present what have been 
described as “the coming out narratives of two Maori gay men” (Tawake, 2006, p. 
373). Sam and Michael Mahana—an uncle and his nephew, a generation apart—both 
face rejection by their whānau, especially their fathers, when their sexuality is revealed.  
However, it is only after Michael—“the 1990s protagonist” (Kennedy, 2011, p. 129) 
and “a gay Tāwhaki” (Ihimaera, 2019, p. 272)—is cast out of the family because of his 
self-declared homosexuality that he comes to learn of the existence of Uncle Sam, his 
father’s brother, who to all intents and purposes had been erased from the family’s 
memory following his death in a car crash in 1971. From Uncle Sam’s diary, given to 
Michael by his Auntie Pat—Sam’s younger sister—Michael finds out that Sam, a 
Vietnam War hero, had experienced extreme physical and emotional brutality, then 
banishment from the whānau, at the hands of his father, Arapeta. This follows 
Arapeta’s discovery that Sam and Cliff Harper, an American helicopter pilot who had 
saved Sam’s life in action, are lovers. By intertwining the stories of Michael and Sam in 
his narrative, Ihimaera invites readers not only to consider “the parallels and differences 
between the treatment of homosexuality in their respective times” (Majid, 2010, p. 
218), but also to ponder the implications of Michael Mahana’s claim that “Maori 
people are among the most homophobic in the world” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 343)15—and 
that he wasn’t supposed to exist. 
                                                          
15 Ihimaera made the same claim—outside fiction—while presenting the Joseph Keene 
Chadwick lecture at the University of Hawai’i in 2000. He reports his friend and colleague 
172 
 
It has been argued that “historically, Maori society, as with other Indigenous 
populations, was characterized by its acceptance and celebration of sexual diversity” 
(Aspin, 2011, p. 113), including of takatāpui—those Māori who identify with diverse 
genders and sexualities.16 However, Ihimaera—himself a gay Māori man—speaking 
through the voices of his gay characters Michael and Sam, is emphatic that from the 
beginning Māori have always regarded sexual relationships between men as flying in 
the face of the preordained order governing relationships between the sexes. As Sam 
explains to Cliff, the consequences for men who violate tapu by having sex with other 
men are “too fearful to contemplate” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 156):  
You relinquished the mana, the tapu, the ihi or life force and the wehi or dread 
that the dynamic of being a man depended on, to maintain your power 
relationships with the world. You brought noa upon yourself, the loss of 
sacredness, and, without sacredness, you were prone to punishment, dishonour, 
banishment and death. (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 156) 
In the light of Derrida’s question: “Is not hospitality an interruption of the self?” 
(Derrida, 1999a, p. 51), my intention is to explore the double bind that lies at the heart 
of The Uncle’s Story—an interruption of the self that is understood by one generation as 
“the collision between cultural expectations and [the] desire for self-fulfilment” (Fox, 
2008, p. 161), but which has its origins decades earlier in Cliff Harper’s penetration of 
Sam Mahana’s anus.17 If, on the one hand, it is a double bind inscribed in the body of 
Sam—a hospitality that arrives in the form of a penetration to interrupt the self, 
                                                          
Ngahuia Te Awekotuku saying to him: “You know that our people are among the most 
homophobic in the world” (Ihimaera, 2002, p. 123). 
16 For example, Elizabeth Kerekere argues that “the open sexuality enjoyed by Māori women 
and men [prior to colonization] clashed with the puritanical mind set of settlers and 
missionaries” (Kerekere, 2015, p. 13). After 1858, when Aotearoa came under the British legal 
system, most whānau continued to accept takatāpui behaviour, but “kept it hidden from public 
view to protect their takatāpui members” (Kerekere, 2015, p. 14).  
17 Other readings of The Uncle’s Story emphasize such diverse themes as: the “plea for the 
acceptance of gay men and women” (Majid, 2010, p. 218) within Māori society; the emergence 
of “the notion of a gay tribe” (Tan, 2014, pp. 367, 376, 377, 379, 383; Valle, 2017, pp. 199, 
201, 202) and the challenges this presents within Māoritanga; “society’s struggle against 
essentializing notions of identity based on racial or sexual criteria” (Tawake, 2006, p. 375); 
“the complexities and intricacies of fictional representations of Māori women’s identities” 
(Bingel, Krutz, Luh, & Müetze, 2011, p. 56); and “local-local interaction on a global scale 
between indigenous peoples” (Kennedy, 2011, p. 134) in regard to the struggle for gay rights. 
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bringing dreadful consequences to him and driving the actions of two generations of the 
Mahana whānau—on the other, it is a double bind made explicit in Auntie Pat’s twice-
stated question to Michael: 
‘What matters most to you, Michael? Being Maori or, or being gay?’ (Ihimaera, 
2000, p. 28) 
‘What matters most, Michael, being Maori or being gay?’ (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 
256) 
If Michael Mahana, by leaving his whānau, running away to Wellington, and eventually 
becoming an international activist for the rights of LGBTQ+ Indigenous People, is able 
to resist the urge to resolve in a definitive way the double bind in which he finds 
himself—and, thus, evade a situation where “nobody should be made to choose” 
(Ihimaera, 2000, p. 256)—his Uncle Sam cannot play the double bind in this way. By 
submitting to physical punishment for what Arapeta and the weight of Māori tradition 
determine is his sexual transgression, Sam opts “to honour his father and his culture” 
(Ihimaera, 2000, p. 256).  
Sam’s ability to absorb rather than flee the consequences of his action—while at the 
same time refusing to repent of “something that doesn’t feel wrong” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 
259)—is linked to his growing realization of the undecidability of the double bind 
which he knows he must inhabit. Yet, in allowing Arapeta to repeatedly lacerate his 
body, urinate on his open wounds, and drive him from the whānau forever, Sam’s 
“punishment had gone far deeper than skin,” opening up in him “a seething rage against 
Arapeta and all he represented” (Ihimaera, 2000, pp. 262, 260). This defiance rising 
within Sam finally finds its expression in a definitive refusal to submit any longer to 
what he now understands as his father’s abuse. Having freed himself from Arapeta’s 
physical clutches, Sam sets off to begin a new life with Cliff in America, but dies in an 
accident on the way to their planned reunification at Auckland Airport.  
If in choosing to conduct a micrological examination of that passage in The Uncle’s 
Story which deals with the anal penetration of Sam by Cliff—and Sam’s “moment of 
revelation” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 246) which comes from it—I do so not just because this 
incident has such far-reaching inter-generational consequences in Ihimaera’s novel, but, 
in order to explore the aporia of hospitality in relation to an event that is so decisively 
interruptive of the self. In doing so, I will also suggest that Sam’s death, although 
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accidental, nevertheless makes sense—and is, perhaps, inevitable—especially given the 
ways in which desire, including how it relates to hospitality, is expressed or staged. As 
well as making connections between this and other sites of penetration in The Uncle’s 
Story, I will look very briefly at another passage in the novel, one which concerns itself 
what I term penetration’s ‘other.’ If this passage “shows a desire but not a fulfilment” 
(Spivak, 2014, p. 56), it gestures, nevertheless, in the direction of an (im)possible 
fulfilment for other Sams, Cliffs and Michaels who “must bring a new promise to life 
and a new music to the impulse of history” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 371). In other words, 
penetration’s ‘other’ instances an attempt at utopic thinking which positions queerness 
as horizon.  
While recognizing that Spivak’s aesthetic education requires that close pedagogical 
attention be paid to desire and its rearrangement through literary reading, I maintain 
that this can only happen if the narrative and the symbolic logics that operate within a 
work of fiction are carefully explored and understood. Committing to “the micrology of 
practice” (Spivak, 2014, p. 5)—by focusing, in this case, on penetrative acts in The 
Uncle’s Story and looking closely at small and sometimes easily overlooked textual 
details associated with them—is one way of doing this. Such an approach has the added 
benefit of keeping the meaning of the text on the move, especially as successive 
micrological examinations are able to adopt different foci as they approach the text 
from new angles. There are many details in the novel that are worth looking at closely, 
and as Bersani puts it, “a new emphasis on the peripheries of our desiring attention 
would not only diversify desire but would also keep it mobile” (Bersani, 1978, p. 7). 
Thus, every reading of a text as rich as The Uncle’s Story becomes an opportunity to 
de-centre, and to learn afresh “to multiply our discontinuous and partial desiring selves” 
(Bersani, 1978, p. 7). 
Sam’s Moment of Revelation 
Cliff was in orgasm, his body shuddering and spilling over. The shock of it 
forced Sam to breathe out, let go—and he reached a kind of understanding. A 
moment of revelation. He opened himself up, made himself vulnerable. With a 
groan he too was pulsing a river. 
‘Sam, yes—’ 
They were both laughing and crying at the same time. Nothing else mattered, 
past, present or future. All there was, was now. 
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This was the secret embrace at the end of the day. 
And they had found it. (Ihimaera, 2000, pp. 246–247) 
The above description of the respective orgasms of Cliff Harper and Sam Mahana 
following the penetration of Sam’s anus by Cliff’s penis marks the climax of three 
pages of what is some of Ihimaera’s most sexually explicit and intensely lyrical writing. 
What is being described here is the outcome of a long seductive inter-play between 
Sam and Cliff that began in the war zones of Vietnam many months earlier, only to 
reach its consummation on a ladder in Arapeta Mahana’s barn in Waituhi.  
To read this passage micrologically, it is necessary to enact Spivak’s injunction “to lay 
out the desire so that the reader can participate in the desire” (Spivak, 2014, p. 56). 
Given that it is Sam who is caught in the putative double bind of being both Māori and 
gay—and that it is this very same double bind which generates the major fault-line 
running through the narrative of The Uncle’s Story—my focus, then, is on Sam’s desire 
rather than Cliff’s. What does Sam desire? In what ways is Sam’s desire rearranged? 
What is the desire in which the reader participates? Is the reader’s desire uncoercively 
rearranged? And for what epistemological purpose? Let’s begin to lay out the desire at 
this site of penetration and gently interrogate it a little. 
For Sam, his entry into the barn with Cliff and the wind’s closing of the barn door 
behind them are the work of Fate, from which “there is no going back” (Ihimaera, 
2000, p. 244). He must keep moving forward and “hope against hope there was a way 
of escape from whatever destiny lay in front of him” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 244)—the 
degradation that he fears will come to him if he participates in the sexually 
transgressive behaviour which he so desires. If, at first, Sam seems to resist Cliff’s 
efforts to penetrate him, he soon groans, whimpers, and gasps at Cliff’s touch—and is 
“gone, gone, gone beyond the point of no return” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 245). Despite the 
initial pain of penetration—“the sheer agony of the act”—Sam “opened himself up and 
made himself vulnerable” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 246) to Cliff. In exposing himself in this 
way, Sam commits himself to a form of hospitality that both initiates and signals an 
interruption of the self that has far-reaching consequences. 
In order to make sense of the claim that for Sam his penetration by Cliff is an 
hospitable act, it is necessary to acknowledge that within the structure of hospitality or 
manaakitanga someone or something on the outside is always brought within. In other 
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words, hospitality always involves the crossing of thresholds—and with Sam’s 
penetration a significant threshold or boundary has been crossed. While hospitality is “a 
way of theorising the relation between the same and the other, the self and the 
stranger,” it is also foundational in the sense that “to be fully human, is to be able to 
alter, to be altered” (Still, 2013, pp. 12–13). Because hospitality implies opening 
oneself to the unknown other it is, therefore, interruptive of self. As such, it is 
potentially both life-giving and extremely dangerous.  
When Sam opens his anus to be penetrated by Cliff’s penis he exposes himself to more 
than physical sensation—pleasure or pain. By transgressing “the order of the Maori 
world” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 155), Sam knowingly makes himself susceptible to a 
multiplicity of forces that have the power to destroy not only himself, but Cliff also. 
But in doing so, he also discovers new potential in the joy and the tears that he finds in 
the “now” of “the secret embrace” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 247) which he and Cliff share. 
This experience of the greatest intensity, where “nothing else mattered, past, present or 
future” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 247), is possibilized by the “structure of reciprocity” (Still, 
2013, p. 15), which is inscribed in the very notion of hospitality. Within this structure 
there is always the potential for guest to become host and host to become guest, and for 
guest and host to figure different modes within the one hospitable interaction. In Sam 
and Cliff’s embrace—the penetration of one by the other—and in Cliff’s affirmative 
cry of “‘Sam, yes—’” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 247) the reciprocity which is the origin of all 
hospitality can be discerned.  
Derrida, with reference to Levinas, describes the process of hospitality as a “movement 
without movement” where “the welcoming of the other” (Derrida, 1999a, p. 23) 
demands acceptance of the other’s infinity. The dynamic of hospitality, which Derrida 
articulates in its transcendent or absolute form, can be seen in its particular or 
conditional expression in Sam’s welcoming of his penetration by Cliff. Derrida’s 
reminder to consider the concept of welcome as “the first gesture in the direction of the 
Other” and to think “the possibility of the welcome” (Derrida, 1999a, p. 25) before 
anything else, is certainly useful when attempting to make sense of the revelation that 
follows Sam’s orgasm, and in untangling and laying out the desires contained therein.  
After Cliff enters Sam—“easing in, sliding in until he was up to the hilt”—his thrusting 
causes Sam to be so overwhelmed by vertigo that he feels himself “nearing 
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unconsciousness” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 246). Sam believes he is “tumbling through Te 
Po, The Night, and falling through Te Kore, The Void” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 246). His 
fear is that he will be consigned to “eternal darkness” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 246). In 
trying to make sense of what is happening here, it is helpful to be aware that while Te 
Kore has sometimes been defined in purely negative terms as ‘nothingness’ or ‘chaos,’ 
other sources speak of the Void as “an original Māori ground of existence” or as 
“potential being” (Mika & Stewart, 2016, p. 308).18 Although it remains unorganized, 
in Te Kore there is “unlimited potential for ‘being’” (Barlow, 2001, p. 55).19 Across Te 
Kore, Sam discerns “a pinpoint of light” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 246)—a trace of 
potentiality, perhaps! As something starts “to build in Sam, something made up of 
Cliff’s rhythmic movements,” Sam now hears from within a temple—Buddhist, 
surely—voices calling in welcome, “Haramai, Sam” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 246). Echoes 
from the past. As a monk ministers to him, Sam sights “something sliding down the 
pillars of the temple, coiling wet and glistening” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 246). Sam 
addresses, what he realizes is a cobra and—as his ‘you’ and ‘me’ become a ‘we’—
establishes a certain mutuality between himself and the snake: “You and me, cobra, let 
us enjoy our brief moment in the sun” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 246). 
In contrast to the Judeo-Christian scriptures, where the presence of any type of snake is 
generally indicative of the presence of evil, Buddhist traditions hold the cobra in 
benign regard for shielding the sleeping Buddha from both rain and sun as he 
slept. In the context of The Uncle’s Story, however, it is helpful to refer back to an 
earlier dream that Sam had while in the jungles of Vietnam. In the course of this dream, 
angry cobras advance on Sam, repeatedly striking at his defences, “opening him up in 
all his vulnerability” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 96). What is significant about these cobras is 
                                                          
18 For example, as Anne Salmond reports it, the early ethnologist Edward Tregear noted in 1891 
that Te Kore, although described as “the Void or negation,” contains “the potentiality of all 
things afterwards to come” (Salmond, 2017, pp. 11, 420, endnote 10). 
19 The Void, understood as potential for ‘being,’ figures significantly in Eastern and Western 
philosophy. According to the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna, the Void or emptiness is “the 
only ontological possibility for the world of empirical existence” (Hamilton, 2001, p. 97). The 
idea that the Void or Nothingness is the condition of possibility for ‘being’ is a foundational 
premise in the ontology of Continental philosophers including Heidegger, Sartre, and more 
recently, Badiou. If, for example, Heidegger insists that nothingness is the basis for any 
discussion of Being, Badiou maintains that any ‘situation’ or ‘entity,’ viewed from an 
ontological perspective, is “only a modality of the void” (Deranty, 2006, p. 603). For Badiou, to 
speak the truth about knowledge, then, is to describe its particular connection with the Void.  
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not that they represent evil or good—or duality—but that in exposing Sam to 
vulnerability, they also open him up to potentiality. Like Te Kore, cobras attest to the 
undecidable, to the risks and opportunities within the structure of hospitality. Whether 
or not the welcoming call of “Haramai,” that Sam hears within Te Kore, The Void, 
suggests hopeful promise or hidden threat, it is a salient reminder to Sam and to the 
reader that within the structure of hospitality “the other, whoever and whatever that it 
is, always comes in the form of undecidability” (Caputo & Cook, 2016, p. xi).  
Immediately before climaxing, Sam “began to feel a sun exploding within him, 
showering Te Kore with light” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 246). Significantly, this illumination 
of The Void, which accompanies Sam’s penetration and orgasm, finds an echo in the 
account of the Great Separation where the many children of Ranginui and 
Papatūānuku—who, hitherto, had been “squeezed within whatever cracks they could 
find” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 343) between the bodies of the tightly embracing Primal 
Parents—eventually, and only with great effort, manage to push them apart. This being 
done, as Michael Mahana tells it, “the light came flooding in,” and the children of 
Rangi and Papa “were able to walk upright upon the bright strand between” (Ihimaera, 
2000, p. 343). 
In explaining this myth, which exists in various versions and is open to many 
interpretations, Michael emphasizes “that fighting for space and for light, the universal 
image for knowledge or enlightenment or freedom, is the continual challenge for all 
peoples who cannot see the sky” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 343). Thus, Sam’s description of 
the sun exploding within his anus and flooding Te Kore with light, when read alongside 
the story of the Great Separation, may be understood both as a metaphor for intense 
sexual pleasure and as an intimation that Sam has received new knowledge from Te 
Kore, The Void. In welcoming what he experiences in his anus and by accepting this 
experience as revelation, Sam affirms that knowing, rather than being an intentional 
constructive process initiated by an individual subject, is “enabled by and necessarily 
requires otherness” (Roth, 2011, p. 20). Sam, in recognizing his body’s “capacity to be 
affected” (Roth, 2011, p. 20) through penetration, acknowledges the thoughts and 
insights that come to him from outside—and which demand to be received as ‘guest.’ 
In other words, Sam finds himself in a position where he is no longer “the most 
important arbiter of the outer world” (Mika, 2012, p. 1088).  
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As we have seen, Spivak’s aesthetic education, in that it attempts to train readers to 
become aware of those situations where they “construct the other as object of 
knowledge” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 316, 374), works by way of interruption. Penetration, 
for Sam, is epistemically interruptive in that it prompts him not only to know different 
things, but also to know in a different way—an immanent sort of knowing, “whereby a 
living/lived body comes to know what it can do in an immediate rather than 
semiotically mediated way” (Roth, 2011, p. 18). If Sam’s sense of self is also 
dramatically interrupted by his penetration, this is not only because cultural taboos 
against anal intercourse are violated, but also because the penetrated male body is 
generally conceptualized as both passive and powerless. However, if, as Guy 
Hocquenghem suggests, anal pleasure is “a way of undermining all sexual 
categorizations”—in that it affirms “the polymorphous potential of desire” (Kemp, 
2013, p. 6)—Sam’s penetration not only brings him to new ways of desiring, but, in 
doing so, prompts him to begin to ‘know’ outside the parameters determined by the 
binary understandings of gender and sexuality which he has inherited. In other words, 
Sam’s penetration is an interruption which, in Spivakian terms, has rearranged his 
desires uncoercively “for flexible epistemological performance” (Spivak, 2012, p. 353). 
This interruption prepares Sam for the in-coming of a different sense of self.  
If Sam Mahana’s identity is understood as a possibilization—through the reproduction 
and transformation in his lived experience of the resources of culture that he has 
received primarily from his whānau and iwi—then Sam’s penetration is an interruption 
of that process, signalling, as it does, a break with his past. In Wolff-Michael Roth’s 
view, a subject’s development comes about through encounters with what is other. By 
way of these encounters, which Derrida and Spivak call interruptions, “the living/lived 
body, comes to be further affected and changed” (Roth, 2011, p. 17). This affectedness 
is possible because of “radical passivity,” an “originary experience, which not only 
enables agency but also accompanies it” (Roth, 2011, pp. 17, 19). Rather than urging us 
to withdraw from engagement, radical passivity disposes us to expose ourselves—and, 
thereby, allow ourselves to become susceptible to being affected by that which is other. 
Radical passivity, as Roth sees it, is a prerequisite or ground for all knowing, because 
“it is only after having been affected that we can begin to think, classify, and relate the 
experience to something else” (Roth, 2011, p. 18). It is by recognizing and accepting 
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the paradox of radical passivity—that knowledge can only be acquired through 
submission to the unknown—that knowing becomes possible. 
Sam’s penetration, precipitated by his willingness to make himself vulnerable to being 
affected by the unknown other, leads directly to a revelation. The “kind of 
understanding” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 246) that Sam arrives at in this moment stretches 
beyond the realization that he and Cliff must enjoy their brief moment in the sun 
because there is only now. It also extends to Michael, who reflecting on his Uncle 
Sam’s experience, observes:  
Having a man inside you changed you. It was as if the penetration reached not 
only some physical centre but also some small room within which your identity 
lay. The masculine identity of the man inside the room had been constructed by 
his society. His very being had been imprinted with codes which guided him 
and said, ‘This is what a man does and this is what a man does not do.’ 
(Ihimaera, 2000, pp. 248–249) 
As I have suggested, while Sam’s penetration by Cliff has seeded within him an 
awareness of a new emergent sense of self, a different way of being male, Sam also 
realizes that he must endure the negative consequences demanded by his culture for 
having done what is forbidden. It is Sam’s father, Arapeta, who takes it upon himself to 
be Sam’s judge, jury and executioner in the face of what he sees as Sam’s 
transgression.  
Letting Daddy and Atua in  
The serious threat, both physical and psychical, that Arapeta poses to his son is 
foreshadowed in Ihimaera’s narrative long before Sam becomes sexually involved with 
Cliff—and Arapeta’s discovery of the nature of their relationship. During Sam’s time in 
Vietnam, he experiences a series of “phantasmagorical images” (Fox, 2008, p, 163) 
which reveal the complexity of his relationship with his father. Admittedly, there are 
elements of both affection and eroticism in the initial embrace that Sam imagines taking 
place between himself and Arapeta. However, Sam’s fantasy soon becomes a terrifying 
and nauseating nightmare when Arapeta penetrates Sam orally, violently plunging his 
left arm deep into his son’s throat until the hair of his armpit grazes Sam’s lips. As he 
tries to shove his right hand in as well, Arapeta cries: “‘Open wide, son, and let Daddy 
in’” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 97). 
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It is possible to read this shocking passage as a symbolic representation of “the lack of 
space for self that Sam experiences as a result of his father’s excessive dominance” 
(Fox, 2008, p. 163). However, in the context of an exploration of hospitality as an 
interruption of the self, it is more productive to contrast Sam’s repugnance in the face 
of this violent and forced—though imagined—penetration by his father with his later 
actual penetration by Cliff. While Sam welcomes Cliff into himself, he tries to “vomit 
his father out of him” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 97).  
In order to begin to make some sense of Arapeta’s persecutory attitude towards Sam 
and his homosexuality, and to understand Ihimaera’s perspective on the origins in 
Māori culture of the codes which are imprinted on men, which guide them and instruct 
them in what a man does and what a man does not do, it is helpful to turn to the story of 
the god Tāne’s fashioning of the first woman, Hine-ahu-one. Up to this time all of the 
gods had been male. As Sam tells it, having followed Papatūānuku’s directions “to 
make a woman from the red earth,” Tāne then attempted to penetrate Hine-ahu-one 
with his penis, but “didn’t know which orifice to use” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 218). After 
attempting to enter her armpits, ears, eyes, mouth, nose, and “even her anus,” Tāne 
finally finds Hine-ahu-one’s vagina—“and sanctified it with the full inward thrust of 
his penis” (Ihimaera, 2000, pp. 218, 219). In some versions of this myth, Sam reminds 
us, Tāne’s brothers joined in as well.   
While this account is usually read as an explanation for the mechanism by which “male 
to female union was . . .  sanctioned by the gods”—and as a justification for why “any 
other kind of union could never be countenanced” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 155)—it is 
possible to interpret it in a way that pays much closer attention to the haphazard manner 
in which Tāne tries to penetrate Hine-ahu-one. Such a reading works not only to show 
“how humankind is not nice to women and queers in different ways, and to see how this 
operates a structure of approved violence” against them, but, also, to destabilize what 
Spivak calls “the grounding presence of the sheer selfishness of reproductive 
heteronormativity” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 123, 98) which the myth appears to affirm. 
Rather than suggesting that the efforts of Tāne—and, perhaps, his brothers—to fuck 
Hine-ahu-one are the result of male gods doing what they are supposed to do in order to 
implement some preordained plan, the alternative reading which I propose suggests that 
the male gods are operating in a random, albeit violent, way and don’t really know what 
they are doing.  
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Tāne’s attempts to enter every orifice of Hine-ahu-one’s body are justified within the 
structure of the myth on the grounds that they explain the origin of the various 
secretions that issue from these parts. Yet, Tāne and his brothers’ trial and error 
approach to sex implies the undecidability or queerness of an originary sexuality that 
preceded “the full inward thrust” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 219) of Tāne’s penis into Hine-
ahu-one’s vagina—an act that institutes both reproductive heteronormativity and 
heteropatriarchy. As Ihimaera highlights in his description of Arapeta’s ill-treatment of 
his wife, Florence, on their wedding night, the behaviour of Tāne and his brothers 
provides a template for the perpetration of abuse by men of women—and, by “the chain 
of equivalences binding these two abject bodies” (Kemp, 2013, pp. 1–2), of woman and 
queer—by heterosexuals of homosexuals. For Florence, “something strong and good 
had died . . . when Arapeta had abusively thrust his penis into her every opening as if 
she was made of dirt” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 232).   
Arapeta, in proclaiming that “when a man takes a woman to be his wife he is re-
enacting a tradition that goes back to the very first woman, Hine-ahu-one” (Ihimaera, 
2000, pp. 235), asserts his right, in imitation of Tāne and his brothers, to poke his penis 
into any orifice on his wife’s body. Somewhat paradoxically, and wanting to have his 
cake and eat it too, Arapeta in the same breath claims the vagina as a privileged site of 
penetration—this on the basis that it is through a woman’s vagina that “a man achieves 
his immortality” by the generation of a son, and, in so doing, defeats Hine-nui-te-pō, 
“the formidable Goddess of Death” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 235).  
Reproductive Futurism 
Arapeta’s affirmation that a man lives forever through the generation of a male line, 
and in this way is able to overcome Hine-nui-te-pō—a complex figure, both 
“maleficent and maternal” (Perris, 2015, p.86)—is indicative of his entanglement in “a 
system steeped in reproductive futurism which permeates all social, political and 
cultural structures” (Giffney, 2008, p. 63). As Edelman argues, having bestowed “the 
imprimatur of meaning-production on heterogenital relations,” reproductive futurism, 
in an effort to repress the conscious self’s awareness of the death drive, proceeds to 
locate ‘meaning’ in a future that is “endlessly postponed” (Edelman, 2004, p. 13). In 
Edelman’s scenario, the figure of the Child becomes both a representation of human 
society’s denial of the death drive and “the wish fulfilment of its desired immortality” 
(Giffney, 2008, p. 65). In The Uncle’s Story reproductive futurism can be seen at work 
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safeguarding, above all else, the continuation and the continuity of whakapapa—“the 
genealogical descent of all living things from the gods to the present time” (Barlow, 
2001, p. 173). Arapeta’s efforts to destroy all traces of Sam after his death, including 
wiping his name from the memory of the whānau by deleting it from the whakapapa 
book, are an attempt to consign him to Te Kore, The Void. In disconnecting Sam from 
“the umbilical cord of whakapapa,” Arapeta does his best to send his son “head over 
heels like a spaceman trailing his severed lifeline through a dark and hostile universe to 
oblivion” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 322). 
Michael Mahana, in stating that “this was how it was done to all gay men and women” 
(Ihimaera, 2000, p. 322), not only rejects claims that Māori generally treated takatāpui 
benignly, but identifies a process of negation that can be usefully illuminated by 
Edelman’s concepts of the sinthomosexual and sinthomosexuality. As Carla Freccero 
reports it, Edelman (2004) argues that within reproductive futurism, homophobia arises 
because “homosexuality comes to stand in for the antisocial force of the (death) drive 
that threatens the fantasy of futurity and meaningfulness” (Freccero, 2006, p. 332). 
Thus, in a homophobic culture, sinthomosexuality and the figure of the sinthomosexual 
are made to represent all that is antisocial, all that is associated with death, and all that 
stands in the way of “the belief in meaning and futurity” (Freccero, 2006, p. 332). 
Arapeta’s governing and totalizing fantasy that a man attains immortality and defeats 
death through the begetting of a line of male descendants is only sustained by the 
demonization of his own son as a sinthomosexual—one who because of his perverse 
sexual orientation is deemed to have no stake in the future of humanity. Given that in 
Arapeta’s eyes the fact that Sam has been penetrated determines that he must now be 
defined in negative terms—as non-heterosexual, non-reproductive, and non-male. Sam 
is judged as having nothing to contribute to the future of the whānau or the mana of the 
whakapapa, and, therefore, is made to figure the death drive. Thus, the mechanism of 
reproductive futurism—which is dependent on the maintenance of reproductive 
heteronormativity as an “agency of validation” and “the currency to measure human 
dignity” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 130, 322)—vilifies homosexuality in order to manufacture 
“the assurance of meaning in fantasy’s promise of continuity” (Freccero, 2006, p. 332).  
It comes as no surprise, then, that Arapeta calculates validity and human worth in the 
currency of sperm. While Turei, Sam’s mate who died in battle, is mourned because 
“the sperm that was in him from his father has died with him, and there will be no 
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further issue,” Sam is excoriated by his father for wasting sperm that is “sacred” 
(Ihimaera, 2000, pp. 173, 257) in an intrinsically non-productive sexual act. Arapeta 
believes that men like Sam who “abuse the sperm which is given to man for only one 
purpose” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 257) desecrate the memory of those who were killed in 
battle with their seed unspent within them. In asserting this position so forcefully, he 
draws attention not only to the inseparability of sex and death in his own 
conceptualization of masculinity, but also to the interchangeability of the roles played 
by the erect penis and the fighting club in the generation of male mana. In Māori 
society, as Sam explains to Cliff, “a man’s cock . . . as much as the fighting club, 
personified all that a man was” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 155).  
But, how does Arapeta’s accusation that Sam has misused his sperm stand up to 
scrutiny? Let’s examine Arapeta’s argument in the light of Spivak’s directive to her 
students when reading texts to “locate the precise claim for the veridical, respect it and 
then go for the excuse/accuse/use dance” (Spivak, 2014, p. 162). On the one hand, 
Arapeta holds firm to a reproductive futurism which insists that sperm is sacred because 
its telos is the begetting of children. On the other, as we have seen, sperm issues freely 
from the penises of Tāne and his brothers, secreting itself in unsanctioned orifices, 
including the mouth, nose, armpits, ears, eyes and anus of Hine-ahu-one—or, in the 
case of Tunui-a-te-ika, a lesser atua, shooting high into the Solar System to form 
Halley’s Comet. Arapeta, we know, sees himself as acting in imitation of the gods, as 
the thrusting of his penis into every opening on Florence’s body demonstrates. 
Ihimaera’s text, especially in its presentation of Arapeta, provides readers with 
“contradictory instructions” (Spivak, 2014, p. 164) of the sort that Spivak maintains 
suggest the operation of a double bind. The fissure in Arapeta’s thought and behaviour 
regarding sperm comes into sharp focus when we consider that while he holds sperm to 
be tapu—because it is essential for the continuation of the whakapapa and the 
whānau—his degradation of his own wife in imitation of Tāne and his brothers risks 
wasting and, thereby, desecrating his own sacred sperm. Arapeta not only abuses the 
woman his sperm will fertilize, but, years later, also the child generated in that act.   
Playing the double bind—in this case, the contradictory messages and instructions 
about sperm which we as readers receive from the character of Arapeta in Ihimaera’s 
text—it is important to note “how the text pushes [us] towards a decision, coaxes [us] 
to break the double bind” (Spivak, 2014, p. 164) by inviting us to attribute a definitive 
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significance not only to sperm, but also to both the penetrative and non-penetrative 
sexual acts that distribute it, either purposively or at random. Spivak’s aesthetic 
education, however, leads us in a different direction—to acknowledge that what we are 
seeing is “a desire represented in a text . . . not its fulfilment” (Spivak, 2014, p. 165). 
Furthermore, it asks us to clear a space for undecidability. By drawing attention to “the 
undecidability of the future” (Spivak, 2012, p. 421), Spivak challenges us to read 
Arapeta’s proclamations about sperm and his own particular alignment with 
reproductive futurism as (failed) attempts to over-determine the meaning of sex and 
sexuality. Spivak, in directing us to pay attention to what is singular and unverifiable in 
a text, asks us to resist as much as possible the temptation to universalize and to locate 
meaning in the universal. By acknowledging, as Spivak suggests we do, “the double 
bind of the universalizability of the singular, the double bind at the heart of democracy, 
for which an aesthetic education can be an epistemological preparation” (Spivak, 2012, 
p. 4), it is possible to appreciate the merits of Edelman’s claim that sex generates 
difference and always resists whatever meaning we attempt to attach to it:  
“. . . sex is the machinery of difference, inherently meaningless in itself, on the 
basis of which an imaginary meaning is posited nonetheless; like the zero as 
zero, it denotes a negativity whose every conceptualization, appearance, or 
image works to efface it” (Edelman, 2017, p. 154). 
However, the negativity that Edelman attributes to conceptualizations of sex, should not 
be read as a rejection of queerness, which, he argues, “refers to what never accedes to 
representation in itself” (Edelman, 2017, p. 157). Rather, it is an acknowledgement that 
sex, which is always queer despite the best efforts to locate it within a predetermined 
system of meaning, opens onto “the space of the imageless, the impossible, the 
unthinkable” (Edelman, 2017, p. 157). Edelman’s insistence on thinking queerness in 
relation to negativity and negation is not so much a denial of queer’s usefulness as a 
refusal—in the face of reproductive futurism—to give queer a positive value or role in 
affirming “hope itself as affirmation” (Edelman, 2004, p. 4). If my reading of Te Kore, 
the Void, as Ihimaera writes it in The Uncle’s Story, is infected a little by Edelman’s 
notion of negation, this is because, as I see it, Te Kore becomes for Sam Mahana the 
space wherein he experiences “the negativity inherent in knowledge as such” (Edelman, 
2017, p. 129). Te Kore, in other words, provides Sam with what Indigenous 
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philosopher of education Carl Mika terms an experience of nothingness, “linked with 
the learning of one’s own vulnerability towards the All” (Mika, 2017, p. 71).20 
As I have argued, following his penetration, Sam comes to an acceptance of his own 
vulnerability—a revelation, which like his orgasm, seems to come from Te Kore, the 
Void. In proposing that this overwhelming experience enables Sam to dwell—if 
briefly—in a state of suspension, a “now” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 247) where distinctions 
between past, present, or future disappear and cease to matter, I wish to suggest that 
Sam’s new awareness makes it possible for him to accept the inevitability of the 
punishment which he had earlier predicted. This punishment—for an act of penetration 
that heralds negative consequences not just for Sam, but also for his whānau and for 
Cliff—Sam feels he must endure rather than flee.  
Figured as a sinthomosexual in a culture with such strong investment in reproductive 
futurity, Sam sees no clear way to be both Māori and gay. He finds himself caught in a 
double bind that he can neither resolve nor continue to inhabit without bringing great 
suffering and even death upon himself. While Edelman—more than thirty years after 
Sam’s ‘death’—urges queers to say, “fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and 
the future that serves as its prop” (Edelman, 2004, p. 29), Sam is equipped neither by 
his culture nor by his personal circumstances to act on such an imperative. Realizing 
that one interruptive act brings about others, what Sam does do is bear the 
consequences of his own hospitality—of opening up the home of his body to the 
otherness of anal penetration.  
Other Hospitalities 
If it is provocative to align Sam’s opening of his anus to Cliff with Derrida’s 
understanding of hospitality as an opening to “the absolute, unknown, anonymous 
                                                          
20 Much more can be said about Te Kore and the distinctively Māori approach to the ‘Void’ that 
it signifies, including its contribution to theorizations of Ako—a concept commonly, but too 
narrowly, translated as teaching and learning. Ako has a much greater reach, implying as it does 
“a state of susceptibility in the face of the world and the dialogue between all things” (Mika, 
2017, p. 67). Understood as an experience of “uncertainty within the flux of the world and its 
collapse within the self” (Mika, 2017, p. 65), Ako is not separable from Te Kore and the 
possibility of nothingness. If teaching and learning processes are about coming to terms with 
“the self’s implication by the world” (Mika, 2017, p. 65), then Sam Mahana’s encounter with 
Te Kore, understood as an engagement with Ako, involves a chipping away or reshaping of the 
self by other entities. 
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other” (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 25) without regard for the consequences—
no matter how interruptive of the self—nevertheless, I do so in order to bring Sam’s 
hospitality in relation to other hospitalities in Ihimaera’s novel.  
More than any other character in The Uncle’s Story, Arapeta, as patriarch of the 
Mahana whānau, has a particular responsibility for ensuring that manaakitanga—
hospitality, generosity and kindness—is expressed to visitors. Indeed, when Cliff first 
arrives in Waituhi, Arapeta welcomes him extravagantly, and appears to do everything 
that is required to make his guest feel at home: “‘The hospitalities of the house are 
yours. Nothing is good enough for the man who saved my son’s life . . . ’” (Ihimaera, 
2000, p. 215). And while it is true that Arapeta “always prided himself on being a 
generous host” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 215), it soon becomes obvious that Arapeta’s 
hospitality is driven by egotism and personal vanity, providing him, as it does, with an 
opportunity to boast about his own war-time exploits. To borrow Spivak’s words, he is 
“Narcissus waiting to see his own powerful image in the eyes of the other” (Spivak, 
2014, p. 54). Arapeta’s highly conditional hospitality, which depends on guests meeting 
their host’s expectations and needs, makes no room for the alteration of the self. He is 
incapable of providing authentic hospitality because he is resistant to interruption, 
impenetrable, unable to accept that “the arrival of the guest may change the space into 
which this guest is received” (Ruitenberg, 2016, p. 29). When Arapeta discovers that 
Sam and Cliff are lovers he accuses Cliff of treachery and threatens him with a death, 
which he justifies as utu—a reciprocal action carried out so as to restore balance. 
As the history of Western literature attests, to invite people into your home is “to give 
them the power to complicate your life right up to the act of taking it” (Heffernan, 
2014, p. 1). In marked contrast to Arapeta’s highly conditional hospitality stand the 
actions of an elderly Vietnamese couple who offer Sam a meal knowing that in doing 
so they are setting themselves up for execution by the enemy. For these two old 
villagers, the code of hospitality must be maintained regardless of any risk to 
themselves: “You are a boy. You were hungry, like all boys, and all boys must eat” 
(Ihimaera, 2000, p. 91). The hospitality given to Sam by the old man and woman is 
unconditional and consequential—bringing about an interruption that leads directly to 
their deaths at the hands of the Vietcong. By inviting the outside inside in such an 
absolute way the old people are doing the unbearable, that is, they are accepting “the 
risk of the other coming and destroying the place, initiating a revolution, stealing 
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everything, or killing everyone” (Derrida, 1999b, p. 71). In the light of the 
unconditional and exemplary hospitality extended to Sam by the old Vietnamese 
couple, it is worth pondering how best to make sense of Arapeta’s complete and total 
rejection of his own son. If hospitality is an opening up in order to allow that which is 
other—that which is outside—to enter, then Arapeta’s expulsion of Sam from the 
whānau, given that it involves turning a familiar into a stranger, is a reversal of this 
process. There is a warning in this—the distant other is not always physically distant. 
We may find the other among ourselves and we may be other to ourselves.  
In challenging us to use the power of the imagination to patiently reach toward the 
distant other, Spivak’s aesthetic education directs us to apply teleiopoiesis to that which 
is other, but also close at hand, including ‘ourselves’—especially in those odd and 
uncanny moments when we may sense that “the unified and autonomous subject . . . is 
an illusory effect of discourse, a convention by which we identify a single locus of 
action” (Ruitenberg, 2016, p. 12).21 Ihimaera takes care to characterize Sam as having 
some sense or inkling of this rather queer process at work within himself, especially in 
those moments which I term penetration’s ‘other’—those rare occasions marked by 
permeability and diffusion, rather than by the sharp and violent intensities that are 
associated with penetrative interruptions. 
Penetration’s ‘Other’ 
Before drawing this chapter to a close with some thoughts about how ideas that have 
emerged from my reading of The Uncle’s Story might contribute to a re-envisioning of 
sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand, I first wish to comment briefly on an 
episode from The Uncle’s Story that is illustrative of the phenomenon of penetration’s 
                                                          
21 Carl Mika, in addressing the significance of movement towards or into the night—a trope 
often linked in Māori thought with the undecidability and potentiality of Te Kore—explains 
that such movement implies that “the indefinite self is engaged with travelling through a state 
of uncertain being” (Mika, 2012, p. 1083). Thus, there are strong resonances between the 
movement towards or into the night that Mika speaks of and the movement implied by Spivak’s 
teleiopoiesis, especially given that both are in the direction of the unknowable—that which 
cannot be “grasped by, or encountered through, cognition alone” (Mika, 2012, p. 1083). Just as 
Spivak’s aesthetic education attends to the imagination in order to “attempt to access the 
epistemic” (Spivak, 2012, p. 10), so Mika argues for an Ako, which, by acknowledging the 
Māori language “as a metaphorical means of communication” (Mika, 2012, p. 1083), is better 
able to tolerate gaps in understanding and value the mysterious. Likewise, exposure and 
attention to the queer serves not only to establish “more supple epistemological frameworks” 
(Sedgwick, 1993, p. 5), but also leads to epistemological adventures. 
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‘other’. The incident referred to takes place in Vietnam during Sam’s time of military 
service. 
Sam, in order to find protection from heavy rain, approaches the threshold of a temple 
where a massive golden Buddha is housed. Weighed down by thoughts of the old 
couple’s death, and trying to make sense of his erotic feelings for Cliff, Sam is afraid 
that if he enters the temple he will be “unmasked, unclothed in the sight of God” 
(Ihimaera, 2000, p. 158). But, as he turns and starts to step away, Sam senses the 
Buddha exhaling and breathing upon the rain. With “every raindrop from Heaven” 
holding within it “a tinkling bell,” it seemed to Sam that “the entire landscape 
resounded with the harmonics of life” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 158). Awestruck, Sam 
responds to the call of the temple pavilion for him to approach: “Haramai, Sam” 
(Ihimaera, 2000, p. 158). As he crosses the threshold—“the paepae”—Sam senses “the 
imminence of a kind of peace that was also a mystery” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 158). The 
temple pavilion opens up to welcome him just as a wharenui back in Aotearoa would. 
Here the thrusting, the perforation, the piercing, the pricking and the probing that are 
characteristic of penetrative or interruptive acts—whether sexual or soldierly—are 
entirely absent. Penetration’s ‘other’—a permeability or diffusion—is suggested by the 
gentle exhalation of the Buddha’s breath, the softness of the rain, the tinkling bell, and 
a landscape redolent of life’s concordance. While there is an invitation here, a calling 
onward, what, perhaps, is most noteworthy is that “all the world seemed to recede 
around him and away from him,” leading Sam, despite his fears and anxieties, to 
receive in the Buddha’s presence “an absolution” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 160)—and a 
reassurance that all would be well. 
Of course, the deep peace that Sam encounters at the temple is fleeting, and he is soon 
back among his soldier mates dealing with the traumas of war and the complexities of 
his sexual attraction and growing love for Cliff. But his experience of penetration’s 
‘other’—where “the wind breathed through Sam, in, out, in, out” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 
162)—has provided Sam not only with an oasis of calm, albeit temporary, in the midst 
of turmoil, but also, I suggest, with a glimpse of “the worlds proposed and promised by 
queerness in the realm of the aesthetic” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 1). Sam has been given the 
opportunity to receive the respite he needs to refresh his spirits and build his strength in 
preparation to face the challenges ahead. This educates Sam to remain open to the 
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unexpected benedictions and consolations of life—despite there being no obvious 
escape from the double bind in which he finds himself. Like the legendary hero 
Tāwhaki, who climbs to the heavens by holding fast to the tendrils of a vine, Sam must 
risk the perils of following his own “suspended way” (Ihimaera, 2019, p. 237)—the 
way of being both Māori and gay. 
In so far as he allows himself to remain vulnerable or susceptible “in the face of the 
world and the dialogue between all things” (Mika, 2017, p. 67), Sam participates in a 
process of Ako premised on “mystery and unknowability” (Mika, 2012, p. 1081). The 
education Sam receives—by way of his anal penetration, his encounter with Te Kore, 
and his time at the Buddhist temple—entails a learning that springs from “the fragility 
associated with the dual nothingness and positivity of a thing” (Mika, 2017, p. 69). If it 
is an education in the double bind and in the queer, it is also an education that flies in 
the face of a conceptualization of mātauranga that “fixes things in the world” (Mika, 
2012, p. 1081). Sam’s learning is not “an epistemological knowing of the world” 
(Mika, 2012, p. 1081), nor does it give him certainty and authority of the sort that 
Arapeta claims. Rather, it attunes him to “a Maori worldedness” (Mika, 2017, p. 71) 
where the ‘I’ is always in the process of being constituted by that which is not known—
“the living momentum for the universe and all things within it” (Mika, 2012, pp. 1081–
1082) which derives its potential from Te Kore. 
Sexuality Education—Hauora and Wellbeing 
As we have seen, Spivak’s aesthetic education attempts to use the imagination to 
negotiate rather than eliminate double binds through “the persistent establishment and 
re-establishment, the repeated consolidating in undoing, of a strategy of education and 
classroom pedagogy” (Spivak, 2012, p. 66). If, in my micrological reading of a passage 
from The Uncle’s Story, I have traversed the double bind of being Māori and gay, 
especially as it is performed and exemplified in Sam’s penetration by Cliff, I have also 
drawn attention to the fissures in Māori understandings of male-with-male sex as they 
present themselves in Ihimaera’s treatment of the story of Tāne and Hine-ahu-one—
which, as Ihimaera shows in his characterization of Arapeta, have served down the 
generations as a template for the abuse of women and queers by men. The abusive 
elements in the Tāne and Hine-ahu-one myth—and Arapeta’s willingness to pattern his 
own destructive behaviour after Tāne’s—would come as no surprise to Spivak, who 
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argues the irreducibility of sexual difference and reproductive heteronormativity, which 
she positions upstream of culture.  
If for Ihimaera, “growing up Māori has come to mean growing up and across the 
fractures in time and space within our culture”—as well as coming to terms with a 
postmodern world—it has also involved claiming those spaces in which it is possible 
“to transform and continue the process of becoming” (Ihimaera, 1998, pp. 15, 16). To 
this end, Ihimaera uses his fiction to “give the gift of belonging” (Ihimaera, 2016, p. 16) 
to takatāpui and to others. He does this by deploying traditional Māori concepts in ways 
that empower those whose stories have “often been suppressed by Māori” (Ihimaera, 
2016, p. 15). 
The Ministry of Education and the Education Review Office also turn to Māori 
concepts in their drive to “support the development of sexuality education resources 
and programmes that address the needs of diverse populations currently underserved by 
existing provision” (Education Review Office, 2018, p. 20). While acknowledging the 
benefits of introducing all New Zealand students to what they describe as “the hauora 
model, which includes physical, social, mental, emotional, and spiritual aspects” 
(Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 3) of wellbeing, the Ministry and ERO are particularly 
committed to using this approach to produce more equitable health outcomes for Māori 
students and their whānau.22 In its conceptualization of hauora, the Ministry of 
Education draws heavily, but not exclusively, on Mason Durie’s model of Te Whare 
Tapa Whā (see Durie, 1994) in an attempt to provide a Māori perspective on wellbeing 
that supports its own promotion of a holistic, but largely unexamined, understanding of 
sexuality. Yet, rather than grapple with hauora’s metaphysical and cosmological 
dimensions, including its inseparability from whakapapa and its source in the Māori 
creation myths, the Ministry presents hauora in more straightforward terms as “the 
good life” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 9). And, although in its 2015 guide for 
schools on sexuality education the Ministry affirms that “hauora is always relational,” 
its relationality is presented schematically, and as occurring “within and across” 
                                                          
22 Evidence cited by the Education Review Office (2018, p. 18) for the need to improve the 
health and wellbeing of Māori includes the following: “Māori are more likely to become teen 
parents than non-Māori”; “Māori women aged between 15 and 19 have a higher rate of 
abortions than any other ethnicity of the same age group”; and “gonorrhoea and chlamydia are 




(Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 9) the four elements or dimensions of wellbeing that 
appear in Durie’s model.23 Hauora’s interdependence with whanaungatanga, 
manaakitanga and kotahitanga is ignored in this document—as it is in the 2020 guide 
which reaffirms “a holistic approach to sexuality education as defined by the hauora 
model” (Ministry of Education, 2020a, p. 10, 2020b, p. 12).24  
However, originating as it does in “the breath or wind of the spirit which was infused 
into the process of birth to animate life” (Marsden & Royal, 2003, p. 60), hauora is not 
unproblematically interchangeable with ‘wellbeing,’ and bears little relation to the 
“relentless neoliberal preoccupation with happiness and health” (Quinlivan, 
Rasmussen, Aspin, Allen, & Sanjakdar, 2014, p. 397) that currently underpins much of 
the thinking around sexuality education in New Zealand schools. Removed from its 
cosmological context, and stripped of its complexity and multi-dimensionality—and, 
therefore, of much of its usefulness as a theoretical tool—hauora, as it is understood 
and practised in neoliberal sexuality education classrooms, takes its place in a ‘fixed’ 
and tidy mātauranga, the plausibility of which depends on “an orderly regard of things 
in the world” (Mika, 2012, p. 1080). As such, hauora “provides no future for young 
people beyond the autological subject” (Quinlivan et al., 2014, p. 398).  
Given the Education Review Office’s willingness to both define and identify negative 
outcomes for Māori—while at the same time borrowing and dumbing-down the Māori 
notion of hauora to frame their own understandings of health and wellbeing—two 
questions are worth considering. Firstly, to what extent do health and sexuality 
education programmes in Aotearoa New Zealand deploy hauora “in ways that re-
instantiate and privilege normative European ways of knowing” (Quinlivan et al., 2014, 
p. 395)? And, secondly, having been emptied of much of its power, does hauora have 
anything to offer a re-envisioned sexuality education?  
In response to the Education Review Office’s call to “support teachers to deliver a 
mātauranga Māori sexuality education programme that meets the needs of Māori 
                                                          
23 These are te taha hinengaro / mental and emotional wellbeing; te taha whānau / social 
wellbeing; te taha tinana / physical wellbeing; and te taha wairua / spiritual wellbeing. 
24 The Education Review Office (2018, p. 45), however, does present “evaluation, inquiry and 
knowledge building . . . grounded in whanaungatanga and manaakitanga” as an indicator of 
effective practice, but fails to attend to the relationship between these concepts and hauora in 
ways that addresses their ontological connection. 
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whānau and students” (Education Review Office, 2018, p. 44), it is not surprising that 
sexuality educators are looking to do so in ways that shift their gaze beyond the oft-
quoted negative health statistics for Māori. The willingness of sexuality education 
teachers to adopt hauora as an antidote to negativity is understandable, however, their 
readiness to embrace hauora primarily as a tool “to craft healthy and happy citizens” 
(Quinlivan et al., 2014, p. 396) may not only disguise a reluctance on the part of 
educators to address the injustices and social inequalities which lie behind the 
depressing figures, but also their failure to recognize that “government policy likes to 
see Māori concepts perform along a set of expectations bounded by Western ontology” 
(Mika & Stewart, 2017, p. 144). 
While there is now an increasing demand from sexuality educators for classroom 
resources that reflect the belief that “sexual diversity has been an essential component 
of Maori society in the past and that this diversity continues into Maori society today” 
(Aspin, 2011, pp. 116–117), this is not unexpected, especially given that sexuality 
education programmes in Aotearoa happily link hauora with the acceptance of gender 
and sexuality diversity—but often without addressing the complicating perspective that 
for Māori “the roles of man to woman were established by primal myth” (Ihimaera, 
2002, p. 124). In a similar vein, Māori “who identify with diverse genders and 
sexualities such as whakawāhine, tangata ira tāne, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersex 
and queer” (Kerekere, 2015, p. 2) are increasingly willing to be known as takatāpui. 
This is to be welcomed, not least because the notion of takatāpui enables identity to be 
thought in ways that don’t force a choice between prioritizing sexuality or gender and 
being Māori. However, the attendant complexities and challenges should not be 
ignored—especially those concerning whakapapa, which establishes the 
interrelatedness of all things, linking the self with the world and enabling a person “to 
negotiate the terrain of both seen and unseen existence” (Smith, 2000, p. 45). As Mika 
puts it, “the self’s well-being is dependent on the nature of whakapapa, with the entire 
self being determined by everything that exists, perceptible or otherwise” (Mika, 2017, 
p. 69). However, because “the primal myths made no allowance for gay man and 
women” (Ihimaera, 2002, p. 124), takatāpui are left with no whakapapa of their own to 
connect them to the atua. As a consequence, takatāpui are not only deprived of the 




Thus, to argue that the takatāpui identity provides young Māori with “opportunities to 
discover and change” (Kerekere, 2015, p. 8)—this by giving them “unfettered access to 
culturally appropriate descriptors of sexual identity” (Aspin, 2011, p. 120) from the 
ancestors—is to address only one aspect of a concept that has a complex and not 
undisputed history. It is necessary, therefore, in the context of sexuality education to 
ensure that educators, when “seeking alternatives to the western concepts of sexuality” 
(Aspin, 2011, p. 119), take care not to simplify or romanticize the notion of takatāpui. 
Neither should the term be used in ways that offer an easy alignment with neoliberal 
understandings of hauora. For, while the notion of takatāpui is a powerful theoretical 
tool for investigating and problematizing “the sexual and cultural components of one’s 
identity” (Aspin, 2011, p. 118), this remains the case only as long as its complex and 
sometimes problematic relationship with other aspects of Māori tradition and history is 
recognized. 
Some Concluding Remarks 
If Witi Ihimaera invites readers of The Uncle’s Story to attend to Sam’s anal 
penetration by Cliff—in the wider context both of the Tāne/Hine-ahu-one myth and its 
re-enactment down the generations by Arapeta and other abusive men—this is in order 
to make gay Māori visible. In doing so, he brings to light the double bind, the 
requirement to choose between being gay and being Māori, that structures his novel. 
Reading Ihimaera’s book in the context of sexuality education and micrologically—that 
is, as Spivak’s aesthetic education directs us to do—we are able to attend to the ways in 
which hospitality is (and isn’t) performed through anal penetration, an act which, as 
Ihimaera explains, was generally viewed as “anathema” and only “applied to captured 
prisoners to desecrate their mana” (Ihimaera, 2002, p. 125). As we do so, we also come 
to a more complex and richer understanding of hauora than that which is available from 
mandated sexuality education resources, including the Te Whare Tapa Wha model and 
its four-sided wharenui which tend to template hauora rather than present it as a 
dynamic force. 
By attending to the fissures in Arapeta’s thought and actions—not only regarding the 
sacredness of the sexual act, but also his measurement of its validity in the currency of 
sperm, the means by which whakapapa is maintained—readers’ desires are rearranged 
in ways that build upon and broaden traditional understanding of hauora and 
whakapapa. As they observe the protocol of Ihimaera’s text, readers are positioned to 
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accept an extension of the concept of whakapapa to include the notion of the gay tribe, 
which Michael Mahana explains in terms of “belonging to a great new gay family” 
(Ihimaera, 2000, p. 296). Such a collectivity, which is inclusive of all takatāpui, 
emphasizes a whakapapa not determined by bloodlines, but by “descent from ancestors 
with sexual and gender fluidity” (Kerekere, 2017, p. 2). If Ihimaera, through Michael, is 
pointing to “the way to win back the family” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 296)—and to claim 
the mana of takatāpui—he is also engaging in the sort of thinking that sets queerness as 
horizon. It is necessary, as Ihimaera argues in another forum, for gay Māori men and 
other takatāpui, too, to work to build “a brave new world” (Ihimaera, 2002, p. 126): 
They have to construct a culture. They have to construct a tribe for themselves. 
They have to construct traditions, a history, a place to stand on and to do battle 
from. (Ihimaera, 2002, p. 126) 
Ihimaera’s perspective is utopic. What we glimpse as we read The Uncle’s Story is the 
possibility of a collectivity to come. This brave new world is possibilized not by 
treating the past as if it were a golden age to be imitated in the present, but through re-
inhabiting aspects of Māori tradition and reworking them in ways that allow for the 
imagining of a queerer and better future. Such a future “won’t just happen—it will have 
to be created” (Ihimaera, 2000, p. 131), as Michael’s friend, Roimata, reminds him. 
Sam, Michael and Roimata are all engaged—in various ways and to varying degrees—
in a struggle to resist “the fixing effect of mātauranga” (Mika, 2012, p. 1080). Given 
that in The Uncle’s Story traditional understandings of sexuality carry much greater 
weight than the perspectives that emerge from their own lived sexual experience, these 
characters are all forced to rethink their ongoing relationship with the world. 
Likewise, the re-envisioning of sexuality education in ways that allow it to refuse the 
domestication, not just of hauora, but of other interrelated and interdependent concepts, 
is a task that must be persistently worked at. Efforts to attend closely, micrologically, to 
The Uncle’s Story—in particular, to the shifts in epistemological orientation that 
become possible when Ihimaera’s novel is read hospitably in the light of Spivak’s 
aesthetic education and with the uncertain ‘knowledge’ that potentiality emerges from 
the nothingness of Te Kore—show how this can be done. Such mindful work comes 
with no guarantees, but does bring with it the satisfaction of contributing to the project 
of rethinking sexuality and sexuality education through the aesthetic. This happens as 
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we engage the imagination while remaining faithful to the singular and the queer. In 
this way, we are able affirm that “sexuality is an ever-changing component of the world 
in which we live” (Aspin & Hutchings, 2007, p. 419)—as it always has been. 
The closing of this chapter—and with it Part Two of this thesis—signals a shift in 
focus. Part Three, which follows, veers in the direction of Leo Bersani, who, by 
positioning sex as a modality of the aesthetic, not only supplements Spivak’s aesthetic 
education, but also opens up possibilities for the reconceptualization of sexuality 































Supplementing Spivak’s Aesthetic Education  
. . . I have not forgotten Derrida re-citing Rousseau: the supplement is dangerous 
because it opens us to the incalculable. (Spivak, 2012, p. 190) 
. . . a new emphasis on the peripheries of our desiring attention would not only 
diversify desire but would also keep it mobile. Peripheral seductions would no longer 
be discarded because they can’t be related to a dominant interest; even our dominant 
interest—our ‘centers’ of desire—would have merely a provisional, peripheral appeal. 
The desiring self might even disappear as we learn to multiply our discontinuous and 
partial desiring selves” (Bersani, 1978, p. 7). 
Overview 
Because the task of aesthetic education, like the work of sexuality education, “requires 
not only cognitive but emotional labour” (Boler & Zembylas, 2003, p. 111), in this 
chapter, I argue the benefits of supplementing Spivak’s aesthetic education with Leo 
Bersani’s notion of the aestheticization of existence—or self-aestheticization—
including his positioning of sex as a modality of the aesthetic. I do this with the 
intention of enabling the imagining of a sexuality education that is not only less tightly 
bound to the epistemological and more concerned with ontological possibilities, but one 
also capable of taking greater account and advantage of “the contingency and mobility 
of desire” (Bennett & Royle, 2016, p. 251). 
In looking to Bersani to supplement Spivak, I am not only providing “an addition from 
the outside,” but also, as Derrida would argue, “supplying what is missing”—
something that “is already inscribed within that to which it is added” (Bernasconi, 
2015, p. 19). As Spivak acknowledges in the epigraph to this chapter, supplementation 
is a potentially dangerous business because that which is being supplemented always 
runs the risk of becoming unrecognizable—other to itself. My intention in exploring the 
potential of Bersanian approaches to contribute to Spivak’s aesthetic education, 
including its deployment of desire, is to shine a light on the ways in which Bersani’s 
aesthetic perspectives—in addition to his theorizations of sex—are capable of keeping, 
not only meaning, but also desire on the move. If, in the process, I distort Spivak’s 
aesthetic education in unexpected or unwelcome ways, it is a risk I am prepared to take 
because supplementation, despite its attendant dangers, also opens up new possibilities. 
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With these thoughts in mind, I begin this chapter by taking a closer look at desire as it 
figures in education, including sexuality education. 
The Place of Desire in School Curricula 
Given that “the shape, or morphology, of desire is something that must resist definite 
parameters and be open to constant amendment” (Todd, 2012, p. 5), it is not surprising 
that attempts to theorize desire or sketch its contours, including in the sexuality 
education classroom, must grapple with the impossibility of having to represent the 
unrepresentable. However, while the question of “desire’s inclusion in sexuality 
education . . . remains an issue for contemporary program policy, design, and delivery” 
(Garland-Levett & Allen, 2019, p. 522), it is important to acknowledge that the place of 
desire in school curricula is the concern not just of sexuality education, but of pedagogy 
generally. This is so because desire ‘manages’ or structures “the limits as well as the 
possibilities for our receptivity to difference” (Todd, 2012, pp. 8–9). In short, desire is a 
precondition for all learning, even though it makes its presence felt—and is policed 
most obviously and anxiously—in pedagogical spaces where sexuality education takes 
place. 
If desire—like pleasure—doesn’t merit a mention in mandated sexuality education 
curricula in Australia, Canada, England, Ireland, and New Zealand (see Garland-Levett 
& Allen, 2019, p. 523), then this is not simply because its inclusion is often opposed on 
traditional religious, cultural, or moral grounds. Rather, neoliberal educational policy 
with its emphasis on “linear, end-product-driven teaching” works either to silence 
desire or to co-opt it for its own purposes, thus undermining “the desire to teach, and to 
teach students to desire learning” (Davies & Bansel, 2007, p. 257). While sexuality 
educators are, perhaps, more aware of the “problematics of desire” (Garland-Levett & 
Allen, 2019, p. 521) in relation to the ‘othering’ of certain sexualities, religious beliefs 
and cultures, they are generally oblivious to the ways in which school-based sexuality 
education is “shaped by what the state desires, demands and enables” (Davies & 
Bansel, 2007, p. 250).  
As I have argued, Spivak’s aesthetic education, recognising as it does that “the world 
needs an epistemological change that will rearrange desires” (Spivak, 2012, p. 2), is 
characterized by pedagogical principles and practices that are attentive to alterity, 
hospitality, interruption, and suspension. Thus, her aesthetic education is a useful tool 
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with which to interrogate neoliberalism’s programme for education—an agenda from 
which sexuality education is not excluded—including the reconfiguration of 
universities and schools to produce “highly individualized, responsibilized subjects 
who have become entrepreneurial actors across all dimensions of their lives” (Davies & 
Bansel, 2007, p. 248). However, while Spivak’s aesthetic education in its challenge to 
“individualism and competition” (Spivak, 2012, p. 154) certainly gives due emphasis to 
the rearrangement of desires for epistemological performance, it does tend to skirt 
around the issues that arise when students engage in the sort of intellectual work that 
requires them to “radically re-evaluate their worldviews” (Boler & Zembylas, 2003, p. 
111). Such is the case, for example, when during the course of school-based sexuality 
education programmes students become aware of the privileging of marital 
heterosexuality, or of the role that desire and sexual pleasure play in the formation of 
sexual subjectivities. World views are similarly re-evaluated when—perhaps, through 
sexuality education—young people come to realize that neoliberalism shapes “the way 
in which we understand what matters, and the ways we can be manipulated and 
controlled through what we understand as mattering” (Davies, 2018, p. 118).  
While attempting to address how best to think of desire and its relation to “the affective 
dimensions connected to learning” (Todd, 2012, p. 1), including in the context of 
Spivak’s aesthetic education and its pedagogy, it is helpful to consider Spivak’s 
relationship with psychoanalysis—a field of thought for which desire is a central, 
though disputed and elusive concept, one that “gives rise to its own elision and 
impossibility” (Azari, 2008, p. 9). I will do this before turning to Leo Bersani’s work on 
desire, sexuality, and the aesthetic subject, “not to undermine but rather to possibly 
contribute [to] and complicate” (Gershon, 2015, p. 15) Spivak’s project of aesthetic 
education. I will also touch on the work of literary and educational theorists, especially 
those who engage to varying degrees with the psychoanalytical tradition and/or with 
queer theory, among them Sharon Todd, Shoshana Felman, Judith Butler, Deborah 
Britzman, and Heather Love.  
Pedagogy and Desire—Some Thoughts 
Desire—including sexual desire—and pedagogy have always been entangled. As Todd 
observes, “the importance of desire for education has a long history” (Todd, 2012, p. 1) 
which stretches back to the beginnings of Western philosophy. While Plato links 
education with eros—meaning “desire in general, connected to but distinct from both 
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human sexuality and rationality” (Hull, 2002, p. 19)—Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, 
announces the universality of the desire for learning: “All men by nature desire to 
know” (Aristotle, ca. 350 B.C.E /1984, p. 1552).  
The notion that education must concern itself both with the search for knowledge and 
the love of wisdom is, thus, premised on the belief that education has its origins in 
desire and the acknowledgement that “lack, absence, or ignorance” (Todd, 2012, p. 2) 
creates a longing or want which demands satisfaction. Given this scenario, desire, 
paradoxically, becomes a necessary mechanism in the production of that which it must 
satisfy. Drawing on the work of Jacques Lacan and Luce Irigaray, Jane Gallop argues 
that “the Platonic ideal of pederasty” provides an “undoubtedly . . . useful paradigm for 
classic Western pedagogy” (Gallop, 1982, pp. 119, 118) because it supports the widely 
held belief that it is the teacher’s job to instil or insert desire for knowledge into the 
student: “A greater man penetrates a lesser man with his knowledge. The student is 
empty, a receptacle for the phallus; the teacher is the phallic fullness of knowledge” 
(Gallop, 1982, p. 118). 
Spivak’s aesthetic education, with its aim of uncoercively rearranging desires, clearly 
challenges the phallic paradigm—as it does the notion of education as “controlling the 
other through knowledge production” (Spivak, 2012, p. 467). In this, Spivak is broadly 
sympathetic to Paulo Friere’s concept of “‘conscientizaҫão,’ famously translated as 
‘conscientization’” (Spivak, 2012, p. 536, endnote 19), and to his critique of ‘banking 
education’—“the mere transfer of knowledge” (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010, p. 51). 
If Friere presents what is, perhaps, the most widely recognized critique of classical 
Western pedagogy’s tendency to imagine teacher-student relations as top-down, “one-
directional, penetrative and incisive” (Todd, 2012, p. 3), it is a critique which also 
defies those models of sexuality education that place undue emphasis on giving young 
people “access to information” about health and sexuality, but without providing them 
with “opportunities to think about, question, and discuss” (Ministry of Education, 2015, 
p. 4) it. In particular, Friere’s advocacy of a lateral, dialogical pedagogy between the 
teacher-student—a process whereby knowledge emerges from the practice of freedom 
and, in turn, results in reflection and carefully considered action—provides a stimulus 
to educationalists to consider “a reconfiguration of the place of desire in the 
pedagogical encounter” (Todd, 2012, p. 3), including, I suggest, in the context of 
sexuality education.  
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In emphasizing the “contingent, multiply determined, and constantly shifting” character 
of the human subject, feminist, critical, postcolonial, queer and other post-structural 
educational theorists have drawn attention to ways in which desire both shapes and is 
shaped by the social-cultural, arguing not only that pedagogy needs to be rethought “as 
a process that gets tangled up in the nexus of social relations,” but also that it should 
operate in ways that enable human agents to “desire against the grain of dominant 
representations, languages, and meanings” (Todd, 2012, pp. 3, 4). By considering 
teacher-student interactions as performative, pedagogy comes to be seen as both a 
cultural and a symbolic practice which, among other things, inscribes gender, sexuality, 
race and ethnicity on its subjects. In so doing, it also ‘performs’ and generates the 
conditions under which teachers and learners produce and participate in desire. The 
development of psychoanalytic approaches to pedagogy and increased attention to “the 
affective investments produced in our learning encounters,” not only suggest that desire 
and affect are “structurally operational in what gets learned, by whom, and how” 
(Todd, 2012, p. 5), but also attest to the importance of emotion, eros, and sexuality in 
pedagogical situations. As Britzman puts it, “eros, a design of sexuality, is the 
beginning of education as well as an announcement of our potential” (Britzman, 2010, 
p. 325). 
Supplementing Spivak’s Desire 
Recognizing that desire—in particular its uncoercive rearrangement—is central to 
Spivak’s project of aesthetic education and its pedagogy, and given the recent flurry of 
interest in exploring the relationship between desire and pedagogy,25 it is, perhaps, 
surprising to discover that Spivak makes little effort to theorize or problematize it. 
Rather, she tends to employ the concept of desire narrowly, and only in relation to the 
epistemological and epistemic. She writes, for example, that “the goal of teaching such 
a thing as literature is epistemological but also epistemic: transforming the way in 
which objects of knowledge are constructed; perhaps also shifting desires in the 
subject” (Spivak, 2012, p. 41). 
                                                          
25 For example, essays by Derek Briton, Shoshana Felman, Laurie Finke, Helen Harper, 
Kaarina Kailo, Gae Makwood, Rebecca A. Martusewicz, Erica McWilliam, Judith P. 
Robertson, and Sharon Todd—gathered and edited by Todd (2012)—provide a range of 
perspectives on what constitutes desire and its place in the process of teaching and learning. 
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In announcing that her aesthetic education is concerned not only with changing the 
ways in which we construct knowledge, but also with rearranging desires in the subject, 
Spivak seems intent on limiting the scope of her pedagogical work, including with 
literary texts, to the cognitive, thus avoiding any reference to the affective dimension 
and desire’s imbrication in it. If, on the one hand, Spivak, in her deployment of desire 
resists the work of Freud—arguably, “the most influential philosopher of desire in the 
twentieth century” (Bennet & Royle, 2016, p. 250)—on the other, she refuses to be 
steered by Foucault’s work on sexuality which explores the role that desire plays in 
shaping social and institutional discourses and practices across historical periods. In 
distancing herself from both psychoanalytical and historical treatments of desire, 
Spivak may be trying to avoid getting bogged-down in debates about whether or not 
desire is contingent on lack, while, at the same time, making it clear that her aesthetic 
education is concerned with desire’s structural role in the production of knowledge 
rather than with desire’s psychic or social origins. Nevertheless, in choosing to confine 
her discussion of desire to the epistemological and the epistemic, Spivak misses an 
opportunity to explore how, in the context of literary reading, what we know and what 
we imagine are inextricably entangled with affect. This entanglement is manifest in 
affect’s propensity to rearrange desires in relation to knowledge and its production. 
Of course, readers discover in literary texts why and how characters desire one another, 
and as a particular fictional narrative progresses are able to follow what happens to 
those desires. At the same time, literary texts also produce desires in their readers—for 
instance, the desire to keep reading, the desire for understanding, and the desire that the 
story will end happily at least for the characters we like. As Peter Brooks explains: 
We can, then, conceive of the reading of plot as a form of desire that carries us 
forward, onward, through the text. Narratives both tell of desire—typically 
present some story of desire—and arouse and make use of desire as dynamic of 
signification. (Brooks, 1992, p. 37) 
Given that among the desires that reading is capable of producing or stimulating are 
those which the reader may seek “to exclude from consciousness, to not admit to 
knowledge”—for example, desires associated with uncomfortable and unwanted 
thoughts or feelings—Spivak’s aesthetic education, like other pedagogical 
engagements, invariably, “has to deal not so much with lack of knowledge as with 
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resistances to knowledge” (Felman, 2012, pp. 25, 26). Thus, as Felman argues, the 
prime focus of the teacher must not be the handing on of pre-packaged knowledge, but 
the countering of what Lacan terms “the passion for ignorance” through “the creation of 
a new condition of knowledge—the creation of an original learning-disposition” 
(Felman, 2012, pp. 26, 27). Spivak’s aesthetic education is undoubtedly concerned with 
preparation for “epistemological revolution” through its persistent “work of displacing 
belief onto the terrain of the imagination” in an effort “to access the epistemic” (Spivak, 
2012, pp. 26, 10). It also assumes that certain expressions of desire are “at the crux of 
the perpetuation of social and psychic violence, as well as violence to the earth and to 
other sentient and nonsentient beings” (Martusewicz, 2012, p. 98). However, Spivak’s 
project does not stray beyond the epistemological and epistemic to explore “the 
multivalent ways desire can be understood as a productive, creative, and sometimes . . . 
violent aspect of our encounters” (Todd, 2012, p. 6), not only with other people, but 
with literary texts as well. Thus, Spivak’s aesthetic education itself resists the 
opportunity to explore the relationship between the affective dimension and resistance 
to knowledge, and, in doing so, effectively ignores the role of affect in the creation of a 
new condition of knowledge. Given the importance of the imagination in Spivak’s 
project, it is worth considering whether Spivak’s reluctance to engage with the affective 
creates resistance to the working of the imagination or contributes to its activation, 
especially in the act of reading. 
Spivak and Psychoanalytical Approaches to the Reading of Literary Texts 
Spivak, in her teaching of literary reading relies on what Felman, following Lacan, 
terms a strong “textual knowledge” (Felman, 2012, p. 27). This knowledge, which 
encompasses “the functioning of language, of symbolic structures, of the signifier, 
knowledge at once derived from—and directed towards—interpretation” (Felman, 
2012, p. 27), makes both psychoanalysis and teaching possible. As Felman argues, it is 
textual knowledge that enables dialogic teaching/learning, providing as it does “the 
analytical structure of insight” which brings analysands, students and teachers to the 
recognition that knowledge is neither substantial, nor the possession of an individual, 
but something that always “comes as a surprise” (Felman, 2012, p. 28) from the other 
through mutual dialogue. 
Knowledge, which Lacan theorizes as “knowledge which does not know itself,” is, thus, 
untotalizable, and can only be articulated by reference to the concept of the 
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unconscious—a mechanism premised on the notion that human discourse can “never be 
entirely in agreement with itself” (Felman, 2012, p. 24). This is the case because the 
human subject is not autonomous, does not have self-mastery, but always operates in 
relation to the other. By appealing to the mechanism of the unconscious, it becomes 
possible to speak of humans—and their fictional representation—in terms of interiority. 
Thus, we are able to speak of people in ‘real’ life and characters in books as having not 
only emotions, but also a ‘hidden’ psychic life that underlies or extends beyond the 
conscious mind, existing as “an island of separateness within rationality and common 
sense” (Bourassa, 2009, p. 7), and operating according to its own internal structures or 
laws. Spivak, who “cannot imagine a world without psychoanalysis, at least as an item 
on the roll of techniques for reading narrative as ethical instantiation” (Spivak, 1994, p. 
66), admits that the “site of unconsciousness” (Spivak, 2012, p. 352)—that which is 
repressed or hidden from sight in a particular discourse—may be successfully opened 
up by a literary reading. However, she stresses that “this is not a recommendation for 
the psychoanalytic investigation of literature or society” (Spivak, 2012, p. 352) because 
‘unconsciousness’—a textual or literary figure—must always be distinguished from the 
unconscious.  
Spivak’s attitude towards psychoanalysis is clearly ambivalent. If, on the one hand, she 
acknowledges that she has “always felt uneasy about the use of psychoanalysis in 
cultural critique”—because its provenance is specific to a particular culture—on the 
other, Spivak is sympathetic to feminist approaches that are “actively contestatory” 
(Spivak, 2012, pp. 219, 220) in their use of psychoanalysis to understand sexual 
difference and gendering. In acknowledging that “the desire of psychoanalysis is to tap 
the para- and pre-logic that produces the subject’s logic, and also the logic of the 
subject’s illogic,” Spivak affirms that psychoanalysis recognizes no originary unity 
underlying the drives of ego and sexuality, “but only a riddle, the grounding riddle or 
Grundrätsel of biology” (Spivak, 2012, p. 221). As Spivak sees it, psychoanalysis itself 
is founded on an aporia, one which Freud himself acknowledged in his “mature 
reflection upon the impossibility of an adequately justified psychoanalysis” (Spivak, 
2012, p. 235). Hence, Spivak’s interest in psychoanalysis lies not in any claim, either 
supported or disputed, that it be recognized as a ‘science,’ but in psychoanalysis’ 
usefulness “as a challenge to systematic moral philosophy” (Spivak, 2012, p. 221). In 
other words, it is as a cultural critic and literary theorist—not as a clinical 
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practitioner—that Spivak taps the potential of psychoanalysis to unpick received 
narratives and, in so doing, produce “malleable situational lessons” (Spivak, 2012, p. 
221) through encounters with a wide range of texts.  
In this regard, Spivak’s approach has been described as “reading psychoanalysis from 
the so-called margins” (Spivak, 1994, p. 41) in an effort to encourage social agency. 
For example, in her rereading of Ovidian, Freudian, and Lacanian accounts of the 
Narcissus-Echo myth, Spivak endeavours “to ‘give woman’ to Echo, to carve her out of 
traditional and deconstructive representation and (non)representation, however 
imperfectly” (Spivak, 2012, p. 218). As she does so, Spivak not only provides readers 
with the opportunity to participate in the potential undoing of Narcissus—“an icon of 
mortiferous self-knowledge”—but also shows that insofar as Echo becomes inserted or 
suspended inside the text of Narcissus, not as herself, but as one ‘ventriloquizing’ the 
other, she in some strange way models not only the work traditionally ascribed to 
women, but also the task of aesthetic education, which is “to borrow and anticipate the 
speech of the other” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 224, 218). 
Spivak, in explaining the role of psychoanalysis in relation to the reading of literary 
texts, speaks of “an ideology of ‘applying’ in critical practice a ‘theory’ developed 
under other auspices” (Spivak, 1982, p. 209). For Spivak, psychoanalysis, employed 
beyond the clinical context, not only becomes a tool to undermine “the implicit 
assumption that literature is an autonomous activity of the mind” (Spivak, 1982, p. 
208), but also a means to challenge widely-held beliefs about the foundations of literary 
pedagogy. This happens by naming “frontier concepts” (Spivak, 1982, p. 224) that push 
against the boundaries of formal criticism, while introducing a psychoanalytical 
vocabulary—along with its accompanying ideologically charged metaphors—into 
literary criticism. However, it is psychoanalysis’ ability to raise questions about overt 
meaning in a text, to illuminate the interplay of presence and absence, fulfilment and 
non-fulfilment in relation to the operation of desire within a text, and to engage the 
reader in “the sub-individual zone of sense-making” (Spivak, 1994, p. 65) that Spivak 
identifies as among its strongest contributions to literary pedagogy and her project of 
aesthetic education. Spivak clearly aligns herself here with Mishra Tarc, who argues 
that psychoanalysis, like literature, “offers an inventive vocabulary and allegorical 
structure with which to view the workings of the mind” (Mishra Tarc, 2015, p. 14).  
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Given the dialogic nature of psychoanalysis and its application, both in the clinical and 
pedagogical contexts, I suggest that it may be an avenue worth pursuing by those 
wishing to open sexuality education up to a pedagogy of hospitality or wanting to 
position it as a space in which it is possible to imagine collectivities to come through 
the practice of literary reading. But, as Spivak’s own ambivalences towards 
psychoanalysis suggest, such a journey must not be taken uncritically—even when it is 
motivated by calls for a re-envisioning of sexuality education in ways that take 
advantage of literary reading’s ability to rearrange desires. 
Bersani, Desire, and the Aesthetic Subject 
Walter Gershon, in attempting both to add to and, perhaps, complicate Spivak’s project 
of aesthetic education—and the role of literary reading within it—voices his concern 
that “a call for aesthetic education would focus so heavily on epistemological pathways 
to knowledge” (Gershon, 2015, p. 11) at the expense of the sensual, the affective, and 
the ontological. In arguing for an aesthetic education that moves outside the frame of 
the double bind and into the sensual, not losing the frame but noting its traces or 
“trajectories of affect,” Gershon seeks to limit aesthetic education’s dependence on “an 
epistemological set of understandings that oppresses ontological possibilities” 
(Gershon, 2015, pp. 14, 13). In the light of Gershon’s observations, Spivak’s project of 
aesthetic education—especially insofar as its pedagogy of hospitality seeks to expose 
readers to all that literary texts have to offer, including potentially destabilizing and 
“discomforting truths” (see Boler & Zembylas, 2003, pp. 110–136)—would do well to 
take account of the trajectories of affect that accompany epistemological movement or 
change, and which contribute to “the whole messy is-ness of being/knowing/doing/is” 
(Gershon, 2015, p. 15). This is because it is in the transactional space of the 
pedagogical exchange that desires are uncoercively rearranged while “manifold forms 
of attachment and disassociation” (Britzman, 2000a, p. 36), affective as well as 
epistemological, are re-enacted. It is in response to Gershon’s argument that I now turn 
to Bersani to supplement Spivak.  
Throughout his long career as a literary and social theorist, Leo Bersani has explored 
the workings of desire, “formulating a series of influential theses about sex,” while 
“methodically working through a philosophy of art” (Glavey, 2010, p. 317). If, on the 
one hand, Bersani insists on the potential of sex, particularly in its nonnormative 
modes, to set off an experience of jouissance that “shatters the self out of a dangerous 
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security about its own sexual identity” (Bersani, 1978, p. 9), on the other, he directs us 
to rethink sex in terms of the aesthetic.26 This rethinking, Bersani argues, makes it 
possible not only to associate sensual pleasure with “a new relational mode that might 
be the result of an aesthetic subjectification” (Bersani, 2010, p. 69), but also to position 
sex as a modality of the aesthetic. Thus, notwithstanding claims that many of his ideas 
about sex align with Edelman’s articulation of the negative or anti-social thesis in queer 
theory—for example, his notion that homo-sex is anti-identitarian and anti-
communitarian—Bersani, especially insofar as he connects sex with the aesthetic, is 
profoundly relational in his focus. However, because he is concerned with forms of 
sociability that are characterized by “epistemologically useless connections” (Bersani, 
2015, p. 81)—which are forged at the expense of self-coherence—Bersani’s interest in 
relationality is often overlooked. Yet, as Michael O’Rourke observes, shuttling as it 
does between questions of self-reflexivity and inter-relationality, Bersani’s work “has 
everywhere been committed, like Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s, to recreating the world 
and letting it be” (O’Rourke, 2012, p. 36, endnote 3). 
Bersani’s more recent preoccupation with the aesthetic subject—in particular, his 
theorization of similitude as a means of creating “a capacity for non-coercive forms of 
relationality” (Glavey, 2016, p. 25), along with his advocacy of “impersonal intimacy” 
(Bersani & Tuhkanen, 2014, pp. 294, 295) as a new way of relating—suggests fresh 
sensual, affective and ontological possibilities for Spivak’s project of aesthetic 
education. His theorizations, including his figuring of “a non-desiring relation to the 
world” (Jöttkandt, 2011, p. 237), support Spivak’s pedagogy of hospitality and her own 
efforts to open up possibilities for the imagining of collectivities to come. If, as Spivak 
says, “the supplement both supplies a lack and adds an excess” (Spivak, 2012, p. 349), 
then Bersani’s work productively supplements Spivak’s aesthetic education, exposing it 
to the incalculable in ways unforeseen by Spivak—including, I suggest, its deployment 
in the field of sexuality education. 
                                                          
26 It is important in this context to acknowledge that aesthetic experience—but, carefully 
distanced from the sexual and the erotic—has long been valued as a means of loosening one’s 
fixation on the self in order to pursue the ethical. Philosophers Arthur Schopenhauer and Iris 
Murdoch, for example, claim a role for the aesthetic in the development of cognitive empathy 
on the grounds that aesthetic encounters are able to educate us in “becoming more adept at 




Clearly, Bersani’s shift “from a psychoanalytic version of the subject whose desire 
testifies to a primordial lack to a version of the subject whose attempts at relationality 
stem from an original relatedness” (Goldberg, 2009, p. 7) serves as an important 
reference point when comparing Bersani’s theorization of the aesthetic subject and 
Spivak’s aesthetic education. However, it would be a mistake to neglect Bersani’s 
earlier work on character and desire in literature—including his exploration of the 
possibility of “deconstructing the self” through the reinstatement of a pre-Freudian 
“psychology of fragmentary and discontinuous desires” (Bersani, 1978, p. 6)—as this 
suggests a potentially fruitful pedagogical path towards the activation and mobilization 
of desire through literary reading, both in relation to Spivak’s project of aesthetic 
education and in the context of the re-envisioning of sexuality education.  
Given that my focus in this thesis is the potential of Spivak’s aesthetic education—
supplemented by Leo Bersani’s conceptualization of sex as a modality of the 
aesthetic—to queer and, thereby, productively contribute to a re-envisioning of 
sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand, it is important to explore Bersani’s 
theorization of desire and sex, including his positing of “sameness as the root of a 
sexuality that is not a matter of lack but of the fullness of material existence” 
(Goldberg, 2009, p. 6). It is with Bersani’s understanding of desire, therefore, that I 
start before turning to his work on the aesthetic subject and new relational modes of 
being, including the potential of his notion of impersonal intimacy to contribute to the 
work of “persistently attempting collectivities to come” (Spivak, 2012, p. 464) in the 
rethinking of sexuality education. 
As I have argued, Spivak’s aesthetic education asks that knowledge structures and 
claims be interrupted and postponed through the practice of teleiopoiesis—that 
mechanism of self-othering which enables a move toward the distant but unreachable 
other by way of the imagination. In this way, Spivak maintains, desires are 
uncoercively rearranged and the subject prepared for ethical performance. If, for 
Spivak, epistemological and epistemic change comes about through the activation of 
the imagination, then for Bersani—who is equally insistent that that epistemological 
appropriation be rejected in favour of an “ethically viable conceptualization of 
otherness” (Tuhkanen, 2014c, p. 147)—any exploration of desire, including its 
mobility, must begin with the physical body, and its intra-relational and inter-relational 
possibilities. Such exploration will take account of “spatial proximity and physical 
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connectedness” (ffrench, 2014, p. 137). Bersani’s notion of otherness—“articulated as 
relay stations in a process of self-extension” (Bersani, 1996, p. 7)—may be profitably 
thought of alongside Spivak’s teleiopoiesis. However, although both concepts imply a 
movement outward, a stretching of and beyond the self, a reaching towards not 
confined to, or by, the here and the now, Spivak privileges the imagination as an 
instrument of extension while Bersani emphasizes the extensibility and receptivity of 
the body. 
In contrast to Spivak, who asks us to ‘think’ sex and sexuality almost exclusively in 
structural terms—for example, she observes that “the first difference we perceive 
materially is sexual difference,” which then “becomes our tool for abstraction, in many 
forms and shapes” (Spivak, 2012, p. 31)—Bersani, sees sex as a prime site for the 
exploration of desire. As he draws our attention to the singularity and “heterogeneity of 
our desiring impulses,” Bersani proposes, as his epigraph to this chapter indicates, that 
“the desiring self might even disappear as we learn to multiply our discontinuous and 
partial desiring selves” (Bersani, 1978, p. 7). Here, Bersani acknowledges a debt to 
Deleuze and Guattari, reading their Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(1983)—originally published as L’Anti-Oedipe in 1972—as a philosophical pastoral of 
“pre-Oedipal desire,” on the grounds of its depiction of “an Arcadia of polymorphous 
perversity” (Bersani, 1978, p. 7). If Spivak challenges us to reach out to the distant and 
unreachable other by the power of the imagination, Bersani—most noticeably in his 
essays on AIDS and homo-sex—seems more interested in how we connect with the 
proximate other through sexual encounter.  
What links Spivak and Bersani most closely is their insistence that epistemological 
appropriation must be resisted and refused—this because of a shared conviction that 
violence results from thwarted efforts to master the other epistemologically. For 
Spivak, who recognizes that “violence is part of desire, pleasure, education,” the most 
effective way to address it is to maintain efforts to displace belief “onto the terrain of 
the imagination” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 125, 10), thereby, accessing the epistemic from an 
unexpected quarter. In other words, violence is best approached indirectly and by way 
of an aesthetic education. Bersani, in arguing that the success of our attempts to deal 
with violence may well depend “on our fundamental imagination of violence: how we 
define it, on whether or not we allow ourselves to be fixated by it, on how we see its 
relation to other kinds of experience” (Bersani & Dutoit, 1985, p. 125), proposes that 
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becoming-human calls for digression rather aggression. Neither Spivak nor Bersani 
believe that the problem of violence, including violence’s foundation in the desire to 
know and master the other, is able to be tackled head-on. As Snediker observes, for 
Bersani, it is more a matter of circumnavigating than of “‘solving’ aggression” 
(Snediker, 2017, p. 159). This circumnavigation requires more than an 
acknowledgement that desire is free-floating. Thus, in promoting digression as an 
antidote to violence, Bersani urges us to resist forms of education that cause us “to feel 
uneasy about our perceptual and affective mobility,” and to seek, instead, “a re-
education in the moves of a consciousness less constrained by the orders of narrativity” 
(Bersani & Dutoit, 1985, p. 125), less determined by epistemological consistency, and 
less amenable to an exaggerated ego. For Bersani, sexual encounter, in addition to 
mobilizing desire, provides opportunities for learning new counter-hegemonic ways of 
relating. This, he argues, is because it opens up spaces where coherence is stretched—
maybe to breaking point—and familiar or comforting narratives no longer hold.  
Sex, the Aesthetic, and New Relational Modes of Being 
Across the decades, what has remained consistent in Bersani’s approach to the 
theorisation of desire has been his willingness to critically engage with the various 
arts—literature, film, sculpture, and painting—in ways that “deconstruct immutable 
structures of representation and mobilize the play of forms and readings” (ffrench, 
2014, p. 128). Bersani’s argument that art has the ability to destabilise not only the 
structures that condition our habitual ways of perceiving and thinking about ‘reality,’ 
but also the “appropriative relation of the self to the world” (Bersani, 2006, p. 163)—a 
relation generally affirmed by psychoanalysis—aligns with his theorization of sex and 
the aesthetic “as experiences that shatter the self’s rigidly defended contours” (Lamm, 
2011, p. 250). However, whereas the self-shattering that happens in sex is the 
consequence of “an object-destroying jouissance” (Bersani, 2006, p. 164), encounters 
with works of art and literature serve to position us across time and space as aesthetic 
subjects in the world.  
For Bersani, one of the great merits of the aesthetic is that it reveals to us that “we 
correspond to the world in ways that don’t necessitate or imply the world’s 
suppression” (Bersani, 2006, p. 174). Insofar as “art diagrams universal relationality,” it 
also attests to the possibility of our “nonprojective presence in the world” (Bersani, 
2006, p. 164). And, although the human subject is always potentially prey to the 
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illusion that otherness can be suppressed through jouissance, the aesthetic insists on 
gesturing toward the pleasure of discovering that it is within otherness that we are 
“harboured” (Bersani, 2006, p. 174). Through the aesthetic it becomes possible for the 
human subject to learn “not exactly to satisfy desire but to see a desire everywhere” 
(Bersani, 2006, p. 166). Developing the capacity to locate desire outside the self—
without claiming desire for the self—is an important step towards feeling at home with 
otherness. It is in this way that we learn to lose the self, only to find it again 
“disseminated among the appearances of the visible world” (Bersani, 2010, p. 69). 
If, for Bersani, the aesthetic is an “ontological laboratory,” this is because aesthetic 
encounters open up spaces where it is possible to experiment with “many models of 
relationality” (Bersani & Dutoit, 1998, p. 63), including the reimagining of the subject 
as a self-spread-widely—across literary texts, for example. Bersani’s notion of the 
disseminated self invites comparison with Judith Butler’s notion of the “unbound” 
body—the body which “in its acting, its receptivity, in its speech, desire, and mobility” 
is always “outside itself, in the world of others, in a space and time it does not control” 
(Butler, 2010, p. 52). If, for Butler, the realization that one never fully possesses or 
completely controls one’s body is what makes “passionate encounter” (Butler, 2010, p. 
54) possible, then a similar insight shapes Bersani’s approach to desire. In his efforts to 
theorize desire in ways that resist assimilation or negation of the other, especially in the 
pursuit of knowledge, Bersani queers Freud’s insistence that desire, though 
“intrinsically free-floating” (Bersani, 2010, p. 159), must nevertheless be directed to 
attach itself to a suitable object. Bersani, however, finds it more productive to 
conceptualize desire as a “choreographic mobility” capable of shaping “an aesthetic 
and, more specifically, a choreographic construction” (Bersani, 2015, p. 6), than as 
movement that seeks attachment. Thus, in thinking what amounts to a “choreographic 
being-together,” Bersani imagines the possibility of an intimacy generated by 
“nonpurposive pleasures of touch” that are capable of resisting “subject-object dualism 
in notions of the relation between the self and the world” (Bersani, 2015, pp. 12, 4). 
Bersani’s reformulation of desire, made possible by desire’s untethering from the 
human subject, enables the thinking of a new type of sociability “uncontaminated by 
desire” (Bersani, 2010, p. 45). Like Foucault, Bersani first experiments with the 
psychoanalytic subject and the intensities of jouissance to test the limits and viability of 
“social relations no longer structured by fixed positions of dominance and submission, 
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of superiority and inferiority” (Bersani, 2010, p. 134). Later, however, in turning to the 
aesthetic, Bersani looks beyond jouissance in order to “institute a relationality 
grounded in correspondences, in our at-homeness in the world’s being” (Bersani, 2006, 
p. 171). 
By emphasizing Bersani’s espousal, especially in his more recent work, of “ever-
proliferating new relational modes and forms of being,” Michael O’Rourke underscores 
Bersani’s claim that “everyone relates to everyone else through formal 
correspondences” (O’Rourke, 2012, p. 36, endnote 3). Similarly, Tim Dean concludes 
that over the years Bersani has increasingly come to conceptualize relationality as 
“irreducibly aesthetic” (Dean, 2010, p. 387). In proposing that aesthetic rather than 
sexual subjectivity has become Bersani’s preferred mode of relating to the world 
beyond the self, Dean argues that Bersani’s concern with processes of self-extension 
rather than self-shattering reveals a prioritizing of “the ethics of ontological 
relatedness” (Dean, 2010, p. 391) over those approaches to ethics that emphasize 
epistemological relations. Thus, although it is often thought that Bersani is preoccupied 
with immobility and aporia, “his is, perhaps primarily, an ontology of becoming” 
(Tuhkanen, 2014a, p. 74). 
Like Spivak, Bersani throws out a challenge to those following the well-trodden path of 
thinkers, including Descartes, Freud and Proust, who “have accustomed us to thinking 
of our connection to otherness in terms of epistemological appropriation and 
possession” (Bersani, 2015, p. ix). In maintaining that art, including literature, “reveals 
continuities of being that discourage our desire to master otherness by means of 
knowledge” (Dean, 2010, p. 391), Bersani is clearly on the same wavelength as Spivak 
who, as we have seen, insists that an ethical response to the other postpones as well as 
interrupts the epistemological—“the undertaking to construct the other as object of 
knowledge” (Spivak, 2012, p. 316). Thus, Bersani’s call for “the decomposition and 
recomposition of intelligibility in aesthetic space” (Dean, 2010, p. 391) as a strategy to 
inhibit consumerist approaches to art in a culture where the aesthetic is largely regarded 
as redemptive, may be heard as a reiteration of Spivak’s demand that knowledge claims 
be interrupted and postponed through the practice of teleiopoiesis. Rather than bridging 
the gap between the self and the other, Bersani, like Spivak, draws attention to “the 
inadequacy of representation in the very need for an appeal to the imagination” 
(Sharpe, 2014, p. 516).  
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If, for Spivak, the necessity to call upon the imagination in the face of the insufficiency 
of representation is evidenced, for example, in the figure of catachresis—where an 
analogy is established but without foundation in either the literal or the historical—the 
practice of teleiopoiesis, which is facilitated by catachresis, does not necessarily imply 
an ontological rift or “an irreducible gap of being between the human subject and the 
world” (Bersani, 2015, p. xi). Rather, teleiopoiesis, like the imagination itself, 
addresses the instability of epistemological structures by taking productive advantage 
of their susceptibility to the incalculable and the unforeseeable. In fact, Spivak’s 
aesthetic education, insisting as it does on “an epistemological preparation into the 
possibility of a relationship without relation” (Spivak, 2012, p. 11) through the 
reflexive rearrangement of desires, acknowledges that there are connections that always 
resist appropriation and explanation by the-human-mind-demanding-to-know. Thus, as 
Morton observes, Spivak’s notion of relation without relation supports “an aporetic 
model of an ethical dialogue,” drawing attention as it does to “the impossible 
experience of an encounter between the self and the inaccessible presence of the other” 
(Morton, 2007, p. 134). What Spivak describes as “the abject relationship without 
relation to planetarity” (Spivak, 2012, p. 380) is but one instance of an ‘impossible’ 
connection.  
Spivak’s conceptualization of relationship without relation invites consideration of 
Bersani’s argument for connectedness amidst otherness. Like Spivak, Bersani appeals 
to the trope of hospitality to present his case. However, in contrast to Spivak—who 
following Levinas and Derrida presents hospitality as a welcoming of the other, an 
interruption of the self by the other—Bersani approaches things from a different angle, 
asking us to view the world not as a hostile place, but as a home or locus of hospitality 
where “individual bodies and the desires they seek to satisfy” (Bersani, 2015, p. 89) are 
already accommodated. However, such a change in perspective requires “a 
modification of our fundamental terms of thought” (Bersani, 2015, p. xii), including a 
loosening of our attachment to knowledge as the primary mode of relating to the world. 
As Bersani sees it, access to this “hospitable otherness” to which we already belong 
comes with the acknowledgement of “the oneness of being—of our intrinsic 
connectedness to the otherness at once external, and from a psychoanalytic perspective, 
internal to us” (Bersani, 2015, pp. xi, xii). Rejecting Cartesian dualisms that separate 
mind from non-mind and conscious from unconscious, Bersani argues for “the 
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assumption of a commonality of being among the human subject and both the human 
and the nonhuman world” (Bersani, 2015, p. 62). Thus, rather than prioritizing the 
ethical encounter with the other that is made possible by the interruption of self in 
hospitality, as Spivak does, Bersani stresses that the subject is never not in a relation of 
correspondence to, and with, the world. If Bersani sets out to deconstruct “the prestige 
of knowledge,” it is on the basis of “an aesthetic ethic of correspondences between the 
self and the world” (Bersani, 2015, p. 5) 
In seeking to counter a relationality that emphasizes difference with one that attends to 
tentative similitude, Bersani asks that we engage in the activity of “positing uncertain 
alikeness” (Bersani, 2015, p. 81). In other words, he invites us to view similitude, not as 
something concrete or fixed, but as a virtuality—an alikeness that is “just emerging—
unfinished, unrealized” (Bersani, 2015, p. 82). By acknowledging that correspondences 
come and go from consciousness before they are fully formed, it becomes possible to 
“try out different positions and extensions” (Bersani, 2015, p. 82) without concern for 
thought’s incongruities, inaccuracies, and faults—the characteristics of the divided 
subject.  
Bersani’s argument that the human subject is “continuously intersected by 
nontotalizable virtual connections” (Bersani, 2015, p. 82), becomes the basis for his 
“refusal to recognize the boundaries, self-sufficiency, and even the reality of the 
isolated ego” (Love, 2014, p. 40). It is also the key to understanding his advocacy of 
new forms of intimacy that involve a rethinking, displacement and dispersal of the 
human subject, including desire. New types of intimacy, which are effected by self-
extensibility rather than a paranoid intensity, are observed in “a kind of cartography of 
the subject, a tracing of spatial connectedness” (Dean, Foster, Silverman, & Bersani, 
1997, p. 8) which becomes possible through the aesthetic encounter. 
For Bersani, the value of the aesthetic, including the literary, lies not in any 
“consolation for what is lacking in life” (Love, 2014, p. 41) that it might provide—he 
rejects “the notion of art as salvaging somehow damaged experience” (Bersani, 1990, p. 
7)—but rather in art and literature’s ability to position us in the world as aesthetic rather 
than as psychoanalytically defined subjects. Particularly significant from the 
perspective of Spivak’s aesthetic education is Bersani’s theorization of the 
displacement, dispersal and spatialization of the human subject, including our desires. 
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Bersani’s work supplements and supports Spivak’s aesthetic education most clearly, not 
only in its elaboration of the “mobility and immobility of desire” (Dean et al., 1997, p. 
3), but also in its elaboration of the notion of impersonal intimacy, both as a new 
relational mode and a pedagogical concept applicable to the re-envisioning of sexuality 
education.  
Bersani and Sexuality Education 
Bersani, like Spivak, is an extensively published literary and cultural theorist who for 
many decades has taught in top-line North American Universities. While neither is a 
philosopher of education in the strictest sense, each has contributed ideas that enable 
education, including sexuality education, to “resist the coercive designs more or less 
hidden” (Bersani, 1986, p. 67) in projects such as neoliberalism. For Bersani and 
Spivak, reflections on pedagogy emerge primarily from their teaching of literary 
reading in humanities faculties which have in recent years become increasingly 
marginalized and trivialized within neo-liberal universities—universities which Bersani 
calls “factories of knowledge” (Bersani & Tuhkanen, 2014, p. 296) and Spivak 
describes as adjuncts to “international civil society” (Spivak, 2012, p. 1).  
While Bersani’s ideas on pedagogy and the place of literary reading within it are less 
developed than Spivak’s—and are often presented with rhetorical flourish—they 
certainly work in support of calls for sexuality education to embrace “a pedagogy of 
being-doing” as they challenge “entrenched and politically invested” (Allen, 2018b, p. 
141) views about the field. Just as Spivak promotes what she calls “imaginative 
activism” (Spivak, 2014, p. 80) in her pedagogical encounters—this in an effort to 
change epistemological performance by persistently resisting the urge to construct the 
other as an object of knowledge—Bersani, in his teaching and reading of literary texts, 
seeks to institute new ways of connecting that enable us to locate ourselves 
aesthetically in the world rather than as psychoanalytically determined subjects.  
Louisa Allen, in drawing attention to “the great pleasures in thinking with new 
materialism” (Allen, 2018b, p. 141) in sexuality education classrooms, alerts us to the 
need to discover pleasure in thinking otherwise, including, I suggest, through literary 
reading—and as we re-envision sexuality education. For, like new materialism, literary 
reading directs our attention to the queerness that is to be found in “unexpected and 
unfamiliar phenomena” (Allen, 2018b, p. 141)—and away from a preoccupation with 
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contraception and safer sex. Bersani’s collapsing of the ontological and the aesthetic—
he sees art and literature as concretizing the ontological—opens the way for the 
discovery of “new pleasures of the body,” not by rational reflection, but through literary 
reading and imaginative effort which make possible “otherwise inconceivable states of 
availability” (Bersani, 2015, p. 93). 
Unsurprisingly, given their long-time commitment to the teaching of literary reading 
and to literature in general—especially the European canon—both Bersani and Spivak 
regard pedagogical encounters with literary texts as ideal occasions, not only “to learn 
otherwise” (Spivak, 2012, p. 164) through the subversion of the familiar and the 
expected, but also as opportunities for self-abstraction or self-synecdoche. As Spivak 
says, it is by self-synecdochizing that a subject is able to establish a metonymic 
connection with a particular situation, and, in so doing, claim collectivity. If, for 
Spivak, the teaching and reading of literary texts—including, I suggest, in the context 
of sexuality education—become the means by which collectivities to come are 
attempted, for Bersani, teaching and literature offer “a rare opportunity to experiment 
with some of the shifts in modes of connecting” (Bersani, 2010, p. 200) that he is 
committed to, in particular the proliferation of impersonal intimacy within and through 
groups of people. While teaching allows for “a certain type of group-work” and 
experimentation in modes of connectedness that might gradually disseminate into 
society, literature, too, has an effect “on the way in which people instinctively and 
intuitively relate and connect” (Bersani, 2010, pp. 200, 201). In maintaining that 
teaching and literature “can train us, among other things, in a kind of impersonal 
intimacy, an intellectual and nonpermanent friendship” (Bersani, 2010, p. 201), Bersani 
positions pedagogy as a mode of extensibility, a mechanism which enables us not only 
to try out all sorts of positions in the world, but also to widen “our connective field” 
(Bersani, 2015, p. 82) beyond the human. This positioning—which preserves “the 
materiality of the subject and of the world” (Bersani, 2015, p. 89), but within the 
aesthetic mode that both eschews the representational and resists the stiffening of 
‘reality’—opens the door to “the possibility of thinking-doing sexuality education 
differently” (Allen, 2018b, p. 25). 
In elaborating on what may fairly be termed his pedagogy of impersonal intimacy—
including the place of literary reading in it—Bersani reveals that his own approach to 
teaching has much in common with key aspects of Spivak’s aesthetic education. In the 
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same way, for example, that Spivak insists on speaking of her project in terms of 
“training of the imagination”/“training the imagination” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 10, 118, 
122, 125, 134, 197, 345, 451, 465), or “training in literary reading” (Spivak, 2012, pp. 
281, 325, 328, 353), Bersani emphasises the need for “training in impersonal 
communities” (Bersani & Tuhkanen, 2014, p. 295). Thus, he describes his work in the 
classroom as a training in how to move differently in the world. Bersani is clearly less 
concerned with the educative process’s provision of systematic instruction in particular 
skills than with the role of pedagogy in promoting forms of ascesis, both of the self and 
of the community. By acknowledging his indebtedness to Foucault’s articulation of 
“the cultivation of the self” (Foucault, 1984/1990, pp. 37–68)—including the practice 
of parrhesia or frank-speech—Bersani attempts to advance the possibility of 
collaborative ways of relating through “methods, routines, practices and disciplines that 
a person undertakes more or less consciously in an attempt to alter his or her own 
subjectivity” (McWhorter, 2006, p. 224). This ascesis seeks not to deny “the material 
inscriptions in our body of a universe to which we belong,” but rather to make us more 
attentive to those correspondences with the nonhuman “that most profoundly situate us 
outside ourselves” (Bersani, 2015, p. 89). In the same way that Spivak insists on the 
training of the imagination as a condition of epistemological and epistemic change, 
Bersani, mindful of Foucault, calls for a training in what amounts to the extension and 
dispersal of the self. This training in “the psychic condition of possibility” (Bersani, 
2011, p. 107) is necessary if new relational modes capable of operating within the 
contradiction of sameness and difference are to emerge. 
In describing “pedagogy and friendship” as “modes of extensibility’ (Bersani, 2010, p. 
201), Bersani not only acknowledges the inevitable entanglement of the two, but also 
gives wings to the notion that the aesthetic enables us to imagine new forms of 
intimacy, pedagogical and companionable, which take us beyond ourselves as they 
attest to the possibility of queer collectivities to come. If, as Bersani observes, “our 
fictions express, elaborate and disguise our desires; they sublimate desire,” then any 
pedagogy that claims to serve the cause of impersonal intimacy and initiate new forms 
of sociality through literary reading will seek to uncover the ways in which “literature 
hallucinates the world in order to accommodate desire” (Bersani, 1978, pp. 271, 314). 
At the same time, it will also attend to the disruption of “those processes by which we 
make a continuous story of our desires” (Bersani, 1978, p. 315). Spivak’s advocacy of 
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self-abstraction and self-synecdoche is clearly illustrative of her project’s commitment 
to the uncoercive rearrangement of desires, including the projection of the self into 
collectivity primarily through linguistic figuration. In contrast, Bersani’s embrace of 
impersonal intimacy—of self-extension as a means of depersonalizing and socializing 
desire—is best understood in spatial terms. Hence, as Heather Love notes, in his 
literary and aesthetic analyses Bersani often “situates his critical objects in space, as 
concrete, sensuously realized entities that are in and of the social world, not set apart 
from it or ‘above’ it” (Love, 2014, p. 40). 
If, for Bersani—as for Spivak—the practice of impersonal intimacy allows for the 
creation of pedagogical spaces where teachers and students can engage the imagination 
to “learn to let go” (Spivak, 2003, p. 34), it also resists the privatization of experience 
by positioning sexuality as a social and aesthetic phenomenon. By conceptualizing 
sexuality as happening in “complex, dynamic spaces of interaction, inhabited by 
multiple individuals relating in time” (Love, 2014, p. 46)—rather than as something 
that operates at the psychological or individual level—Bersani challenges us to consider 
ways in which sex and the aesthetic are configured in relation to one another. A 
sexuality education that takes Bersani’s thought seriously and concerns itself with 
bodies-in-relation is one that will, therefore, also attend to the extensibility of bodies in 
space both as a social and as an aesthetic occurrence. 
While Spivak’s aesthetic education emphasizes working towards “the formation of 
collectivities without necessarily prefabricated contents” (Spivak, 2003, p. 26), Bersani 
proposes “that we be—differently—or a little more than the way in which we are” 
(Bersani & Tuhkanen, 2014, p. 296). In doing so, he shows that he is preoccupied with 
the ontological in ways that Spivak, whose efforts are more geared to the 
deconstruction of “the millennially established structures of feeling and desires” 
(Spivak, 2012, p. 131), isn’t. If one of the most significant questions that Spivak’s 
aesthetic education poses to sexuality educators is “what is it to learn, these lessons, 
otherwise?” (Spivak, 2012, p. 162), then, in assessing Bersani’s contribution to 
Spivak’s project it is important, as this chapter draws to a close, not only to consider 
how the application of Bersani’s onto-aesthetics supplements Spivak’s work by 
allowing us to learn from it otherwise, but also the ways in which Bersanian approaches 
might work to queer sexuality education. 
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Some Concluding Remarks 
As I have emphasized throughout this chapter, Bersani has remained committed over 
many decades to the exploration of desire and sexuality, especially within the various 
modalities of the aesthetic that are possibilized through the reading of literary texts and 
engagements with works of art. Among Bersani’s most significant contributions both to 
Spivak’s project of aesthetic education and to the queering of sexuality education, I 
suggest, is the complication and queering of the notion of desire that his theorization of 
desire and its mobility makes possible. As Ann Wordsworth observes, Bersani’s work 
is a recognition of “improvisatory and unbound desire; a possibility that reader and 
writer also might evade the classifications of orthodox, psychological and moral 
structures” (Wordsworth, 1980, p. 91). Not only does Bersani suggest new ways in 
which Spivak’s notion of the uncoercive rearrangement of desire might be ‘thought,’ he 
also opens up possibilities for aestheticizing the ontological, especially when sex is 
understood as a modality of the aesthetic and sexuality education is imagined as a 
laboratory for its aestheticization. 
If the prospect of aligning Spivak’s project of aesthetic education with sex and 
sexuality sounds a dangerous enterprise, it is, perhaps, because the sort of 
supplementation that Bersani’s work on desire provides, inevitably, introduces excess 
into Spivak’s project, thereby opening the door to the incalculable. As we have seen, 
this is the case because the body, the vector of sexual desire, does not ultimately own or 
control itself—it is unbound. To entertain such a prospect in the context of sexuality 
education is both exciting and scary—because sex is aporetic, propelling our desire to 
know while at the same time limiting our ability to take control of how and what we 
know. As Jen Gilbert reminds us, “sexuality drives understanding but is never 
commensurate with our understanding of it” (Gilbert, 2014, p. xv). 
Drawing on Bersani’s ideas and those of other theorists, the next chapter turns to the 
memoir of choreographer/dancer Douglas Wright in order to build an argument for the 




Sex in the Modality of the Aesthetic—A Choreographic Approach to 
Sexuality Education 
The aesthetic is not confined to works of art; sex can also be one of the modalities of 
the aesthetic. (Bersani, 2010, p. 70) 
[Leo Bersani to Nicholas Royle] So choreography seems to be me [sic] absolutely 
central in trying to reimagine new relational modes. Although how you get from that to 
more ordinary life situations is something to work on. (Royle, 2016, p. 272) 
Overview 
As I continue my exploration of the potential of Spivak’s aesthetic education—
supplemented by Bersani’s notions of interpersonal intimacy and of an aesthetic ethic 
of relations between the self and the world—to generate pedagogical approaches that 
keep not only meaning but also desire on the move, I pursue Bersani’s claim, stated at 
the head of this chapter, that sex can be a modality of the aesthetic. This is in line with 
my already well-rehearsed argument that Spivak’s project of aesthetic education is able 
to queer and, thereby, productively contribute to a re-envisioning of sexuality education 
in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
In this chapter, through a reading of three sex scenes from Douglas Wright’s memoir 
ghost dance (2004), I seek to demonstrate how a literary work in its treatment of sex as 
a modality of the aesthetic is able to position its readers as aesthetic rather than 
psychoanalytically defined subjects in the world, in this instance, by drawing upon “the 
idea of choreographing a self” (Royle, 2016, p. 271)—a notion first introduced by 
Bersani in an interview with Nicholas Royle as a way of countering and reformulating 
the concept of personality in aesthetic terms, but further developed in his collection of 
essays Receptive Bodies (2018). As Bersani explains: 
Our uniqueness, our individuality is the form of how we move and over time 
how we have moved ourselves and how others have moved us through space. A 
personality is a specific ‘aesthetic of handling’. (Royle, 2016, p. 272) 
In support of Bersani’s position, and to illuminate Wright’s treatment of sex as a 
choreographed—and, therefore, an aesthetic—practice, I make reference to the inter-
related concepts of chora and choreia, especially as they have been theorized by Julia 
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Kristeva in “the conscious attempt to bridge the gap between thought and the moving, 
dancing body” (Chiaroni, 2017, p. 30). In doing so, I take on board the argument that 
“while allied to dance, choreography is not dance per se” (Manning, 2013, p. 75). 
Rather, as Erin Manning suggests, the choreographic may be understood more broadly 
as a technique which, in Guattarian terms, enables a heteropoeisis, that is, “a self-
generating practice of difference” (Manning, 2013, p. 76). This I do in order to make a 
case for the exploration and activation of choreographic thinking in the context of 
sexuality education. 
If, as Bersani says, choreography is “absolutely central in trying to reimagine new 
relational modes,” then my attempt in this chapter to rethink sex and sexuality in 
choreographic terms may be seen as a response to Bersani’s invitation—issued in his 
interview with Nicholas Royle and stated in the second of the epigraphs at the head of 
this chapter—to apply a choreographic imagination to “more ordinary life situations” 
(Royle, 2016, p. 272). Thus, with the help of Wright’s ghost dance, I prepare the way 
for a sexuality education where desires can be mobilized and rearranged through the 
sort of choreographic thinking made possible by literary reading. 
Why the Choreographic? 
In choosing to focus on Wright’s descriptions of sexual acts, I do so not only because 
they clearly emphasize the choreographed and choreographic aspects of sexuality—the 
ways in which bodies “move toward, away, into, around each other” (Royle, 2016, p. 
272)—but also because, as Bersani argues, choreography provides a non-verbal 
pathway to the reimagining of new relational modes, new possibilities of 
connectedness, new forms of intimacy. Such reimagining is the task of a queerer, more 
utopically driven sexuality education.  
Given that Wright’s own work as a choreographer is “characterized by the unstable 
tension between exorbitant movement and disruption, between force and 
fragmentation,” I acknowledge that in his writing as well as in the dance that he has 
choreographed, the very desire which Wright presents as fuelling creativity also 
“disrupts the assumptions that prop up our identity and our constructions of the world” 
(Wilcox, 2009, p. 27). As ghost dance shows, Wright’s is no easy journey to new 
relationality—pilgrims on this difficult road are warned that they “cannot take any short 
cuts or skip any difficult sections of the route” (Wright, 2004, p. 7). 
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In recognizing that “the phenomenological intertwining of presence and body that 
dance brings about as it moves” can produce the “generative space of thought” 
(Lepecki, 2004, p. 2), I also accept that other modalities of the aesthetic—for example, 
music, which especially in its fugal form works to bring about “the polyphonic 
complication of the ‘subject’” (Tuhkanen, 2018, p. 27)—are likewise capable of 
evoking an ungraspable, unstoppable otherness that prompts us to rethink 
connectedness and relationality. As Kristeva observes, fugal compositions such as 
Bach’s, suggest “an acknowledged and harrowing otherness” that has been inscribed 
“in an original play being developed, without goal, without boundary, without end” 
(Kristeva, 1991, p. 3). Like dance, these contrapuntal pieces seemingly refuse to ground 
themselves on fundamentals and are always on the move. Yet choreography, because it 
concerns itself with what is inescapably embodied, presents itself as an obvious starting 
point for the conceptualization and exploration of sex as a modality of the aesthetic. 
Sexuality education may become the ‘laboratory’ where this experimentation can 
happen. 
Efforts to develop an aesthetic subjectivity that “eschews psychologically motivated 
communication and replaces such communication with families of form” (Bersani, 
2006, p. 168)—of which the choreographic is but one example—deserve greater 
attention in the face of demands to “re-envision sexuality education in ways that 
reconfigure and exceed its current boundaries” (Allen, L., 2011, p. 1). Emphasizing, as 
they do, the importance of providing students “with possibilities for understanding 
themselves as sexual subjects” (Allen, L., 2011, p. 14), calls for the re-envisioning of 
sexuality education seek to do more than advance effectiveness in addressing such 
‘problems’ as STIs/STDs, unintended pregnancies, sexual coercion and violence, and 
the proliferation of digital pornography. It is in the context, then, of ‘seeking to do 
more’ with sexuality education that I put the case for conceptualizing sex as a modality 
of the aesthetic. In proposing that sex be thought and positioned within a modality that 
allows for the accounting of “all possible modulations of connectedness” (Royle, 2016, 
p. 272) as choreographic, I hope to actualize the rearrangement of desires that Spivak’s 
aesthetic education promotes. For, as the sexual is conceptualized in terms of the 
aesthetic, not only is the imagination trained in epistemological performance, but 
possibilities for new ways of being sexual and ethical subjects also emerge—subjects, 
for example, who in relating to others and the Other register an ‘aesthetic of handling.’ 
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This aesthetic, first established in the mother-infant relationship, precedes and only 
subsequently gives way to an aesthetic of language and thought. As Christopher Bollas, 
who first conceptualized the notion, explains: 
. . . the aesthetic of handling yields to the aesthetic of language, and it is at this 
point that the experience of being yields and is integrated with the experience of 
thinking. (Bollas, 1978, p. 388) 
The re-envisioning of sexuality education that becomes possible when sex is thought in 
relation to the aesthetic—including ‘the idea of choreographing a self’ and the notion of 
an ‘aesthetic of handling’—is in tune with other approaches to re-imagining the field, 
including efforts to map “flows of movement involving humans and things in the 
sexuality education classroom,” not in order to ask what movement means or 
demonstrates about sexualities, but to attend to “the becoming of sexuality education as 
event” (Allen, 2018a, p. 347). Spivak prefers to describe such a becoming as the 
inauguration of an “event-to-come”—an event that “escapes performative conventions” 
(Spivak, 2012, pp. 177, 209) and which is realized only beyond the frame of the here 
and now. The thinking of sex and sexuality within and through the mode of the 
aesthetic also aligns well with the workings of concept-as-method, an approach to 
research premised on the proposition that “concepts—acts of thought—are practices 
that reorient thinking, undo the theory/practice binary, and open inquiry to new 
possibilities” (Lenz Taguchi & St. Pierre, 2017, p. 643). However, while Lenz Taguchi 
and St. Pierre apply concept-as-method to social science and educational inquiry that 
typically makes use of quantitative, qualitative and mixed methodologies, my intention 
here is to employ it in the context of literary reading, not only to rethink sex as a 
modality of the aesthetic—in particular, the choreographic—but to open up possibilities 
for such an approach in the reimagining of sexuality education as a utopic site of 
learning where queerness is positioned as horizon. 
In doing so, I also seek to convince that queerer understandings of and approaches to 
sex and sexuality become available when sexuality educators and researchers are 
attentive to the potential contribution of the humanities—art, literature, drama and 
dance, especially—to a learning area that has been thought and taught in New Zealand 
state schools, for the most part, under the umbrella of Health and Physical Education, 
or, in the case of some state-integrated schools, Religious Education. While arguing 
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that the concept of sex as aesthetic, when deployed persistently and interminably, 
becomes a method that allows sexuality educators to rethink sexuality education, I hold 
to the hope that queerness—if it is invited into the classroom as Gilbert suggests—
might become a means of learning to “tolerate our own sense of strangeness” and 
“endure the humiliations of surprise” (Gilbert, 2014, p. 93) that are always part and 
parcel of the work of sexuality education. 
Chora and Choreia 
Since Socrates first suggested the existence of a hypothetical and indeterminate place 
beyond the city’s walls to which those who did not deserve the shelter of Athens’ 
citadel were to be sent and received, the notion of chora, which in the Timaeus (Plato, 
ca. 360 B.C.E./1997c) is imagined as “all-receiving, as the receptacle of all generation, 
the in which and from which of all generation” (Sallis, 1999, p. 113)—because it 
protects and nurtures as well as receives—has figured significantly in the Western 
philosophical and literary tradition, especially as a means of explaining how things 
come into being in the world. The idea of chora has continued to exert a strong 
influence into our own time, notably through the work of theorists such as Derrida and 
Kristeva, especially insofar as it “transforms our senses of beginning, creation, and 
invention” (Rickert, 2007, p. 252) in regard to material, virtual, affective and rhetorical 
spaces.  
On the one hand, Derrida, in resisting the many interpretations that have over the 
centuries attempted to pin a specific meaning or attribute a particular form to what he 
terms khōra—that which “can ‘offer itself’ or promise itself only by removing itself 
from any determination” (Derrida, 1995, p. 94)—associates khōra with irreducible 
difference that can never be given a definitive value. Derrida, while remaining silent on 
any link between khōra and dance—choreia—nonetheless, references choreography in 
his work, especially as a way of figuring the instability of gender and sexual identity. In 
appealing to the choreographic trope in order to articulate and perform the 
“indeterminable” multiplicities and mobilities of sex and sexuality—he speaks of a 
choreography that “can carry, divide, multiply the body of each ‘individual,’ whether 
he be classified as ‘man’ or as ‘woman’ according to the criteria of usage”—Derrida 
expresses the “desire for a sexuality without number,” a possibility prepared for by the 
invention of “incalculable choreographies” (Derrida & McDonald, 1995, p. 154). 
Derrida’s call for “a choreographic text with polysexual signatures” (Derrida & 
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McDonald, 1995, p. 154) is answered, as we will see, in Wright’s efforts to position sex 
as a mode of the aesthetic, not only in the dances he choreographs, but also through the 
narration of his own sexual history in choreographic terms. This choreographic telling 
emphasizes in its unfolding the multiplicities and mobilities of sex, but always 
juxtaposed or entangled with the “darting, swerving and leaping” (Wright, 2004, p. 
198) movements of contemporary dance.  
Kristeva, on the other hand, explains chora in psychoanalytical terms, both as the pre-
verbal space or phase characterized by the inchoate instinctual drives and their stases 
theorized by Freud, and as the extra-linguistic functioning that is the necessary other of 
all signification and language. For Kristeva, because chora is identified with the 
semiotic—the release into language of instinctual drives and energies which interrupt 
language’s symbolic function, its ability to refer—chora is understood not only to 
precede figuration, but also to underlie and unsettle it. Insofar as chora is associated 
with that which cannot be signified or made intelligible, it remains mysterious in much 
the same way that sex does. As a site of generation, chora is linked to the maternal 
body but also to the origins of dance—that is, to the “choreia of choreography,” both in 
respect to rhythmic physical movement and “the dance of thought” (Chiaroni, 2017, p. 
29). Having identified poetry and dance along with other art forms “as practices 
erupting on the border of chora and society” (Hall, 2012, p. 49), Kristeva then 
conceptualizes them as representing “the flow of jouissance into language” (Kristeva, 
1984, p. 79). Thus, in her alignment of dance—choreia—with chora, Kristeva provides 
an invaluable key to the appreciation of Douglas Wright’s choreography, which both 
invites and challenges us to recognize in the dance, “not only systematic, formalized 
movements in a completed piece” (Hall, 2012, p. 51), but also a kinaesthetic process 
arising out of the instincts and drives of the body, and finding expression and order in 
the articulation of steps, rhythms, gestures etc. in space and time. For Kristeva, dance 
requires and reveals the intersection of the semiotic and the symbolic, neither fully 
including nor excluding one or the other. Happening as it does “between bodies in time 
and space” (Klien, Valk, & Gormly, 2008, p. 7), dance can never be immobilized and 
its meaning is always impossible to capture for definitive analysis. As Wright himself 
says: “Dance is famously ephemeral; if unperformed the works survive as an echo, on 
video, in memory, or in name only” (Wright, 2004, pp. 241–242). 
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For both Kristeva and Wright, choreography becomes possible when the body is 
experienced and understood as chora, a space which allows for and nurtures the 
generation of movement. In explaining his own beginnings as dancer and 
choreographer, Wright presents his body as chora, a womb or site of incubation for 
both the dancer and the dance: 
From the earliest time I can remember I was always dancing. I still don’t know 
what possessed me; perhaps the fluttering white moth laid its eggs in me and my 
dancing was a kind of hatching. (Wright, 2004, p. 158) 
There was already a dance waiting like a fist inside me. (Wright, 2004, p. 203) 
In so doing, Wright echoes the ancient understanding of chora as “the Receptacle, the 
matrix or mother of all becoming” (Rickert, 2007, p. 255), a notion which Kristeva 
places in dialectical relation to that of the rational, which she identifies with the 
masculine, that is, to laws, norms and structures. Wright, in claiming the maternity and 
semiotics of chora, positions himself in tangential relation to those codes of language 
and behaviour linked to the symbolic and the masculine—codes which Kristeva 
describes as “embodiments of the Idea” and “nothing more than the thought of 
archivists, archaeologists, and necrophiliacs” (Kristeva, 1984, p. 13). It is these non-
generative codes, personified by Wright’s rugby playing Dad, which ensured that “in 
Tuakau, South Auckland, in the early 1960s a dancing boy was frowned on with a 
frown handed down for generations” (Wright, 2004, p. 158).  
For Wright, as for Kristeva, the understanding of the body as chora—a space out of 
which movement is produced—allows not only for the emergence of dance as a 
physical form, but also for choreographic ways of thinking. In other words, dance and 
choreography emerge at those points in space and time where an aesthetic of handling 
intersects with an aesthetic of language. Kristeva, in reviewing her own contributions to 
contemporary thought speaks of the articulation and development of such iconic 
notions as “intertextuality, strangeness, the significance of language, the subject-in-
process, abjection and reliance” in terms of dance and the choreographic—that is, as 
“nimble movement of incorporated thought” (Kristeva, 2013, p. 1). It is, Kristeva 
argues, by acknowledging “our possibility—or not—of creating new languages: new 
literature, new painting, new dances” (Kristeva, 2013, p. 2), as well as by drawing upon 
the insights provided by the human sciences, that we might begin to address what she 
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perceives as the crisis of our multiple, and often seemingly competing, ethnic, familial, 
national, religious and sexual identities. It is in dance and choreographic thought that 
Kristeva recognizes the possibility of what Dante termed the transhumanar—going 
beyond or exceeding the human: 
I hope it will be dance that speaks one of the new languages of the human 
comedy. Dance as a radical gesture of this transhumanar which humanity needs 
. . . . (Kristeva, 2013, p. 2) 
For Kristeva, dance’s ability to make a unique contribution to the transhumanization 
process springs from its genesis at the intersection of body and meaning, the moment 
where the semiotic disrupts the symbolic, a point of both jouissance and negation. Yet, 
as a trans-linguistic experience, dance also informs and accompanies thought by 
providing a way of understanding and practising “concepts, disciplines and genres” 
(Kristeva, 2013, p. 1). In a similar vein, Spivak, in commenting on a passage from the 
Nātya Sāstra, a second or third century Sanskrit Hindu text on the performing arts that 
deals with “how to transform the body into a space of writing and turning,” observes 
that “the yoking of dance to the body is in order proficiently to lead toward what is 
signified by the body as a collection of akṣara or letters” (Spivak, 2012, p. 84)—that is, 
language. In noting the crossing over of movement into thought that takes place in 
dance, Spivak registers both jouissance and its negation, the inevitable violence that 
occurs whenever the symbolic is interrupted by the semiotic. In other words, dance 
exceeds any possibility that the choreographic might simply represent or mean 
something. 
If, for Kristeva, dance “might be the ‘language’ that we look to as we search for 
illumination of some of the more perplexing chapters in our ‘human comedy’” 
(Chiaroni, 2017, p. 30), for Bersani, choreography is “absolutely central in trying to 
reimagine new relational modes” (Royle, 2016, p. 272). In the light of the theorizations 
of Kristeva and Bersani, Wright’s memoirs exemplify a conscious effort by a 
dancer/choreographer—who due to illness gradually loses command of his body—to 
leap with the written word into “the gap between thought and the moving, dancing 
body” (Chiaroni, 2017, p. 30). In his attempt to negotiate this gulf, Wright 
choreographs his own passage around and through the sorts of unavoidable and 
impossible aporia and double binds which Spivak’s aesthetic education reveals and 
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addresses through teleiopoiesis—movement toward the distant and unreachable other 
via the imagination. Insofar as Bersani, Wright and Spivak, in their different ways, seek 
extensibility, they enact what may be called “pedagogies of crossing” (Alexander, 
2005). This is because in their extending out/moving toward they inevitably “cross the 
fictive boundaries of exclusion and marginalization” (Alexander, 2005, p. 7)—and 
queer them. 
If dance—whether it involves the moving body, or the pen in the nimble movement of 
incorporated thought—appears to provide a way of laying “the ghost of the undecidable 
in every decision” (Spivak, 2012, p. 104), it is also an event that discloses itself only in 
its performance. Given that it is impossible to remain in a double bind—a decision to 
move, to go this way or that is always called for—dance and the choreographic provide 
both a way of figuring the experience of the impossible which, as Spivak tells us, “is 
the condition of possibility of deciding” (Spivak, 2012, p. 109), and a means of easing 
the burden of responsibility that comes with confronting aporia.  
For Wright, dance is radically comic. This is because it is a performance in the face of 
the absurdity of the human condition—the interminable shuttling between impossible 
positions that we recognize not only in Spivak’s uncovering of aporia, but also in the 
“oscillation between the semiotic and symbolic, between rejection and identification” 
(Oliver, 1993, p. 11) that so much of Kristeva’s writing explores. Bersani, insofar as he 
narrativizes “the paradoxical relations of form and content” in the various aesthetic 
works which he explores in his essays, does so “in a surprisingly comic mode” that 
“gives way to a therapeutic vision of non-destructive relationality” (Kurnick, 2014, p. 
65). Comedy, for Bersani, is located in the realization that “a new possibility of 
connectedness comes out in the very expression of the impossibility of connectedness” 
(Bersani & Tuhkanen, 2014, p. 283). It is in the context of the possibility/impossibility 
of new relational modes that Bersani gestures in the direction of the transhumanar 
through a re-envisaging of sex, conceptualized and managed as choreography—“bodies 
examining ways to sort of move toward, away, into, around each other” (Royle, 2016, 
p. 272). In this process, while sexuality is most obviously evoked “by the intriguing 
ways in which the bodies intertwine” (Royle, 2016, p. 272), it is, at the same time, also 
implied in their rejection and parting. 
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It is with these thoughts in mind that I now turn my attention to Douglas Wright’s ghost 
dance, firstly, to situate this book of memoirs in the context of the global AIDS 
pandemic, an overwhelming and traumatic event that forced gay men to confront the 
unavoidable relationship between sex and death, before undertaking a close reading of 
three scenes therein. My intention is to show how a dancer/writer, by treating sex 
choreographically, is able to position it as a modality of the aesthetic. 
ghost dance—A Testimony 
As Ann Cvetkovich observes, “within queer culture, memoir has been a particularly 
rich genre for documenting the AIDS crisis, providing gay men with a forum to 
articulate what it means to live in the presence of death and record their lives before it 
is too late” (Cvetkovich, 2003, p. 210). If Gary Fisher, Derek Jarman, Paul Monette, 
and David Wojnarowicz are some of the internationally recognized gay men who dealt 
with issues of preservation and loss by writing memoirs that testified to “the experience 
of living and dying with AIDS” (Cvetkovich, 2003, p. 211), Douglas Wright is, 
arguably, the highest profile gay New Zealander with HIV to have done so. However, 
unlike the vast majority of his fellow gay memoirists who died in the first decades of 
the global AIDS pandemic, Wright, largely thanks to antiretroviral drugs, remained 
creatively active until his death late in 2018.  
Wright’s two books of memoirs, ghost dance (2004) and Terra Incognito (2005) serve 
as testimony to “this post-modern plague” in which “people died in almost festive 
droves, some of them my friends and lovers” (Wright, 2004, p. 15). Composed as they 
are of “bits and pieces of a memory that has been overwhelmed by occurrences that 
have not settled into understanding or remembrance, acts that cannot be constructed as 
knowledge nor assimilated into full cognition, events in excess of our frames of 
reference” (Felman, 1992, p. 5), memoirs such as Wright’s bear witness not only to the 
devastation wrought by AIDS, to human survivability and persistence, but also to the 
irrepressibility and unpredictability of desire, sexuality and creativity. If, as Cvetkovich 
argues, “Freud’s ideas about trauma and sexuality are spectacularly juxtaposed with 
gay male cruising and anal sex” (Cvetkovich, 2003, p. 61) in Bersani’s work, then 
Wright’s memoirs reveal that there are very many ways in which the complex linkage 
between sex and the traumatic is enacted and conceptualized in sexual interactions 
among men. Richard Canning, in noting that “a discontent at the relationship between 
center and margin . . . has been pivotal to Wright’s choreography” (Canning, 2009, p. 
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334), draws attention to a question voiced by Wright in response to the AIDS-related 
death of an ex-boyfriend: “When does a side-effect become central?” (Wright, 2004, p. 
17). In ghost dance, Wright subverts dominant narratives about AIDS and male-with-
male sex by placing at the centre of his narrative that which usually occurs on the 
margins. By doing so—at least for the duration of Wright’s memoir—what is 
considered normal is pushed into the shadows, while the queer, the digressive and the 
perverse aspects of sex and sexuality are brought to the foreground and given room to 
move. To the extent that Wright in his memoir attends to the queer, he also 
theatricalizes and aestheticizes it—this by allowing queer to perform in social spaces 
where we see it working alongside and athwart his own efforts to choreograph a self. 
The three scenes of sexual activity from ghost dance which I have chosen to examine, 
each in its own way provides an opportunity for Wright to self-aestheticize. The scenes 
are presented by Wright in reverse chronological order, thus giving emphasis to the 
author’s assertion that “ghost dance is not a conventional autobiography with a linear 
progression through one life, but a faithful record of the journeys I felt compelled to 
make into my own past” (Wright, 2004, p. 11). The sex scenes, which also involve 
varying degrees of actual or threatened trauma, attest to Wright’s ability not only to 
choreograph the events of his own unfolding life, but also to his commitment to “the 
idea of choreographing a self” (Royle, 2016, p. 271)—the latter evidenced in Wright’s 
retrospective selection and re-organization of these events through his narration. 
In the first of the sex scenes, Wright tells of experiencing an uncontainable level of 
sexual arousal which brings him to a “state of extreme ecstasy” (Wright, 2004, p. 62), 
spiritual as well as sexual. The situation Wright describes occurs not long after his 
positive HIV diagnosis late in 1989 or early in 1990 and during a Buddhist meditation 
course near Christchurch. Wright’s second account is of a night spent at a gay 
bathhouse in New York City in 1984, a time when “the distant rumblings of a 
mysterious gay illness were mere background noise easily drowned out by the thunder 
of acclamation” (Wright, 2004, p. 90). For Wright, it is the sight of “skeletal bodies laid 
out on the pallets” (Wright, 2004, p. 93) in the cubicles at the bathhouse that brings him 
face to face with the reality of what at the time was being referred to as a ‘gay cancer’. 
The third passage concerns itself with twelve-year old Douglas’ initiation into the 
world of sex with adult males in and around the men’s toilets at Auckland’s Ponsonby 
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Road bus station. As the adult Douglas explains, “up until then sex was a mystery but 
now I knew what some people did; a veil lifted” (Wright, 2004, p. 161). 
Sex Scene One—Meditating with Mr Goenka 
This first scene of sexual activity that Wright presents us with takes place within a 
formal pedagogical context—a meditation class guided “by the pre-recorded voice of 
the founder of the Vipassana Foundation, a Mr Goenka” (Wright, 2004, p. 55), who 
instructs, warns, exhorts and explicates in an effort to pass on the Dharma received by 
the Buddha. Wright is clearly impressed by Mr Goenka, who speaks with authority as 
he explains the Buddha’s insights into the link between human suffering and desire. 
While the ancient meditation technique in which class members are instructed is 
offered as “gift” (Wright, 2004, p. 55), its systematic acquisition proves to be a 
laborious task, as Wright and his fellow meditators struggle to spatialize their bodily 
desires and sensations onto an imaginary but expansive landscape: 
. . . inch by screaming inch we, or rather our minds, crawled like pilgrims over 
the vast topography of a country whose tempestuous history was locked deep 
within. (Wright, 2004, p. 56) 
Sensations experienced are not to be judged, but, rather, visualized and 
perspectivized—observed as if figures in the distance by the meditators who then shift 
their focus and mentally move on. As the meditation course progresses Wright comes 
to believe that he is getting better at dealing with his mind’s tendency to stray: 
Now I had a map, the painstaking journey over my body was becoming more 
familiar and increasingly I was able to observe the sensations I encountered 
without either craving them if they were pleasant, or trying to push them away if 
they were not. (Wright, 2004, p. 60) 
It seems that Wright is developing an ability to see himself, not so much as a fixed 
subject—“a private core at the centre of an expanding universe”—but as a rendering of 
“complex, dynamic spaces of interaction” (Love, 2014, p. 46). While focusing 
meditatively on his chest, for example, he is able to explore the sensations which he 
experiences in that cavity of his body, going over “the area again with my fine-toothed 
mind combing it very slowly and carefully” until he visualizes himself—with “an 
indescribable relief”—excreting out of the chest-orifice “what felt like bucketfuls of 
thick, black tar that I knew was the essence of grief” (Wright, 2004, p. 61). If, at times, 
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Wright struggles “to remain impartial,” as Mr Goenka instructs, he does his best to play 
“the role of witness” (Wright, 2004, p. 61) to the sensations that move in, on, and 
through his body. In Bersanian terms, Wright is learning that “modes of relationality in 
human life are ‘deduced from’ our perceptions of spatial relations” (Bersani & Dutoit, 
1998, p. 63). More precisely, “they are imitations of our body’s experience of space” 
(Bersani & Dutoit, 1998, p. 63). As he employs the figurations made available through 
language to suggest or evoke affects that cannot be pinned down by words—that is, to 
signify what ultimately escapes signification—Wright remains alert not only to what 
affect theorists describe as “an intensity that rigorously exceeds language” (Massumi, 
2015, p. 73), but also to the impossibility of ever separating affect and language. It is 
not a matter of positioning affect in opposition to language, for, as Massumi says, “it is 
just as obvious that there is an affective dimension to language” (Massumi, 2015, p. 
150). Thus, Wright, in attempting to describe “an indescribable relief” (Wright, 2004, 
p. 61) writes: 
This was no hazy, suggestive feeling, it was as real as shitting and afterwards, 
under the spangled sky, my chest felt newborn, as light as a feather on a breath. 
(Wright, 2004, p. 61) 
Here Wright is both concretizing his experience of relief by tying it through simile to 
the physical act of defecation and etherealizing it by comparing it to the lightness of a 
feather drifting in air. Yet, also discernible in Wright’s description of what is ultimately 
indescribable is a sense of outward movement, of going beyond the self, of expanding 
into a more capacious space, “of entry into a hospitable otherness to which we have 
always (if unknowingly) belonged” (Bersani, 2015, p. xi). Wright’s focus and 
awareness shift from what is happening within the confines of his ribcage—“a curious 
bulging, something welling up” (Wright, 2004, p. 61)—to the lightness of being made 
possible when one’s roof is the stars. We see in Wright’s experience “the experimental 
initiation of a connection, or a correspondence” (Bersani, 2010, p. 166) made possible 
through extensibility, but expressed in language. 
This notion of self-extension—of “self-expansiveness, of something like ego-
dissemination” (Bersani, 2011, p. 106)—can be seen most powerfully in Wright’s 
account of his intense sexual arousal during one meditation class: 
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It would be an understatement to compare it with a thousand orgasms, a 
thousand rushes of heroin, even years of continual praise experienced 
simultaneously in one body over the course of approximately 30 seconds. The 
duration of the event is, in any case, almost impossible to gauge. (Wright, 2004, 
p. 61) 
Wright’s claim that what he experiences here exceeds any possible eventuality covered 
by Mr Goenka’s rules and warnings suggests, as Talburt and Rasmussen argue, that 
sexuality is “irreducible to the names we use to find and make it” (Gilbert, 2014, p. xv). 
In seeking to describe his experience of jouissance—that which he terms 
“inconceivable” (Wright, 2004, p. 61)—Wright engages in Spivakian teleiopoiesis, 
moving towards what is unreachably other, the sexual, through imaginative effort. 
Thus, Wright describes the space given over to sexual arousal as extending or 
expanding beyond the genitals to include the spine, which in turn becomes a site of 
orgasm that shoots ejaculate through the top of his head. While the metaphors that 
Wright employs to express sexual arousal and release, such as those of “a fat, juicy 
snake” or “gushes of blinding light” (Wright, 2004, p. 61), or a volcano erupting, are 
fairly standard tropes for such subject matter, what is significant is that the room and 
the other people meditating in it are described by Wright as “splattered with holy 
come” (Wright, 2004, p. 62), an image that suggests an expansive or extensive 
sexuality, one that has escaped the confines of a particular body to occupy a space that 
is no longer personal but intra-personal. If, as Bersani claims, “intrinsically violent 
desire is desire in search of an object” (Bersani, 2015, p. 8), then the sort of objectless 
sexuality that Wright presents here as having arrived unannounced and unexpected to 
interrupt Mr Goenka’s meditation class is better understood as “a kind of movement 
from which desire is absent” (Bersani, 2015, p. 10). Sexuality, thought in this way, is 
generative of possibilities that “can be a source of pleasure or nonpleasure” (Gilbert, 
2014, p. xxii).  
Inseparable from the “state of extreme ecstasy” that Wright experiences is “a feeling of 
joy, almost celebration,” which overwhelms him in the face of what he now recognizes 
as “mystery” (Wright, 2004, p. 62). After a long period of dissatisfaction and hard on 
the heels of his HIV diagnosis, Wright has reached a point where he is “simply grateful 
to be alive and wanted to give thanks” (Wright, 2004, p. 63). Nevertheless, over time, 
as the intensity of his experience begins to fade—and despite his teacher’s warning not 
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crave the return of the ecstatic—Wright, does his best to manufacture a repeat 
performance. Although he is unsuccessful in this, Wright is given “the milk of loving-
kindness” (Wright, 2004, p. 63), both for his enemies and for himself, one final gift 
from the meditation course. Back in Wellington, “brimful of something so unfamiliar it 
took me a while to comprehend” (Wright, 2004, p. 63), Wright begins planning and 
choreographing Gloria, his next dance work. 
At this point, and through their juxtaposition, the reader is invited to make a direct link 
between Wright’s experience of sexual bliss, his reception of the gift of loving-
kindness, and the genesis of Gloria (1990), a work expressing Wright’s gratitude for 
the cycle of life. Danced to and against the music of Antonio Vivaldi’s Gloria 
RV589—a liturgical song of praise in celebration of the birth of Christ—Wright’s work 
was attacked by morals groups who objected strongly to the presence of nudity, 
especially when Alun Bollinger’s film version was first broadcast on New Zealand 
television in 1990. Yet, in the context of his oeuvre as a whole, Gloria is best 
understood as one of Wright’s “apprentice works,” providing, as Wright says, “a bridge 
for me to the works that are really my own” (Whyte & Wright, 1996, p. 43), to more 
mature pieces that contain his “hallmark stunning choreography, provocative imagery 
and disturbing themes” (Little, 2006, p. 233).  
However, what is most significant about Gloria, both in the light of this sex scene from 
ghost dance and for my argument, is the way in which Wright positions this work as the 
outflowing of an expansive, self-extending sexuality that moves beyond the confines of 
his body, beyond the four walls of the meditation room, and—in due course—comes to 
occupy not just the performing stage, but spreads throughout “the entire universe” 
(Wright, 2004, p. 63). Like “the milk of loving-kindness” (Wright, 2004, p. 63), with 
which it is inseparably entwined, sexuality, as Wright choreographs it at this point in 
his memoirs, escapes the very margins of the page on which he writes to become a 
creative force that permeates the world. In Bersanian terms, sexuality, as Wright 
presents it here, is no longer configured in inevitable relation to the Freudian subject, 
but “transformed through the deflection of the psychologizing and epistemophilic 
impulse toward a disinterested form of contemplation and an awareness of physical 
presence and spatial proximity” (ffrench, 2014, p. 136). This expansive understanding 
of sexuality becomes possible with the recognition that “the body is the mind’s most 
intimate world,” extending, as it does, “both physically and ontologically, into the 
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world that surrounds it, and into the universe inhabited by that world” (Bersani, 2015, 
p. 94).   
Sex Scene Two—At the Bathhouse 
In Wright’s account of a night spent at a gay bathhouse in New York City in 1984, 
choreographic elements—steps and movements indicative not of individual desire and 
mobility, but of the formation of a machinic assemblage, “a great, pulsating monster of 
conjoined flesh” (Wright, 2004, p. 94)—figure throughout. In a milieu that offers an 
extensive menu of sexual possibilities, but where “dancing was the only thing banned” 
(Wright, 2004, p. 95), there is no intimation of expansiveness or extensibility, only of 
repetition and claustrophobia. There is nothing in what Wright gives us in this scene 
that evidences impersonal intimacy or “the new subjective and relational models” 
(Roach, 2012, p. 127) which Bersani once associated with the jouissance of anonymous 
male with male sex. Rather than witnessing to any disruption of routine and predictable 
ways of relating, what happens in the bathhouse is presented by Wright in such a way 
as to suggest the overdetermined nature of the site. If the unexpected does occur, for 
example, when Wright breaks into uncontrollable laughter or starts to dance, 
suppression or expulsion from the venue inevitably follows. 
The attention paid by Wright to the mechanical aspects of sex, often juxtaposed with 
images suggestive of both animality and physical pain—penises pistoning in and out of 
mouths, the methodical pinching and piercing of flesh with steel needles, a man with 
arm elbow-deep in another man’s rectum, “as if a vet was helping a distressed animal 
give birth,” or a bare arse stuck in the air “like a half-skinned rabbit” (Wright, 2004, p. 
94)—situates the visitors to the sex venue as details on a crowded canvas by 
Hieronymus Bosch, perhaps, The Garden of Earthly Delights. Like Bosch, Wright 
brings his figures into close physical proximity with one another within a series of 
adjacent spaces, each populated by the sexually exotic, fantastical, alluring, and 
terrifying. From “a swaying, tinkling roof-garden” to “rooms almost pitch black, 
somewhere deep in the bowels of the earth” (Wright, 2004, p. 93), participants and 
onlookers play their part in constructing and deconstructing various assemblages of sex 
and death, of heaven and hell. If in shifting combinations, men cluster together, 
“reverently watching,” egging-on the participants “in a many-throated roar,” or simply 
“intent around something” (Wright, 2004, pp. 93, 94) such as a ritualized sexual 
practice, their focus never holds for long before they disassemble and regroup to 
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worship at another point within the environs of the bathhouse. However, as Bersani 
would see it, while “a kind of sociality of proximate bodies may be entertained here,” in 
the context of the incipient AIDS pandemic it must be deemed a sociality incapable of 
“neutralizing the epistemological disaster of psychological supposition and paranoia” 
(ffrench, 2014, p. 137). 
Fortified by alcohol and/or dope, which he believes makes him “invisible and 
impervious to danger” (Wright, 2004, p. 93), Wright likens himself to a sleep-walker, 
moving quietly and unobserved through the spaces of the sex venue. He pictures his 
body “gradually dissolve” and imagines that he is reduced to “just one hovering eyeball 
drifting through veils of smoke” (Wright, 2004, p. 94). On sighting, through wide-open 
cubicle doors, “skeletal bodies laid out on the pallets,” Wright wonders if he has 
“inadvertently opened a secret connecting door and wandered into the funeral parlour” 
(Wright, 2004, p. 93) next door. By conceptualizing sex and death as adjacent spaces—
the one giving ready access to the other if only we dare to open the door between—
Wright comes to acknowledge that “a ‘gay cancer’ out there” is “now right in front of 
[him]” (Wright, 2004, p. 93). Machinic assemblages, which Wright had earlier 
observed forming, now begin to break up: 
There were holes in the black walls and out of these holes severed, moving body 
parts floated disembodied in the air, like the dismembered fragments of one 
butchered body trying to find each other to reconnect. (Wright, 2004, p. 94) 
If Wright’s hovering eye registers in the flickering eye-whites of a man whose flesh is 
being systematically and repeatedly penetrated by steel needles the jouissance of “an 
ecstatic saint in a nest of fire” (Wright, 2004, p. 94), then the only response he can give 
to the overwhelming intensity of his experience at the bathhouse is to dance: 
I stood in the corner and began to dance to a music that was so low and sinister 
it was like the slowed down, played backward sound of Tibetan monks chanting 
from The Book of the Dead. (Wright, 2004, pp. 94–95) 
This sex scene ends abruptly with the barman ejecting Wright from the venue after 
Wright persists in dancing despite repeated warning not to do so. While Wright’s dance 
is clearly liked with death, what is uncertain is whether the movements he makes 
signify a surrender to death, or an affirmation of life in defiance of mortality. The text 
presents Wright’s movements as mechanistic, repetitive and ponderous—in sync with 
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the music that he can’t help responding to. It also allows readers to see Wright’s 
determination to dance in another way—as one gay man’s protest, or act of witness, in 
the face of the enormity of the dawning AIDS pandemic. 
Sex Scene Three—At the Bus Station 
Keren Chiaroni, drawing on material from Leanne Pooley’s documentary film, 
Haunting Douglas (2003), describes the young Douglas Wright’s realization of the 
“spatial awareness involved in learning the language or the ‘designs’ of the dance” 
(Chiaroni, 2017, p. 31) in this way: 
Douglas Wright spoke of his discovery of the world of dance as being like 
receiving a pass into a ‘select society with its own language and rules’. A world 
of signs which offered him, as a self-destructive and angry young man, much-
needed structure, and ‘a map of positions that showed me exactly where I was. 
(Chiaroni, 2017, p. 31) 
If, in learning the language of dance, Wright discovers how he has to position himself 
in relation to “a definite front, side and back” (Chiaroni, 2017, p. 31), the same is also 
true of his own initiation, around the age of twelve, into the world of sex with adult 
males. In emphasizing the choreographic movement of the men cruising in and around 
the public toilets at Auckland’s Ponsonby Road bus station, Wright attends to “the 
intricate, almost invisible mating dance they were performing” (Wright, 2004, p. 161): 
This dance includes sly glances alternating with direct looks, tiny movements 
and gestures of the head, eyes and hands, and ritualistic pacings with 
meaningful pauses up and down in front of the chosen one. They were like spies 
with coded signals or some kind of human chameleon that had developed 
ingenious methods of camouflage to outwit its vigilant predator. (Wright, 2004, 
p. 161) 
For Wright, “up until then sex was a mystery” (Wright, 2004, p. 161). However, with 
his sexual initiation—his participation “in this secret ritual” (Wright, 2004, p. 161), as 
he calls it—Wright is inducted into a system of signs, a gay semiotics, which allows 
him to join in and interpret the sexual activity that is occurring around him. It is on this 
basis that Wright is able to claim that a veil had been lifted. Just as his initiation into the 
world of dance brings the young Douglas into a particular sub-culture with its own 
rules and language, so, too, does his entry into a network of gay sex require him to 
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learn “some extraordinarily detailed choreography to convince my adult victims I 
wasn’t police ‘bait’ before they consented to abuse me” (Wright, 2004, p. 161). If 
Wright details his own acquisition of an extensive range of movements, gestures, 
glances, pacings and pauses as a necessary pre-condition for successful cruising, he 
does so in order to establish that his is a willing participation in the performance of the 
mating dance. By representing himself as an agent soliciting consent from adults, 
whom he describes as his victims, Wright challenges the dominant consent paradigm 
operating in intergenerational sexual encounters, which defines the child or youth 
through his inability to consent and the adult—always predator—as “consent’s 
transgressor” (Fischel, 2016, p. 7).  
In shining the spotlight on his own emerging sexual autonomy—his aspiration to 
exercise “the right to desire, to have wanted sex”—Wright prompts readers to question 
dominant cultural metaphors of ‘innocence’ and ‘incapacity’ that present youthful 
bodies as “either pure and therefore imminently contaminable, or as already sexualized 
and therefore not salvageable” (Fischel, 2016, pp. 99, 98). Tropes of the innocent child 
or youth, and of the child or youth not yet competent to give consent, which serve to 
block the development of sexual agency and decision-making abilities, and at the same 
time sexualize young people by promoting the eroticization of subjects invested with 
seductive appeal on the basis of sexual prohibition, are certainly destabilized by 
Wright’s account. Yet, to claim that we see in the young Douglas an emergent sexual 
autonomy premised on agency, desire and volition, and cultivated through social 
relations, is neither to deny his dependency on adults more powerful than himself nor to 
turn a blind eye to his vulnerability to harm—for “sex frequently takes place in worlds 
and relations of inequality” (Fischel, 2016, p. 114).  
What is clear from Wright’s narrative is that the greatest threat to his flourishing, as he 
sees it, comes not from the potentially exploitative adult men he cruises, but from those 
who exemplify what Joseph J. Fischel describes as peremption: “the uncontrolled 
disqualification of possibility” (Fischel, 2016, p. 132). In young Douglas’ case, 
peremption is best exemplified by his father: 
Dad, a former halfback for Counties, said to my mother as I wafted past, ‘Christ 
Pat, get him out of my sight!’ and I responded by dancing wherever and 
whenever I could. Now, in the playground, at playtime and lunchtime, I 
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improvised wild expressive dances in full view. And after school in our 
backyard with only Mum as a witness as she did the dishes in the kitchen, I 
continued. (Wright, 2004, p. 158) 
Douglas’ Dad, rather than affirming and fostering his son’s inclination to dance, 
seeks—albeit unsuccessfully—to stifle it. Moreover, the father’s refusal to tolerate the 
sight of a dancing boy signals an attempt to disqualify young Douglas’ emerging sexual 
autonomy—an autonomy intimately bound up with dancing. As an instance of 
peremption, what is implied here is a narrowing of space, “a cramped rather than an 
exploited existence” (Fischel, 2016, p. 143). Dad’s inability to make room for his queer 
son to develop his own sexual autonomy—all said and done the father is shaped by the 
demands of compulsory heterosexuality and a homophobic culture—helps explain why 
Douglas looks to older, more experienced gay men, not just for sexual contact, but for a 
degree of companionship as well. Thus, Wright’s decision to present his own and 
others’ illicit and potentially dangerous sexual activity in spatial, choreographic terms 
may be read not only as an act of defiance, but also as an affirmation. Young Douglas’ 
is an expansive response to attempts to limit and cramp his life. More specifically, his 
seeking out of older men for sex marks his rejection of the male heterosexual culture of 
his father—which has neither time nor place for a dancing boy—and signals his entry 
into various queer spaces where successful sex is the result of clever and careful 
choreography. 
As an aesthetic activity that shuns the personalization of desire—by resisting attempts 
to psychoanalyse or psychologize it—Wright’s choreographic response to life attests to 
a propensity to queer both sex and dance in ways that echo Bersani’s call to aestheticize 
the one in terms of the other. If “an elementary lesson of both deconstruction and queer 
theory is that the ‘inside’ of any position will inescapably be haunted by its constitutive 
‘outside’” (Savoy, 2011, p. 244), then the skilled and intricate choreography which 
Wright performs as he cruises for sex both deconstructs and queers the abuser/victim 
binary through inversion. Wright’s willingness to risk negotiating on his own terms a 
typical Spivakian double bind—in this case the consent/abuse binary—reveals a 
preference on Wright’s part to opt for indeterminacy and mobility rather than coherence 
and immobility. His is an effort to survive and thrive in spaces that otherwise would be 
uninhabitable. Wright’s refusal, for example, to submit to the sort of dualistic thinking 
which insists that consent given by a minor is always evidence either of coercion or of 
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the subject’s lack of knowledge and understanding similarly suggests, as Fischel 
argues, that to “think of consent as a spectrum instead of a switch” (Fischel, 2016, p. 
102) might facilitate the negotiation of complexities associated with the issue of 
intergenerational sex. This happens through the creation of a more commodious space 
for nuanced thought that resists “an uncomplicated division between incapable children 
and volitional adults” (Fischel, 2016, p. 103). Wright further queers the matter by 
presenting consent not as a verbal negotiation between desiring subjects—that is, as a 
conversational contract where ‘yes means yes’ or ‘no means no’—but as dependent on, 
and signalled by, the successful acquisition and deployment of choreographic literacy; 
the learning of a language where desire and choice are expressed through certain bodily 
movements and gestures that are observed, imitated, initiated and combined in all sorts 
of ways to create what amounts to a dance. As Fischel explains: “The consent token 
need not be verbal. It can include body language, particular forms of conduct, and 
mutual initiation” (Fischel, 2016, p. 117). How much of the deconstructive queering of 
the concept of consent is the work of the highly instinctive and intuitive twelve-year-
old dancer, and how much that of the reflective and reflexive middle-aged narrator 
retrospectively choreographing a life, of course, remains a matter of conjecture! 
Having chosen to convey details of his sexual encounters with older men that some 
readers will find disturbing, Wright opts to presents these experiences—which are often 
at one and the same time both pleasurable and unpleasant—as positioning him as an 
aesthetic rather than as a psychoanalytically defined subject in the world. Thus, while 
paying close attention to jarring or disturbing details, either features of the spaces 
where the sexual encounters take place or of the bodies of the men that Douglas is 
having sex with, Wright’s text directs readers away from forming judgements about 
activities usually deemed emotionally damaging or morally dubious. This it manages to 
do by side-lining the psychological and the ethical and emphasizing aesthetic 
subjectivity instead. For example, operating within the modality of the aesthetic, 
Wright describes in a rather matter of fact way, certainly without alarm, the dinginess 
of a run-down boarding house with its “couch decomposing against a wall the colour of 
a bruise,” and the “fetid mouth” (Wright, 2004, pp. 160, 161) of a man with missing 
front teeth who resembles his father. While he freely highlights the incongruous—
“once I drank stout in bed with a bald-headed man old enough to be my grandfather 
while we watched rugby on TV” (Wright, 2004, p. 161)—what he chooses to single out 
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for emphasis about the encounter is not any actual or threatened harm, but his hatred of 
rugby. Such observations suggest Wright’s attentiveness to “broken intimacies,” that is, 
to those “moment[s] of failed or interrupted connection” (Love, 2007, p. 24), which, 
Bersani argues, are “grounded in the very contradictions, impossibilities, and 
antagonisms” (Bersani, 1996, p. 108) that attend desire. 
In discovering sex and learning about himself by cruising public toilets—“this was how 
I found out what I was”—Wright comes to see that he is “so disgusting” (Wright, 2004, 
p. 161). This negative self-realization is queer, not because Wright’s sexual activity is 
with men per se, but because he “instinctively knew” that it was his dancing—“a 
giveaway clue” (Wright, 2004, p. 162)—which by marking him as different from other 
boys, also condemned him to the squalid locations where much of the sex happened, 
places of darkness where men emptied their bowels and bladders. In other words, 
homo-sex and dancing come together in what Bersani calls a family of form or “regime 
of correspondences” established by “a kind of looping movement between the two” 
(Bersani, 2010, p. 147). Thus, it is as a dancing boy that Wright first finds himself 
excluded from heteronormative narratives of belonging and becoming. It is also as a 
dancing boy that Wright comes to realize that it is his queer sexuality and his ability to 
aestheticize his experiences that equip him to resist and survive the smothering, 
stultifying consequences of peremption. 
Young Douglas’ sense of shame—which Wright typically spatializes by giving it a 
home in public toilets where other people go to crap—occasions an intricate description 
of a well-frequented lavatory cubicle at the bus station which “seemed to be carved out 
of solid rock in an underground cave with moss of a poisonous green growing in nooks 
and crannies and water constantly trickling down walls covered in rude words and 
drawings” (Wright, 2004, p. 161). What is interesting about this description is not only 
the close attention that Wright pays to the physical details of this space of excrement 
and sexual encounter—this in an attempt to create in the reader a sense of a toxic 
subterranean chamber devoid of healthy life—but also his attentiveness to the crude 
graffiti on the walls which arouses his curiosity and invites semiotic analysis. For 
Wright, while dance and sex each has its own set of signs—its language, rules and steps 
which ensure that participants are able to position themselves and move (or not move) 
in relation to others—both are connected, as are other aesthetic modalities, “with the 
drives and instincts of the body” (Chiaroni, 2017, p. 29) from which they cannot be 
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separated and through which we relate to the world. As Hecquet and Prokhtoris (2007) 
argue, it is through our body, which is “the effect of certain meaningful 
inscriptions/translations—and of change” that “our rapport with the world, and so also 
with works of art” (Chiaroni, 2017, p. 28) passes. 
If, for the young Douglas, the urge to dance is insistent and irrepressible, a desire which 
moves through his body as if “[he] was caught in a kind of hurricane and nothing could 
stop [him] from responding” (Wright, 2004, p. 159), dance also provides him with a 
model for “an aesthetic ethic of correspondence” (Bersani, 2015, p. 5) between himself 
and the world. Whenever this emergent aesthetico-ethic is under threat of erasure, for 
example, when Douglas is treated with silence and shamed for his dancing—“SISSY 
SKITING” (Wright, 2004, p. 159), as it is cruelly tagged by some—he experiences a 
sense of contraction and diminishment that can be averted only through the self-
affirmation found in dance. As he explains, “it was as if my body was getting smaller 
and smaller, hotter and hotter with the shame and anger of it so that dancing became a 
way of not disappearing or burning up entirely. (Wright, 2004, p. 159).  
The same holds true for young Douglas’ experience of sex. If on the one hand, he seeks 
a rapport with the world through sex—and the promise and potential it holds for self-
extension, for expanding his sense of self as he occupies and aestheticizes a variety of 
spaces—on the other, when Douglas experiences shame or disgust, his world contracts 
until it is no more spacious than a toilet cubicle. What is remarkable is that whatever 
the space, no matter how big or small, whether welcoming or unfriendly, he persists in 
choreographing his moves within it. It is in this way that Douglas is able “to explore 
alternatives and to look for a way out of the usual traps and impasses of binary 
formulations . . . . to locate all the in-between spaces that save us from being snared by 
the hooks of hegemony” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 2). In other words, he becomes adept at 
what Judith Halberstam’s book of the same title calls ‘the queer art of failure’ 
(Halberstam, 2011). 
Some Concluding Remarks 
The three sex scenes from Wright’s memoirs which I have discussed in this chapter 
reveal the author’s willingness to present desire as “fragmentary and discontinuous” 
(Bersani, 1978, p. 6), multiple and mobile. His self-theatricalization in sexual 
encounters that are strongly choreographed, and his willingness to present desire and 
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the erotic as “moving through but not concretized in sex practices” (Roach, 2012, p. 
133) indicate a readiness on Wright’s part to experiment with forms of sociality or 
sociability that are remarkably in tune with Bersani’s notion of impersonal intimacy—
in absolute terms, “a form of relationality uncontaminated by desire” (Bersani, 2010, p. 
45), but one which subject to conditions resists the attempts of normativizing structures 
to organize desire. If, as we have seen, Wright, like Bersani, concerns himself with 
movement and processes whereby “the unconscious ruptures the contours of the self,” 
he is also aware of the ways in which “being with others disperses and spatializes” 
(Love, 2014, p. 45) the self.  
Tuhkanen, in attempting to identify and describe the sort of ‘swerving’ movement, 
which he sees as characteristic of the queerness of Bersani’s thought, figures a dance 
that departs from and cuts across established lines. In this, he invites comparison 
between Bersani, the literary and cultural critic, and Wright, the professional dancer 
and choreographer who, as we have seen, persistently thinks the movements of desire 
and sex in choreographic terms. The new forms of relationality envisaged by Bersani—
and which Wright attempts in his work—imply “a lateral mobility,” a movement “to 
the side of objects” (Bersani, 1990, p. 26), that is, “a digressive, transversal dance of 
desire that is not impelled by the need to assimilate an established choreography but 
moves for the mere pleasure of soliciting company, of crossing a line” (Tuhkanen, 
2014b, p. 16). 
Wright’s description of dance as “darting, swerving and leaping . . . lunging” (Wright, 
2004, pp. 198, 199) implies a subject/narrator who is prepared to veer ‘off-centre’—that 
is, move towards “an experience or event of difference, of untapped and unpredictable 
energy” (Royle, 2011, p. 4). Such veering is indicative of Wright’s propensity to 
approach the work of choreographing a dance, a narrative, or a life from queer angles. 
Given that queering, like veering, offers “a different ‘slant’ to the concept of orientation 
itself” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 4), it comes as no surprise that “veering is intricately entwined 
with the emergence and history of what we called ‘queer’” (Royle, 2011, p. 9). Thus, it 
is helpful to take veering into account when explaining the impossibility of separating 
Wright’s choreography, both for the stage and with the pen, from its queer context.  
In presenting us with queer notions of dance and sex, Wright affirms that the desire that 
runs through both is ultimately unable to be contained within any established 
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choreography. Like Bersani’s work, Wright’s choreography opens up the possibility of 
new forms of relationality—or impersonal intimacy—that are produced in “the 
swerving movement of nonannihilative desire” (Tuhkanen, 2014b, p. 16). Literary 
reading also has a key role to play in this process, including in the rethinking and 
reimagining of a sexuality education that is willing to entertain new forms of 
relationality as it attends to the queer movement of desire.  
If, as Louisa Allen claims, “paying attention to flows of movement is an unusual focus 
for critical sexuality education research” (Allen, 2018a, p. 347), it is also the case that 
the movement of desire tends to be overlooked by sexuality education researchers and 
in classrooms. Thus, in echoing Allen’s statement that “movement is a materialising 
force in the becoming of sexuality education” (Allen, 2018a, p. 356), I wish to 
emphasize that the movement of desire is integral to the becoming of sexuality 
education. As Spivak and Bersani argue, desires can be mobilized and rearranged 
through the sort of choreographic thinking that literary reading and other aesthetic 
encounters inaugurate. This applies at least as much to sexuality education as it does to 
other areas of education. 
Part Four of this thesis, which follows, focuses on literary reading, especially in the 
context of sexuality education, as a means of opening up new possibilities for attending 






















Sexuality Education, Risk-Taking, and Literary Reading 
When students have opportunities to engage critically with sexuality education they are 
capable of thinking . . . with a high degree of sophistication. (Education Review Office, 
2018, p. 41) 
Overview 
In the context of sexuality education, and with reference to the work of Spivak, Bersani 
and Wright, I reflect in this chapter on the ability of literary reading to mobilize desire 
and keep meaning on the move in ways that models of health and wellbeing—which 
sexuality education teachers often unthinkingly “import into the classroom in order to 
meet students’ needs” (Quinlivan et al., 2014, p. 400)—rarely do. At the same time, I 
seek to present literary reading as a pedagogical space where risk and revolt may be 
experienced, mediated, and only to some extent contained. 
Desire in a Sexuality Education Concerned with Safety 
As I have argued throughout this thesis, the practice and teaching of literary reading 
that Spivak’s project of aesthetic education promotes offers the possibility of 
rearranging desires uncoercively through the deployment of the imagination. This 
possibility extends to sexuality education, where matters of desire are inextricably 
entangled with matters of sex. However, in the context of New Zealand’s school-based 
sexuality education—which presents sexuality as ‘natural’ while attending to the 
‘positive’ aspects of growing up—desire and its mobility will always be problematic, 
especially given that sexuality education in its theorizations and practices usually 
“evokes a linear education model in which knowledge is cumulatively attained on a 
journey toward maturation” (Garland-Levett, 2017, p. 125). This is so because desire, 
in the queerness of its movement, never ceases to evade the linear and confound 
progress! 
Under such an educational regime, if something seems to go ‘wrong’ with a young 
person’s ‘natural’ sexual development—whether because of the intrusion of unwelcome 
and disruptive forces such as harassment, abuse, violence, and pornography, or as the 
result of other “broken negotiations with the world” (Bersani, 1986, p. 41)—sexuality 
education, having failed as a prophylactic, is readily repurposed as a repair shop tasked 
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with doing its best to redeem, reconstruct, restore, and reclaim that which has been 
damaged. When this happens—and as it shifts its focus, not only to “identifying risks 
and planning safety strategies” (Ministry of Education, 2015, pp. 15, 16), but also, 
however subtly, to policing desires—sexuality education tends to back away from its 
responsibility to “offer youth a facilitating environment for experiences of revolt” 
(Gilbert, 2014, p. 42).  
Paradoxically, the more sexuality education concerns itself with safety, the less willing 
it is to seriously entertain the attraction of risk and revolt to young people for whom 
these interpretive practices are important aspects of meaning-making. Preferring to 
frame safety in terms of strategy and action, rather than as a matter of perception and 
interpretation, sexuality education programmes in Aotearoa New Zealand tend to 
underplay “the psychical functions of risk in a person’s life” (Gilbert, 2014, p. 38). 
Indeed, the Ministry of Education’s warning that sexuality education programmes 
“should engage, empower, and inform young people rather than focus on risk” 
(Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 5) ignores the positive contribution that certain sorts of 
risk-taking can make to mental health. As Douglas Wright’s ghost dance illustrates, 
peremption—the foreclosing of possibilities—can be just as damaging to the self as 
risky sexual behaviour or revolt in the face of damaging norms. 
In order to ensure that students “thrive and become confident, connected, actively 
involved, life-long learners” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 7), sexuality education 
has in recent years come to rely increasingly on various—mostly visual—cultural 
models of health and wellbeing which the Ministry of Education promotes on the 
grounds that they support a holistic approach to sexuality education.27 While such 
models may be appealing, especially to sexuality education teachers seeking to address 
in a straightforward way “the diverse needs and strengths of students” (Ministry of 
Education, 2015, p. 3) from the various communities of Aotearoa New Zealand, they 
have their limitations. While claims are made for their dynamism, usually on the basis 
                                                          
27 In addition to the Tapa Whā model already mentioned, other Māori models identified by the 
Ministry of Education as helpful in the context of sexuality education include: Te Pae 
Mahutonga; Te Wheke; the Powhiri Model; Te Uruuru Mai a Hauora; the Waka model of 
whānau, hapū, and iwi health; and the Wero model for teaching respectful and safe processes 
(see Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 9). Pasifika models include: the Fonofale model; the 
Kakala model; and the Tivaevae model (see Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 10). 
249 
 
of an interactive relationship between their various parts (see Ministry of Education, 
2015, pp. 10–11), such models, though presented with good intentions, often work to 
prevent a deeper engagement with the rich epistemologies they appear to present in 
such a clear and attractive manner. Because of this, they tend to freeze both meaning 
and desire rather than keep them on the move. In failing to acknowledge that “the 
encounter with the Other [is] always an encounter with the unrepresentable” 
(Halberstam, 2013, p. 183), such models simplify and reduce complex cultural 
understandings in order to fit them into a pre-existing format or onto a template—thus 
limiting queer possibilities as they try to tidy up meanings and contain desire. 
Mobilizing Desire through Literary Reading  
What Bersani adds to Spivak’s project of aesthetic education by way of his reading of 
canonical literature is a highly articulate and sophisticated examination of the different 
ways in which desire is both mobilized and immobilized in relation to the human 
subject as that subject is represented and treated in texts. In seeking to deconstruct 
desire—“an area of human projection going beyond the limits of a centered, socially 
defined, time-bound self, and also beyond the recognized resources of language and 
confines of literary form” (Bersani, 1978, p. ix)—Bersani draws attention to various 
mobilizations and immobilizations of desire in literary texts and the possibilities these 
open up for reimagining the world, and, I suggest, for re-envisioning sexuality 
education. For instance, the socially definable and verbally analysable self, the self that 
is subject to psychic shattering, the transcendent, universal or free self, the partial or 
marginal self, and the disseminated or scattered self (see Bersani, 1978, p. x) are just 
some of the manifestations of the self that Bersani has chosen to explore in relation to 
desire’s movement over many decades of literary reading. While he has advanced this 
study via authors as diverse as Artaud, Austen, Balzac, Baudelaire, Beckett, Brontë, 
Eliot, Flaubert, Genet, Gide, James, Lawrence, Proust, Racine, Rimbaud and Stendhal, 
Bersani has also done so through films directed by the likes of Almodóvar, Godard and 
Resnais.  
If, as we have seen, an overriding commitment for Bersani earlier in his career was the 
exploration of “radical psychic mobility” (Bersani, 1978, p. x)—which he locates not 
only in sexual jouissance, but also in the ecstasy that accompanies violent, destructive 
and dehumanizing acts—more recently, this concern has morphed into a preoccupation 
with notions of self-extensibility or self-expansiveness. Nevertheless, desire, however it 
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is explained and theorized, remains key to an understanding of Bersani’s thought. In 
support of his own work, Bersani draws attention to Deleuze and Guattari’s suggestion 
that “a new emphasis on the peripheries of our desiring attention would not only 
diversify desire but would also keep it mobile” (Bersani, 1978, p. 7). One implication 
of this position is that “peripheral seductions” (Bersani, 1978, p. 7) should be valued for 
their own sake, rather than sacrificed on the altar of expediency because they do not 
align with a dominant point of view—for instance, in the context of a re-envisioned 
sexuality education. 
As Bersani sees it, desire is able to “both clarify adventures in psychic mobility and 
throw some new light on the comforts and the dangers of the structured self” (Bersani, 
1978, p. xi). It is in the practice of literary reading that this happens, for, as Bersani 
explains, the literary imagination plays a key role in the mobilization of desire where, 
as we have seen, it makes possible the uncoercive rearrangement of desires that is 
central to Spivak’s aesthetic education. From Bersani’s perspective, the literary 
imagination does this in two ways—the one pulling against the other. If, on the one 
hand, the literary imagination “reinstates the world of desiring fantasies as a world of 
reinvented, richly fragmented and diversified body-memories,” on the other, “it also 
gives ample space to those processes by which we make a continuous story of our 
desires” (Bersani, 1978, p. 315). While the former encourages self-extensibility or self-
expansiveness, the latter teaches us “to give up the intensities of an infinitely desirable 
hallucinated world for the somewhat disappointing enjoyments of fulfilled desires” 
(Bersani, 1978, p. 315). In other words, much is sacrificed in the shaping of a consistent 
and comprehensive narrative. 
Much of Bersani’s more recent thinking around the notion of choreographing a self is 
sparked by the idea that “our uniqueness, our individuality is the form of how we move 
and over time how we have moved ourselves and how others have moved us through 
space” (Royle, 2016, p. 272; Bersani, 2018, p. 55). In effect, it is an extension of his 
own work on the mobility of desire. As such, it needs to be understood in the context of 
Bersani’s on-going preoccupation with the dismantling of notions of stable subjects and 
psychologically coherent characters, not just by physical movement, but also through 
the rearrangement of desire that becomes possible with the practice of literary reading. 
For literary reading, if approached as an aesthetic rather than as a transactional 
experience, is able to move students beyond “stock responses”—those “passive forms 
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of automatic reflex, reinforcing what is already known rather than paving the way for 
what might be known”—into what Northrop Frye claims is “a different world of 
understanding altogether” (Bogdan, 1986, pp. 52, 57). 
However, it must be acknowledged that the work of literary reading as Bersani 
approaches it is potentially both an exhilarating and a discomforting business, 
particularly for those—adolescents and young adults included—who lack “the 
‘certitude of identity’ that comes from a position of relative power” (Bruns, 2011, p. 
76). If there is a risk for students in “releasing themselves to enter into the alternative 
world of a literary text” (Bruns, 2011, p. 76), the extent of that risk will depend on the 
“fluidity of boundaries between self and the world, ordinary existence and imaginative 
experience, consciousness and repression of consciousness, identity and loss of 
identity” (Bogdan, 1992, p. 192). Because exposing oneself to everything a literary text 
has to offer presents undeniable risks and opportunities for teachers as well as students, 
especially in the already-fraught context of sexuality education, there is always a need 
for careful pedagogical mediation. Sexuality educators are wise to “tread lightly 
through such vulnerable territory” (Bruns, 2011, p. 77). However, though they must be 
mindful of students’ varying abilities to cope with the destabilization brought about by 
literary reading, teachers should not turn away from the work of challenging students to 
be risk-taking readers. For the potential rewards are at least as great as the dangers, 
especially if the work of bringing about the “the expansion of the self’s boundaries” 
(Bruns, 2011, p. 76) takes place in a pedagogical environment that is supportive of 
students’ uncertainties, one where teachers are acutely aware that young people are 
embodied readers “affected by the specificities of . . . feeling, power, and location” 
(Bogdan, 1992, p. 192). 
Given that “the work of adolescent development places the adolescent at risk,” then 
sexuality education, if it is to help rather than a hinder young people, must “orient itself 
around narratives of sexuality that can take seriously youth’s struggle to reconstruct 
their experience” (Gilbert, 2014, pp. 43, 42). Literature is a valuable source of such 
stories, especially for those teachers who are prepared to rethink sex, sexuality, and 
sexuality education through their own reading of literary texts. While there are certainly 
sexuality educators who make use of literature to attend to their own needs and 
strengths—and those of their students—what must be reclaimed for sexuality education 
are those narratives that interrogate the stories we tell ourselves, or which enable us to 
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“examine the desires we bring to our meanings of external reality that we are not 
allowed in real life encounters with others” (Mishra Tarc, 2015, p. 16). If risky 
narratives, among them stories that pick at notions of identity, are used with students in 
sexuality education classrooms, the teaching that occurs around them “must be able to 
meet the sense of homelessness that attends transitions and break-aways in learning” 
(Robertson, 1999, p. 290). In other words, “principles of care” (Robertson, 1999, p. 
290) need to be applied. Yet, although making meaning from risky stories is hard work 
and often hurts, it is important to remember that pain is indicative of growth—
extension and expansion—rather than stagnation. 
As we have seen, Douglas Wright’s ghost dance is one such risky narrative. In giving 
us an account of his much younger self—a sexually active twelve-year-old boy 
responding to the challenges of life by dancing wherever and whenever he could—
Wright not only provides us with an example of a boy resisting peremption, but also 
invites us to consider understandings of intergenerational sex that look beyond “the 
twinned spectres of ruined innocent children and pathological predators” (Fischel, 
2019, p. 174). As we engage with Wright’s self-narrative, we are patiently groomed to 
reconstruct our own self-narratives in ways which, as well as making space for our own 
unintelligible selves, “narrate renewed forms and contents of human existence” (Mishra 
Tarc, 2015, p. 19). 
Making Room for the Queer and the Choreographic  
Through the spaces it opens up, literary reading has a particular contribution to make to 
a re-envisioned sexuality education—one where the notion of impersonal intimacy 
suggests new ways of approaching “some of the most exhilarating, passionate and 
devastating experiences in a person’s life,” while at the same time providing “an 
opportunity for thinking that exceeds the moral panics that coalesce around sexuality in 
childhood and adolescence” (Gilbert, 2004, pp. 233, 235). From a pedagogical 
perspective, then, the practice of literary reading not only offers the sort of “training in 
impersonal communities” (Bersani & Tuhkanen, 2014, p. 295) that Bersani seeks, but 
also provides a space where, as Spivak reminds us, the possibility of collectivities to 
come can be kept alive through the imagination. To the extent that it offers training in 
ambiguity and multiplicity, literary reading is a valuable asset for those educators 




If, on the one hand, as many claim, “there is no room for ambiguity” when it comes to 
adolescent sex education—otherwise what possibility is there of averting the serious 
physical, emotional, social and spiritual risks and consequences of sexuality?—on the 
other, ambiguity is recognizably and undisguisedly “part of the fabric of sexual 
relations” (Gilbert, 2004, p. 235). Thus, as Gilbert affirms, sexuality education calls for 
a type of teaching “that is itself ambiguous even as it insists on the ambiguity and 
multiplicity of meaning” (Gilbert, 2004, p. 235). In other words, an education that is 
open to and generates the queer is needed. Citing Herbert Tucker (2003), Gilbert 
reminds us that a teaching that is mindful of ambiguity “requires that students recognize 
that ‘the other is also there’” (Gilbert, 2004, p. 235). Spivak and Bersani, with their 
shared concern for protecting otherness from epistemological colonization—a stance 
exemplified in Spivak’s notion of relations without relationship and in Bersani’s 
figuration of nonrelational relatedness through “a homo-ness that joins sameness and 
difference” (Goldberg, 2009, p. 16)—are sympathetic to teaching ambiguity 
methodically through reading in the same persistent and undramatic manner that Tucker 
describes. While Tucker speaks of working “via gradual absorption towards changes of 
mind that may in the long run modify mental habits” (Tucker, 2003, pp. 444–445), 
Spivak and Bersani emphasize that such work doesn’t just happen, but involves 
persistent ‘training,’ whether of the imagination or in impersonal relations. In an 
important sense, literary reading is a training ground for change! 
If, on the one hand, Bersani’s efforts to encourage an impersonal intimacy 
uncontaminated by desire set a pedagogical direction capable of clearing the way for 
the emergence in sexuality education classrooms of the sorts of collectivities to come 
that Spivak imagines as possibilities, on the other, his exploration of desire has the 
potential to supplement and queer Spivak’s aesthetic education—and any contribution 
that her project might make to the re-envisioning of sexuality education in Aotearoa 
New Zealand. In making these claims, I am mindful both of Dean’s argument that for 
Bersani “sex and safety are fundamentally incompatible; indeed, sex is defined by its 
incommensurability with safety” (Dean, 2000, p. 164), and of Halberstam’s observation 
that “the sexual instinct . . . constitutes an oppositional force to what Bersani terms ‘the 
tyranny of the self’” (Halberstam, 2013, p. 177). Given that Bersani maintains that 
sexuality’s value lies in its ability to “demean the seriousness of efforts to redeem it” 
(Bersani, 2010, p. 29)—for example, through our efforts to find meaning, coherence 
254 
 
and a sense of mastery in the construction of sexual identities—his work may aptly be 
described as ‘counter-intuitive.’ This is so because it overturns any understanding that 
we might have of “the interconnectedness of intimacy, romance, and sexual contact” 
(Halberstam, 2013, p. 177), emphasizing instead sex’s selfishness and destabilizing 
potential. 
If sexuality education cannot help avoid ambiguity and multiplicity, not only by 
inviting queer in, but also as it makes more room for the queer that is already there, it 
benefits, too, from the sorts of counter-intuitive approaches that emerge from Bersani’s 
reflections on sex and desire. As Bersani points out, nowhere does the need for counter-
intuitiveness become more apparent than in our efforts to capture, pin down and make 
sense of desire—especially in order to maintain the illusion, not only that desire 
immobilized is desire fulfilled, but that desire immobilized, or at least contained, 
somehow serves to create a stable and coherent subject.  
Bersani’s suggestion of “the possibility of desublimating desire (and, correlatively, of 
deconstructing the self)” (Bersani, 1978, p. 6) assumes particular significance in the 
context of sexuality education where, as The New Zealand Curriculum (2007) informs 
us, “students build resilience through strengthening their personal identity and sense of 
self-worth” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 13). Spivak, with her persistent notion of 
“position without identity” (Spivak, 2012, pp. xv, 31, 32, 33, 431, 432, 435, 439, 465, 
501, 583, endnote 36), and Bersani, with his paradoxical “concept of nonidentitarian 
sameness, that is, homo-ness” (Roach, 2012, p. 130), surely challenge sexuality 
educators to think beyond such simplifications. 
Underpinning my earlier discussion of three sex scenes from ghost dance is an implicit 
advocacy for the practice of literary reading as a means of rethinking sex in the 
modality of the aesthetic, in particular, in relation to the choreographic. Such an 
approach, I believe, not only opens us possibilities for the re-envisioning of sexuality 
education in Aotearoa New Zealand, but also enables the generation of pedagogical 
perspectives that work to keep desire and meaning on the move—as they escape 
simplification by queering the obvious—in ways that the pre-packaged models of 
health and wellbeing provided by the Ministry of Education often fail to do. Louisa 
Allen, in proposing that we think more about “the mapping of movement” in sexuality 
education classrooms in Aotearoa New Zealand and elsewhere, does so in the broader 
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context of calls for the development of “a sexual choreography of schooling” which 
would attend to “flows of movement” (Allen, 2018a, p. 347), both of humans and of 
things, within educational institutions.  
Allen’s approach, in that it seeks to decentre the human in such a way that room is 
made for the emergence of vibrant non-human matter, is avowedly post-humanist and 
materialist. While sympathetic to Allen’s work, especially to the extent that along with 
similar projects (see Springgay & Zaliwska, 2015) it aims to “create conditions for 
innovative and sustainable pedagogical change” (Allen, 2018a, p. 353), my focus here 
is on the practice of literary reading. If Allen’s paper attempts to “create a rhythm with 
words that echoes some sense of movement’s flow” (Allen, 2018a, p. 353), my aim is 
to explore ways in which the literary reading of texts might open up sexuality educators 
and researchers to a choreographic understanding of movement as a force in the 
thinking, and, therefore, the becoming of sexuality education. In doing so, I take up the 
argument that YA texts are important sources of sex and sexuality education (see 
Bittner, 2012; Gilbert, 2004), and, therefore, worthy of serious attention when 
attempting to queer sexuality education classrooms.  
Apropos of the sexuality education of adolescents, Gilbert observes that “we rarely ask 
youth to read novels even though we may recognize that the ‘ruse of eros’ is central to 
adolescents’, as well as our own, adventures in sexuality” (Gilbert, 2004, p. 234). This 
rings true in the New Zealand context where fiction—if it is read at all, either formally 
or informally, in connection with sexuality education—is generally seen as an avenue 
“to address the complications of love and identity,” or as a means of assisting young 
people to “make healthy choices in their sexual lives” (Gilbert, 2004, pp. 233, 234–
235). Given these assumptions, it is not surprising that LGBTQ+ fiction for young 
adults, like other YA literature directed at historical ‘outsiders,’ has been hailed, on the 
one hand, as a way of enabling those who have been excluded to “see their own faces 
reflected in the pages of a book” (Jenkins & Cart, 2018, p. 3)—and, thus, be reassured 
by the knowledge that one is not alone in the world—and, on the other, as a potential 
“informal educational source of sex and sexuality” (Bittner, 2012, p. 358).  
In New Zealand, the YA fiction that concerns itself with LGBTQ+ themes and is 
available in schools has tended for the most part to follow international trends by 
emphasizing queer visibility, that is, the voluntary or involuntary ‘coming out’ of 
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LGBTQ+ characters.28 In such stories, the reader’s interest is engaged and sustained 
through the “dramatic tension arising from what might happen when the invisible is 
made visible” (Jenkins & Cart, 2018, p. xiv), as well as by the invitation to identify 
with the LGBTQ+ character(s) who is/are usually sympathetically drawn. Relatively 
fewer books, though more in recent years, have emphasized the themes either of 
LGBTQ+ assimilation into supportive communities or of the emergence of queer 
consciousness.  
While arguing for the inclusion of an aesthetic dimension to sexuality education—
especially through the positioning of sex as a modality of the aesthetic and the 
rethinking of sex as a choreographed practice—I am, at the same time, aware of the 
silence of The New Zealand Curriculum (2007) in regard to the relation of the aesthetic 
to sexuality education. Thus, although the Ministry of Education states that sexuality 
education is not confined to the learning area of Health and Physical Education within 
The New Zealand Curriculum (2007), but occurs “across the wider school” (Ministry of 
Education, 2015, p. 8), there is no explicit recognition of a connection between the 
aesthetic dimension/modality and sex and sexuality. In its advancement of “a holistic 
approach to sexuality education,” especially through the promotion of the concept of 
hauora, the Ministry clearly acknowledges that “sexuality has social, mental, and 
emotional, and spiritual dimensions” that are closely “interrelated” (Ministry of 
Education, 2015, p. 14). However, the aesthetic is conspicuously absent from its 
conceptualizing and its models. By neglecting to consider sex in relation to the 
aesthetic, including sex as a modality of the aesthetic, The New Zealand Curriculum 
(2007) appears to limit the role of literature and the arts in sexuality education to 
supporting and reinforcing messages related to hauora, health promotion, and socio-
ecological perspectives, as well as to various attitudes and values conducive to the 
                                                          
28 Two ‘classic’ YA novels by New Zealand authors that fit this pattern are William Taylor’s 
The Blue Lawn (1994) and Paula Boock’s Dare Truth or Promise (1997). At a time when most 
schools were still reluctant to encourage LGBTQ+ visibility, these books were recognized for 
their sympathetic treatment of the coming-out of their respective gay or lesbian protagonist(s). 
The Blue Lawn won the 1995 Senior Fiction Award, while Dare Truth or Promise was the 
winner of the 1998 New Zealand Post Children's Book of the Year. Both novels were picked up 
by international publishers and later nominated for the Lambda Literary Award for Children’s 
and Young Adult Literature. However, in the nineteen-nineties, although some New Zealand 
schools were willing to risk controversy by teaching The Blue Lawn and/or Dare Truth or 
Promise, others refused to have them in classrooms or in the library. 
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advancement of personal and interpersonal wellbeing, ethics, and social justice. Sex 
and sexuality education are not themselves approached from an aesthetic perspective. 
Of course, it is not surprising to discover that the type of counter-intuitive insights into 
sex and sexuality that readings of Spivak, Bersani and Wright are capable of producing 
are at odds with the direction of sexuality education in New Zealand’s state and state-
integrated schools as mandated by the Ministry of Education’s Health and Physical 
Education in The New Zealand Curriculum (2007) and ‘unpacked’ in subsequent 
documents including Sexuality Education: A guide for principals, boards of trustees, 
and teachers (2015) and its 2020 revision. There, as we have seen, sexuality education 
programmes are required to present sexual development as both ‘positive’ and 
‘natural’—“sexuality education in New Zealand takes a positive view of sexual 
development as a natural part of growing up” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 4.), we 
are told. Yet, the documents repeatedly under-cut themselves, telling us, that New 
Zealand school-based sexuality education programmes are required at the various levels 
to address issues of “risk and safety” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 12)29. Why, we 
may ask ourselves, if sexual development is natural and positive, do we need to be 
reminded so often of the need to mitigate against sex’s attendant dangers?  
Further anxiety comes with the Ministry of Education’s warning that in New Zealand 
schools sexuality education should neither “be framed by notions of risk and safety” 
(Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 23) nor by those of “risk and violence” (Ministry of 
Education, 2020a, p. 27, 2020b, p. 31). For, this approach easily leads to programmes 
“driven by fear and blame” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 23, 2020a, p. 27, 2020b, p. 
31). In advising schools that lessons concerned with matters such as sexual violence 
and abuse be kept at arm’s length from the rest of the sexuality education programme, 
the Ministry not only seeks to deal with a Spivakian-type double bind by refusing to 
face it, but also in the process reveals a “desire for transparency and accessibility of 
                                                          
29 For example, the Ministry of Education (2015) focuses on such measures as “safety 
management” (p. 13); “identifying risks and planning safety strategies” (pp. 15, 16); 
“investigating safety procedures and strategies for sexual health, including access to health 
care, contraception, issues of consent” (p. 18); “understanding the influence of attitudes and 
values on the safety of self and others” (p. 18); “identifying risks and developing skills for safer 
sexual practices, including preventing pregnancy and sexually transmissible infections” (p. 19); 
“understanding safer sexual practices” (p. 20); and “critically analys[ing] issues of safety and 
risk” (p. 23). 
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meaning in sex education” (Gilbert, 2004, pp. 233–234) that encourages a side-stepping 
of the ambiguities and complexities raised by Spivak, Bersani, and Wright. Rather than 
express a willingness to direct teachers to engage with the “delightful and disturbing 
action of eros” (Carson, 1998, p. 97), avoidance is often held to be the wiser option. A 
consideration of Gilbert’s question—“shouldn’t sex education address exhilaration, 
passion and devastation?” (Gilbert, 2004, p. 233)—is apt here, too, especially in the 
light of Bersani’s claim and Wright’s testimony that sexuality is always inherently risky 
and unsafe. 
Gilbert, in emphasizing that we must not “erode the possibility for new, more expansive 
understandings of sexuality and learning” (Gilbert, 2014, p. xiii)—whether in an effort 
to be ‘right’ or ‘safe’—indicates a line of thought well worth pursuing in any re-
envisioning of sexuality education. If education, frequently undone by an unpredictable 
and uncontainable sexuality moving through cultures and persons, often fails to take 
account of “the strange and contradictory movements of desire” (Gilbert, 2014, p. xi), 
then this is to its detriment. Much is to be gained by attending to the complexities and 
complications of sexuality that the work of Spivak, Bersani and Wright makes visible—
for example, Bersani’s notion of sex as both self-shattering and aesthetic; Spivak’s 
argument that reproductive heteronormativity “offers us a complicated semiotic system 
of organizing sexual/gendered differential” (Spivak, 2012, p. 124); and Wright’s 
choreographic negotiation as a twelve-year old of the consent/abuse double bind. 
However, The New Zealand Curriculum (2007) is more interested in deploying 
sexuality education to “develop competencies for mental wellness, reproductive health 
and positive sexuality, and safety management” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 23) 
than in grappling with the unsettling notion—and the complexities which flow from 
it—that “both in relation to gender and sexual identities the individual subject is never 
captured by a unitary model of who and what they are” (Weeks, 2011, p. 212). For 
example, the Education Review Office, in recommending that teachers draw on student 
voice when dealing with the issue of pornography in an effort to help students “separate 
fantasy from reality, and distinguish between healthy and unhealthy relationships” 
(Education Review Office, 2018, p. 26) imply that it is possible to make hard and fast 
distinctions between the one and the other. In the pursuit of clarity about 
pornography—which international research suggests “is becoming an increasingly 
accepted and prevalent aspect of young people’s sexuality experiences” (Education 
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Review Office, 2018, p.18)—decisiveness tends to be favoured over more complex and 
nuanced thought.  
Although the Education Review Office acknowledges that “when students have 
opportunities to engage critically with sexuality education they are capable of thinking 
through these issues with a high degree of sophistication” (Education Review Office, 
2018, p. 41)—a statement, the importance of which, I highlight by placing it at the head 
of this chapter—sexuality educators do not necessarily have the confidence or 
capability to promote and make the most of such engagements. Because teachers, 
principals, and board of trustees of New Zealand schools are encouraged to hold 
themselves responsible for what is framed as the “delivery” (Ministry of Education, 
2015, pp. 26, 28, 31, 32, 33, 37; Education Review Office, 2018, pp. 6, 10, 11, 20, 29, 
42) of health and sexuality education programmes, ways of conceptualizing sexuality 
education that do not sit easily with notions of education as something easily packaged 
and dispatched tend to be rejected. No wonder, as Allen observes, sexuality education 
has concentrated “on delivering information about safer sex and pedagogies enabling 
students to practice condom use” (Allen, 2018b, p. 133). For, that which is easily 
deliverable—information—is what tends to be delivered. Sophisticated thinking does 
not arrive in the same way! 
It seems, then, that it would be unwise and counter-productive to take account of the 
ideas of Spivak, Bersani and Wright in pre-service or in-service professional 
development programmes for teachers of sexuality education in New Zealand schools. 
The ‘unsafe’ perspectives on desire, sexuality and impersonal intimacy which Bersani 
and Wright espouse, and Spivak’s ‘destabilizing’ notions of aporia, double binds and 
relations without relationship would be unlikely to get much traction in the current 
educational environment. Nevertheless, the “counter-intuitive but crucial shift in 
thinking away from projects of redemption, reconstruction, restoration, and 
reclamation” (Halberstam, 2013, p. 177) that Bersani, Wright, and Spivak perform in 
regard to sex and sexuality serves to productively complicate such important notions as 
the LGBTQ+ subject, LGBTQ+ rights, and homonormativity and the process of homo-
normalization. Indeed, ideas of redemption, reconstruction, restoration, and 
reclamation, which Bersani, Wright, and Spivak disrupt, still underpin school-based 
sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
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Among other structures central to sexuality education that Spivak, Bersani, and Wright, 
in their different ways, attend to and interrogate are the binaries of adult/child, 
heterosexual/homosexual, cis gender/gender diverse, knowledge/innocence, and 
pleasure/danger. While Bersani’s approach has been described as “emphasizing the 
negative potential of the queer, and thus rethinking the meaning of the political through 
queerness” (Halberstam, 2013, p. 178), Spivak’s contribution to this complication lies 
in her rethinking of gender as “an instrument of abstraction” and “a position without 
identity” (Spivak, 2012, p. 31). For, by applying the tools of deconstruction to sexual 
difference and reproductive heteronormativity (RHN), Spivak sets out to show, not only 
that the supposedly irreducible is reducible, but also that “originary queerness contains 
and is contained by reproductive heteronormativity (RHN)” (Spivak, 2012, p. 190). 
Wright’s ghost dance, as I have argued, is a rich text for literary reading, especially on 
account of its choreographic treatment of sex in the modality of the aesthetic.  
Given that discussions about sexuality in schools in many parts of the world, including 
Aotearoa New Zealand, “are often framed by the crises of teenage pregnancy, AIDS 
and STIs, gay suicide, and sexual assault and harassment,” which “set the agenda for a 
sex education constituted through discourses of moral panic and a narrow conception of 
health and illness” (Gilbert, 2014, p. 65), there is an urgency, as Gilbert argues, to think 
beyond a sexuality education that insists on compliance—whether it be in the service of 
abstinence, or is promoted to improve mastery of various methods of contraception, 
infection control, or of one’s body and psyche. In this context, the ability of Spivak, 
Bersani and Wright to complicate and challenge habitual ways of thinking provides a 
welcome opportunity for those seeking a re-envisioning of sexuality education in 
Aotearoa New Zealand to investigate how sexuality moves unpredictably in our 
schools—that is, in queer ways which defy the simplification of sexual development as 
‘natural’ and ‘positive’.  
Some Concluding Remarks 
If, in its stated aim of taking account of “broader understandings about sexuality and 
sexuality education” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 3), the Ministry of Education’s 
Sexuality Education: A guide for principals, boards of trustees, and teachers (2015) 
leaves the door at least partly open to the complications that might arise in sexuality 
education if teachers are willing to be hospitable to the insights and approaches of 
Spivak, Bersani and Wright, it also allows for the sorts of possibilities that may emerge 
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from a sexuality education that is confident enough to take advantage of the literary and 
aesthetic modalities that are accessed through the humanities. Hence, I argue against a 
sexuality education that is directed exclusively by the empirically focussed sciences and 
social sciences. While these clearly have an important role to play in sexuality 
education, this should not be at the expense of the humanities and the approaches they 
nurture and promote, including literary reading. For as Bersani, Wright and Spivak 
show us, a notion such as desire, which is at the heart of sexuality education, is able to 
be explored broadly, deeply, and choreographically through the reading of literature. 
If, in this chapter, I have focussed on the ability of literary reading to mobilize desire—
thereby, keeping meaning on the move to the benefit of sexuality education—in the 
chapter that follows, I argue the advantages for sexuality education of theorizing desire 




Sexuality Education, Pedagogies of Desire, and Literary Reading 
There is osmosis between sexuality and existence, that is, if existence diffuses 
throughout sexuality, sexuality reciprocally diffuses throughout existence, such that it 
is impossible to identify the contribution of sexual motivation and the contribution of 
other motivations for a given decision or action, and it is impossible to characterize a 
decision or an action as ‘sexual’ or as ‘nonsexual.’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2014, p. 172) 
If the world is approached as a reality constructed of interactions, relationships, 
constellations and proportionalities, then choreography is seen as the aesthetic practice 
of setting those relations or setting the conditions for those relations to emerge. (Klien 
& Valk, 2008, p. 20) 
Overview 
Given that the human body and sex are inevitably and inextricably entangled with 
desire—but also with discourses of knowledge, power and pleasure, as Foucault has 
argued—it seems to me both necessary and advantageous that efforts to conceptualize 
sexuality education in ways that are both more utopic and queer would concern 
themselves with desire, not only as it relates to sex and figures in these discourses, but 
also as a pedagogy that activates the imagination, opening the way for a “relational 
encounter among individuals through which unpredictable possibilities of 
communication and action are created” (Zembylas, 2007a, p. xiii). Yet, for a variety of 
reasons, including the Ministry of Education’s long-standing pre-occupation with 
sexual health and an emphasis on risk-management, desire remains for the most part 
invisible, unaddressed, and certainly under-theorised, in the context of sexuality 
education in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
In this chapter, as I propose the enactment of pedagogies of desire, especially in the 
field of sexuality education and in the context of Spivak’s aesthetic education, I argue 
the benefits of theorizing desire in multiple ways—psychoanalytical and Deleuzo-
Guattarian among them—paying attention through its mapping to the ways in which 
desire underlines movement. Whether the movement of desire is conceptualized as 
occurring between subjects, as it is in the psychoanalytical tradition, or in Deleuzo-
Guattarian terms, “as part of an immanent process of connectivity between bodies” 
(Beckman, 2013, pp. 34–35), it is always fruitful to take note of what desire does and 
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makes possible, including its ability to keep meaning on the move. If different ways of 
conceptualizing desire permit desire to do different things and, therefore, to produce 
different results, then theorizing the movement of desire in relation to the 
choreographic is especially worthwhile when considering the dynamics of sex, or the 
re-envisioning and queering of sexuality education through Spivak’s aesthetic 
education 
Desire and the Choreographic  
As we have seen, Bersani’s understanding of the choreographic emphasizes how, over 
time and in various spaces, we move ourselves and are moved by others—an aesthetic 
of handling—yet, choreography can be thought more broadly still as extending beyond 
the human to include any dynamic assemblage. For, as the choreographer and artist 
Michael Klien suggests, “choreography has become a metaphor for dynamic 
constellations of any kind, consciously choreographed or not, self-organizing or 
artificially constructed” (Klien & Valk, 2008, p. 20). Viewed as an aesthetic practice, 
choreography, as stated at the head of this chapter, is concerned not only with 
establishing relations in the world, but also with “setting the conditions for those 
relations to emerge” (Klien & Valk, 2008, p. 20). In other words, choreography is 
concerned with opening up possibilities, not with repeating the same. 
In the context of sexuality education and when aligned to pedagogies of desire, a 
choreographic approach to movement and thought, such as that described by Klien, has 
the ability to draw attention to what in Deleuzo-Guattarian30 terms amount to 
“territorialized forms of the body”—that is, to those forces that close rather than open 
the body “to what it is capable of” (Beckman, 2013, p. 6). This is so because a 
choreographic theorization of sexuality education undermines “the dominant insistence 
upon the stability of bodies, the body as fact, transmitting obvious information” 
(Britzman, 1998b, p. 63), an insistence which neoliberal education echoes and amplifies 
to its advantage. If, for Deleuze and Guattari, deterritorialization challenges those 
stratified forms of desire which result from the organizing principles and structures 
                                                          
30 Given that four of Gilles Deleuze’s most important works were co-authored in a collaborative 
process with Félix Guattari, it is often impossible to separate the thought of one author from the 
other, even in the many texts that they produced individually. Thus, for the purposes of this 
chapter, I treat Deleuze’s own individual works and those he wrote together with Guattari as 
constituting Deleuze’s oeuvre, frequently describing them as Deleuzo-Guattarian. 
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inherent in the notion of ‘territory,’ then a sexuality education that is choreographic in 
its emphasis, and which sets out to enact what Klien calls an ‘Aesthetics of Change,’ 
“engages everyone’s perception and knowledge of ‘how things move,’ inquiring if and 
how individuals can imaginatively order and re-order aspects of their personal, social, 
cultural and political lives” (Klien & Valk, 2008, p. 21). Imagined, thus, as a form of 
deterritorialization—a “coming undone” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p. 322) through 
movement—a choreographic approach to sexuality education does not require the 
implementation of a grand plan, and might involve “no more than the reshuffling of 
context,” that is, “enough ‘re-framing’ for an idea-body to get unstuck, rough and 
tumble, from its habitual pattern of circumstance and repetition” (Klien, Valk, & 
Gormly, 2008, p. 18). Such an approach, therefore, has much in common with Spivak’s 
aesthetic education, which through the uncoercive rearrangement of desires sets out to 
teach the imagination “to discover (theoretically or practically) the premises of the 
habit that obliges us to transcendentalize” (Spivak, 2012, p. 10)—that is, to absolutize 
or totalize—such values as ‘nation,’ tribe’, ‘religion,’ ‘family,’ ‘gender,’ ‘subject,’ 
‘sexuality,’ and ‘education’. 
In advocating for the enactment of pedagogies of desire in sexuality education, I do so 
by promoting literary reading—for literature “is not merely instructive about desire; in 
a sense, desire is a phenomenon of the literary imagination” (Bersani, 1978, p. 10). In 
other words, desire and the imagination converge and become entangled in the spaces 
opened up by fiction, spaces where seduction of the reader by the story and its 
characters becomes more than possible. However, familiarity with literature and the 
discourses circulating around it not only brings into focus “how little attention literary 
criticism has paid to the desire which features so commonly in the texts it analyses,” 
but also calls into question “the widespread notion that desire, however differently 
conceptualized” (Belsey, 1994, p. 8) requires no analysis. 
Just as psychoanalytical approaches to desire tend to work to reinforce the idea that 
subjectivities are or should be fixed—and invariably linked to objects—Deleuzo-
Guattarian and Bersanian theorizations support the hope that “the desiring self might 
even disappear as we learn to multiply our discontinuous and partial desiring selves” 
(Bersani, 1978, p. 7). On the one hand, human agency is less important in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s sexual imaginary than “the ability to open up to new connections, or to be 
disrupted so radically that a new thought can be born” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 218). On 
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the other, intensive movement is just as worthy of attention as “great movements of 
extension” in the production of those “conjunctions nomadic and polyvocal” (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1983, p. 319) which work to make established sexual categories—those 
classifications which create discrete sexual orientations and separate the human from 
the nonhuman, for example—irrelevant or even nonsensical. As Deleuze and Guattari 
queerly and utopically state: 
. . . homosexuality and heterosexuality cannot be distinguished any longer: the 
word of transverse communications, where the finally conquered nonhuman sex 
mingles with the flowers, a new earth where desire functions according to its 
molecular elements and flows. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 319) 
Thus, while we do well to take account of the surfaces upon which desire, as it moves, 
extends itself, we must also pay particular attention to those intensities, those “moments 
in which something new may be created, another way of relating to the world and to 
oneself where one cannot maintain the person one felt one was” (O’Donnell, 2011, pp. 
221–222). For, it is at such moments that “the operation of desire undoes 
presuppositions and depersonalises, making us see that we are less the one who has 
desires, than that desires have us” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 222). In Spivakian terms, we 
are not rearranging desires, desires are rearranging us. It is by allowing our desires to be 
uncoercively rearranged and by relinquishing our tight grip on agency that we come to 
recognize that we are “constituted and moved by many forces” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 
222), and that our sexuality is not something that belongs to us as subjects, something 
which we can hold together by effort or dint of will. At the same time, being “already 
something other than itself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2014, p. 174), sexuality is unable to 
be transcended. As Merleau-Ponty’s epigraph to this chapter suggests, sexuality and 
existence are best thought of as mutually osmotic and diffusive. Therefore, by figuring 
sexuality as co-extensive with life, we, like Merleau-Ponty, may come to appreciate 
that sexuality is “continuously present in human life as an atmosphere” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/2014, p. 171).  
For Deleuze and Guattari sexuality is similarly continuously present—“not just 
becoming as one, or even two, but becoming as a hundred thousand” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1983, p. 296):  
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The truth is that sexuality is everywhere: the way a bureaucrat fondles his 
records, a judge administers justice, a businessman causes money to circulate; 
the way the bourgeoisie fucks the proletariat; and so on. (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1983, p. 293) 
As Deleuze and Guattari state, sexuality is found in all cultural, social, political, 
governmental, and economic institutions. Yet, despite its ubiquity, sexuality is 
“captured and allowed only to mean certain things” (Beckman, 2013, p. 9). Insofar as it 
“represents a seizure of the body” (Halperin, 1992, p. 261), sexuality is directed to 
produce only approved forms of subjectivity. 
Nonetheless, when sexuality educators as everyday choreographers begin to ‘think’ 
more freely with desire in its various and multiple conceptualizations—as the likes of 
Spivak, Bersani, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze and Guattari prompt us to—then sexuality 
education, even under a neoliberal agenda, becomes better at thinking more queerly, 
utopically, and aesthetically. Re-conceptualized as a site where movement is implicated 
in the imagining and reimagining of sexuality, and in the making, unmaking and 
remaking of sexual subjects, sexuality education no longer operates as a curriculum 
area designed primarily to support the formation and maintenance of stable sexual 
subjects within a humanist framework.  
The more mobility is recognized as working against structures that rigidify—and the 
more the choreographic becomes a way of attending to how, over time and in various 
spaces, we move ourselves and are moved by others—the easier it becomes not only to 
problematize “the drive to identity, recognition, and self-affirmation” that pervades 
much of the current thinking around sexuality education, but also to interrogate those 
theories which tie the human subject to “relations of desire” (Grosz, 2005, pp. 186, 
189), theorizations which sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand mostly takes 
for granted. Moreover, if desire is refigured as an impersonal force, as Deleuze and 
Guattari suggest it should be, it cannot be tied down or reduced to any specific relation 
to the human subject. A choreographic approach to sexuality education—one that 
attends to ways in which “inhuman forces, forces that are both living and non-living, 
macroscopic and microscopic, above and below the level of the human” (Grosz, 2005, 
pp. 189–190) move in relation to the contours and components of bodies, human and 
otherwise—both side-lines efforts to distinguish between such favoured concepts as 
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consciousness and the unconscious, and works to open up a field closed by 
psychoanalysis. 
Given that desire, as Deleuze writes it, is “not a natural given,” but an ‘event’ on “a 
field of immanence . . . defined by zones of intensity, thresholds, degrees and fluxes” 
(Deleuze, 2007, p. 130), it follows that sexuality itself is “highly plastic and . . . no 
longer reliant on the terms of any binary opposition such as those of male/female, 
active/passive or human/animal” (Shildrick, 2009, pp. 123–124). Sexuality, thus 
conceived, and resistant to the gravitational pull of the Daddy-Mummy-Me triad of 
psychoanalysis, may be experienced as both heimliche and unheimliche, familiar and 
unfamiliar. This is so, not only because, as Sedgwick explains, anyone’s sexuality or 
gender can’t be made to signify monolithically, but also on account of the “powerful 
effects of overlap, resonance and substitution between the ‘queer’ and the ‘uncanny’” 
(Royle, 2003, p. 43). 
In response to Claire Colebrook’s question: “Is queer theory a reflection on what it 
means to be queer, or does the concept of queerness change the ways in which we 
theorise?” (Colebrook, 2009, p. 11), it is fair to say that Deleuzo-Guattarian 
theorizations—and their off-shoots, including the work of Elizabeth Grosz and new 
materialist thinking—certainly queer our understandings of and approaches to sex and 
sexuality education. And they creatively do so, in that the work of Deleuze and Guattari 
indicates “a rupture in the established ways of thinking, suggesting an intrinsic 
queerness in thinking and theorising that breaks away from a representational thought” 
(Nigianni, 2009, p. 2). For, in Deleuzo-Guattarian terms, queer-becoming implies not 
only a resistance to normalization, but also a willingness to sabotage the repetition of 
sameness in order to produce difference. When conceptualized in relation to the 
choreographic, Deleuzo-Guattarian ways of approaching sexuality suggest a “capacity 
to produce deviant lines along established thinking and disciplines (Nigianni, 2009, p. 
1), a transversal movement “where openness is introduced through variations in 
relationships that disrupt, rework but also productively inhabit hierarchies” (Ringrose, 
2015, p. 399). They also through their openness to the random movements of desire 
clear the way for fresh approaches to sexuality education that are “playful, 
experimental, hopeful (yet hopeless), and thus decidedly queer” (Allen, 2018b, p. 6).  
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With Allen’s statement in mind, I affirm that my intention in arguing for the 
choreographic treatment of desire in relation to the re-envisioning of sexuality 
education is neither to restrict movement, nor to make it fit a particular model—
Spivakian or Deleuzo-Guattarian—but, rather, “to provide a cradle for movement to 
find its own patterns . . . over and over again . . . to prevent a body . . . whether bound 
by skin or habits . . . from stagnation, and enable that lightness, primal energy and 
elemental possibility only to be found once relations start dancing” (Klien & Valk, 
2008, p. 22). Spivak’s aesthetic education and literary reading have an important role to 
play in this process. 
Sexuality Education and Desire 
Michalinos Zembylas, by calling for the enactment of a pedagogy of desire that 
“produces and seduces imaginations” (Zembylas, 2007b, p. 332), as opposed to one 
that coerces or represses them, aligns himself, unwittingly, perhaps, with Spivak’s 
aesthetic education, which, as we have seen, seeks “an uncoercive rearrangement of 
desires, through teaching reading” (Spivak, 2012, p. 373). In doing so, Zembylas, like 
Spivak, recognizes that without desire the imagination cannot operate. 
Although sex, the subject and focus of sexuality education, is unavoidably entangled 
with human desire and the human body, sexuality education, as we have seen, has for 
the most part ignored the erotic tradition which attends to “the body primarily 
conceived, and primarily become significant, as the agent and object of desire” 
(Brooks, 1993, p. 5). Yet, given “a Cartesian legacy” (Allen, 2014, p. 89)—a dualism—
which historically has determined that educational institutions prioritise the 
development of the mind over that of the body, it is, perhaps, inevitable that “student 
bodies and the messiness of their sexuality” (Allen, 2018b, p. 1) have been regarded 
within education as marginal and somewhat embarrassing. Nevertheless, young bodies 
and messy sexualities are concerns which must be addressed, albeit reluctantly, in order 
to facilitate students’ smooth progress through a curriculum that affords a very high 
status to ‘academic’ subjects such as science and maths. The fact that sexuality 
education in New Zealand schools sits under the umbrella of Hauora Wāhanga Ako or 
the Health and Physical Education learning area within The New Zealand Curriculum 
(2007)—and that prospective teachers of sexuality education are usually trained from a 
Health and Physical Education perspective—helps explain why desire and its 
theorization have up to now been neglected in a curriculum that is more at home with 
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managing bodies ‘at risk’ than with positioning sexuality education as “a problem of 
and for thinking” (Gilbert, 2014, p. 67).  
Promoting wellbeing through sexuality education (2018), the most recent Education 
Review Office report to evaluate the effectiveness of sexuality education in New 
Zealand schools, does so on the basis of the direction set by The New Zealand 
Curriculum (2007) and Sexuality Education: A guide for principals, boards of trustees, 
and teachers (2015), both of which determine a focus “on the wellbeing of the students 
themselves, other people, and society through learning in health-related and movement 
contexts” (Education Review Office, 2018, p. 5). In reporting the findings of its 
investigation into how well schools support and promote wellbeing for their students 
through sexuality education, ERO paints an uninspiring picture, one which suggests 
that many of the 116 schools that it visited between May and August 2017 are failing to 
meet the needs of their students in various aspects of this curriculum area.31 
In a quantitative summary of how well sexuality education was taught in the 116 
schools that it visited, ERO reported the following: in 27.6% of schools it was taught 
not at all well; in 19.0% somewhat well; in 33.6% well; and in 19.8% very well (see 
Education Review Office, 2018, p. 6). If it is not worrying enough that most schools 
barely manage to comply with Ministry requirements for the teaching of sexuality 
education, it is also seriously concerning that many schools evidence significant lapses 
and deficiencies in matters of stewardship, leadership, connection with community, 
curriculum design and delivery, and teacher capability and confidence. For sure, if 
“‘intellectual’ subjects like maths and science” (Allen, 2018b, p. 1) were to receive—as 
sexuality education has—an Education Review Office report which identifies “absent, 
or inadequate, community consultation”; “lack of assessment and evaluation”; “lack of 
teacher comfort and confidence”; “low prioritisation . . . among competing priorities”; 
and “school policies not widely understood and implemented” (Education Review 
                                                          
31 The Education Review Office reports: “In the 2017 evaluation, ERO found that, overall, 
curriculum coverage remains inconsistent. Some schools are not meeting minimum standards of 
compliance with current requirements. Most schools are meeting minimum standards, but many 
have significant gaps in curriculum coverage. Although biological aspects of sexuality and 
puberty are well covered, more in-depth coverage is needed for aspects like consent, digital 
technologies and relationships. Sexual violence and pornography were covered in fewer than 




Office, 2018, p. 7) as barriers to their successful delivery or implementation, there 
would be consternation and alarm in the community! 
In ERO’s estimation sexuality education in New Zealand schools is not up to scratch. 
Yet, viewed through a queer lens, sexuality education’s shortcomings may be the very 
straw that Rumpelstiltskin spins to produce gold. If, as Allen argues, “sexuality 
education has always been a queer proposition for schools” (Allen, 2018b, p. 1)—given 
its potential to disrupt much that is normal and normative about school life—perhaps, it 
is its very queerness, its relative insignificance in the educational hierarchy, and its 
awkward fit with the more ‘academic’ subjects that make sexuality education “ripe for 
the emergence of new modes of thought” (Allen, 2018b, p. 3). Thus, in its very 
ambivalence and strangeness, sexuality education might come to exemplify 
Halberstam’s “queer art of failure” (Halberstam, 2011)—a failure theorized in the mode 
of the aesthetic—which not only “allows us to escape the punishing norms that 
discipline behavior and manage human development” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3), but also 
at the same time to move beyond “a series of stalemates” (Allen, 2018b, p. 3) involving 
sexuality education’s most pressing issues. 
Many of the Education Review Office’s recommendations for the improved provision 
of sexuality education in schools are difficult to fault—for example, that schools 
“implement a comprehensive sexuality education programme, making sure sufficient 
time is provided for delivery and that students at all levels have opportunities to engage 
with sexuality education,” or that they “make sure teachers have sufficient professional 
capability to effectively teach sexuality education, and access professional learning and 
development as needed” (Education Review Office, 2018, p. 20). However, what is not 
addressed in the Education Review Office’s report are the limitations and exclusions 
inherent to the theoretical framework upon which sexuality education in Aotearoa New 
Zealand is currently based.  
Because concerns about health and wellbeing—physical, social, cultural and spiritual—
drive sexuality education in its present form, risk-management and addressing issues of 
disadvantage are over-riding preoccupations. This is evident in the current report’s 
sometimes infelicitously articulated anxiety in relation to groups already identified as 
disadvantaged—including Māori, Pacific, and international students, students with 
strong cultural and religious beliefs, queer students, and those with particular learning 
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needs—who “remain less well catered for, despite being at higher risk of negative 
wellbeing outcomes” (Education Review Office, 2018, p. 5). While the report’s concern 
for student wellbeing is to be lauded, the Education Review Office, in neglecting to 
contextualize wellbeing in relation to eros, also ignores desire—“a term that lies at the 
heart of sexuality” (Weeks, 2011, p. 39)—thus, missing a golden pedagogical 
opportunity to link sexual desire with the desire for knowledge.  
Unlike Peter Brooks, for example, who argues that there is much to be gained from 
theorizing “about bodies emblazoned with meaning within the field of desire, desire 
that is originally and always, with whatever sublimations, sexual, but also by extension 
the desire to know: the body as an ‘epistemophilic’ project” (Brooks, 1993, p. 5), 
sexuality education in Aotearoa New Zealand and elsewhere, does not, for the most 
part, take advantage of the insight that the desire to know—curiosity—is inseparable 
from sexual desire, but also from movement. Nor does sexuality education address the 
issues that the Education Review Office identifies as requiring deeper coverage—
consent, digital technologies, sexual violence and pornography—in relation to desire 
and curiosity. Thus, notwithstanding ERO’s finding that “without the knowledge and 
skills to navigate this context, young people are at risk of developing unhealthy 
attitudes toward sexuality, increasing risks to mental and physical wellbeing for 
themselves and others” (Education Review Office, 2018, p. 18), it must be asked 
whether a better future for sexuality education will be determined not so much by 
increased knowledge, more developed skills—and everyone working harder—than 
through “an ontological reorientation of the nature of sexuality education itself” (Allen, 
2018b, p. 144). As Allen suggests, it is time for “a queer experiment in defamiliarizing 
our current understandings of sexuality education” (Allen, 2018b, p. 144). 
While Allen proposes that a queering of sexuality education might come about by 
focussing on those features “which have been constituted as peripheral foci in 
conventional sexuality education” (Allen, 2018b, p. 7), my proposal for queering 
sexuality education involves both a return and a veering: a return to desire—“an iconic 
conception in the Western metaphysical tradition” (Azari, 2008, p. 9), one that is 
central to Spivak’s aesthetic education—and a veering in a different direction. Thus, in 
calling for the mapping of desire’s strange choreographic, I draw attention to the 
swerving, turning, swinging, curving, slanting, sheering, deviating, deflecting 
movements that occur not only when desire moves us in relation to other bodies 
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(human and otherwise), but also in relation to thought. If, as Ahmed suggests, queering 
offers “a different ‘slant’ to the concept of orientation itself,” it also positions us “at an 
oblique angle to what coheres” (Ahmed, 2006, pp. 4, 172) as given, whether in action 
or in thought. In other words, because “desire is, after all, what moves us closer to 
bodies” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 103), and to ideas, a queer perspective on sexuality 
education—one that takes account of the unpredictability and strangeness of desire’s 
movement—will accept that desire does not travel in straight or direct lines. Just as it is 
productive when conceptualizing desire spatially to imagine it moving transversally, 
that is, travelling “the path in between, the diagonal across the grids of horizontal and 
vertical coordinates, the zigzag of a line of continuous variation,” so, too, is it helpful to 
think of desire in temporal terms, as “always underway among things” (Bogue, 2007. p. 
5), always in media res. Asserting this is to concur that desire— successfully evading 
as it does all attempts to contain or restrain it—“can go anywhere” (Belsey, 1994, p. 6), 
anytime. It is also to affirm that “desire eludes final definition” (Belsey, 1994, p. 3). 
Although it is many years now since Michelle Fine first wrote of “the missing discourse 
of desire” (Fine, 1988)—thereby drawing attention to the ways in which schools in 
combination with other institutions have denied female sexuality through the silencing 
of discourse about desire and pleasure—desire, like pleasure, remains largely absent 
from Aotearoa New Zealand’s mandated sexuality education programmes.32 Maybe it is 
because desire is so slippery and difficult to grasp, so intangible, that sexuality 
educators have tended to shy away from addressing it—in much the same way that they 
have avoided attending to pleasure. Yet, in the context of sexuality education, desire 
and pleasure—if mentioned at all, or even in their conspicuous absence—have been 
linked more often than not. For example, The Politics of Pleasure in Sexuality 
Education: Pleasure Bound (2014), a recent volume of edited essays that seeks “to 
provoke a reconfiguration of thought regarding sexuality education’s approach to 
pleasure and desire” (Allen et al., 2014, p. 4) consistently binds the two together. But 
                                                          
32 With the release of the new guidelines for relationships and sexuality education (Ministry of 
Education, 2020a, 2020b), the long-held official silence about desire and pleasure appears to 
have been be broken. For example, at level 8 of the curriculum students will be “able to explore 
desire, pleasure, consent, and attraction as interpersonal, social, and ethical concepts” (Ministry 
of Education, 2020b, p. 39). Whether such exploration will extend to the sorts of queer, 
aesthetic and choreographic approaches to sex and sexuality that my thesis advances—
including through literary reading—remains to be seen.  
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there is much to be gained, I believe, by loosening this bond. If “we untie pleasure from 
desire, the latter can be allowed to exist as a constructive positivity in its own right” 
(Beckman, 2011, p. 12)—but only when it has been released from the psychoanalytic 
apparatus and freed from a relation with ‘lack.’  
If sexuality educators avoid addressing pleasure because it doesn’t behave itself—after 
all, “when a discourse of pleasure is put into circulation it is (re)configured and 
recuperated in unpredictable ways” (Allen et al., 2014, p. 9)—they steer clear of desire 
because it seems too abstract, too intangible, too complex to theorize. As Gorton says 
of desire: “It is a difficult and perhaps an impossible concept to pin down, explain or 
‘solve’” (Gorton, 2008b, p. 1). Given the many and seemingly contradictory 
conceptualizations of desire that are on offer—psychoanalytical, Marxist, feminist, 
Foucauldian or Deleuzo-Guattarian among them—the hesitancy of sexuality educators 
to grapple with it is not surprising, especially as desire has been variously classified as 
an affect, as a drive, as an emotion, and, by Spinoza, “as the essence of human 
subjectivity” (Gorton, 2008b, p. 8).  
Because of the great and abiding influence exerted by psychoanalysis on contemporary 
thought, current theorizations of desire and desire’s relation to sexuality have found it 
impossible to ignore Freud and his followers. All, to a greater or lesser extent, have 
been influenced by psychoanalysis, which, especially in its Lacanian form, 
distinguishes between the satisfaction of a biological need and “the demand that 
remains tenaciously persistent” (Azari, 2008, p. 10) once that need has been met—this 
while at the same time insisting that “there is no insistent sexual desire which pre-exists 
the entry into the structures of language and culture” (Weeks, 2011, p. 40). Wishing to 
break the stranglehold of psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari reject a sexuality that 
has been territorialized by Freud’s Oedipal and castration complexes, a sexuality which 
is predicated on lack and the belief that desire can never be satisfied. Rather, by 
envisioning “a sexuality that is not limited by organic or structural functions but that 
moulds its material in ever changing constellations and connections” (Beckman, 2011, 
pp. 9–10), Deleuze and Guattari depart from psychoanalytical—in particular 
Lacanian—approaches to sexuality. The latter maintain that desire comes into play only 
with the subject’s entry into the symbolic order, that is, the social world of linguistic 
communication and inter-subjective relations that presupposes a distinction and 
separation between the signifier and the signified. By conceptualizing desire in relation 
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to material flows and connectivity—an approach which positions desire as a pre-
subjective, pre-conscious and immanent force: “first and foremost the psychical and 
corporeal production of what we want” (Holland, 2010, p. 68)—Deleuze and Guattari 
open the way for the elaboration of “a new sexuality beyond Oedipus and what it could 
be and do” (Beckman, 2011, p. 11).  
However, while Deleuze and Guattari’s work has been welcomed by many queer 
theorists as an explication of “the materiality of desire under capitalism”—especially, 
insofar as desire in the depersonalized form of energy flows is the genesis of all social 
life—their “intensified emphasis on desire as the motor of history and an elevation of 
the desiring subject as history’s agent” (Hennessy, 2000, pp. 70, 71) has been criticised 
for resulting in the removal of desire, and by extension sexuality, from the material 
events of history. Thus, although always driving history, Deleuzo-Guattarian desire is 
forever outside history and—like the desiring subject itself—can play no part in 
accounting for or explaining the actual changes that take place from one historical 
period to another, or from one stage of capitalism to the next. Spivak, in observing that 
for Deleuze and Guattari desire is “not tied to an individual subject, not to a subject at 
all,” but stands, rather, as “a kind of misnomer for something that ran everything” 
(Spivak, 2008, p. 253), identifies the risks involved in employing a term like desire, 
which being applied so broadly ceases to signify anything much. Yet, Spivak may have 
missed the point! For, “‘the menstrual flow that carries away the seed unfecund’”; 
“amniotic fluid spilling out of the sac and kidney stones; flowing hair; a flow of spittle, 
a flow of sperm, shit, or urine” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 5)—and other vivid 
images encountered in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical work—are not so much 
representational metaphors as compelling figurations of the movement of desire and the 
productive flux that constitutes the intensities of sexuality. It is through such images, as 
much as by way of reasoned argument, that Deleuze and Guattari suggest “the infinite 
variety of potential interconnections and relationships” (Weeks, 2011, p. 40) available 
to a subject that is transient, in the middle of things, without fixed or stable identity.  
If, for Deleuze and Guattari, it is capitalism—produced by the Oedipalization of 
society—that represses desiring production and sexuality while forcing disjunctions of 
gender and identity, it is the same capitalism that also manufactures homosexuals. In 
observing that “desire is no more homosexual than heterosexual,” Guy Hocquenghem, 
the pioneering gay theorist and activist, emphasizes that “just like heterosexual desire, 
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homosexual desire is an arbitrarily frozen frame in an unbroken and polyvocal flux” 
(Hocquenghem, 1972/1993, pp. 49–50, 50). 
Yet, despite the many and seemingly contradictory ways of theorizing desire, what 
persists through them all is the intimation that desire is non-totalizable, and, therefore, 
always exceeds the best efforts to contain or explain it. Nevertheless, in the context of 
sexuality education, desire must continue to be interrogated because no matter how it is 
conceptualized, whether by psychoanalysis, Marxism, feminism or sexology, within or 
outside fiction, it “remains a fundamental and constitutive category of human 
experience, indifferent to the signifier, and the common assumption that this condition, 
because it is simply given, needs no analysis” (Belsey, 1994, p. 8). While the 
theorisation of desire is never straightforward—entangled as desire is with other 
concepts pertinent to sexuality, including knowledge, power, and pleasure—what is 
common to all theories of desire is the urge to account for its mobility. For example, if 
according to psychoanalysis, “desire is a movement, but one with a focal point,” then, 
for Deleuze and Guattari desire is “more fluid and open-ended” (Gorton, 2008b, 26). 
However, given that movement plays a significant role in all theorizations of desire, 
rather than positioning the different theoretical models of desire in opposition to one 
another, may it not be more productive to “examine the ways in which this movement 
functions and how it can be connected more specifically to recent work on affect” 
(Gorton, 2008b, p. 26)? 
Pedagogies of Desire and Literary Reading 
Insofar as desire is understood to be an affect, a drive, or a flux, it is helpful to think of 
it—as Ahmed thinks of emotions—as “not simply located in the individual,” but as 
moving “between bodies” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 10). By attending to the movement of 
desire—that is, to desire’s choreographic propensity “to arrange bodies in time and 
space” (Lawrence, 2008, p. 54) rather than to desire’s origin—the emphasis is shifted 
from what desire is to what desire can do. In this way, as Gorton suggests, desire, 
however it is theorized, can be thought “as something that supports connections and 
relations and that produces an expression that is impossible to contain or categorize” 
(Gorton, 2008a, p. 19). Such a perspective is valuable, not only because it highlights 
desire’s relation to the choreographic, but also because it suggests a means of avoiding 
the deadlock that is created when, for example “Lacanian and Deleuzian models of 
desire are constantly set in opposition to each other” (Gorton, 2008a, p. 16). Thus, in 
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proposing that sexuality education would benefit greatly from the enactment of “a 
pedagogy of desire” that “can be theorised in ways that mobilise creative, transgressive 
and pleasurable forces within teaching and learning environments” (Zembylas, 2007b, 
p. 331), I argue that theorizations of desire capable of leading to productive pedagogical 
encounters among students and teachers need not be restricted to those provided by 
Deleuzo-Guattarian perspectives and approaches. 
However, whereas Zembylas proposes “a pedagogy of desire” (Zembylas, 2007b, p. 
331), I prefer the plural, especially given that there are many and various ways of 
theorizing desire, each of which permits desire to do different things. In my own 
exploration of desire’s ability to do things, in particular, in pedagogical contexts and 
through literary reading, I attend to desire’s ability to keep meaning on the move. Like 
Gorton, I hold that desire is a force that underscores movement, “whether of a narrative, 
a gaze or analysis and that it resists interpretation and any final closure” (Gorton, 
2008b, p. 1). 
In emphasizing desire’s inseparability from movement, it is helpful, especially in the 
context of sexuality education, to approach desire “through different theoretical 
registers” (Gorton, 2008a, p. 30), for instance, the psychoanalytical and the Deleuzo-
Guattarian, two theorizations usually positioned antithetically. This brings with it the 
benefit of being able, firstly, to distinguish between a choreographic that attends to 
movement between self and other, and one that highlights movement for movement’s 
own sake; and, secondly, to track the ambivalence that accompanies desire’s 
movement. 
Because, since Freud and the advent of psychoanalysis, the human body has been 
“defined radically by its sexuality” (Brooks, 1993, p. xiii), it is at our present point in 
time difficult to imagine pedagogical explorations of what a body can do that neglect to 
take account of psychoanalytical approaches to sex and sexuality. These, as Lacan 
argues, posit desire as “the drive for wholeness and completeness” (Zembylas, 2007b, 
p. 335). However, while psychoanalytical understandings of desire are often dismissed 
for their negative emphasis on lack or absence, they do, nonetheless, provide a useful 
way of figuring movement in relation to the other. Spivak’s aesthetic education with its 
advocacy of teleiopoiesis—reaching out to the distant other (whether person, place, 
thing, or idea) through the imagination—being a case in point. If, as we have seen, 
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desire perceived through the lens of psychoanalysis is movement with a focus—albeit 
movement that sets the subject in the direction of an unattainable other or which 
incessantly shuttles between poles of a double bind—Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conceptualization of desire as a fluid process, one without beginning or end, attends to 
desire’s productive potential and its role in ‘becoming’.  
In relation to ‘becoming’—and figured in choreographic terms—the potential of desire 
thought and imagined as movement lies in “its ability to dynamically extend the many 
from the one” (Manning, 2009, p. 21). That is to say, desire enables pedagogical 
encounters among individuals “through which many possibilities for growth are 
created” (Zembylas, 2007b, p. 332). Such an emphasis is useful in that it serves as an 
antidote to a sexuality education that over-plays notions of being and identity. In other 
words, desire imagined beyond the dynamics of self-other/subject-object binary 
relationships is desire “not attached to a form already-taken,” but a force that in its 
movement gives rise to “openings, intervals, fluxes of potential relation” (Manning, 
2013, pp. 21, 52)—all of which come at the expense of predetermined outcomes. 
Zembylas, in support of the claims of a Deleuzo-Guattarian approach to a pedagogy of 
desire—a pedagogy that sets out to make possible the sorts of dynamic extensions that 
Manning identifies—argues that the release of “powerful flows of desire” promised by 
such a pedagogy would enable teachers and students to challenge normalized 
significations and representations, thereby, gaining access to “a radical self” (Zembylas, 
2007b, p. 332). Yet, if, as Zembylas proposes, the success of such a pedagogy depends 
on teachers understanding “the multiple aspects of desire and how they pervade 
pedagogical relations among students and themselves” (Zembylas, 2007b, p. 332), then 
it is imperative, I believe, that teachers of sexuality education expose themselves to 
ways of conceptualizing desire—including theorizations developed within 
psychoanalysis—which think the movement of desire differently from Deleuze and 
Guattari. What is important is not so much the differences between the various 
theorizations of desire, but what they produce, connect, align, or disjoin. As Gorton 
explains, we need to “consider desire as a way of thinking and as a kind of intelligence; 
as something that supports connections and relations” (Gorton, 2008b, p. 29). 
Earlier, I addressed the inevitable entanglement of desire and pedagogy. Here, in 
advancing the case for the activation of pedagogies of desire within sexuality education, 
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I work from the premise that “the classroom becomes a space in which desire and 
knowledge converge” (Zembylas, 2007b, p. 333). The unpredictability and intensity of 
this confluence are particularly marked when it comes to sexuality education, for 
although all reflections on sex and sexuality demand that we recognize that “our bodies 
are with us” (Brooks, 1993, p. 1), we inevitably have great difficulty thinking how this 
is the case. For example, we variously speak of having a body, of living in a body, of 
being at one with a body, or of experiencing alienation from a body. Because we shift 
our subject-object relations so readily in relation to the body and the experiences of 
pleasure, pain and desire that we associate with it, the body is “always the subject of 
curiosity, of an ever-renewed project of knowing” (Brooks, 1993, p. 1).  
If, as Beckman argues, “exploring what constitutes a body at any particular time, and 
what this body is capable of, is more interesting than trying to ascertain its relation to a 
central mind or the permanence of its identity” (Beckman, 2013, p. 47), this is 
especially so in regard to sex and sexuality education. In this context, our centuries-old 
preoccupation with wanting to understand the body’s contours and components—
arising, perhaps, from an awareness of the body’s instability and volatility: that is, our 
sense of the body as ‘other’—is readily evidenced in “specific pleasurable 
configurations of bodies in literature and culture” (Beckman, 2013, p. 45). Thus, 
literature is a valuable but much under-utilized resource for sexuality educators wanting 
to explore cultural and social, as well as personal understandings, not only of pleasure, 
but also of desire. 
Belsey, for example, in claiming that “the tradition of Western fiction is threaded 
through with desire”—on the basis that people like telling and reading about it—
recognizes that our culture’s understanding of desire is to a very significant extent 
inscribed in its fiction, which has become “the location of norms, proprieties and 
taxonomies” (Belsey, 1994, pp. ix, 4), including those related to sex and sexuality, that 
continue to shape and constrain us. Given Foucault’s contention that sexuality is “an 
especially dense transfer point for relations of power” (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 103), it 
is not surprising that since the Enlightenment, and as the discourse of sex has 
proliferated, sexuality has increasingly been seen as a force to be controlled and 
administered rather than as a state to be judged and disciplined. With the rapid growth 
in literacy over the same period, fiction’s complicity in what amounts to a process of 
sexual policing has not gone unchallenged. However, just as fiction has played a 
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significant role in the development and spread of a scientia sexualis less concerned with 
sexual pleasure than with personalized control, so has the novel, especially in the West, 
also contributed to the deconstruction of reductive and restrictive conceptualizations of 
sexuality. As the editors of a recent study of sexuality and contemporary literature 
observe, “a common thread running through the critical scholarship on sexuality in the 
humanities and social sciences over the last five decades has been the attempt to 
dismantle essentialist notions of sexuality” (Gwynne & Poon, 2012, p. xi).  
This convergence of desire and knowledge is especially apparent in the literary reading 
of texts, including that which takes place in pedagogical contexts—a process described 
by Louise Rosenblatt (1986, 1994, 1995, 2005) as ‘transactional’ in an effort to shift 
attention away from any message readers might receive from a given text and place the 
emphasis on what occurs when we read a literary work. As Rosenblatt explains: “Sharp 
demarcation between objective and subjective becomes irrelevant, since they are, 
rather, aspects of the same transaction—the reader looks to the text, and the text is 
activated by the reader” (Rosenblatt, 1994, p. 18). 
Georges Poulet, in describing the ways in which a book claims a reader, identifies 
dynamics and processes characteristic of pedagogies of desire, but also suggestive of 
seduction and sexual merging: “take a book, and you will find it offering, opening 
itself” (Poulet, 1972, p. 57). As Poulet sees it, successful transactional reading 
necessitates a falling away of barriers between reader and text—“you are inside it; it is 
inside you; there is no longer either outside or inside” (Poulet, 1972, p. 57)—not unlike 
that which occurs whenever the classroom becomes “a space in which the teacher and 
the student ‘seduce’ each other and capture each other’s desire” (Zembylas, 2007b, p. 
333). If, in a pedagogical setting, as at other sites of seduction, someone is successfully 
‘won over,’ this happens not by force, but through allurement. In Spivakian terms, 
desires are uncoercively rearranged. Because, for Spivak, “all texts . . . are 
transactional, and they teach you how to read, not just the text but also the world” 
(Spivak, 2014, p. 51), transactional reading itself “is a theory of reading in the strongest 
possible sense,” especially insofar as it gestures towards the possibility of action 
through “active transaction between past and future” (Spivak, 1998, p. 272). In other 
words, literary reading facilitates a teleiopoiesis that stretches the reader’s imagination 
beyond the frame of the here and now. 
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While Spivak does not explicitly concern herself with sexuality education as such, she 
is well aware, as I have mentioned earlier, that the first difference is sexual difference. 
Sexual difference becomes the impetus for our invention and articulation of a whole 
series of consequent binaries related to sex and sexuality which form the taken-for-
granted fabric of many sexuality education programmes. In promoting transactional 
reading, Spivak urges a deconstructive approach to texts which “would put these 
oppositions into question” (Spivak, 1998, p. 272) through an examination of “how we 
inscribe ourselves in sexual difference” (Spivak, 2012, p. 392). Such an approach is 
invaluable in that it is able to bring to light and challenge the unexamined assumptions 
which all too often underpin the design and teaching of mandated sexuality education 
programmes. For these generally tend to reflect and serve dominant educational 
ideologies and, as a consequence, neglect or marginalize queer and other minority 
perspectives on matters of gender, sex and sexuality. 
By arguing for her particular brand of transactional reading, Spivak seems to encourage 
readers to allow themselves to be seduced by the text, but also to resist it—the one in 
order to counter or reverse the other. In doing so, Spivak points to the entanglement of 
desire and sexuality that inevitably occurs whenever readers actively engage with a 
text: “To be sure, to learn to read well is to say ‘yes, yes’ to the text, if only in order to 
say ‘no,’ in other words to perform it, if only against the grain” (Spivak, 2012, p. 47). 
If, as Spivak explains, this affirmation and negation on the reader’s part provides “a 
toe-hold” that enables the reader not only to enter the text, but also to participate in its 
desire, if not in the desire’s fulfilment, it is because learning to read in this counter-
intuitive way offers the kind of training that “makes the muscles of the ethical reflex 
stronger” (Spivak, 2014, pp. 56, 57). As Spivak sees it, in saying ‘yes’ to a text, the 
reader submits to the pleasure of being directed, moved and formed by the words on the 
page. Yet, by simultaneously resisting the pull of the text, the reader refuses to be 
“consolidated and sedimented” as subject by it—but only in order that she “can go on 
saying ‘yes,’ indefinitely” (Spivak, 2012, p. 39).  
This dynamic—the incessant making and unmaking of meaning—which Spivak argues 
develops the ethical response, is especially pronounced in the reading of fiction where, 
“even in the most simple reading, according to rudimentary or sophisticated hypotheses 
about persons, places, and times” (Spivak, 2012, p. 37), the reader is required to 
imagine herself as the one for whom the text was written. In other words, every reader 
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must allow herself to be positioned by the text so that her mind comes to resemble “the 
mind of the so-called implied reader” (Spivak, 2012, p. 37). The same holds true, I 
suggest, when it comes to the ‘reading’ of sex. For the shuttling dynamics of ‘yes’ and 
‘no,’ which operate in the context of literary reading, helping to strengthen the ethical 
reflex, are also at work in pedagogical spaces, including those of sexuality education. 
However, without a leap of the imagination anything written, spoken, or otherwise 
performed within the spaces of sexuality education or literary reading will have little 
impact. The experiencing/reading subject must be willing and able to grasp that what is 
received is destined for her. 
Deleuze, like Spivak, understands reading to be an activity laden with ethical 
implications. Although coming at the matter from a different angle to Spivak, 
Deleuze—who theorizes ethics in terms of how we “assess what we do, what we say, in 
relation to the ways of existing involved” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 100), rather than as 
blueprint for acting derived from transcendent values of good and evil—similarly 
rejects the notion that characters in literature are there to be judged or imitated. 
Literature, like ethics, must concern itself with becoming—in other words, with the 
maximizing of those forces and connections that expand and extend life’s possibilities. 
If writing, to the extent that it is always becoming, is “always incomplete, always in the 
midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience” 
(Deleuze, 1997, p. 1), then the same can also be said of reading.  
In contrast to most readers who see a book or other text “as a box with something inside 
and start looking for what it signifies”—that is, they are fascinated by the signifiers and 
go in search of a meaning to attach to them—Deleuze envisages a way of reading that 
both acknowledges and departs from the strictly transactional, one where the book is 
viewed “as a little non-signifying machine” (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 7, 8). Deleuze’s 
approach side-lines questions of hermeneutics, spot-lighting instead the text’s 
operability: “‘Does it work, and how does it work?’ How does it work for you?” 
(Deleuze, 1995, p. 8). In rejecting the taken-for-granted notion that a book is “an image 
of the world” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 11), Deleuze affirms that reader and text 
“overwrite and iterate one another until the two become inseparable, indiscrete entities” 
(Cole, 2009, p. 34). This position is not too far removed from Rosenblatt’s claim that in 
the act of reading each becomes the other’s environment, or from Spivak’s assertion 
that “the effort of reading is to taste the impossible status of being figured as object in 
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the web of the other” (Spivak, 2012, p. 317). For Deleuze, the reading of a literary text 
requires a sensitivity towards intensities and flows of desire that extend beyond the 
book itself: “Writing is one flow among others, with no special place in relation to the 
others, that comes into relations of current, countercurrent, and eddy with other flows—
flows of shit, sperm, words, action, eroticism, money, politics, and so on” (Deleuze, 
1995, p. 8). 
If, as Deleuze suggests, “reading with love” requires that the reader read intensively, 
this is with the intention of facilitating an engagement with those aspects of a text that 
resist signification—“flows, revolutionary active lines of flight, lines of absolute 
decoding rather than any intellectual culture” (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 9, 22). Deleuze urges 
the reader to embrace this responsibility, not because of his own affinity with vitalist 
thinkers, including Bergson, William James and Nietzsche, whose philosophies “focus 
on emergent processes that develop in unpredictable ways and sustain themselves by 
means of their own internal logic” (Moses, 2014, p. 3), but because literary reading, 
like literary writing, has the ability to invent “ways of living, of surviving, resisting, 
and freeing life” (Marks, 1998, p. 125). This happens by de-emphasizing the 
consciousness of the reader as “a mind reacting to itself—to its own thoughts, ideas, or 
memories” (Moses, 2014, p. 203). Deleuze, in calling for ways of reading that decentre 
the subject and subjectivity, and open up “a world in which individuations are 
impersonal, and singularities are pre-individual,” seeks to promote what he terms “a 
Cogito for a dissolved self” (Deleuze, 2014, p. xvii). To embrace this Cogito, is to 
commit oneself to an ethics that is focussed on maximizing, not limiting, life’s 
possibilities. 
As Deleuze and Guattari see it, if reading has any role to play in the dissolution of the 
self and of finding new ways of living in the world, it is in the context of the emergence 
of a minor literature—writing which to the extent that it is characterized by “a high 
coefficient of deterritorialization” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 16) facilitates a 
physical, mental or spiritual undoing of all that is habitual. It is in this context that 
literary reading, insofar as it mobilizes and releases desire, enabling readers to view the 
world from a minoritarian perspective, becomes a powerful pedagogical tool. In 
Deleuzo-Guattarian terms, when “teachers and students make available to themselves 
the forces of pleasure and the powerful flows of desire”—for example, through the act 
of reading—they may discover themselves in “a landscape of becoming” (Zembylas, 
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2007b, p. 332) where representations, significations, regularities and certainties are 
overtaken by flows and intensities that break established codes. As language’s 
signifiers become conduits of force, intensity and desire, and, thus, “regain the other of 
signification” (Genosko, 2016, p. 8), readers will find themselves increasingly ‘at sea,’ 
no longer able to rely on their own previous experience (of reading or of the world) in 
their efforts to find and uphold a stable meaning in the text. From a Deleuzo-Guattarian 
perspective, this disorientation or defamiliarization, though unsettling for readers, is 
potentially very productive because it stimulates “a sobering process by which the 
knowing subject disengages itself from the dominant normative vision of the self he or 
she had become accustomed to” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 167). Reading minor literature—or 
any literary text viewed through a minoritarian lens—in this way prepares a subject to 
become “relational in a complex manner that connects it to multiple others” (Braidotti, 
2013, p. 167). 
Deleuze and Guattari, in proposing that readers approach a book as “an assemblage” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 4)—which in its multiplicity is “shaped by and acts on a 
wide range of flows” (Livesey, 2010, p. 18)—attest to the impossibility of attributing to 
a text a stable definition. Rather, a text’s meaning is always in flux. This is because of 
“the particular way in which a particular reader connects to it” (Hamilton, 2018, p. 13) 
on a particular occasion. If in Deleuze and Guattari’s view, a book has no secrets to 
reveal, what it does imply are “strata and territories” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 3), 
intimations of the familiar or the same—certain repetitions of words, phrases, language 
structures, or of the images they create—from which readers attempt to construct 
interpretations of the text. As they do so, readers will also sense a text’s “seemingly 
inherent resistance to organization” (Hamilton, 2018, p. 12), that is, its apparent 
inability to provide a unified, unambiguous meaning. This is the case with “lines of 
flight” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 3), those multiple inclinations within the reader-
text assemblage “that could evolve in creative mutations” (Lorraine, 2010, p. 147) and 
which work to move the assemblage beyond its present form. In other words, when a 
reader encounters a text there is always desiring-production, a potential for the 
production of the new. Key to the actualization of the new in the reader-text encounter 
is the reader’s willingness to risk defamiliarization, a readiness to see texts as 
“passageways that have the potential to transform our way of thinking about (any 
aspect of) the world” (Hamilton, 2018, p. 13). Like Spivak, who insists that readers 
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must incessantly juggle with the multiplicity of possible meanings that a text 
suggests— thus, indefinitely deferring the attribution of any final meaning to it—
Deleuzo-Guattarian approaches to reading view encounters between readers and texts, 
including those that take place in explicitly pedagogical contexts, as opportunities to 
keep meaning on the move, thus, providing “some possible escape routes from 
enclosure” (Cole & Masny, 2014, p. 1). With meaning always taken to be multiple, 
processes of defamiliarization are stimulated and “dominating paradigms that are intent 
on control and exploitation” (Cole & Masny, 2014, p. 1) undermined. 
If new thought is “born along the line of flight of the literary encounter” (Hamilton, 
2018, p. 13), lines of flight within the reader-text assemblage also imply both “a sort of 
delirium”—a délirer or going off the rails, as Deleuze describes it—and a betrayal of 
“the fixed powers which try to hold us back, the established powers of the earth” 
(Deleuze & Parnet, 2006, p. 30). This is so because lines of flight work against the 
tendency to absolutize and essentialize such constructions as ego or subject. Notions 
such as the dissolved self or deterritorialization are articulated on the basis that 
“individuals find a real name for themselves . . . only through the harshest exercise in 
depersonalization, by opening themselves up to the multiplicities everywhere within 
them, to the intensities running through them” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 6). Clearly, given that 
a Deleuzo-Guattarian pedagogy of desire is premised on a willingness to embrace 
ambiguity and challenge established boundaries, it “does not escape the tensions 
between risks and pleasures in teacher-student encounters” (Zembylas, 2007b, p. 332), 
whether or not these encounters are mediated by the reading of a literary text. Lines of 
flight not only serve to account for “an erotic frisson that propels and sabotages the 
practices of education” (Gilbert, 2014, p. x), but also for literary reading’s particular 
ability to stir the pot of sexuality, especially, perhaps, when sexual elements are veiled 
by a text rather than directly presented, as is often the case with YA literature.  
Reading for More Spacious Worlds 
In the context of school-based sexuality education, then, where risks and pleasures are 
both corporeal and explicit, the literary reading of texts dealing with so-called ‘non-
normative’ expressions of sexuality—or the presence of queer-themed fiction in the 
school library—can be expected to provoke educational conflicts. While these may 
reflect “large-scale cultural battles about sexuality,” they also indicate “how the most 
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intimate of our experiences can come to shape how we see and act in the world” 
(Gilbert, 2014, p. xiii). 
In such circumstances, an approach to literary reading sympathetic to Poulet’s 
supposition that a book is not just one thing among many, but an object waiting to be 
transported away from its materiality and immobility—a gift asking to be read—will 
set off alarm bells for some sexuality educators. This is to be expected given that such 
an approach seems to invite vulnerable young readers to let down their guard and open 
themselves up to the potentially dangerous “quantity of significations” (Poulet, 1972, p. 
57) issuing from the pages in front of them. For, as Poulet puts it, a book, in welcoming 
me, “lets me look deep inside itself, and even allows me, with unheard-of license, to 
think what it thinks and feel what it feels” (Poulet, 1972, p. 57). Although they would 
take issue with aspects of Poulet’s approach to books and reading—his notions of 
immateriality and interiority, for example—Spivak and Deleuze, in their different ways, 
also argue that a book is of value to the extent that it allows its readers to think other 
and to resist the habitual.  
Implicit in the act of reading, as Poulet presents it, but also in the very notion of 
queerness, is a sense of both the singularity and the otherness of the self. If singularity 
“is something that happens over and over, each time differently, in the life of the 
literary work” (Attridge, 2015, p. 138)—as it is read in various but particular 
contexts—then, concomitant with this singularity is the recognition by the reader, not 
only of “the alterity of one’s self” (Sorensen, 2010, p. 34), but also of the self’s 
ungeneralizability. This recognition acknowledges the awareness of the divisions 
within the self, as well as its inconsistency and instability. Furthermore, it is through 
“the introduction into the known of that which it excludes in constituting itself as the 
known” (Attridge, 2015, p. 219) that literary reading is able to challenge established 
epistemological, ontological and ethical paradigms. This happens as it disturbs mental 
and emotional structures, and shifts habitual ways of thinking and feeling. Insofar as the 
act of literary reading “unveils otherness to the reader” (Sorensen, 2010, p. 35), it 
becomes an event—“an unpredictable occurrence . . . that brings about a change” 
(Attridge, 2015, p. 40)—which, as Spivak explains, implies “an indeterminate ‘sharing’ 
between writer and reader” (Spivak, 2012, p. 317). Whether this occurrence is 
explained in relation to Spivakian teleiopoiesis, or from a Deleuzo-Guattarian 
perspective as “engagement with the otherness of our immanent and fluid relations to 
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our selves, each other and the world” (Sholtz & Carr, 2018, p. 461), what marks it is a 
willingness on the part of the reader to resist the temptation to appropriate or master the 
situation by thinking unicity rather than admitting multiplicity. In that reading involves 
a kind of suspension of the sense of self, it also develops in readers an ability to be at 
home with paradox and the queer. 
If reading is always an uncertain and potentially risky activity that challenges habitual 
ways of thinking and seeing the world, its goal, as Spivak and Deleuze and Guattari see 
it, is never the destruction of the reading subject. Spivak’s aesthetic education, for 
example, in seeking to train the imagination by directing readers to inhabit 
unacknowledged double binds through teleiopoiesis, aims to bring about an exposure 
which “would destroy that habitation” (Spivak, 2012, p. xiii)—but, not the reader. In 
other words, Spivak, by opening the reader to “a logic of destabilization always already 
on the move in ‘things themselves’” (Royle, 2000, p. 11), equips her to denaturalize 
and deconstruct those dichotomies that found and support taken-for-granted hierarchies 
through the manipulation of difference. Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari, who, while 
appearing at times to place the practice of literary reading in the service of self-
dissolution and the obliteration of any distinction between self and other, caution 
against throwing out the baby with the bath water. In warning of the unmitigated risks 
involved in any effort to dismantle the subject, they point to the need “to keep small 
rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant 
reality” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 160). 
As Deleuze and Guattari see it, what is called for—in reading as in ‘life’—is not so 
much the dissolution of the subject as a “depersonalization through love,” a process 
whereby “one becomes a set of liberated singularities, words, names, fingernails, 
things, animals, little events” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 7). When one loves—and opens up “to 
more spacious worlds, to masses and large aggregates” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 
294)—one enters a disjunctive synthesis, a relation-without-relation, through which 
“one can be this or this or this, and this and this and this” (Colebrook, 2010, p. 81). In 
other words, when disjunction is acknowledged as a mode of desiring-production, the 
constraints of either/or ways of thinking are left behind. By ignoring the logic of 
binaries—the logic of the excluded middle—series of what Deleuze calls “larval 
subjects” (Deleuze, 2014, pp. 103, 104, 151) are produced: “not persons but points of 
relative stability resulting from connection” (Colebrook, 2010, p. 80).  
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When disjunction as a mode of desiring-production is recognized as operating 
transversally or queerly, crossing and connecting different potentials and investing 
territories in an effort to multiply relations, the movement of desire may then be 
understood as the movement of eros—not eros “bound between a subject and its other” 
(Sholtz & Carr, 2018, p. 461), but eros as the proliferation of desire and the initiation of 
becomings. If Spivak’s aesthetic education promises to train us in one way of releasing 
desire from the binaries that bind it, including those foundational to customary 
understandings of sex and sexuality, Deleuze and Guattari direct us to take another path 
in the pursuit of what has been termed “infinite eros” (Sholtz & Carr, 2018, pp. 455–
465), a trajectory which Elizabeth Grosz has assiduously advanced in her own 
exploration of ways in which functioning bodies transform understandings of space, 
time, knowledge and desire.  
In emphasizing that sexuality and desire are “energies, excitations, impulses, actions, 
movements, practices, moments, pulses of feeling” (Grosz, 1995, p. 182), rather than 
aspirations, fantasies, hopes or wishes, Grosz directs us to see how at a micro level and 
in a corporeal sense sex and sexuality are less the products of human agency than the 
result of the movement of eros in/across/through/around/over series of body parts—
vagina, penis, anus, nipples, mouth and tongue among them, but also toes, nose, 
fingers, hands, elbows—and of the on-going territorialization, deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization of various colours, sounds, smells, textures that result. This 
movement is not contained within “a predesignated erotogenic zone, a site always ready 
and able to function as erotic” (Grosz, 1995, p. 182), as psychoanalysis proposes, but 
extends beyond the human body to those sites of machinic connection and interruption 
where one thing or surface engages or disengages with another. It is at those points and 
moments where surfaces meet—for example, where a nose sniffs a lemonwood, a 
finger brushes against the bark of a kauri, toes sink into mud, or a piece of toilet paper 
wipes an arse—that eros makes itself felt in “rhythms, intensities, pulsations, 
movements” (Grosz, 1995, p. 182). These, in their provisionality, temporality, and 
singularity, always resist generalization and universalization. 
While Grosz’s work challenges us “to abandon our habitual understanding of entities as 
the integrated totality, and instead focus on the elements, the parts, outside of their 
integration or organization,” it also advances the argument for a choreographic 
approach to sexuality education in that it figures desire as a force, which as it 
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ceaselessly moves, creates “encounters, interfaces between one part and another of 
bodies or body-things” (Grosz, 1995, p. 182). Thus, if, as has been claimed, an “infinite 
eros speaks to philosophy as a dance of differences” (Sholtz & Carr, 2018, p. 460), then 
it also makes sense, I believe, for sexuality education to take advantage of those 
theorizations of desire that not only attend to desiring-production, but which also 
imagine the mobility of desire in choreographic terms, that is, as movement that 
disrupts “habitual ways of connecting, recording and consuming” (Hughes, 2015, p. 
69)—and, hence, of thinking. For, rather than prioritizing the subjective ‘I’ caught up in 
movement, an exploration of the possibilities of choreographic thought attends to the 
thinking of movement as event, as well as to how the potential for thinking movement 
might be realised. 
Received understandings of choreography, at least in the West, have tended to afford 
prestige to the role of the individual choreographer—the human agent, traditionally 
male, who determines, maps and directs the moves within a particular work or art form, 
sometimes in an autocratic fashion. However, if choreographic ways of thinking are to 
benefit sexuality education, it is necessary to distinguish between such retrograde 
views, which find support in the notion that “the uniquely personal vision of an 
‘auteur’” (Copeland, 2011, p. 50) is an indispensable factor in the production of quality 
art, and other more expansive approaches to choreography that take advantage of 
“wider perspectives of bodily being-in-the-world” (Monni, 2008, p. 37). The latter 
work to broaden the definition of choreography by stressing its utility as “a tool of 
understanding and change, in reinventing relations to destabilise sedimentary 
stagnation” (Terlingo, 2008, p. 17). As Klien explains: 
The term ‘choreography” was transposed to the field of human relations, as a 
way of seeing the world, an art of interaction and interference with . . . an art of 
traversing . . . the everyday governance of relations and dynamics, expressed in 
physical movement or ideas. (Klien & Valk, 2008, pp. 21–22) 
Embracing as it does both Klien’s concept of “‘Choreography as an Aesthetics of 
Change’” (Klien & Valk, 2008, p. 21) and Bersani’s commitment to choreography as a 
means of furthering new relational modes, it is this wider perspective that informs and 
enables the sort of choreographic approach to the pedagogy of sexuality education 
which I advance. It is a perspective which also supports a choreographic 
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conceptualization of literary reading in that it accounts for “the ways in which texts 
extend, interrupt or displace” (Hughes, 2015, p. 69) the familiar and the habitual 
through the movement of desire. To use a Deleuzo-Guattarian metaphor, literature 
activates our desiring-machines, giving rise, as we read, to affects and becomings. Or, 
as Spivak puts it, “reading literature closely” exercises “the imagination to play the 
double bind” (Spivak, 2012, p. 12), an activity which brings about its own uncoercive 
rearrangement of desires. 
While the psychoanalytical tradition has consistently relied upon and worked with the 
concept of depth, drawing our attention to that which lies ‘buried’ in the psyche—the 
unconscious mental processes and motives that determine much of human behaviour—
“the important thing for Deleuze is not discovering new depths but rather producing 
new surfaces” (Lapoujade, 2017, p. 50). By adopting the notion of the ‘plane’—a term 
used to denote “the autonomous existence of a surface” (Lapoujade, 2017, p. 51) upon 
which all movement takes places and all determination is made—Deleuze not only 
emphasizes the superficial, but in the process discredits the requirement, dear to 
psychoanalysis, that all being, all movement, must be explained in terms of ‘ground’ or 
‘grounding’. Grosz, like Deleuze and Guattari before her, also stresses that movement 
occurs on surfaces. What we term libidinal desire—or “desire as corporeal 
intensification”—involves “being thrown into an interchange with an other whose 
surface intersects one’s own” (Grosz, 1995, p. 200). Thus, desire’s inscription of 
erotogenic surfaces is best imagined in transversal terms, as extending and cutting 
across planes, rather than penetrating inward to form and enclose interiors. One benefit 
of re-conceptualizing the movement of desire in this way is that it collapses the 
distinction between “the surface of pure thought” and “the noisy depths of the body” 
(Lapoujade, 2017, p. 154)—the binary of surface and depth—and so challenges certain 
abyssal forms of thinking to which sexuality education is prone.  
Attention to surface at the expense of depth, in addition to supporting the anti-
psychoanalytical argument that “the unconscious has no pre-given form or essential 
structure and that there is no state to which it might return in support of health or 
perfection” (Hughes, 2015, p. 63), also undermines the very notion of interiority, which 
since the time of Freud has shaped dominant approaches not only to the human 
personality but also to literary characterization. Up until very recently writers and 
readers of fiction have generally been able to presume ‘interiority’—the idea that a 
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fictional character not only ‘exists’ in “a kind of enfolded space that is an island of 
separateness in the world that surrounds it” (Bourassa, 2009, p. 7), but also that 
important aspects of that character always remain hidden from the world. Nor are these 
‘secret’ elements, including desires and emotions, able to be accessed by the character’s 
own consciousness, even though they contribute significantly to the character’s 
formation and development. 
In directing us to forsake depth for surface, the likes of Elizabeth Grosz and Deleuze 
and Guattari throw into question E. M. Forster’s famous dictum that it is “the function 
of the novelist to reveal the hidden life at its source” (Forster, 1927, p. 66). Yet, with 
the refiguring of desire as a force that moves across surfaces rather than as an emotion 
that operates within and between characters, we are better equipped to read literature, 
especially fiction, in new and exciting ways. ‘Human’ attributes or qualities—of 
emotion, inwardness, individuality, experience (the latter being the elements in the plot 
that determine and illustrate a character’s ‘development’), potentiality, and meaning, 
for instance—which writers have readily attached to their fictional creations in an effort 
to make them seem ‘life-like,’ lose their fascination when readers abandon notions of 
depth and refocus their attention on the movement or flow that takes place on the 
various surfaces or planes that are made present through the reading of a novel. A shift 
in emphasis in literary reading from “the humanness of the human” (Bourassa, 2009, p. 
18) facilitates the reader’s affirmative recognition of the presence of the nonhuman in 
encounters with the fictional text, that is, with language and its other. For, “force is the 
other of language without which language would not be what it is” (Derrida, 1978, p. 
27).  
In literary reading, as Bourassa argues, the nonhuman—or more-than-human—comes 
in various modalities which Deleuze, for example, conceptualizes as affect, the event, 
force, singularity, the outside, and the virtual. These modalities “exist in relations of 
resonance with each other, of differential repetition, of imperfect overlap, of mutual 
intensification, and, at times of mutual capture” (Bourassa, 2009, p. 24). If lines of 
flight, that is, movements of deterritorialization or destratification, are “the conceptual 
tools which best allow us to map Deleuze’s ethics of reading” (Smith, 2007, p. 50)—
including the presence and dynamics of the nonhuman or more-than-human—they also 
serve us well when considering the relationship between reading and writing. While 
writing “expresses the lines of flight charting bodies (both personal and collective),” in 
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reading “one either resonates with lines of flight or one doesn’t” (Smith, 2007, pp. 50, 
51). 
If lines of flight, becomings, and deterritorializations are concepts often employed 
interchangeably by Deleuze—as a way of addressing at the level of language the 
territorialization implicit in such a notion as ‘images of thought’—this is, in part, 
because of “the Deleuzian drive toward conceptual production” (Smith, 2007, p. 37), a 
dynamic which, I believe, needs to be taken account of in any rethinking of sexuality 
education. For, by positioning desire as “the force of positive production, the action that 
creates things, makes alliances, and forges interactions,” it becomes possible to re-
imagine sexuality education as unrestricted by “blueprints, models, ideals, or goals” 
(Grosz, 1995, pp. 179, 180), as experimental, inventive, open-ended—and, thus, better 
able to take advantage of curiosity and cope with uncertainty.  
Some Common Ground 
At first glance, Spivak’s aesthetic education, preoccupied as it is with shifting ideas 
through the uncoercive rearrangement of desires—that is, with “epistemological 
reterritorialization” (Spivak, 2012, p. 544, endnote 2)—seems at a distance from the 
work of Deleuze and Guattari which is more obviously concerned with ontological 
matters, the material world, and the movement of bodies. Yet, in respect of any 
potential contribution that the respective approaches of Spivak and of Deleuze and 
Guattari might make to the re-envisioning of sexuality education in Aotearoa New 
Zealand—and to its queering—it is important to acknowledge that they occupy 
considerable common ground.  
A closer examination of Spivak’s aesthetic education reveals that her unwillingness to 
place desire in the service of any telos or predetermined end positions her much nearer 
to Deleuze and Guattari than to the psychoanalytical tradition where desire always 
circulates within the orbit of the Daddy-Mummy-Me triad. On the one hand, there is a 
clear resonance between Spivak’s insistence that “the world needs an epistemological 
change that will rearrange desires” (Spivak, 2012, p. 2) and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theorization of desire as a “positive and productive” (Ross, 2010, p. 65) force. On the 
other, Spivak’s warning against any “tendency towards totalization” (Spivak, 2000, p. 
23) that would attempt to make the undecidable decidable clearly aligns with Deleuze 
and Guattari’s refusal to personalize desire. If Deleuze and Guattari “de-sexualise and 
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de-individualise desire” (Ross, 2010, p. 66), so, too, in her own way does Spivak who is 
primarily concerned with desire’s role in the activation of the imagination, the structure 
which she posits as necessary for “thinking absent things” (Spivak, 2012, p. 16). Thus, 
Spivak, by refusing to outline any theory of her own about the origins of desire, signals 
that she, like Deleuze and Guattari, is much more interested in desire’s operation—
what desire can do and how it moves—than in speculating about its genealogy. As she 
says, in regard to such speculation, “the ‘perhaps’ decides” (Spivak, 2000, p. 23).  
As I have argued, both Spivakian and Deleuzo-Guattarian theorizations of desire have 
much to offer sexuality education in that they inform the practice of literary reading in 
ways that provoke queer or “aberrant movements” (Lapoujade, 2017). As Rajchman 
explains, “a movement may be said to be ‘ab-errant’ just when it breaks away from a 
given rational logic, physical, social or mental, and veers off on new paths, in an 
unchartered zone, without inside or outside, up nor down, start or finish” (Rajchman, 
2017, p. 9). If, as Zembylas puts it, “desire in pedagogical relations is always 
movement” (Zembylas, 2007b, p. 340), then the pedagogical practice of literary reading 
in the context of sexuality education is especially prone to producing unexpected or 
aberrant outcomes because it draws one into the risky business of thinking one’s own 
thoughts “moored to love, hate, loss, and disappointment—the emotional geography of 
our sexual lives” (Gilbert, 2014, p. 65). Given Brian Massumi’s claim that thought 
never arrives unaccompanied by physical sensation, and that “in the experience of 
reading, conscious thought, sensation, and all the modalities of perception fold into and 
out of each other” (Massumi, 2002, p. 139), it seems fair to conclude that readers will 
encounter the aberrant and the queer affectively as well as cognitively. This, perhaps, is 
especially the case when so-called hot-to-handle topics are addressed in sexuality 
education, for the classroom is no less likely a space for the emergence of intensities 
than the private places to which most people prefer sexuality to be confined. As Grosz 
puts it, “the bedroom is no more the privileged site of sexuality than any other space; 
sexuality and desire are part of the intensity and passion of life itself” (Grosz, 1995, p. 
181), including life at school.  
Yet when sexuality—that which “is most foreign in each of us” because we are not in 
control of its meanings—is invited into the classroom, it “pushes against the laws of 
hospitality, is a disruptive guest, breaks rules, and is rarely a good role model” (Gilbert, 
2014, p. 92). The fact that literary reading, as I have presented it, is “an encounter 
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composed through a text that is not entirely under its own control and is not reducible 
to a single affective referent” (Bradway, 2017, p. vii)—this because the transactional 
nature of the reader-text relationship determines that reader and text together are 
opening a space of potentiality—adds to the unpredictability of an already potentially 
volatile situation. This is, perhaps, especially so when the encounter takes place in the 
context of sexuality education. 
Some Concluding Remarks 
In the light of my claim that literary reading has a positive contribution to make to the 
re-envisioning of sexuality education—and in the context of Spivak’s advocacy of an 
aesthetic education that will uncoercively rearrange desires through reading—it should 
have come as no surprise, then, that in this chapter I have argued the benefits of 
adopting a Deleuzo-Guattarian theorization of desire, pointing out its affinities with the 
queer as well as with Spivak’s own work. For such an understanding enables readers to 
engage in the literary reading of texts so that “intensities and surfaces rather than 
latencies and depth” (Grosz, 1995, p. 183) are privileged. The latter, of course, are a 
preoccupation of those psychoanalytical approaches to literature which equate quality 
fiction with those literary works where characters are most life-like, that is, 
psychologically convincing.  
However, if, as Bersani states, “questions of character are precisely a kind of 
petrification of the ability to move” (Royle, 2016, p. 266), then the sorts of reading 
made possible by Spivakian, Deleuzo-Guattarian, and queer approaches to texts—
readings that not only counter the tendency to freeze character or fix meaning in 
relation to other textual features—are to be welcomed for their ability to keep desire 
moving along aberrant trajectories. This focus on movement, as a process of making 
and unmaking, is potentially very productive, especially given that calls for “a new 
politics of attention might also involve paying attention to the process of sexuality 
education rather than pre-existing ends or aims” (Allen, 2018b, p. 134).  
If, as MacLure has argued in respect to methodologies used in qualitative research, 
more attention needs to be paid to those moments of the process that “confound the 
industrious search for meaning, and instead exert a kind of fascination” (MacLure, 
2017, p. 52), then greater emphasis should also be given, I believe, to the practice of 
literary reading in the context of sexuality education. For literary reading, insofar as it 
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draws attention to intensities—to those movements and moments in the encounter with 
the text that “‘glow’” (MacLure, 2017, p. 52)—shifts attention from fixed meanings 
and ends to the mobility of desire, including its tendency to veer and queer. And there 
are plenty of opportunities for sexuality educators and their students to experience this 
‘glow,’ these aberrant movements, through encounters with texts drawn from the ever-
expanding world of YA literature with LGBTQ+ content.  
In the final chapter of my thesis which follows, I turn to one such text—William 
Taylor’s Pebble in a Pool—in order to explore not only the ‘glow’ of shame, but also 






Drawing to an End . . . 
. . . to a reparatively positioned reader, it can seem realistic and necessary to experience 
surprise. Because there can be terrible surprises, however, there can also be good ones. 
Hope, often a fracturing, even a traumatic thing to experience, is among the energies by 
which the reparatively positioned reader tries to organize the fragments and part-
objects she encounters or creates. Because the reader has room to realize that the future 
may be different from the present, it is also possible for her to entertain such 
profoundly painful, profoundly relieving, ethically crucial possibilities as that the past, 
in turn, could have happened differently from the way it actually did. (Sedgwick, 2003, 
p. 146) 
Overview 
One of the significant challenges that sexuality educators face is how to deal adequately 
in the classroom with those affects which are experienced or perceived either by 
themselves or their students as ‘negative’. In this brief chapter, I suggest how the sorts 
of Spivakian, Bersanian, Deleuzo-Guattarian, and queer theorizations around desire and 
its movement—including its relation to literary reading—which I have concerned 
myself with in this thesis might helpfully inform the treatment of shame, among the 
most intense of affects or negative feelings requiring “depathologization” (Cvetkovich, 
2012, p. 5). This I will do with reference to the opening sentences of William Taylor’s 
YA novel, Pebble in a Pool (2003). 
. . . Reparatively, Not Shamefully  
Silvan Tomkins, in claiming that “the pulsations of cathexis around shame, of all 
things, are what either enable or disenable so basic a function as the ability to be 
interested in the world” (Sedgwick & Frank, 1995, p. 500), suggests that shame is “the 
primary affect of intersubjective life” (O’Donnell, 2017, p. 1). If discourses on shame 
are commonly marked by such recurring motifs as personal inadequacy, low self-
esteem, inability to meet a moral standard or ideal determined by others or oneself, 
social ostracism, and objectification and marginalization by others, this is because 
“shame attaches to and sharpens the sense of what one is” (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 37). In 
that it “works on and through bodies . . . shame also involves the de-forming and 
reforming of bodily and social spaces” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 103), causing the subject to 
turn away from self and from others. Insofar as shame interrupts positive self-
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identification, it reconstructs an identity characterized by inhibition and isolation at the 
expense of enthusiasm and joy. 
As Ahmed observes, given that “shame can also be experienced as the affective cost of 
not following the scripts of normative existence” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 107), it is hardly 
surprising that those whose sexual desires, pleasures, objects of love, or claimed 
identities are deemed by themselves or others to be queer—that is, they deviate or veer 
from dominant social, cultural and familial ideals—are particularly susceptible to 
extreme levels of shame and melancholy. This is often apparent in the sexuality 
education classroom, not only when queer students and teachers “experience shame and 
vulnerability with regard to sexual feelings that they perceive as out of their control or 
not within prescribed norms” (Lamb, 2014, p. 143), but also in relation to non-
conforming gender identities. While the presence of shame is more markedly obvious 
in the case of “impoverished or inaccurate sexuality education” (Fischel, 2016, p. 
147)—for example, in those abstinence-based programmes where it is explicitly 
manipulated as a means of scaring young people off same-sex relationships, premarital 
sex, getting pregnant, or catching an STI or STD—shame is also inadequately 
addressed in other less paranoid contexts, including those programmes dealing with 
sexual abuse and the emotional trauma arising from it. Yet, in its efforts “to support the 
positive and holistic development and health of all students in New Zealand primary, 
intermediate, and secondary schools” (Ministry of Education, 2015, p. 3), shame is 
ignored both by the Ministry of Education’s Sexuality education: A guide for 
principals, boards of trustees, and teachers (2015) and its recent “refreshed guidelines” 
(Ministry of Education, 2020a, 2020b, p. 7). Nor does it merit a mention in the 
Education Review Office’s Promoting wellbeing through sexuality education (2018). 
On the other hand, Eve Sedgwick’s process for depathologizing shame, depression, 
failure, melancholy and negative feelings through the practice of reparative reading—
an approach which emphasizes “multiplicity, surprise, rich divergence, consolation, 
creativity, and love” (Love, 2010, p. 237) as a means of countering damaging paranoia 
and hopelessness—provides sexuality educators with a strong pedagogical tool. As 
Sedgwick makes clear in the epigraph to this chapter, the reparatively positioned reader 
works from a position of hope, entertaining the notion that the future may be different 
from the present and that the past may have happened differently. So, too, do Pitt and 
Britzman, who in their “speculations on qualities of difficult knowledge in teaching and 
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learning” (Pitt & Britzman, 2003, p. 755) explore and problematize those pedagogical 
approaches that attempt to deal with trauma, including shameful thoughts and 
experiences, by way of its representation and narration. By linking anxious thought to 
those encounters with knowledge that gives rise to feelings of shame, Pitt and Britzman 
draw attention to the “ordinary yet ubiquitous trauma of having to learn” (Pitt & 
Britzman, 2003, p. 770). If “lovely knowledge” is the comforting knowledge that we 
are required to give up when we open ourselves up “to accept the losses that compose 
the force of learning” (Pitt & Britzman, 2003, p. 766), then ‘difficult knowledge’ is that 
new knowledge which we construct from the wreckage of old meanings. In asking 
“what it means to represent and narrate ‘difficult knowledge’” (Pitt & Britzman, 2003, 
p. 756)—this includes, I suggest, the varieties of knowledge that often come to light in 
the spaces opened up by sexuality education—Pitt and Britzman invite reflection on the 
complexities of such an exercise in the broader context of teaching and learning:  
Where does one situate the event that is experience? In the past that is narrated 
or in the presence of its interpretation? (Pitt & Britzman, 2003, p. 759) 
Yet, Pitt and Britzman, by insisting that the figure of trauma—so often employed to 
describe those disjunctive experiences which we perceive as obstacles confounding our 
best efforts to construct linear and coherent self-narratives—also stands as metaphor 
“for the pushes and pulls between knowing and being known, between phantasy and 
reality, between one’s early history of learning and one’s haunted present of learning, 
and between experience and its narration” (Pitt & Britzman, 2003, p. 769), gesture in 
the direction of moving beyond stuck identities towards new sorts of relations.  
In turning now to the opening sentences of William Taylor’s YA novel, Pebble in a 
Pool (2003), I do so in an attempt to provide a platform for a ‘thought experiment’ 
stimulated both by Sedgwick’s notion of reparative reading and Pitt and Britzman’s 
questions around difficult knowledge and its narration—not only “what it means to 
represent and narrate ‘difficult knowledge’” (Pitt & Britzman, 2003, p. 756), but also, 
perhaps, the ethical obligations in doing so. 
The Pebble in a Pool  
Toss a pebble into a pool of still water. Watch the ripples. Calculate the effect. 
Nothing much, I hear you say, just a few tiny waves and then all is still again. 
Well, think a bit harder. What if you were an amoeba living your single-cell life 
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in that puddle, busy in the middle of your process of dividing? What if you were 
some higher form of life, a water bug, whatever, and those ripples caught you in 
a frenzy of water bug mating? Not quite so inconsequential now, I think. The 
effect of that pebble tossed into the middle of that small, still pool—your 
home—might indeed be cataclysmic, catastrophic. At the very least, life-
changing. 
The problem in relating all this to my life of late is that I am not sure at all 
whether I am the pebble, the pool, or some denizen of that water. But I can’t 
think of any better way to open the story of my life as it has been lived over the 
course of last year. (Taylor, 2003, p. 1) 
Here, Paul Carter, the seventeen-year-old narrator and gay central character of Pebble 
in a Pool, begins the story of his final year at Everton High by intimating that his is 
‘difficult knowledge’—the type of knowledge, which because it “cannot be put in its 
proper place, . . . can return as a threat that divides” (Pitt & Britzman, 2003, p. 765). 
Indeed, rejection by his classmates and a hostile reaction from the Principal after 
speaking out against the gay-bashing and subsequent death of another queer student, 
ejection from the family home following an extremely violent beating at the hands of 
an abusive and fundamentalist father, and a precipitous entry into his first sexual 
relationship with Steve, “a very good-looking older dude” (Taylor, 2003, p. 20) would 
appear to suggest that Paul is not only ‘at risk,’ but the shamed victim of very difficult 
life circumstances. Yet, this is not the conclusion to which Pebble in a Pool directs us. 
By faithfully following the protocol of the text, it becomes possible to read what 
happens to Paul not as a tale about trauma and shame overwhelming a victimized 
human subject, nor as the story of a human agent battling and overcoming forces that 
conspire to bring him down, but as an exercise in how through “moments of disruption 
and recognition, a space opens up, inviting, without guarantee of success, resistance 
and creativity” (O’Donnell, 2017, p. 2). 
If becoming-other, in a Deleuzo-Guattarian sense, “entails a passage between 
categories, modes of existence and discrete entities such that stable elements are set in 
metamorphic disequilibrium” (Bogue, 2010, p. 9), then it is possible—from a 
minoritarian perspective and without making excessive claims for it—to take the 
beginning of Pebble in a Pool as a little lesson on the conditions for becoming-other. 
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The novel’s opening, in that it attends to Paul’s inability to locate himself as subject in 
what might be termed “but a unique instant of production in a continual flow of 
changes evident in the cosmos” (Stagoll, 2010, p. 26), underlines for readers that 
movement is the pre-existing “process of differentiation” (Grosz, 2011, p. 1), the 
dynamic that makes and unmakes things, bringing about what we call change. 
Therefore, as Elizabeth Grosz reminds us, to speak of human agency makes sense only 
in the wider context of “a series of imperceptible movements, modes of becoming, 
forms of change, and evolutionary transformations that make up natural, cultural, and 
political life” (Grosz, 2011, p. 1). On the one hand, if Paul, as character, doesn’t know 
where to position himself in relation to what he perceives as life-changing events—“I 
am not too sure at all whether I am the pebble, the pool, or some denizen of that water” 
(Taylor, 2003, p. 1)—on the other, as narrator, what he does have is an incipient 
awareness of “the conditions under which material and living things overcome 
themselves and become something other than what they were” (Grosz, 2011, p. 1). By 
directly addressing readers as ‘you,’ Paul not only invites us to participate in his own 
disorientation, initially by asking us to imagine ourselves as various features of the 
scene he lays out before us (pebble, pool, water, amoeba, water bug), but then by 
urging us to “think a bit harder” (Taylor, 2003, p. 1) about the possible range of impacts 
that a seemingly inconsequential action such as throwing a small stone into the pool 
might have on its inhabitants and beyond.  
The images that William Taylor has Paul present us with in this apparently simple 
scenario—of movement in and through water: ripples, tiny waves, stillness, frenzy; and 
of life forms dividing, mating, struggling for existence—suggest not only the fragility 
of pool life and its vulnerability as an assemblage to forces external to itself, but also its 
intricate and inextricable links with the cosmos. They also indicate the complexities and 
multiplicities of any assemblage conceptualized in relation to material flows and 
connectivity. Of course, in describing the pool and its inhabitants, Paul is setting the 
scene for the narrative which is about to unfold, his detailed account of the life-
changing events that he has experienced over the past year. But from a Deleuzian 
perspective, where “to talk, even about yourself, is always to take the place of someone 
else in whose place you’re claiming to speak and who’s been denied the right to speak” 
(Deleuze, 1995, p. 41), Paul’s words also mark a move towards the impersonal, a step 
in the direction of becoming-amoeba, becoming-water-bug, becoming-pebble, 
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becoming-pool, becoming-other, becoming-queer—as he inserts himself into the scene 
he describes.  
All readers attempt a similar process of insertion and suspension whenever they engage 
with fictional texts. For insofar as literary reading is understood as an attempt “to find 
creative ways to de-personalise the self as a way to intensify life in order to sense more 
and perceive more” (O’Donnell, 2017, p. 7)—that is, to become-other—it also suggests 
possibilities for resisting habitual ways of thinking and feeling that reinforce the 
damaging isolation and exclusion of shame. If, as we have seen, Spivak’s aesthetic 
education sets out to change habits of mind, it is a process that presumes a reader’s 
willingness to insert himself/herself “inside the text of the other, not as her/himself,” 
but in an effort to take on the voice of the other, that is, to “ventriloquize” (Spivak, 
2014, p. 31) the other. Spivak’s assertion that “the effort of reading is to taste the 
impossible status of being figured as object in the web of the other” (Spivak, 2012, p. 
317) suggests something both of the complexity and of the paradoxical nature of this 
task. Here, her stance is consistent with Deleuze’s claim that literary reading demands a 
sensitivity towards intensities and flows of desire that extend through and beyond the 
book itself. Both approaches to literary reading—Spivak’s and Deleuze’s—ultimately 
require an act of faith: faith, certainly, in the suspended relation to meaning and 
reference that operates within and through language, but faith, too, in choreographic 
ways of thinking as well as doing, which as we have seen are able to re-contextualize 
and re-frame ideas and bodies, unmooring them from stultifying habit and fruitless 
repetition.  
Some Concluding Remarks 
The ability to re-contextualize and re-frame as a means of countering the stale and the 
unproductive is especially helpful when addressing shame and its sisters. Given that 
Spivak’s aesthetic education is premised on the uncoercive rearrangement of desires 
and Deleuze theorizes desire as the force that supports the very conception of life and 
the production of the new, my contention is that both have a part to play in shaping 
“new ways of short-circuiting the seemingly near-inescapable habits of thought” 
(Sedgwick & Frank, 1995, p. 500) which establish and reinforce shame and other 
unproductive states.  
301 
 
Thus, mindful of the benefits claimed both for Pitt and Britzman’s problematizing of 
“issues of encountering the self through the otherness of knowledge” (Pitt & Britzman, 
2003, p. 755)—especially through narratives of trauma, including those with a sexual 
dimension—and for Sedgwick’s practice of reparative reading as a means of addressing 
shame ethically, epistemologically and affectively, I close this final chapter of my 
thesis by inviting sexuality educators to explore those theorizations of desire that not 
only emphasize desiring-production, but which also encourage a re-imagining of 
sexuality in choreographic terms.  
If the boldness of this invitation is provoked by “an optimism for opening new 
possibilities for ways of thinking and being” (Allen, 2018b, p. 29) in the field of 
sexuality education, it is inspired, as I indicated in my Preface, by Kathleen Quinlivan’s 
insistence on “the potentiality for a different, and better, kind of future” (Quinlivan, 
2014, p. 276)—that is, a queerer future where Spivak’s aesthetic education and 
Bersani’s choreographic treatment of sex in the modality of the aesthetic might play 
their part in keeping the door to the house of sexuality education open in the 
expectation that something wondrous might enter and disturb its inhabitants. Given, as 
Quinlivan observes, that young people involved in school-based queer straight alliances 
often willingly risk disappointment for the sake of something better, then sexuality 
educators must be prepared to do the same if sexuality education in Aotearoa New 
Zealand is to keep Muñoz’s “educated hope” (Chambers-Letson et al., 2019, p. ix)—as 
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